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Abstract  
 
This thesis investigates the capacity of the newly introduced Chinese Special 
Economic Zones in Africa (CSEZAs) to deliver ‘cooperation’ and ‘mutual 
development’ to China and Africa. Referring to existing scholarship on other forms 
of liberal spatial economics, it addresses the conceptual, methodological and 
theoretical void in which the subject of CSEZAs evolves in academia. As extensive 
global interactive processes are identified in the schema of the CSEZA, this thesis 
advocates Andre Gunder Frank’s Dependency Theory as the appropriate prism 
through which to explicate the new zone format. Empirical data about the seven 
CSEZAs outline the problematic and development-conducive aspects of the zone 
model. It is argued here that the failure to customise the SEZ model to the African 
context is what corrodes the developmental prospects of the CSEZAs. The Mauritius 
JinFei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone is taken as an example of a 
problematic CSEZA. A detailed analysis of the Mauritian case allows a visualisation 
of the respective role of China and the African state in the CSEZA context. As the 
exploitative and non-developmental nature of the CSEZA model (in its current 
form), is established, this thesis concludes that the CSEZA gives a new interpretation 
to the traditional practice of dependency. This new version, nonetheless, 
exacerbates the dialectic development-underdevelopment processes integral to the 
global capitalist economy. 
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Chapter 1 
Researching Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa: 
What, Why, and How? 
 
 
What are Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa? 
Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa (CSEZAs) are bounded areas of economic 
and commercial activities that the Chinese government officially started to build in 
selected African countries from the year 2006. These zones are bilateral ventures in 
which both the Chinese government and the respective African partner 
governments are supposed to cooperate equally in order to deliver mutual 
development. This mutual development refers to cash profits as well as social and 
environmental benefits to both parties. As Hu Jintao explained when talking about 
the objectives of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 2006, China seeks 
its own sustainable development, cultural dissemination and wants to secure 
international support by extending out projects such as the CSEZAs. Though any 
official corresponding speech African has not been transmitted to the public by Hu 
Jintao’s African counterparts on the this subject, the words of the Chinese President 
imply that his African partners have similar pursuits to China.  
Seven years since their official launch, and yet, the CSEZAs have not delivered 
any of the expected developmental goods. Neither have they initiated the first 
steps towards sustainable development, nor have they promoted cultural 
exchanges, or even created a strong base for Chinese-African collaboration, which 
could be used as leverage in international dealings. Instead, a survey conducted for 
the purpose of this thesis (the survey will be expanded in chapter 4) reveals that all 
the CSEZAs are facing difficulties. Most of these difficulties occur at the initial 
establishment stage of the zones. Because of these initial hindrances, four CSEZAs 
have not been able to attract more than a couple of investors.  The remaining three 
CSEZAs, which are already functional, are facing difficulties mainly in relation to 
their expansion, harmonious integration within the host country community, and in 
their abilities to match the development preferences of their respective host 
 3 
communities. As the commitment undertaken at FOCAC 2006 place high 
expectations upon the CSEZAs, the stagnation or fall of these projects become of 
diplomatic, political and economic pertinence. This thesis addresses the issues of 
diplomatic, political and economic pertinence surrounding the seven CSEZAs, and to 
this end, dissects the concept of a CSEZA itself.  
 
Chapter Statement 
The first chapter of this thesis explains why there is a need to research CSEZAs and 
how to proceed in doing so. It identifies CSEZAs as a newly concocted foreign policy 
instrument of China. It picks upon the lacunas and confusions in existing CSEZA 
literature—on its conceptualization, theorization, implementation, and success—
and selects the under-researched problematic aspects of CSEZAs. Accordingly, this 
chapter then formulates the problem statement which guides the research and 
analysis in this thesis.  ‘Global capitalist structure’, ‘cooperation’, and ‘mutual 
development’ are identified as the principal conceptual lenses through which the 
CSEZAs should be investigated. This is followed by a discussion of why the Chinese 
SEZ in Mauritius has been chosen as the illustrative case of the identified CSEZA 
problem. This chapter draws a list of specific research questions in order to 
establish the step-by-step progression of the investigation which will be undertaken 
in this thesis. Having established the framework and route to CSEZA research, this 
chapter discusses the methodology applied in this thesis. This section provides an 
understanding of the research formula, sources and questions which are used 
across the thesis. The challenges faced during the course of investigation for this 
thesis are also evoked. This chapter announces the structure of the thesis.  
 
Parameters of CSEZA performances 
‘Cooperation’ and ‘mutual development’ were the leitmotifs of FOCAC 2006. The 
two notions were heralded as the objectives as well as spirit of all the ventures 
proposed at the summit—and therefore, also of the CSEZAs. The emphasis that the 
Chinese president laid on these two terms and their synonyms throughout his 
speech drives in the idea that China wishes to highlight the give-and-take 
relationship expected from this partnership.  China will support and assist the 
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African countries but the effort must be reciprocated. Both parties are expected to 
derive equal benefits from the projects. One particular phrase from Hu Jintao’s 
speech puts across the message clearly:  ‘We both…are eager to benefit from each 
other’s practice in development’ (Jintao 2006).  
 The usage of these two terms in the context of the Chinese-African 
partnership echoes the diplomatic jargon employed by nations when negotiating an 
agreement. ‘Cooperation’ and ‘mutual benefit’ are terms which increase the 
chances of securing the participation of an envisaged partner in a deal. This is 
because both terms promise of a situation whereby the win-sets of each parties 
match, and are profitable to both. A zero-sum game is thereby created. However, if 
we view this situation through Robert Putnam’s lenses, the use of ‘cooperation’ and 
‘mutual development’ in this context may also be for in order to secure the 
ratification of either party’s domestic community—which is fundamental in this 
case since the Chinese stakeholders would be extensively using the public property 
of the host African states.   
As cooperation and the mutuality of development are put forward as the 
objectives of the CSEZAs, and are also used as the discourses which legitimise the 
existence of these zone projects, it is essential that this thesis measures the extent 
to which ‘cooperation’ and ‘mutual development’ occur in the unfolding of the 
CSEZAs. The two notions act as the ultimate parameters for an evaluation of the 
success, as well as, the validity of the CSEZAs.   
 
Conceptual Framework 
This thesis therefore needs to measure the CSEZAs through three conceptual 
frameworks: the overarching global capitalist structure under which these zones are 
evolving; the aura of cooperation in which these zones are meant to evolve; and the 
development they are meant to deliver to both parties.  
 
1. The Global Capitalist Structure 
The CSEZA is a global creation in the true sense. It involves two state actors (i.e. 
China and Africa), Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), Chinese private 
companies, other foreign investors and local African communities. Not only is it a 
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multi-dimensional entity, the CSEZA is a multi-levelled one too: it straddles 
international, national and local strata. Though as a sum of its parts, the CSEZA can 
itself claim to be a global emblem, it is nevertheless subject to the umbrella global 
structure which pushes the CSEZA to span all the hierarchies and dimensions that it 
does.  
The combination of a professedly socialist China practising visibly capitalist 
pursuits through a spatial entity whose propensity for exploitation exceed its 
ideological commitment to cooperation automatically evokes the question: why did 
China go through so much effort to seek cooperation and mutual development? The 
different answers to this question—be it Brautigam, Farole and Xiaoyang’s (2010) 
insinuations that these are China’s way of domestic restructuration, or Horta’s 
(2010) hypothesis that CSEZAs aim for access to African resources—all agree that 
China did so under the pressures and inducements of the global capitalist world 
structure.1   Until now, the structures and arrangements through which countries 
and companies meet these pressures and inducements have been predictable: by 
joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO), through foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and by outsourcing their production activities, among others. China is one 
country which has most creatively internalised these requirements of the global 
capitalist system, and tailored a mechanism for capitalist pursuits according to its 
own preferences. It is not the first time that China opted for a zone-form 
instrument to converse with the global capitalist structure. It is in a similar format, 
in the shape of the Special Economic Zone  (SEZ), that Xiaoping relented to global 
capitalist modes in the 1970s and opened China’s door to FDI.  
As the principles of free trade which dictate relationships amongst global 
entities across the world become appreciative of inequality, China takes advantage 
of this global ratification of inequalities and externalises the pressures for a 
competitive economic performance that is imposed by the global capitalist order. 
This externalisation of China’s capitalist pursuits takes the form of CSEZAs. The 
African host countries on their turn, willingly welcome these CSEZAs in order to 
ease their own pressures they face under global capitalism. 
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2. Cooperation 
Cooperation is the spirit, medium and objective of FOCAC. This platform of 
discussion between the Chinese government and its African counterparts was 
created with the aim of addressing specific problems facing developing countries.2  
The remedial essence to all those problems is combined under four pursuits (Zemin, 
2000): (i) ‘Strengthen solidarity and promote South-South cooperation’, (ii) 
‘Enhance dialogue and improve North-South relations’, (iii) ‘Take part in 
international affairs on basis of equality and in an enterprising spirit’, (iv) ‘Look 
forward into the future and establish a new long-term stable partnership of equality 
and mutual benefit.’ In the chase for these four pursuits, China committed to the 
realisation of eight projects in order ‘*t+o forge a new type of China-Africa strategic 
partnership and strengthen…cooperation’ at FOCAC 2006 (Jintao, 2006). The 
creation of CSEZAs was one of them. However, cooperation is not the only the 
objective of the establishment of CSEZAs. This sense of a fair sharing of 
responsibilities and risks also permeates into the implementation process of the 
CSEZAs. Hence, while deliberating the developmental credibility of the zone model, 
it should be kept in mind that China and Africa are meant to equally share the 
responsibilities, blames, as well as benefits derived from the CSEZAs. 
 
3. Development 
We therefore understand that mutual development of the Chinese and African 
partners is the outcome expected from CSEZAs.  However, until now, this objective 
has evaded the Chinese and African CSEZA partners. Although none of the parties 
have explicated anywhere what development means to them, the general academic 
understanding of the term indicates towards features such as: job creation, 
infrastructural upgrade, poverty alleviation, sustainable growth, more export 
income, female empowerment, technological improvements, amongst others 
(Seers, 1969).  China, with a GDP of USD 9.2 trillion in 2013, and Africa, whose 
highest registered GDP in 2013 is USD 350.6 billion, (The World Bank, 2013b) the 
CSEZA partners are negotiating for two different levels of development through one 
single zone. While China may wish to focus on generating more foreign exchange 
income through the exports in CSEZAs, and show little interest in job creation, for 
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the Chinese as well as for the local Africans, African partners will concentrate 
primarily on job creation in large numbers. Though the developmental goods 
sought by both are the same, the scale on which each of them expects that 
particular developmental outcome differs.  Interestingly, as will be revealed later in 
this thesis, the CSEZA, as per its structure, does have the capacity to reconcile and 
contain within itself the developmental expectations of both parties and deliver to 
each their respective requirements. This is why, logically, as per its structure and 
functions, the CSEZA proposes a potential model of development. However, the 
developmental value of this model can either be enhanced or comprised depending 
on the way its deployment mechanism is customised to its host context.  
 
China’s Going Global Strategy 
At FOCAC 2006, Hu Jintao committed to ‘*e+stablish three to five trade and 
economic cooperation zones in Africa in the next three years’ (Jintao, 2006).3  To 
date, seven pilot CSEZA ventures have been put up across five different African 
countries: one in Egypt, one in Ethiopia, one in Mauritius, two in Nigeria (in Lekki 
and Ogun), and two in Zambia (in Chambishi and Lusaka). Though FOCAC 2006 was 
where the CSEZAs’ status as an exercise of Chinese bilateral diplomacy towards 
selected African countries was confirmed, this official commitment to export zones 
to Africa was just a build up of efforts that China had perceptibly been considering 
from much earlier. The account of 2006 as China’s Year of Africa drawn by Taylor 
(2011) provides an insight into the preluding events whose partial culmination is the 
creation of the CSEZAs.  
China’s African policy paper was published in January 2006. Section IV of the 
paper stressed China’s economic commitment to Africa:  
China promised improved access to its markets, to increase Chinese 
investment in Africa, to make available increased financing for investment, to 
expand agricultural cooperation and to encourage Chinese construction 
endeavours in Africa as part of Chinese efforts to upgrade the continent’s 
infrastructure. Equally, the development of Africa’s natural resources will be 
actively promoted (Taylor, 2011, p. 66). 
 
This was followed by Li Zhaoxing’s (then the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs) 
diplomatic trip around the continent, also in January 2006. Soon afterwards, in April 
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2006, Jintao too visited three African countries. In November 2006, at the inaugural 
ceremony of the third FOCAC ministerial, Jintao committed to the realisation of 
eight projects in order to reinforce China–Africa cooperation. Along with the 
construction of the CSEZAs, (which ranked seventh on the list of cooperation 
projects), the remaining items on the list reveals that China had given a thorough 
thought to the planning of the entire mechanism which was to support the 
exportation of these zones. Item number three on the list, which alludes to the 
establishment of ‘a China-Africa development fund which will reach US$5 billion to 
encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa and provide support to them’ 
(Jintao, 2006) is evidence of this postulation. The latter endeavour was clearly in 
tandem with the CSEZA projects, as both the CSEZAs and the China-Africa 
Development Fund (CADFund) complement each other’s needs and objectives.  
As the CSEZAs unfold, other instances which reflect China’s well-organised 
foray into select African countries through an instrumentalisation of the CSEZAs 
come forth: the pervasive part played by Chinese SOEs in the CSEZAs; the way in 
which the plot of land relinquished by the host African country is managed; the 
strategies to which the Chinese parties resort to in order to make the most out of 
the African assets at their disposition, and so on. Simultaneously, the picture that 
emerges of the African host government is that of being comparatively disengaged 
and at the margins of this cooperation plan. A hands-off role in the monitoring of 
the zone’s progress; inadequate policy frameworks to regulate the activities of the 
CSEZAs; and poor negotiation terms are the features that best describe the African 
commitment to the CSEZAs. While this gap between the demeanours of the two 
partners results in China securing its share of ‘wins’ from this ‘win-win’ (ibid.) 
cooperation venture, the other half of the benefits which were to go to the host 
African country are yet to be delivered. 
It is clear from the above that CSEZAs are not the product of the sudden whim 
of the Chinese administration. Rather, it is a well thought-through method of 
deploying foreign engagement. It is supported by a well-oiled mechanism made up 
of existing as well as new governmental authorities, a history of cooperation with 
Africa, and Chinese experience at zone management. The resultant structural 
coherence and staunch policy substance of the CSEZAs is an added reason that 
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elicits its study. Transnational engagement with the aim of mutual development is a 
political manoeuvre that is not new to international affairs. It has been delivered in 
various forms. Bilateral trade, economic and political treaties, aid, technical 
assistance, and foreign direct investment, are the most popular means through 
which two countries can mutually satisfy some of their respective needs. The CSEZA 
surpasses these conventional methods and proposes a new way of transnational 
cooperation for mutual development—one whose central element is established 
spatial presence. Though there are cases (which may be contested)4 of countries 
whose governments have secured land in other countries in order to fuel their food 
security, the CSEZA is the first attempt at mutual development whereby a foreign 
government has committed to another government to develop a piece of land in 
the latter’s jurisdiction and also pledged to share all the costs and benefits that 
come with the project.  
A follow-up of Chinese economic affairs shows that the CSEZA is part of 
China’s evolutionary ‘going-global’ strategy; a strategy to whose realisation China 
applied concerted efforts after its integration WTO in 2001. Starting from the SEZs, 
which China launched domestically at the time of the Open Door policy, to its failed 
attempt at regional economic cooperation through the Suzhou Industrial Park5, 
China is now testing the probability of success of these zone forms when exported 
overseas. While the other methods of global integration that China uses are 
traditional ones applied by all countries across the globe (attracting FDI, use of 
cultural diplomacy, giving out aid and assistance, investing abroad through its 
SOEs), through the CSEZAs, China proposes a new model of developmental 
engagement to the world.  Looking at China’s splendid domestic experience with 
SEZs, CSEZAs promise success. And, if these zones succeed in delivering mutual 
development to the partners, the CSEZA would be a development model to be 
replicated by nations seeking to uplift their society and economy with limited 
inputs.   
 
Why Study CSEZAs? 
The coherence and strength of the CSEZA model in offering mutual development of 
stakeholders involved, and the known success of its original form in China—in the 
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shape of SEZs—make CSEZAs a development model to look out for.  However, the 
promise of this new development model can only be tapped to the maximum if 
policy-makers are able to understand, and consequently, replicate the procedural 
and structural particularities of this new concept. As mentioned earlier, CSEZAs 
derive its basic elements from the SEZ model which China implemented at home. 
However, along the way, as the Chinese economy evolved over the years, new 
partners and strategies of development joined China’s ‘going-global’ movement. 
The CSEZA is a composition of all those gradually evolving elements which today 
represents the alternativeness of China’s global integration mechanism.  In order to 
understand what the CSEZA is made of; whether it is similar or different from 
previous zone forms known to us; what are the macro policy framework required 
for its correct implementation, we need to gather a conceptual understanding of 
this construct. Then only will academics and policymakers be aware of the 
components they need to introduce in existing developmental programmes of 
countries so as to deliver the same goods and service that the CSEZA does. In case 
the CSEZA is diagnosed as having faults, again, a conceptual understanding of it 
would allow academics and technicians to identify the troublesome dynamics or 
deployment procedures that should be revised in order to make the CSEZA be able 
optimize the developmental output expected from it, hence making it a successful 
model of development. 
The CSEZA comes at a time when the world is economically and commercially 
integrated. Investments, production processes and market access are activities that 
cannot exist unless territorial boundaries of countries are transcended. However, 
these activities are important as they serve the main aim of countries, which is 
profit maximisation. As the CSEZA format and its stated purpose of ‘mutual 
development’ (hence, shared profit) also transcend territorial boundaries, this 
thesis researches the theoretical bearings of this microcosm of general global 
capitalist behaviour.  What does the advent of the CSEZA imply? How does it fit the 
global state of affairs? What new understanding of international economic relations 
does the CSEZA impart? This is important, because any newcomer to the global 
scene needs to be assessed for its capacity to contribute—positively or negatively—
to the existing economic scenario. This will allow not only an understanding of its 
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purpose, but the nature of its impact can also be anticipated, and if required, 
mitigated.  
Publications by international organisations and research bodies describing 
and appraising the seven CSEZAs make one common observation: the difficulties 
faced by these zones and the controversies that surround them are starting to 
define their identity. CSEZAs are being equated to exploitation. Surprisingly, the 
recommendations that critics offer for an improvement of this situation altogether 
ignore the responsibility sharing that should follow from the ‘mutuality’ agreed 
upon between China and Africa. Critics choose to concentrate uniquely on the 
responsibility of the host African country. This bias at the expense of the receiving 
African country and the CSEZA implementation process (which occurs under the 
aegis of the African host country) imperatively needs to be complemented by an 
assessment of the role of the patron country and of the CSEZA initiation process 
which takes place in China. This thesis seeks to strike the balance in an assessment 
of the respective Chinese and African endeavours and responsibility in regard to the 
CSEZAs.  
 
Failures in Past Analyses 
Seven years since the official introduction of the CSEZA, this new arrangement of 
bilateral economic and trade cooperation has hardly garnered any appreciation. On 
the contrary, the seven pilot ventures have been marred with controversies 
regarding their lack of success in delivering developmental outcomes; their 
exploitative streak; and their arbitrary functioning.  Since it is a relatively new 
concept, and that most of the zones have not properly taken-off yet, only a small 
number of studies have been carried out on CSEZAs. These few publications have 
been conducted by agencies such as the World Bank (WB) and the South African 
Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). While research led by WB focuses on the 
process that goes behind the setting-up of the CSEZAs and weighs the merits and 
faults of the seven zones, papers published by SAIIA have mostly been descriptive 
case-specific studies about the particularities, progress and problems of individual 
CSEZAs. No academic publication has, as yet, either: (i) attempted a deconstruction 
of the concept of the CSEZA, or (ii) delved into a combined understanding of the 
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merits and faults of the CSEZA as a model and assessed its credibility as a venture 
when it is deployed onto the African soil.  
Such a synchronised study would permit both an identification of the 
theoretical and conceptual idiosyncrasies of CSEZA notion itself and, a practical 
diagnosis of the actual difficulties identified at ground level when implementing 
these zones. By so doing, it would allow us to extract a series of technical policy 
observations from which adequate notional alterations could be made to the model 
before it is exported to the African context. It would also allow for a customisation 
of the model to the specific context of each African host country. Thus, it is when 
armed with both a conceptualised understanding of the thinking behind the CSEZA 
and a knowledge of the shape that the CSEZA logic produces when given tangible 
form on a plot of land in an African country that researchers can attain a 
comprehensive understanding of CSEZAs. Meanwhile, the ignorance prevalent 
regarding these two dynamics of the CSEZA is costing Chinese developers their 
goodwill among the host African and international communities, and costing the 
host African countries their already strained capital, resources and assets, as well as 
their domestic political capital.  
A treatment of CSEZAs studies into “theory only” and “case-study only” 
researches causes scholars to miss out on nuances that are fundamental to an 
understanding of CSEZA’s potential. For example, despite acknowledging the link 
shared by China’s own SEZs with its recently concocted CSEZAs, researchers do not 
explore the conceptual association between the two entities. Pioneers of CSEZA 
research, Brautigam and Xiaoyang (in Farole and Akinci, 2011, p. 70) mention the 
common patronage of SEZs and CSEZAs but do not consider the probability that this 
commonality might extend to other functions, features and objectives of the two 
zone forms. This is despite the fact that, on several occasions, the Chinese 
government has confirmed that it is seeking to replicate its own SEZ experience 
through the CSEZAs. Therefore, as China duplicates its SEZs in Africa, it is implied 
that the developmental goals to be delivered by the CSEZAs are the same as what 
the SEZs deliver at home, in China. But as Guo (2011a) underlines, quick 
development and employment (which are objectives that African countries seek 
from the CSEZAs) are not amongst the goals that SEZs prioritised in China. 
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Therefore, the question that arises is: are the developmental goods that are 
currently being delivered by this revamped version of the SEZ indeed of the same 
nature that Africa aspires for itself? If not, how can the CSEZAs be modified to 
match the needs of its host African counties? The disjuncture between the SEZ and 
the CSEZA established by academics blurs out such crucial considerations which 
should have been at the forefront of CSEZA studies.  
Studies that do concede that CSEZA’s roots lie in the idea of the SEZ read the 
SEZ as not being an exclusively Chinese practice. World Bank scholars such as Farole 
often adopt this position (The World Bank, 2011, p. 27-31). According to them, 
CSEZA’s association to the SEZ has nothing to do with their common Chinese roots, 
but with the fact that the SEZ is a form of zone which functions under similar 
conditions and has characteristics which can be found in the CSEZA. World Bank 
publications by authors such as Farole dismiss the Chinese proprietorship of the 
concept of SEZ so much so that they use the term ‘SEZ’ to denote any other spatial 
format of liberal economics (ibid).6 As they use Export Processing Zones (EPZs), 
SEZs, Free Zones, freeports and other terms interchangeably, academics, such as 
Farole, obscure the specifically Chinese features that the SEZ concept assimilated 
upon its launch by Deng Xiaoping in 1970. It was devised as China’s own version of 
zonal economics. The primacy of foreign direct investment (FDI) as the ‘means’ as 
well as the ‘end’ of the SEZ; the nature of the actors involved; the constant 
modification in reforms required by the model; its preferred forms of investment; 
its phase-style development; and the central role of land in the entire scenario, all 
these features and practices which are exclusive to China’s customised version of 
liberal zone economics, are rendered inconsequential. 
This interchangeability of the terms EPZ, SEZ and CSEZA by WB researchers is 
replicated in their choice of methodology when assessing the CSEZA. The variables 
they take into account when measuring the success of these zones largely compose 
of foreign exchange income through export earnings, creation of employment, 
technology-transfer, transfer of skills and know-how, FDI, and forward and 
backward linkages into the local economy (Farole, 2011, p. 62-86; Ancharaz and 
Nowbutsingz, 2011, p. 12). The focus is on measurable domestic economic 
indicators located in the host country. However, this methodology does not allow a 
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comprehensive measurement of the CSEZA’s merits. This is because the presence of 
international actors such as the Chinese government, the Chinese private sector, 
and foreign investors from across the world who settle within these CSEZAs—all 
integral to the existence of the CSEZAs—are kept out of the equation. Intervening 
global pressures such as the end of trade preferences, which act as extraneous 
variables impacting directly upon these domestically based foreign zones are also 
ignored. Moreover, the conventional zone-measurement formula restricted only to 
an assessment of economic exchanges received by the domestic context is 
inappropriate for the CSEZAs whose principal objective is mutual development. The 
mutuality of gains is disregarded as the focus is set on measuring the deliverables in 
Africa only. The benefits acquired by China are not investigated. This is despite the 
fact that Africa and China are bound to share all the developmental outcomes—be 
it of economic, social, political or environmental nature. Therefore, the CSEZA 
requires a methodology which gives equal attention to non-economic exchanges 
among strata beyond the host African territory.    
As researchers avoid conducting a conglomerate examination of the CSEZAS, 
in spite of having a collection of individual analyses of the seven CSEZAs at hand, 
they are predisposed to blame the African host countries for most of the drawbacks 
faced by the projects.  Instead of applying the identified problems across the seven 
CSEZAs to an investigation of the patterns which may indicate the shortcomings 
internal to the CSEZA concept, stagnant or failing CSEZAs are prematurely 
concluded to be the results of the subjective failures of African host countries, who 
are apparently not able to adequately implement the model of development 
offered by China (Brautigam and Xiaoyang, 2011 p. 95).  Appraisals only 
communicate what are the modifications required at the host country environment 
level and specific recommendations are made to improve the support framework 
that the host African countries put in place to conform to the CSEZA requirements. 
Where suggestions for improvement are directed to the Chinese party, these 
recommendations are solely directed to the zone developers and can only be 
implemented in conjunction with efforts from the host African government (The 
World Bank, 2011, p. 81-84). The Chinese side is neither given any independent 
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remedial responsibility for the lacunas in the zone ventures, nor is China’s CSEZA 
concept and its possibly subversive essence questioned.  
This susceptibility for CSEZA studies to concentrate more on what went wrong 
in the implementation on the African side—instead of simultaneously taking notice 
of the shortcomings in the Chinese model and considering the need to contextualise 
the basic attributes of the model to the particular African cases—prompts 
researchers such as Auty (2011, p. 222), Brautigam, Farole and Xiaoyang  (2010, p. 
5) to conclude that the host African countries uninhibitedly grant concessions to the 
Chinese zone developer, even at the expense of their national benefit. As this belief 
spreads, a strong sense of dislike of the CSEZAs is installed among the local African 
communities. National African governments are pointed out for striking a poor deal 
and China is viewed as exploitative. As a result, the political goodwill of the host 
African governments gets compromised vis-à-vis their own people. This also 
prevents the host African governments from considering a re-negotiation of the 
CSEZA deal since detractors would publicise it as yet another concession. 
Consequently, the prospect of the CSEZA is placed at stake. The threat that these 
proliferating believes place on the CSEZAs’ future make us question the extent to 
which researchers’ observations about the concessionary nature of the deal stand 
true across the five host African countries. By inflating the discourse about 
concessions, researchers such as Auty, Brautigam and Xiaoyang, may be diverting 
attention from the more exploitative mechanisms of the CSEZAs. 
Another shortcoming in previous works on CSEZAs is the lack of significance 
granted to the study of the different nature of the actors involved in the CSEZAs. 
Although the role of the Chinese government is evoked through the references 
made to the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the part played by the Chinese 
private investors is also brought up, academics do not read more into the nature of 
these actors. While Brautigam and Xiaoyang, (2011) do provide an in-depth 
description of the involvement of China’s MOFCOM and its sub-bodies in tendering 
and financing the CSEZAs, their recognition of the engagement of the Chinese 
government within the zone venture terminate at that. MOFCOM’s role is taken at 
face value and its nature as a governmental actor is presumed to have no 
theoretical bearing. Similarly, the CSEZA developing companies are merely treated 
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in relation to their role as the zone developers. The fact that they are SOEs or 
private companies is not given any importance. In the same breath, researchers also 
side-line the impacted local African communities who do not have a purposeful 
structural presence in the CSEZA scenarios. Their integral role to the notion of the 
CSEZA is ignored merely because these local communities are symbolic entities of a 
certain ‘type’ of problem that is generated from under the concept.  The local 
African communities who have been affected are not reducible to a recurrent 
structural identity whose intervention can be consistently measured and analysed. 
Thus, as researchers focus more on the names rather than on the nature of the 
actors, they distance themselves from a systematic understanding of CSEZAs. This 
prevents them from clearly determining whether ‘structure’ or ‘agency’ dominates 
the concept. The lack of clarity on the nature of the concept translates itself into a 
similar confusion regarding the theory suitable for the study of the CSEZAs. This 
therefore explains the absence of any theoretical work on CSEZAs. 
Academics who write about China’s relations with Africa mostly classify 
CSEZAs as mechanisms for China to secure natural resources, goodwill (Horta, 
2010), allow restructuration at home, and gain market access (Brautigam, Farole 
and Xiaoyang, 2010). World Bank emphasises that one of the motives of these 
zones is to overcome the trade barriers that Europe and America have set against 
Chinese exports (ibid. p. 2). Another explanation stipulated is the profit-motive 
behind this zone: 
[D]espite the substantial government incentives, the Chinese zones in Africa 
are profit-driven initiatives, led by private sector consortia (although many of 
the lead firms are national or provincial state-owned enterprises). The 
Chinese government designed the program to ensure that developers have a 
profit motive because they view this as critical to ensure sustainability (ibid. p. 
3). 
 
Hence, it is assumed that CSEZAs are either a neorealist exercise of balance of 
power or are founded on neoliberal grounds of competitive trade.  Although both 
theories provide broad understandings of contemporary Chinese activities in the 
developing world and shed light on the policies regulating the activities internal to 
these zones, they fail to explain why CSEZAs are constructed in the way they are in 
the first place, i.e. as bilateral transnational spaces. What does the adoption of this 
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new transnational spatial approach to profit making or access to resources imply for 
the parties involved, and for the rest of the world? The unusually complex set of 
actors engaged in the construction of CSEZAs; the presence of unstructured 
elements such as local communities; the front-bencher role assumed by private 
developers; interactions between actors of different nature and with different 
pursuits; the ad hoc intervention of an unpredicted elements such as the personal 
ambitions of the zone developers and their elite African partners, challenge the 
ability of structural theories to provide a comprehensive understanding of what the 
implications of CSEZAs are. The only certainty exuded from the CSEZA composition 
and deployment, which indicates towards a preference for a certain type of 
theoretical perspective, is the unevenness of the benefits it generates and 
distributes. The respective output received by the Chinese and African partners is 
disproportionate to the input they each invest in the CSEZAs.   Moreover, instead of 
a relationship of equals, the two sets of actors, from China and from the host 
African country, interact as superior and subordinate. It therefore appears that 
CSEZAs are trickle-down projections of systemic global appropriation activities 
which is characteristic of the current global capitalist system which endorses 
hierarchies. The topic should therefore be considered from a paradigm which posits 
that political and economic activities, entities and occurrences, represent a pre-
determined hierarchical structure inherent to capitalism.  
 
Problem Statement 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria and Zambia currently face problems regarding 
their respective CSEZAs. While some have stagnated before even completing the 
first phase of construction, others are trying to impinge upon the assets of the host 
African countries, and are being resisted either by the African government or the 
local populace. World Bank’s recommendations do not appear to have made much 
of a difference in improving the situation of these zones. This is because, as 
mentioned earlier, the WB’s suggestions for improvement singularly address the 
African administrations, when in fact the onus to make any impactful change rests 
with both Chinese and African partners in conjunction. The World Bank ignores that 
China and the host African countries disregard the ‘mutual cooperation’ and 
 18 
‘partnership’ rhetoric and connect through a hierarchy of authority and 
subordination, where China is the benefactor and Africa is the beneficiary. In that 
respect, Africa’s ability to shape its own regulatory environment in order to extract 
the maximum out of the CSEZA can only be effective if the goods that the CSEZA 
model is to deliver matches the priorities of Africa. If the modality of the CSEZA 
model itself is not designed to deliver what Africa seeks, a modification of the 
African policy and business environment to make it more conducive to the CSEZA 
model is pointless. In order to overcome these difficulties, both China and the host 
African countries should each agree on a customisation of the model according to 
the priorities and the existing situation of the host country. Presently, no step has 
been taken towards such a re-contextualisation. China lies low on this front since 
the Chinese zone developers are already garnering benefits from the CSEZA deal by 
implementing lucrative adjacent business strategies. However, the African 
countries, which are the most in need of successful CSEZAs, are hesitant to push for 
re-negotiations for various reasons. They are keener to modify their policy 
environment in the hope of, and as an attempt to, redeem the project. As the host 
African governments are tardy in extracting benefits from this cooperative 
agreement, they reinforce their own subordination to China.  
Following from the willing submission of the African governments to China’s 
creative venture of externalised self-development, the subordinate segments 
internal to the African countries, on their turn, get expropriated of the surplus value 
they create, by their own superior nationals. This thesis uses the case of Mauritius 
to illustrate how this process of exploitation and subordination happens in the 
CSEZAs. Through a study of the impact of the Mauritian Chinese SEZ project and an 
identification of the strategies and methods deployed by both Chinese and African 
sides, this work demonstrates how the CSEZA model is denunciative of a new 
version of dependency relations: one whereby even without a direct hierarchical 
confrontation among nations and their sub-layers, a diffusion of diplomatically-
ratified economic spaces abroad can act as agents of dialectic processes of 
development and underdevelopment. 
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Case Study  
The choice of the Mauritian CSEZA, the Jin Fei Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Zone (JFET) as the case study for this thesis is not arbitrary. The Mauritian example 
has been chosen principally because of its prototypical experience of being a 
problematic CSEZA. Although Mauritius has the most favourable business 
environment of the five CSEZA host countries, surprisingly the Mauritian Chinese 
SEZ has failed to a greater degree than the rest of the zones. The experience of JFET 
presents us with the worst-case scenario. Since its introduction, the Mauritian 
Chinese SEZ has been marked by a variety of difficulties, each of a different nature 
and whose respective responsibility is attributable to a distinct actor or practice. 
Therefore, as a vast collection of conceivable CSEZA-related problems are present in 
the Mauritian case study, an assessment of this particular zone acts as a guideline 
to caution against the difficulties the other six CSEZAs are facing or are likely to face.  
The example of Mauritius is moreover engaging because of the island’s 
previous resounding success with the EPZ. Not only does Mauritius’s previous 
familiarity with the EPZ practice puts its Chinese SEZ experience into perspective, 
but it also helps in dispersing beliefs of the conceptual homogeneity of the EPZ and 
CSEZA. Introduced in 1970 with the aim to create jobs for the rising unemployment 
in Mauritius, for over the next two decades (i.e. 1970s-1990s), the number of 
enterprises in the Mauritian EPZ grew from ten to 568, and the number of jobs 
created plummeted from 644 to 89,906 (Burn, 1996, p. 45). It is in anticipation of 
similar results that Mauritius initially welcomed the Chinese SEZ. In fact, it was one 
of the popular discourses under which the JFET project was promoted in Mauritius. 
Invocations of the EPZ appear in arguments presented in defence of the CSEZA 
venture by the then Minister of Finance and Economic Empowerment (MOFEE), 
Rama Sithanen:7 
[W]e said very clearly that the main objective of the economic and trade zone 
is to export to Africa and elsewhere…Even for textile and garments, there is 
no import duty and there are no other taxes. There is nothing new that we are 
giving to Tianli [the zone] with respect to the exports that they carry out from 
Mauritius. The same facilities are given to the EPZ today. The EPZ does not 
pay any import duty and the EPZ is reimbursed its VAT… (Mauritius, 
Parliament. 2008, 10 June). 
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Nonetheless, this is where the EPZ’s similarity with the CSEZA ends. As compared to 
the total shareholding absence of Mauritian parties from JFET, Kothari and 
Nababsing (1996, p. 133) note that ‘local capital must have been over 50% of total 
equity investment in certain time’ in the Mauritian EPZ. Moreover, Mauritius had 
customised the EPZ model to suit its own geography. In Mauritius, the EPZ is a 
‘status’ rather than a zone. Companies located anywhere on the island could 
subscribe to be an EPZ enterprise rather than having to settle within a territorial 
boundary. This was profitable to Mauritius as it allowed a distribution of 
employment opportunities across the island, incurred lesser investment in support 
infrastructure and, more enterprises could join the practice compared to what a 
zone space would have been able to contain. But even with all these advantages, the 
Mauritian EPZ could not sustain a profitable growth beyond the year 2000. An 
African Development Bank/Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development report (AFDB/OECD) (2003, p. 206) shares that, from an average of six 
per cent growth recorded upto the year 2000, the EPZ growth rate in Mauritius was 
reduced to four per cent in 2001. Currently, numerous Mauritian EPZ factories are 
relocating to Madagascar, with the intention of outsourcing production to a less 
expensive pool of labour and move closer to raw materials such as cotton. Between 
2002 and 2012, 398 export enterprises had closed down and 35, 772 jobs were loss 
(L’Observatoire de L’industrie, 2012). If the EPZ could not generate developmental 
outcomes for more than two decades in spite of the advantages it had in 
comparison to the Mauritian Chinese SEZ, chances of the latter delivering substantial 
development appear slim.   
 
Research Questions 
Now that we are aware of the problems which the CSEZAs face and know which 
actors and actions that need to be studied in order to understand how and why 
these problems come about, we can formulate the key research questions which 
would drive this thesis. These questions will guide the investigation and eventually 
assist in establishing whether CSEZAs bring development or not. 
The pivotal question in this study is regarding which theory best explains the 
nature and logic behind the various interactions in CSEZAs. Which theory explains 
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the impact that the CSEZA has on its internal as well as external components? The 
second question is regarding the method to be used in an evaluation of the CSEZAs. 
Is the CSEZA’s research methodology similar to that of the EPZ and SEZ or does it 
require the creation of a new methodological formula? As we move to a ground 
investigation of CSEZAs, there is a need to probe into why some CSEZAs are more 
successful than others.  The next question seeks to explain how the events and 
actors connected to JFET justify the stagnation of the project. Following this, we 
investigate whether JFET has really contributed Mauritian development, or has it 
had the contrary impact. The last question, which enables us to draw 
generalizations out of the specificities of the case of JFET, pertains to the 
contribution of the Mauritian case study to the chosen theoretical perspective. 
 
Methodology 
This thesis treats only one case study in profound detail—that of the Mauritian 
CSEZA. A single case study approach has been selected only after having conducted 
a researched overview of all the seven CSEZAs. After a survey of the characteristics, 
status and problems faced by the seven zones, the Mauritian CSEZA stood out as 
the most promising, yet least developed zone. The difficulties of diverse nature 
faced by the JinFei zone is the reason why Mauritius is the ideal case to be studied 
in depth in order to understand the complexities of the new CSEZA notion in one 
go. The JinFei zone singularly faces problems akin to those faced by the remaining 
six zones altogether. Therefore, the single case study focus is justified as it has been 
selected only after a comparative study of all seven zones. The preliminary 
comparative review of the seven zones is represented in Table 3.1.  
This thesis uses both qualitative and quantitative methods The quantitative 
information is sourced from various governmental authorities in Mauritius: Central 
Statistics Office (CSO), Registrar of Companies, Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development (MOFED), National Audit Bureau, among others. While some of these 
statistics were available on their online databases, a number of them could only be 
accessed at their office sites. The qualitative information gathered for this thesis 
too come from diverse sources: official record papers filed at the Registrar of 
Companies, Registrar General’s office, reports from non-profit organisations, 
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recorded parliamentary debates, documents which certain parties related to the 
project initially posted online, secondary literature, and from interviews conducted 
during fieldwork in China and Mauritius.  
Thirty-six interviews were conducted with people knowledgeable about the 
CSEZAs. These were ambassadors and diplomats of the CSEZAs host African 
countries based in Beijing; academics who have researched the subject; 
government officers in China and Mauritius who have been involved in the 
negotiations of the zones; members of the civil society whom these zone projects 
have impacted; social activists who follow the development of the zones, among 
others.  The principal reason why I chose this particular selection of interviewees is 
because altogether, the intervention of each enable to crosscheck the information 
provided by the other. This is possible with this sample of interviewees as each of 
the stakeholders hold different positions in this scenario: we have the zone 
initiators from either of the governments, the promoters, the implementers, the 
affected communities, and those who have analysed the situation. The interviewees 
altogether provide a complete picture of the situation.  
The interviews were mostly made up of open-ended questions. The choice of 
open-ended questions is for two reasons: firstly, I had already collected the 
technical and precise information from official records aforehand and therefore, I 
already had the answers to the possible close-ended questions (such as, who are 
the stakeholders of the projects). The few closed questions that I asked were in 
order to crosscheck the technical information previously collected. Secondly, open-
ended questions allowed me to address my research objective in a better way—
namely whether CSEZAs bring development or not. By keeping my questions open, I 
gave the opportunity to my respondents to talk in narrative formats. This allowed 
me to establish a coherent understanding of the logic behind the CSEZAs: how they 
evolved, what the objectives of these zones are, and so on.  
The data evoked in this work has been gathered over a period of two and a 
half years (October 2010 to May 2013) through fieldwork in both Mauritius and 
China. I started collecting my data in Mauritius whereby I consulted the official 
registration papers of all the companies related to JFET.  These papers provided me 
with all the company registration details, contact details and financial information 
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of the various parties linked to the CSEZ project. I thereafter contacted the parties 
present in Mauritius, with requests for interviews.   
The Chinese representatives of the project refused to be interviewed—except 
for one officer who provided off-record information.  As for the concerned 
Mauritian parties, while non-governmental bodies such as the Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce and the Joint Economic Council were willing to interact with me, 
government authorities were reticent to grant me an interview. In the wait for an 
interview of the Mauritian governmental bodies, I intercepted the social activists 
and the farmers.  Eventually, the Board of Investment, Mauritius, (BOI) agreed to 
talk about JFET. However, I received minimal information from the BOI. The 
reticence of Mauritians to talk about the project took me to China for over one 
month—to find the other side of the story. 
The interviews I carried out in China were composed mostly of open-ended 
questions which sought information about the objectives of the CSEZAs and about 
JFET especially. My questions pertained to the status of JFET, the vision behind the 
CSEZA demarche, the procedural evolution of a CSEZA project, and so on. However, 
I was only able to get information from the governmental authorities based in 
Beijing. My fieldwork in Shanxi, Taiyuan (the patron province of JFET) was not 
fruitful since the stakeholders refused to grant interviews.  
I went back to Mauritius after my fieldwork in China, equipped with new 
information which would allow me to push for clarifications with the governmental 
authorities who had earlier denied me information and those who had provided me 
with information inconsistent with the Chinese version received in China. Since the 
version of events provided to me by the Chinese stakeholders clashed with the 
BOI’s version, I requested for an interview again in order to get a more coherent 
understanding of the project. This time, the BOI was more informative, accepted 
the correctness of the information collected from China but gave mostly off-record 
information. Some senior officials from other Mauritian governmental bodies also 
gave off-record information in which they indicated that the JinFei project has been 
mismanaged.  Between October 2010 to September 2013, I visited Mauritius four 
times. During each of my visits, I ran follow-up interviews with the various 
stakeholders. I also visited the JFET site to inspect the latest developments each 
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time.  
I encountered various challenges during my fieldwork. Some of the Mauritian 
governmental stakeholders were hostile. Others provided me with information 
which proved to be wrong when crosschecked. During my research journey, I was 
also interviewed by the local Mauritian press, which has been trying to understand 
what was going on in JFET. Upon my revelation of the JFET-CT Power connection in 
the Mauritian press in early 2013, I received threats and legal notices from the CT 
Power project promoters. The promoters requested the Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of St Andrews to invalidate my degree. On my last visit to the JFET site in 
late May 2013, I was threatened by the Director of JFET who objected to my 
publications about the JFET project and my presence on the site.   
 
Structure of Thesis 
Chapter 1 addresses the basics of this thesis. It clarifies the specific subject of 
investigation and its problem. It explains how this thesis is going to investigate the 
problem and through which methods. It sets the parameters against which the 
current activities of CSEZAs need to be measured so as to have accurate knowledge 
of their impact.  Chapter 1 furthermore explains why is it essential to study CSEZAs 
and how past analyses have failed to probe in the crucial aspects of this new zone 
form.  The choice of Mauritius as a case study is also explained.   
Chapter 2 explores of the theoretical affiliation of CSEZAs. It starts by discussing 
existing China-Africa literature which deal with concerns connected to CSEZAs. It 
then moves on to identify three rationales which support the need to study CSEZAs. 
These are: the decline of the United States of America (US) versus China’s ascent, 
the failure of multilateralism in bringing development versus the success of new 
spatial formations in doing the same, and the failure of Bretton Woods’ 
homogenous neoliberalism versus China’s customised approach. In fact, these three 
sets of dualities evoke to a single common reality: the existing competition between 
two distinct approaches of international engagement—one led by Western actors 
and the other led by China. This confrontation finds renewed substance with the 
advent of the CSEZA which proposes an alternative to traditional approaches of 
international engagement pioneered by the West. The two approaches are named 
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as the Spatial Infusion Approach of the West and the Spatial Diffusion Approach of 
China. As we recognise the alternativeness of the Chinese approach under CSEZAs, 
Chapter 2 dissects the CSEZA to understand its composition and internal dynamics. 
It also seeks to understand how CSEZAs fit into the existing global system: how do 
these zones relate to the rest of the world? This chapter reaches an understanding 
that the alternating relations of domination and subordination making up the 
CSEZAs call for the application of Andre Gunder Frank’s Dependency perspective as 
the appropriate theoretical lenses. Realist, liberal and constructivist readings of the 
CSEZA are deliberated but proven to be unsuitable. The appropriateness of the 
Dependency Theory is elaborated upon in a thorough portrayal of the fundamentals 
of the theory and how these fundamentals still hold contemporary relevance due to 
Dependency Theory’s ability to assimilate modifications while still keeping its basic 
beliefs intact.  The CSEZA is presented as a new symbol of dependency. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the methods to study CSEZAs. It establishes that the SEZ is 
substantially different from the EPZ and deserves an independent identity. But 
unfortunately, scholars do not extend this individualism of the SEZ by drawing a 
differed methodology for it. The merits and success of the SEZ is still measured 
according to the formula applied to the EPZ. It is understood that unlike EPZs whose 
focus is mostly domestic, the SEZ involves international dynamics since it deals with 
international trade and competitiveness pressures and a diversity of FDI push-pull 
factors which are the cause for foreign investors’ engagement with China’s SEZs. 
While a differed methodology for SEZs is not of priority concern, the inheritance of 
the same methodology by the CSEZA concept is problematic. In CSEZAs, exchanges 
occur in the international, national as well as local realm. To this end, a new 
methodology is suggested for the study of the CSEZA. 
Chapter 4 gives an overview of the seven CSEZAs and brings to light the 
problematic nature of each of these projects. It starts by explaining the 
establishment process of the CSEZA. This is followed by a detailed description of 
each of the seven CSEZAs.. As these descriptions allow for a comparative analysis of 
the seven cases, the commonalities between the relatively more successful and less 
successful CSEZAs are identified. This chapter derives three preconditions for 
successful CSEZAs. These pre-requirements are: (i) the involvement of Chinese SOEs 
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as the majority partner in a joint venture with the host African government, (ii) the 
Chinese SOEs acting as the CSEZA promoter must have previous experience in SEZ 
management, and (iii) the Chinese SOEs acting as the CSEZA promoter should be 
specialist of the activity or product which will feature majorly in the CSEZA. This 
leads to a classification of the presence of SOEs as one of the problematic aspects of 
CSEZAs. The second problematic dynamic of the CSEZAs is ‘land’ which, can be 
easily mismanaged to the detriment of the zone ventures.  This chapter thereafter 
argues that since these two problematic components are actually integral 
components of SEZs in China, it is the failure to contextualise the CSEZAs according 
to the needs and capacity of the host African country that causes the problem. The 
blame for this failure to contextualise is attributed to both Chinese and African host 
governments.  This chapter assesses the role of each of them in the CSEZA process.  
In conclusion, chapter 4 contemplates the possibility of redeeming these 
problematic CSEZAs.  
 Chapter 5 presents the Mauritian case study. It gives a background of the 
Mauritian economy and explains why the Mauritian Chinese SEZ project is the 
worst-case scenario. It identifies five sets of additional projects, entities and 
companies whose activities should be studied along with the deployment of JFET. 
These five sets of projects, entities and companies are thereafter sub-divided into 
two sections, depending on whether they impact the development or cost aspect of 
JFET. After an individual introduction of each of these complementary projects, 
entities and companies, this chapter provides a comprehensive timeline of the 
unfolding of JFET.. The chapter ends by confirming the deadlocked status of the 
Mauritian Chinese SEZ.  
Chapter 6 confers the responsibility of JFET’s failure to seven strategies 
deployed by the Chinese and the Mauritians. The impact of these strategies—and 
thus of JFET—on Mauritius is contemplated. This chapter focuses specifically on the 
impact JFET has on the two national aspects of the African host government which 
the CSEZA concept was designed to improve: the national development objectives 
and key assets of the host country. The Mauritian national development objectives 
gauged in this chapter are: backward linkages, employment creation and creation of 
foreign exchange income. As a quantification of the excess public funds that went 
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into the CSEZA project is already provided in chapter 5, the key asset subject to 
evaluation in this section is land.. A survey of both assessment frameworks confirm 
that CSEZAs are essentially expropriating entities whose impingement is only aided 
by the mismanagement of unperceptive African policymakers.  
Chapter 7 gives a theoretical rendition of the Mauritian Chinese SEZ 
experience. It deliberates the respective metropolis and satellite status of China and 
Africa, and contemplates whether CSEZAs truly reflect exercises of Dependency 
Theory prescribed by Frank. In the quest to confirm or reject this supposition, 
Chapter 7 investigates the nature of the relationship shared by China and Mauritius.   
As it receives confirmation that China and Mauritius connect in capacity of 
metropolis and satellite in most of their exchanges, this chapter moves on to see 
how JFET plays out the dependency equation anticipated by Frank.  We find that 
though JFET contains all dynamics of dependency prescribed by Frank, it exercises 
these relations of domination and subordination in a unique way. This is the case of 
all the CSEZAs.  This chapter terms the ways of the CSEZAs as being a new 
manifestation of dependency. It compares this new manifestation of dependency to 
the old dependency premises as formulated by Frank. This chapter ends by arguing 
the case for an updated version of the dependency theory based on the new ways 
of exercises domination and subornation exemplified through the case of CSEZAs. 
Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter of this thesis.  It acknowledges the 
underdevelopmental contributions of JFET to Mauritius.  It affirms that the blame of 
this underdevelopment enabled through JFET is shared between Mauritius and 
China. While China mainly failed at the customization of its model, Mauritius is 
responsible for various mismanagement of assets which are related to this project. 
Despite all these tensions surrounding the JFET project, China and Mauritius 
maintain a healthy rapport. This thesis therefore underlines that CSEZAs by no 
means, are deterministic of the entente between China and Africa. Chapter 8 then 
moves on to enumerate the contributions of this thesis. It presents to academics 
the methods and indicators through which to assess CSEZAs in the future. It draws 
the CSEZAs success formulae which would enable China to revise its model for 
improved application and also allow the African hosts to held renegotiate the terms 
and conditions of the existing CSEZAs. And finally, it updates Frank’s Dependency 
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Theory and identifies the new carriers of dependency relations in contemporary 
capitalist system. The thesis ends with a post scriptum, filling in with accounts of 
recent occurrences in JFET which only substantiate the conclusions reached in this 
thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framework for the Study of Chinese 
Special Economic Zones in Africa 
 
Chapter Statement  
This chapter starts with an overview of existing literature which surrounds CSEZAs 
and moves on to contextualize the need to research the potential of this new zone 
form. Why and to whom are the findings of this thesis important? Three globally 
pertinent political hypotheses legitimise this research: the decline of the United 
States of America (USA) and the rise of China; the failure of multilateralism as 
opposed to the success of newer platforms; and the shortcomings of the generally 
endorsed neoliberalism as compared to the success of China’s customised 
approach.  As these three rationales establish that CSEZAs challenge the global 
political and economic status quo, this chapter introduces a new set of theories to 
explain the departure of CSEZAs from the conventional approach of the Bretton 
Woods powers. It coins the comparative theoretical lenses called the Spatial 
Infusion and Spatial Diffusion approaches.  This chapter then deconstructs the 
CSEZA structure. It identifies the various actors, levels, and different relationships of 
power that circulate across this zone project. This complex endeavour therefore 
triggers the question: which theoretical paradigm best explains the CSEZA and its 
global impact? After a discussion of the main theories traditionally applied to the 
study of Chinese relations to Africa, this chapter concludes that they are not 
suitable to comprehensively explain CSEZAs. Instead, the two most important 
composite of the CSEZAs, their structural components and the notional frameworks 
within which they unfurl (‘cooperation’ and ‘mutual benefit’ in a global capitalist 
system), suggest that CSEZAs are closer to the ideas of development theories. After 
running through the different branches of development theory, this chapter makes 
the case for a close applicability of Andre Gunder Frank’s Dependency Theory.  
Frank’s Dependency Theory is identified as having a majority of the modalities, 
which is closest to those evoked by the CSEZAs. For those dynamics of the CSEZAs 
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that Frank’s approach falls short in explaining, the flexibility that his version of 
Dependency Theory grants to the functional components of the global political and 
economic system allows for room to manoeuvre. By borrowing Frank’s lenses, this 
thesis also takes on the opportunity to contribute to updating dependency 
thoughts. The combination of the CSEZA and Dependency Theory is therefore 
perfect as the unprecedented innovativeness of CSEZAs contributes to a re-
actualisation of the traditional premises of Dependency Theory formulated by Frank 
in the 1967. 
Existing Literature 
 
Though CSEZAs is a niche area of study, literature on subjects and actors that this 
phenomenon is linked to is extensive. A preliminary understanding of CSEZAs can be 
sourced from literature on the multi-disciplinary China-Africa studies (international 
relations studies, development studies, economic studies), and the more 
economically focused, economic zone studies.  
Over the past decade, China-Africa studies have garnered a lot of interest.  
Authors who research Chinese presence in Africa come from various disciplines and 
are of different convictions. Some of them are Alden (2007), Brautigam (2011), 
Davies (2008), Farole (2011), Kapilinsky (2006), Taylor (2011). Each has enlightened 
readers about at least one obscure dimension of the Chinese system: from the ways 
in which MOFCOM disburses aid and technical assistance; the resource-focus of 
Chinese engagement; the logic behind selective China-bashing by the Western; to 
the difference or similarities between Chinese private sector actors and state-
owned enterprises when operating in Africa. The three main research objectives 
into which we can categorise the China-Africa studies cohort are: firstly, those 
assessing China’s impact on Africa; secondly, those researching African 
responsiveness to China; and thirdly, those comparing Chinese engagement in 
Africa to that of Western actors. Some of the debates evoked under these three 
categories of China-Africa studies, which are useful to this thesis, are overviewed 
below.  
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In 2012, Mohan and Lampert contested the usual China-centered approach 
that academics adopt when scrutinizing Chinese-African relations. They insist that 
Africa too, assumes leadership in Chinese-African collaboration.  According to them, 
the most substantial African contribution to this relationship comes from African 
state as well as non-state agency elements. Using the examples of Angolan state 
elites, local African traders and that of African workers employed in Chinese 
businesses in Africa, Mohan and Lampert conclude that ‘Sino-African relationships 
that are more locally driven and mediated than is generally recognized’ (2012, 109).  
Padraig’s and Taylor’s (2010) work on flexigemony too reiterate the importance of 
the host context when discussing Chinese engagement in Africa. They emphasize 
the pragmatism ingrained in the Chinese approach. As they remark, “Chinese actors 
adapt their strategies geographically to suit the particular histories and geographies 
of the African states with which they engage” (2010, 2). Therefore, there is a 
consensus that the particularities of the host African context should be given equal 
consideration when evaluating Chinese involvement in Africa. 
Authors writing from an economic perspective are particularly keen on 
assessing the impact of Chinese aid, trade and investment on Africa. Sindzingre is of 
the opinion that China conducts its economic exchanges in a very unconventional 
form—almost like a barter system whereby trade, aid and investment are all tied 
together. Consequently, China’s impact on Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries is 
highly ambiguous. On one hand, China is a ‘genuine growth factor’ (2011, 19) as it 
has contributed to sustaining a high price of export commodities; on the other, 
China is likely to lock SSA countries in a commodity-based export structure. What is 
certain for Sindzingre though is that these conflicting Chinese pursuits will not 
permit African countries to initiate their structural transformation anytime soon.  
Sindzingre’s analysis brings us to the studies of Kapilinsky. Kapilinsky (2006), in 
collaboration with Morris (Kapilinsky and Morris 2008; 2009) conducted several 
studies over the past decade, assessing the impact of cheaper Chinese exported 
manufactures on African products manufactured for exports.  They conclude that 
manufactures from the ‘Asian drivers’ negatively affect SSA exports. Kapinlinsky and 
Morris’s (2009) work is revelatory of the key dynamics that should be kept in mind 
before evaluating the impact of Chinese FDI in SSA.  Firstly, there is a need to 
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thoroughly understand the intermeshed nature of state-owned and private Chinese 
FDI abroad. According to them: 
[m]any “SOEs” function as conduits for private gain, in the sense that 
profits are appropriated in part by key individuals who are not formal 
owners of the firms. Similarly, the returns from, and decisions made in 
many apparently “private” firms are in part a reflection of the direct 
decision-making power of state bodies, particularly provincial 
governments. “Private” in China means that the state holds less than 50 
percent of the equity. In addition, state officials may also own 
companies, but in their ‘private capacity’, and often use the connections 
gained through their government positions. (2009, 2) 
 
The second item upon which Kapilinsky and Morris emphasise is the need to 
consider the host country’s policy environment when assessing the developmental 
contribution of FDI.  Kapilinsky and Morris propose to reinvest negotiation power in 
African actors in the latter’s dealings with China. This negotiation power should be 
reinvested into the African governments to begin with, and should thereafter also 
involve regional African organizations in a ‘cartelised bargaining’ practice. It is only 
when the African country mobilises its own domestic capacities to strike a good deal 
with the Chinese, and consistently monitors the delivery of the developmental 
goods, that SSA will benefit from Chinese FDI.  
Authors dedicated to comparative studies of Chinese and OECD engagement 
in Africa inform us of the concerns and preconceptions of Western actors when 
they study China in Africa.  David Shinn (2009) observes that both China and the 
USA share converging, hence competing, interests in Africa. The three common 
interests that he identifies are: (i) access to resources, (ii) support of African 
countries in international forums, and (iii) exploiting Africa as an export market. 
China additionally seeks African support on the Taiwan issue. On its part, USA has 
two more interests in Africa: firstly, the agreeability of African states to allow 
America to use their air space and ports, and secondly, in order to allow the USA to 
keep an eye on the development of criminality (terrorism, drugs etc.) in Africa. 
Shinn explains that nonetheless, the USA has diplomatically coerced China in 
responsibly exercising its presence in Africa, in keeping with international norms. 
But China evades this indirect supervision by the USA by shielding behind its 
adherence to non-interference and sovereignty.  
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While global leaders try to bring Chinese activities to standards of 
international legitimacy, Guérin (2008) sees China as nurturing a different 
understanding of international norms and practices. He researches the example of 
the multilateralism exhibited under the FOCAC initiative. According to him, the 
multilateralism displayed at FOCAC is, in fact, only an aggregation of all the bilateral 
agreements that China has undertaken vis-à-vis its key African partners. The capital 
investment thereunder has only been totaled and rounded-up and presented as a 
comprehensive Africa package at the summit. This allows China to diplomatically 
pronounce itself as a partner to all, small and big countries, of the African continent  
(Guérin, 2008, 5).    
The trend that we note across the China-Africa literature is that all 
researchers invariably underline the importance of the local African context. As 
Kapilinsky and Morris join Padraig and Taylor in stressing the need to give 
preeminence to the host African context when assimilating Chinese elements, the 
need for the same is echoed in an adoption of Chinese SEZS in Africa. However, 
strangely, ‘host country customization’ or ‘context’ are elements which have been 
ignored in economic zone studies. Madani (1999), Jayanthakumaran (2003), Warr 
(1989) do not touch upon the importance of matching the structural and policy 
requirements of the zone format to the developmental needs and existing 
economic, social, environmental particularities of the host country.  Authors who do 
allude to customization have a very general take on how it should be exercised. For 
example, Farole (2011, 239) underlines the importance of tailoring EPZs—
traditionally based on the Asian experience—according to the present global 
economic climate in which African countries evolve. He mentions the end of the 
Multifibre Agreement, competition from Asia and others, as reasons for why there 
is the need to revise the zone format to make it more suitable for African countries. 
If most African zones are unlikely to be competitive as manufacturing 
export platforms, they may need to rethink their strategies and move away 
from the traditional EPZ model and toward, for example, natural resource-
based activities, including agricultural and minerals processing…African 
SEZs will also require a much greater focus on building regional value 
chains and promoting industry clusters. This will require much more 
integration with local and regional economies than is possible under the 
existing enclave models, as well as a refocusing on generating efficiencies 
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through external scale and coordination rather than simply through 
internal efficiency. 
 
It is assumed that all African countries face the same global pressures and therefore 
should be imposed a uniform zone form. In regard to the CSEZAs, this thesis 
proposes to move from a homogenous treatment of the African case and further 
refine the zone customization function in order to suit the specific needs and 
profiles of each African host country.  
 As the main investment of the host country in a CSEZAs is land, and the 
benefit it awaits is development, in order to optimize its share of profit from the 
CSEZAs, the host African country should customize the zone in a way in its own 
inputs are in keeping with its actual capacity and that the structure and 
implementation of the zone responds to its developmental needs. An analysis of 
how the host African countries and the Chinese partners deal with the land 
requirement of the CSEZA is deterministic of the developmental or anti-
developmental effect of these zones. This is also the principal element of the CSEZA 
which makes a strong case for the need to customise the zone requirements and 
functions. The treatment of the zone’s land requirement in the source country of 
the SEZ concept, i.e., in China, needs to be modified when it is being practiced by 
another country, whose economic, political and environmental conditions are 
different. It is only then that the CSEZA would be able to maximize its chances of 
success. An overview of the land acquisition process for SEZs in China reveals the 
extent to which exploitation of land lies at the core of the SEZ concept. Any of the 
five African countries would not be able to sustain the same experience—even less, 
the little island of Mauritius.  
 On 6 August 2011, a Chinese newspaper reported that local county officers 
had illegally requisitioned 267 hectares of land in order to make space for real 
estate development in Hebei. Farmers who occupied the land were threatened and 
their crops were destroyed (Shen and Yishi, 2011). Shortly afterwards, in November 
2011, South China Morning Post reported a series of riots in Lufeng city (Guangdong 
province) over the acquisition of 323.7 hectares by the local government in order to 
build an industrial park and residential areas. Twelve thousand resident farmers 
claimed to have been poorly compensated (Chi-yuk, 2011; Chi-yuk and Pinghui 2011; 
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Chen, 2011). These two cases are only glimpses of the innumerable similar 
occurrences that generally prelude the construction of SEZs in China. A Chinese 
civilian-led voluntary project called ‘The Blood Stained Housing Map’ which uses 
Google Maps to locate tragic land and property grab in China enlists such macabre 
cases. This initiative was publicised by The Wall Street Journal’s China Real Time 
Report on 29 October 2010 (Chin, 2010). Picking up on exploitative activities carried 
out in light of SEZs, Gopalakrishnan (2007) remarks that land tenure of farmers 
situated near SEZs are threatened as the Chinese government favours large-scale 
development projects. He refers to figures from Huang and Yang: 
[B]etween January 1992 and July 1993, rights over 1,27,000 hectares of land 
were granted to real estate developers across China but only 46.5 per cent of 
this land to developers was actually developed. (Gopalakrishnan, 2007, p. 
1493) 
 
This is not to say that China does not have legal provisions regulating land 
acquisition under SEZs. 
Until 2002, only the Land Administration Law catered for grievances regarding 
SEZs in China. While Article 2 of the Land Administration Law accounted for the 
authority of the state to requisition land owned by collectives in order to serve 
national interest, Article 37 of the same allows for the requisitioned arable land to 
be reconverted to arable land if construction of the scheduled project fails to start 
within two years. In 2002, China introduced the Land Contract in Rural Areas Law. 
This law safeguards the hold of farmers on the land the collective has contacted out 
to them for cultivation. Article 16 Section (2) commits to providing adequate 
compensation to the displaced farmers. The latest relevant legal development came 
in the form of the 2004 Amendment to the Land Administration Law whereby issues 
pertaining to the conversion of requisitioned agricultural land into construction land 
were comprehensively addressed. Under this amendment, China sought to be more 
considerate when compensating displaced farmers. But what remained unchanged 
throughout these years was the power of the state to requisition land at its will for 
SEZs. With power vested in the government’s ability to retrieve land for SEZ-based 
national development, land acquisition at the expense of rural livelihoods only 
becomes more common. This mass requisition of land for SEZs has also affected 
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Chinese national food security. In an article by China Daily published in March 2012, 
the Ministry of Land and Resources shared that China needs to maintain at least 
120 million hectares of agricultural land for a sustainable food security. However, in 
2009, the total expanse of land under cultivation had already fallen to 121.7 million 
hectares (Yingqi, Zhu and Ce, 2012). A glimpse of the Chinese legislations only 
confirms the integrality of land appropriation to SEZs. The fact that in its home-
ground itself the SEZ concept thrives upon acts of land appropriation ratifies land 
mismanagement as an inescapable feature of this zone model. As the patron 
community itself suffers from the impact of land exploitation through SEZs, little 
respite can be expected for those countries upon whom this model is transposed.  
India copied China’s SEZ model, and now counts 158 operational SEZs.  
Further 588 SEZs are in the pipeline. At numerous occasions, rural farming land has 
been acquired for these SEZs. Some well-known cases are: attempt at land 
acquisition for an SEZ from the Raigad farmers by the Reliance Industries since 
2006, and the Trident SEZ project in Punjab. However, the worst case was that of 
the land possession attempt for the Nandigram SEZ project in West Bengal in 2007 
which derailed into a riot. The livelihood of 30 villages was at stake. Villagers were 
killed and numerous women were raped during the riots (The Times of India, 2007). 
The canvas of deadly riots, eviction of rural communities without compensation and 
prioritization of the developer’s profits presented by India in light of the land 
appropriation process for SEZs flagrantly denounces the gross mismanagement on 
behalf of the Indian government in tailoring the SEZ model’s land requirement 
according to the present situation of the country. The last census carried out in 
India in 2011 revealed that although a considerable growth in the proportion of 
urban population could be noted, 68.84 per cent of Indians still lived in rural areas 
(Chandramouli, 2011). The source of livelihood of these people is agriculture—an 
activity which contributes to the Indian economy as well as to its food security. 
However, as Dev and Sharma (2010) note in their study of food security in India, 
there is a steady decline in the agricultural production of the country which does 
not bode well for the problem of malnutrition prevalent in India. One of the reasons 
to which they attribute this decline in agricultural production is the proliferation of 
SEZs. In their own words,  
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[l]ong term factors like steeper decline in per capita land availability and 
shrinking of farm size are also responsible for the agrarian crisis. Land 
issues such as SEZs, land going to non-agriculture, alienation of tribal land 
etc. are becoming important (ibid., pp. 3-4). 
 
In such a precarious situation of land usage distribution—with overlapping impacts 
on crucial national concerns such as food—an unregulated and unharmonised 
adoption of zone models by countries is condemnable. Based on these information 
and studies, this thesis advocates for a heightened sense of responsibility amongst 
the host African states in the customization of the zone requirements according to 
their own domestic capacities. Through a discussion of the importance of 
customization in zone practices, this thesis contributes to this unexploited aspect of 
zone studies. The land dimension would also recur throughout this thesis as an 
indicator of whether CSEZA ventures are exploitative or developmental.  
 
Contextualising the Debate about Chinese Special Economic Zones in 
Africa 
As this pragmatic new Chinese spatial strategy is deployed across Africa, scholars 
are driven by the need to identify the overarching logic behind such a complex, yet 
flexible endeavour. What do CSEZAs imply for China, the host African countries and 
the world at large? Do CSEZAs contribute to the development required in the 
African nations? These questions are of utmost importance today because the 
conventional ways of enacting development have faltered and policy-makers are on 
the lookout for an alternative model to uplift the poorest continent. As it proposes 
some novelty in its approach, structure, functioning and components, the CSEZA 
generates interest. Three global investigative premises substantiate the need to 
consider the different approach suggested by China’s CSEZAs. These premises will 
guide us to distinguishing the theoretical lenses which appeal to the attributes of 
the CSEZA.  
 
1. The decline of the USA versus the rise of China 
American and European concern about the escalating power and influence of China 
is no secret. After the Cold War, America assumed the position of the world 
hegemon and a unipolar world order was established (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002; 
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Krauthammer, 1990/91; Walt, 1987). Using their high voting quotas in international 
institutions, OECD countries led world affairs by setting the rules and policy 
directions (Oatley and Yackee, 2004).8 Meanwhile, China started manifesting itself 
on the international platform mainly through cultural and economic proliferation. 
Confucius Institutes, university scholarships, overseas business acquisitions, market 
encroachment and unconditional aid offers disseminated Chinese global influence 
(Kurlantzick, 2007, p. 67; Wang, 2008; Zhang, 2005).  Although perturbed by the 
idea of having to share its responsibilities with China, Washington, nevertheless, 
remained quite secure about its authority over other nations. The comfort of the 
USA rested on the fact that, ultimately world affairs were conducted according to its 
own ideology—the eponymous Washington Consensus. As is reflected through the 
faith the international community continues to have on American fiscal measures 
even after the financial crisis, the USA remains the prescriber of the models of 
development and is the one to set the benchmarks for international legitimacy 
(Garten, 2009). The commanding stance that America constantly adopts vis-à-vis 
China in their dealings is also an indication of this reassured serenity in American 
global leadership. For instance, America took it to itself to pressurise China to 
intervene in the Darfur 2003 conflict, and showing similar clout, it also pressurised 
China to allow the Yuan to appreciate in order to curtail Chinese trade surplus with 
the USA (US Department of State, 2006; BBC, 2012). Gu, Humphrey and Messner 
(2007, p. 9-10) observe that this composure of America, even in face of the rising 
dragon, is due to the uncertain demeanour displayed by China. According to them, 
China still undergoes an identity dilemma; it is unsure whether it is a developing or 
a developed country. Consequently, China tends to be restrained and non-
confrontational.   
Reporting on America’s potential clash with China over the sale of weapons to 
Taiwan by the US, and Obama’s expected meeting with the Dalai Lama, The 
Washington Post picked up on the display of ‘triumphalism’ and a ‘new 
assertiveness’ increasingly apparent in Chinese behaviour (Pomfret, 2010). The 
article describes a scene that occurred at the Copenhagen climate change summit.  
China only sent a deputy foreign minister to meetings set for the level of 
heads of state; its representatives publicly clashed with their American 
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counterparts. And during the climax of the conference, China's security team 
tried to block Obama and the rest of his entourage from entering a meeting 
chaired by China's prime minister, Wen Jiabao. (ibid.) 
 
It is obvious from such conduct that China has emerged from its cocoon and 
marches alone confidently. Nevertheless, the most potent demonstration of China’s 
newly acquired belligerence is its exportation of its domestic SEZ model of 
economic development to foreign countries. Through these, China openly 
challenges the monopoly that the OECD countries exercise in the prescription of the 
terms of growth and development.  
 
2. The failure of multilateralism to bring development versus the 
success of new spatial formations in enabling development 
Although the geographical contextualisation of politics and economics under terms 
such as kingdoms, colonies, nations, multilateralism, bilateralism, and others, were 
initially intended to contain particular elements and actors for the ease of 
implementing orderly action, over time, these spaces have acquired a life and 
identity of their own. There is a progressive logic behind the advent of each of these 
structures. As the chronology of these structures reveals, the shape, size and 
content of these spatial forms have changed according to the priorities of the 
entities of authority ruling at the time. Likewise, Krugman (1991) observes that the 
erosion of US economic and technological primacy is undermining the importance 
of multilateralism and giving way to new forms of cooperation structures. Such a 
switch between platforms is called ‘regime-shifting’ (Helfer, 2004). Helfer produces 
a realist argument which explains how spatial reconstruction of economic and 
political relations is possible. He argues that though initially regimes reflect the 
distribution of power, over time the institution clouds over the primacy of the 
states and their particular interests. Consequently, states opt out and pursue their 
agendas through other forums (ibid., pp. 13-14). The failure of the Doha Round is 
one example where multilateralism has continuously failed, and countries have 
established other conglomerations to pursue the same agenda. Another example is 
the failure of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), after which the only 
possible way to regulate foreign investment was through bilateral investment 
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treaties between the host and patron countries (Kutty and Chakravarty, 2010, p. 
92).9 The advent of the CSEZA proposes a new spatial platform for the regulation of 
foreign investment.   
 
3. The failure of Bretton Woods ‘one-size-fits-all’ Neoliberalism versus 
China’s customised approach 
The Bretton Woods trio dominate the international scene in matters of finance, 
trade and economic management. The ideological blueprint substantiating the 
strategies of these organisations is neoliberalism. From the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF) programme, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
initiative, to Official Development Assistances (ODAs)—each of these endeavours 
launched by OECD countries as measures to promote economic growth, 
development and poverty reduction in developing countries, have fallen short in 
meeting their objectives. This is because there has been a lack of consensus among 
leading nations, an absence of commitment on part of donors (Gwin, 1997),10 and 
no customised implementation programmes for the target countries. Strict 
conditionalities were moreover imposed on the later (Stiglitz, 1998). For instance, 
the provision of ODAs to African nations comes with prerequisites imposed as 
conditional to disbursement of aid.  With the formulation of the Policy Framework 
for Investment (PFI), even investments from OECD members have become subject 
to similar conditionalities.11  
Finding their credibility threatened because of such unpopular practices, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WB have attempted to move away from 
applying the ‘world’s best practice’ and established regional desks in Asia and the 
Pacific so as to gather more knowledge about the region’s specific policy needs. 
Under the 1997 Partnership Initiative, they started subcontracting research to 
academics from developing countries (Evans and Finnemore, 2001; Pincus and 
Winters, 2002).  The CSEZA takes the trend of the customisation of development 
plans to suit the needs of the host country a step further. China does not impose 
any conditionalities but allows the countries welcoming the zone to set their own 
terms and conditions. The CSEZA, hence, becomes Africa’s Best Alternative To a 
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Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) in comparison to other conditional development 
mechanisms.12  
 
The Spatial Infusion and Spatial Diffusion Approaches 
Each of the three above rationales, which justify the need to study CSEZAs, 
respectively attribute three different spirits to the new zone form—namely, 
revisionist; evolutionary; alternative entities. These three spirits of the CSEZAs are 
contained in the new conceptual approach whereby the distinctiveness of the 
Chinese approach from that of the OECD countries is highlighted. The OECD-
endorsed exercise is named as ‘spatial infusion approach’ and China’s manoeuvre as 
‘spatial diffusion approach’.  
 
1. Spatial Infusion Approach 
The OECD countries set the agenda for the world through the Bretton Woods 
organisations. They then call for other nations to join them in granting international 
legitimacy to this agenda. It is a classic top-down approach whereby America and 
Europe demand that other countries join them to exercise multilateralism. In cases 
where nations do not respond positively, they are faced with punitive measures. 
This forms a spatial concentration of power led by the West. Thus, multilateralism 
enables a euro-centric institutionalisation of international space. The ‘spatial 
infusion approach’ of the OECD countries is demonstrated in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: Spatial Infusion Approach  
Source: Author 
 
 
2. Spatial Diffusion Approach 
The logic behind China’s ‘spatial diffusion approach’ is that China takes its capital 
and expertise to the African countries and offers to build them SEZs on their land. 
There is greater opportunity for host-country customisation and state-ownership of 
this development activity. China poses as a partner. This is in contrast with the 
hierarchical process applied by the OECD countries. Here, China diffuses spatial 
concentrations of Chinese power and profit to other parts of the world. Even if 
Chinese SEZs keep the same basics of space creation like multilateralism (i.e. having 
the same objective of increased profitability through preferential treatments), it 
adds a higher degree of pragmatism to its characteristics, and is conspicuously more 
diplomatic in its construction. While multilateralism, free trade areas and ODAs 
were straight top-down approaches to cooperative development, the CSEZA model 
gives it the appeal of the more considerate bottom-up approach. Figure 2.2 
presents the ‘spatial diffusion approach’.   
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Figure 2.2: Spatial Diffusion Approach  
Source: Author 
 
This difference between the Western and Chinese approaches towards 
African countries resonate in constructivist and psychological studies on cultural 
variations in negotiations. These studies stipulate that the West adopts a more 
direct style of negotiation while Eastern negotiators are more diverted in their 
methods (Weber and Morris, 2010). As revealed through a study by Morris and 
Kaiping (1994), Americans tend to focus on central figures while Chinese consider 
the context. Similar elements can be identified in the above discussed distinct ways 
in which OECD countries and China enable investment in Africa: for the OECD 
countries, the surrender of the state is the objective; on the other hand, China 
considers the appropriation of a small space and through it, a diplomatic capture of 
its greater national context as the best move.  This conceptualisation of the 
dissimilar approaches adopted by the OECD countries and China is instrumental in 
convincing analysts to acknowledge the alternativeness of the CSEZA as a 
development model. It also spreads the conviction that the CSEZA therefore 
requires a disparate set of variables and a different theoretical lens in order to 
understand it.  
 
 
CHINA 
AFRICA 1 
CSEZA 
AFRICA 2 
CSEZA 
AFRICA 3 
CSEZA 
 44 
The Levels, the Actors and the Appropriate Theory 
Contrary to the one-dimensional EPZ and SEZ, which are restricted by their state-
patronage, the CSEZA breaks through both constrains upon interactive space and 
nature of actors. While the expansive reach and composition of the CSEZA is 
indicative of the large-scale impact it has, this characteristic becomes problematic 
when it comes to identifying the theoretical framework which can engage all the 
components and activities of this type of zone.  Which school of thought can 
provide a comprehensive conceptual bracket under which to package an 
understanding of how these territorially-bound SEZs, established in Africa by the 
Chinese government, in cooperation with Chinese private investors connect to the 
grand scheme of world affairs? Are these CSEZAs mechanisms of China to balance 
other nations? Have they been formed to enable market access and profit 
maximisation? Alternatively, are they manifestations of a new Chinese identity? Can 
we locate a structural or ideological leitmotif throughout this process? Which 
perspective will allow academics to decide upon the logic of the CSEZAs, identify 
their performance indicators, predict their likely future, and eventually, present 
recommendations to overcome their faults?  What is the link holding together these 
different levels of interactions—whereby each level is not solely the monopoly of 
state entities but also comprises of non-state entities? In sum, we seek to find out 
the nature of the links connecting the CSEZA to: the African state, the African 
community, the Chinese government, and the Chinese private investors, and 
altogether, as a sum of its parts, the connection between the CSEZA and the global 
system.  Figure 2.3 demonstrates the different actors and levels of interactions that 
make up the CSEZA. The different levels of interaction, the different spatial 
substance of each level, the varying nature of the actors involved, the existence of 
trans-level links and the different economic and political characteristics of each 
echelon shown in this schema, confirm that divergent relationships of power and 
authority are involved in this system. 
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Figure 2.3: Levels and Actors involved in Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa  
Source: Author 
 
The divergences characterising this process further imply that there are a limited 
number of common dynamics across the levels that can cooperate on an equal 
footing.13 This complicates the assessment process for academics as they are not 
able to easily cross-analyse data, measure the performances of each strata and 
calculate the gains and losses of each.  
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Nonetheless, one overarching construct which defines the CSEZA’s dynamism 
drawn in Figure 2.3, is the hierarchy within which these actors evolve. That the 
CSEZA is deployed over levels indicates that there is a vertical separation of powers 
and authority. This invariably implies that there is always one dominant and one 
subordinate actor in the process of the CSEZA formation. As it starts with the ‘world 
structure’, and eventually only comes into realisation at the most localised level, we 
understand that China’s creation of CSEZAs is a devolutionary response to global 
pressures. The grand construct which contains the CSEZAs is that of the global 
capitalist economy—led and conditioned on the terms of the leading organisations 
such as the WB, the WTO, and the IMF.  All state as well as non-state actors of the 
world submit to the pressures and requirements of this conditioning structure. 
Therefore, China too, has to evolve under the same structure, willingly in the 
economic sense, and unwillingly for its political ideology. Lying at the margins of 
development prior to the Open Door policy, China liberalised its economy and 
pursued global economic integration through more creative mechanisms than any 
originally economically liberal OECD state (Hale and Hale, 2003, 37).14 It devised SEZ 
spaces in order to welcome FDI; created the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM 
Bank) to support outgoing Chinese FDI; introduced flexible taxation systems, 
focused on technology; exported its SOEs, made use of Special Purpose Vehicles 
(SPVs); and established profitable construction-finance models such as the Built-
Own-Operate  (BOO), Built-Operate-Transfer (BOT), and Built-Operate (BO)? 
(Larçon, 2009). By ultimately joining the WTO in 2001, China confirmed that it seeks 
legitimacy in the eyes of the Washington-led economic order within whose 
perimeters it has to function. This assumption is further confirmed through the fact 
that China is now USA’s second largest trading partner. With multiple stringent 
product regulations, China has to ensure that its products, services and activities—
which are to feed its domestic economic growth and development—conform to 
Washington’s norms. The fact that China has not been able to override the anti-
dumping obligations regarding solar technologies imposed on it by the world 
economic order is yet another evidence of the quest for legitimisation by China 
which flows from the OECD-led world order. Recent indications of the rising interest 
of private Chinese companies to join foreign stock listings, the interest of foreign 
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investors in developing China’s pension system for its unsupported ageing 
population, and the emerging idea of extending commercial microfinance services 
to rural communities in China shows that China believes that its current 
underdeveloped social dimensions can only be uplifted by recourse to capitalist 
mechanisms (Hale and Hale, 2003). And through the exercise described under the 
Spatial Diffusion Approach, one of the means through which China responds to 
these pressures is through the exported CSEZAs—a structure whose outer layer and 
pursuits are capitalist but can at the same time, easily camouflages the socialist 
elements that China still endorses in its means of implementation.  
Neither state actors nor non-state actors are singularly self-sufficient in 
enabling a CSEZA.  It is an element of compulsive lack of autonomy and inescapable 
inter-linkages, which defines the relationship among the components of diverse 
nature identified in Figure 2.3. The one coagulatory idea, which grants the required 
hierarchical fluidity to this web of interaction, made up of a mix of state and non-
state actors is that of ‘dependency’; dependency of all subordinate structures onto 
the global capitalist structure, and dependency of each level onto its immediate 
superior. The question which comes up here is: do these relationships not indicate a 
case of interdependency rather than dependency? The answer is no. Had there not 
been a clear hierarchy in the interaction of the strata indicated in Figure 2.3—
whereby instead of a vertical alignment of actors, there had been a web of 
interactions across levels—then a case could have been made for relationships of 
interdependence. In this particular situation, it is clear that the African State, 
though containing the Chinese SEZ, is dependent on the Chinese patron, and the 
Chinese conglomerate is dependent on the economic climate and pressures 
propagated by the neoliberal world system.  At no point in any of these 
relationships, does the reverse happen. Neither does the world structure become 
dependent on the activities of the Chinese state and its private investors, nor does 
the Chinese state depend on the graciousness of the African state to exercise tge 
CSEZAs. Although the zone is established in the African host country, China still 
retains full control of that space directly. The question that therefore pertains is 
which theoretical prism believes that, at the core of each event happening across 
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the world, the explanatory experience is that of one-way dependency, whereby all 
are subject to the pressures of the existing capitalist system.  
In fact, all schools of thoughts in international relations recognise this element 
of dependency when talking about China’s relation with other world actors. 
However, each does so in varying construal. Whether one argues that China is a 
revisionist power (realism) or that China is a development partner (neoliberalism), 
both positions are based on an acknowledgement of the dependency and relativity 
of China’s identity on par with “superior powers”, or in relation to historically 
similar nations. The problem with the treatment of dependency by these traditional 
theories is that they see ‘dependency’ only as a channelling instrument in the 
relationship among and across states and non-states actors. Realism, neoliberalism 
and constructivism respectively allow the identification of foreign policies and 
motivations of self and others (realism) diagnose the exchange of goods 
(neoliberalism) and the formation of identity (constructivism). None of them view 
‘dependency’ as the prevalent global climate of which realist, neoliberal or 
constructivist pursuits are a result. Furthermore, none of the traditional IR theories 
treat the development concern which is central to the CSEZA endeavour. Does the 
centrality of the developmental concern then make any of the development 
theories suitable for the study of CSEZAs? Can a case be made for the 
modernisation theory? Dos Santos’s critique of the theory of development rightly 
explains why not just any development theory would be applicable to the CSEZAs: 
[T]he theory of development…seeks to explain the situation of the 
underdeveloped countries as a product of their slowness or failure to adopt 
the patterns of efficiency characteristic of developed countries (or to 
"modernize" or "develop" them- selves). (Dos Santos, 1970, 231) 
As China actively modernises itself in the quest for development and generates new 
mechanisms such as the CSEZAs, which Africa too welcomes in a similar thirst for 
new developmental methods, it is proven that hindrances to national development 
is not only self-imposed but also externally-imposed. Therefore, just any theory of 
development will not do justice to a study of CSEZAs. Instead, the study of CSEZAs 
warrants theoretical lenses which invests primary focus onto the conditioning 
global system, and sees the rest of the activities and actors as results of this 
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conditioning climate. Furthermore, as we noted in the general diagnosis stipulated 
in the problem statement of this thesis (Chapter 1), rather than the development it 
promised, CSEZAs are generating underdevelopment. An understanding of the 
creation of underdevelopment as a result of the global economic structure is 
provided under Andre Gunder Frank’s Development Theory. 
Contemporary critics have constantly discarded Dependency Theory as a 
negligible line of thinking, unable to match steps with the evolution of world affairs 
and a globalised system (Blaney, 1996; Gülap, 1998). Though partly true, if we 
consider the fact that Dependency Theory has constantly accommodated changes 
within its reasoning in the past, as Castells and Laserna (1989) agree, with further 
adjustments, Dependency Theory could be the most appropriate perspective to 
inspect this recent spatial initiative. With coinciding basic ideological perimeters, 
Dependency Theory and the CSEZA form a pair of a theory and a new phenomenon 
which together, have the potential to create new knowledge.  Dependency Theory 
is able to contain the free flowing CSEZA which appears to be a political, economic 
as well as social endeavour simultaneously. As the CSEZA transcends borders, 
actors, and coerces the involvement of those not even directly concerned, 
Dependency Theory draws from its repertoire of the understanding of global 
processes of development and underdevelopment and explains to us the pursuit of 
this venture. It cautions against what a structure and process such as the CSEZA 
might entail. On its turn, this new politico-economic space allows us to challenge 
and modify Dependency Theory’s conventional interpretations of how development 
and underdevelopment unfolds in the capitalist world structure. Thus, rather than a 
wholesale adaptation of Frank’s dependency perspective, through an application to 
the study of CSEZAs—whose behavioural components are closest to Frank’s 
theory—this thesis reinvents the Dependency Theory. It brings into consideration, 
those variables of dependency of the new economic age which Frank ignored back 
in 1967. 
A justification of the chosen theoretical framework is only valid in 
conjunction with a deconstruction of the non-applicability of the other theories that 
have traditionally provided coherent explanations of Chinese dealings in 
contemporary world affairs. 
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Dismissing the Theoretical Alternatives 
As mentioned before, realism, liberalism and constructivism are the usual 
paradigms applied to a study of China-African relations. However, these approaches 
are justified if the study is based on hypotheses that China seeks resource 
accumulation in Africa, attempts to access the African market or even seeks to 
spread its soft influence. Their application to this study would furthermore receive 
support had the macro-understanding of the world system behind CSEZAs indicated 
towards a conditioning global climate of a balance of power; a regime of 
international economic cooperation through competition; or of being a set of global 
interactions which create new identities.  But, neither does this study seek to 
investigate the objectives of the CSEZAs (for we are already aware that 
development is objective of the CSEZAs), nor can we readily assume that CSEZAs 
emerge from forces behind the traditional understandings proposed by realism, 
liberalism or constructivism. The key to the investigation of the rationale behind the 
introduction of CSEZAs is the complex structure and varied composition of this new 
zone form. China did not create such a complex, multi-levelled and multi-
dimensional zone without a reason. It is the particularities of the CSEZA which 
reflect the logic from which this zone form emerged. Moreover, the CSEZA’s 
potential for development—or underdevelopment—is contained within the 
deterministic form of the zone and does not rely on its eventual physical 
manifestation. While the three grand international relations theories can very well 
provide a valid reasoning for China’s launch of CSEZAs according to their own 
priorities, they cannot explain why China gave such a shape to its exercise of 
political or economic balancing; how does this specific format enhance China’s 
competitiveness in a neoliberal climate; or how do the new global interactions push 
for the creation of an entity structured as such. Therefore, the theory, which would 
best explain CSEZAs should be one that focuses on the distinct composition of the 
zone. Realism, liberalism and constructivism do not give space for such a detailed 
deconstruction of political and economic realities. In fact, a discussion of the 
inapplicability of traditional international relations theories to an all-inclusive study 
of the CSEZA highlights inadvertent admissions about the suitability of studying 
these zones from a dependency paradigm.  
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1. Realism 
The mere mention of China triggers debates among realists about China’s 
revisionism (Christensen, 1996, 2001; Mearsheimer, 2004; Shambaugh, 1996, 
2011). This perception of China is rooted in realists’ beliefs that human nature is 
egoistic and states are configurations that contain these selfish drives. In the 
absence of an international government, nation-states are the principal actors and 
consequently, form an anarchic world. This co-existence of international anarchy 
and the selfish passion of nations unleash power struggles. Nations, therefore, have 
to be self-preserving (Bull, 2002; Carr, 1939; Waltz, 1979). While classical realism 
disregards the part played by international structures in determining inter-state 
relations, neorealism is well equipped to consider the American-Chinese equation in 
the contemporary global arrangement. Waltz argues that though equal in function, 
states differ in the power weightage and it is this distribution of capabilities that 
defines the prevalent international structure (Waltz, 1979, p. 114). The balance of 
power theory summarises this idea.15 The balance of power theory also posits 
‘balancing’ and ‘bandwagoning’ as the only two behavioural options for states in an 
anarchical system.16 However, Waltz quickly dismisses bandwagoning as a desirable 
step as he argues that balancing is the only feasible step as nations try to sustain 
their relative power (ibid., p. 126). Unipolarity is impossible in this scenario.  But 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union and faulted predictions about the stability of a 
bipolar international system, neorealism veered towards multipolarity. Neorealists 
saw the unilateral rule of America as transitionary.  
Waltz, the staunchest of neorealists, refuses to acknowledge a unipolar world 
order to the extent that three years after the Soviet collapse, he declared that 
‘bipolarity endures, but in an altered state’ (Waltz, 1993, p. 52). He justifies his 
claim by pointing out that Russia is still militarily capable and its military might has 
not been displaced by any other new nation. Waltz almost bets that once countries 
like Japan, Germany and China become nuclear-armed, the world will be multipolar. 
Substantiating his prediction, Waltz quotes an event of 1990 when the USA 
attempted to dictate the establishment of a new bank for Eastern Europe in order 
to secure veto capacities, but failed (Fansworth, 1990). Waltz concludes that this 
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was already an indication of the faltering solo rule of America. ‘The old and the new 
great powers will have to relearn old roles, or learn new ones, and figure out how 
to enact them on a shifting stage’ (1993, p. 72).  
In spite of his rooted assurance, along the way, Waltz dismissively predicts a 
long term of American hegemony whereby the US will witness no act of balancing 
by other nations. He betrays his conviction in many of his statements pronounced in 
support of an inevitable establishment of multipolarity. For instance, he said, 
‘*u+nbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger to others. The 
powerful state may, and the United States does, think of itself as acting for the sake 
of peace, justice, and well-being [...] Some of the weaker states in the system will 
therefore act to restore a balance and thus move the system back to bi- or 
multipolarity. China and Japan are doing so now’ (Waltz, 1997, p. 916, my italics). 
While the obvious sense of the statement is strictly neorealist, one can make out 
that this prediction is nevertheless based on a knowledge that is ideologically 
incongruent with the beliefs of the neorealists. Although some may argue that the 
description of the US as ‘the powerful state’ and its positioning against ‘weaker 
states of the system’ is in keeping with the idea of relative gains, it is also true that 
these words establish a hierarchy in which America already exists as a hegemon. In 
the case of China, although Waltz recognises that China is acquiring nuclear 
capabilities (hence matching the neorealist requisites to transcend to the status of a 
great balancing power), in his 2003 interview lecture with Kreisler, he affirms that 
America is more secure than ever and, at the time, China is far from being able to 
balance America (Waltz, 2003).  
Mearsheimer too counters expectations for a global balancing act by new 
powers. He concludes that while Japan will not be elevated to the status of a new 
power pole, China’s rise will be limited to East Asia (Mearsheimer, 2004; 
Mearsheimer & Brzezinksi, 2005). Today, peacekeeping efforts in East Asia propel 
countries of the region to give in to regional American military preponderance. As 
evident through the New Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation, the 
Japanese and American association cancels out possibilities of a conflicting 
remilitarisation of Japan. This leaves out China and North Korea as the only nations 
predisposed to create instability. But even China’s confrontation with the US will 
 53 
not attain a global scale and will be contained within the Asian region. Mearsheimer 
refers to the 2009 Defence White Paper of Australia in which this mood for greater 
regional security strife in the Asia-Pacific is well summarised. He draws the 
following analysis:  
[T]he power gap between China and the United States is shrinking and in all 
likelihood “US strategic primacy” in this region will be no more. This is not to 
say that the United States will disappear; in fact, its presence is likely to grow 
in response to China’s rise. But the United States will no longer be the 
preponderant power in the Asia-Pacific region, as it has been since 1945 
(Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 381). 
 
As realist thinkers worked upon refining the premises of realism so as to 
achieve greater applicability, a neoclassical realist strand emerged, pioneered by 
the likes of Rose, Wolforth, Brooks, and Schweller. Even if its association is closer to 
foreign policy analysis rather than to the study of political processes, neoclassical 
realism still contributes towards an evolved realist understanding of the world. 
Neoclassical realists distinguish specific areas in which great powers can balance 
each other. Rousseau (2003) lists five of the most common sectors which carry 
balancing potential. According to him, an evaluation of the Chinese threat should be 
calculated in proportion to its achievements in these five areas.   
(i) Defence spending: In 2009, US spent USD 668.6 million on its military capacity 
while China invested USD 116.6 million. In 2010, US still led in military 
spending, with an outgoing of 4.8 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP) 
injected into its defence programmes. In comparison, China spent 2.1 per cent 
of its GDP on military aspects in the same year (Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, 2009; 2010).  
(ii) Weapons procurement: The embargo on arms trade with China that was 
imposed after the Tiananmen Square events prevents China from acquiring 
weapons of advanced technology capable of competing with Western 
equipment. The majority of Chinese weapons are acquisitions of Soviet-era 
military technologies which will soon be obsolete (Weitz, 2010). Besides, 
China’s constant reaffirmation of its commitment to the ‘no first use rule’ 
reassures of its non-offensive military intention.17 
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(iii) Alliance behaviour: To date, China has, neither overtly nor officially, built 
alliances with other states. Even its traditionally close association with Russia 
seems to wane—a recent indication of which is Russia’s reticence to sell its 
latest military technology to China (Weitz, 2010; Deng, 2001, p. 361). Pakistan 
and the select African countries can hardly be considered as allies who will aid 
China at balancing the US. As Malik observes in relation to North Korea, 
Myanmar and Pakistan, ‘nearly all of China’s allies happen to be weak and 
failing states’ (Malik, 2003, p. 90).   
(iv) Economic interactions: The fact that a large portion of FDI inflow in China 
comes from America confirms that Chinese economic partnerships are not 
trying to put America out of competition. Most importantly, China’s accession 
to the WTO in 2001 ensures that America keeps Chinese commercial activities 
in check through the Dispute Settlement Mechanism.18  
(v) Policy statements: China continuously describes its rapport with the US as 
that of partnership and cooperation. A jargon of ‘cooperation for a better 
world’ colours the talks of both nations’ leaders (China.org.cn, 1997; 
Washington Post, 2011).  
Therefore, dismantling all assumptions about China being a threat to the US, 
neoclassical realists state the following:  
What such arguments fail to recognize are the features of America’s post-Cold 
War position that make it likely to buck the historical trend. Bounded by 
oceans to the east and the west and weak, friendly powers to the north and 
south, the United States is both less vulnerable than previous aspiring 
hegemons and also less threatening to others. The main potential challengers 
to this unipolarity, meanwhile – China, Russia, Japan and Germany – are in the 
opposite position. They cannot augment their military capabilities so as to 
balance the United States without simultaneously becoming an immediate 
threat to their neighbours. Politics, even international politics, is local (Brooks 
and Wohlforth, 2002, p. 24). 
 
By giving importance to internal variables and led by the belief that ‘the scope and 
ambition of a nation’s foreign policy is determined by its relative power capabilities 
and place in the international system’ (Rose, 1998, p. 146), neoclassical realists 
suggest possibilities of non-balancing behaviour among states. In relation to China, 
they state the following: 
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Today, however, U.S. dominance is the status quo.  Several of the major 
powers in the system have been closely allied with the Unites States for 
decades and derive substantial benefits from their position. Not only would 
they have to forgo those benefits if they tried to balance, but they will have to 
find some way of putting together a durable, coherent alliance while America 
was watching. *…+ although there may be several precedents for a coalition of 
balancers preventing a hegemon from emerging, there is none for a group of 
subordinate powers joining to topple a hegemon once it has already 
emerged… (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2002, p. 25)  
 
This overview of the progressive generations of realism and their stance on 
Chinese revisionism reveals that realism, benignly or unconsciously, accepts that 
even if states function in anarchy, their actions are influenced by experiences of 
dependence; a constant feature of an anarchical world structure with diverse power 
distribution. Waltz’s incongruent arguments about the prospects of unipolarity 
versus multipolarity, only to acknowledge the ever-expanding longevity of American 
hegemony; Mearsheimer’s claims about the regionally contained global rise of 
China due to American predominance; the overt acceptance of bandwagoning 
behaviours by neoclassical realists—all three stances point towards an element of 
dependence that contributes to the formation of the international structure.  The 
key to this admittance to dependence is the concept of ‘relative gains’ stressed by 
realist thinkers. As they argue that states are concerned about maximising the gains 
they receive in comparison to those gained by other states, realist thinkers establish 
a relationship of action-reaction and hence domination-subordination, whereby it is 
the comparative power of one state and its actions that initiates another state to 
assume the position it does.   
 
2. Liberalism 
Liberalism is based on the Kantian understanding of human nature. It emphasises 
an inherent sense of goodwill and supports possibilities of cooperation among 
nations. Taking from the idea of ‘absolute gains’, liberals argue that states are not 
concerned with what others are gaining. Their sole focus is their subjective profit 
and security maximisation (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Powell, 1991).  Nonetheless, 
liberals agree with realists that the world structure is anarchic. They attribute this 
anarchy to the fact that state behaviour is not determined by the international 
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system but by a nation’s domestic conditions such as its political nature and 
economic policies (Doyle, 1983; Kant, 2003; Keohane and Nye, 1977). In keeping 
with the democratic peace theory, liberals should therefore presume conflict 
between China and the community of democratic states.19 However, this is not the 
case. Instead, today, neoliberals appear more at ease with the demeanour of China. 
After the Second World War, neoliberalism emphasised more on the role of liberal 
economics, trade and market access in furthering international cooperation and 
democratic governance (Harvey, 2005). As Doyle (2005, p. 465) puts it, ‘avoiding a 
challenge to another liberal state's security or even enhancing each other's security 
by means of alliance naturally follows economic interdependence’. That China’s 
capitalist economic policies prevail over its communist identity and allow non-
confrontational existence explains the neoliberal respite (Findlay and Watson, 1997; 
Hale and Hale, 2003; Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2007). In the context of a discussion 
about the relations between Latin American countries and China, Jilberto and 
Hogenboom conclude:  
[Y]ears away from its international Maoist policies, China’s doctrine is 
nowadays based on: no hegemonism, no power politics, no arms races and no 
military alliances. This strategic doctrine proclaimed by the Chinese President 
Hu Jintao (since 2003) forms part of China’s global policy to favour its 
economic development and integration in global neoliberalism. In Latin 
America, this doctrine is seen as positive for improving international 
cooperation, strengthening mutual conﬁdence, preventing international 
confrontations and thereby being positive for multilateralism’ (Jilberto and 
Hogenboom, 2007,p. 494). 
 
Through its prioritisation of free global trade, neoliberalism acknowledges the 
significance of ‘dependency’ in world affairs, for such a configuration can only be 
sustained through reliance on external markets, imported raw materials, 
technologies, labour, and so on.  As the world becomes the arena for competition, 
state and non-state actors depend on external resources to reduce production costs 
and produce improved quality goods in order to make the most of the market.   
Since it accommodates the role of both, public and the private sector, 
neoliberalism fits the profile of the CSEZA on quite a few accounts. Why not study 
the CSEZA from a neoliberal paradigm then? There are several contentions. Firstly, 
neoliberalism only informs us of how the CSEZA can function successfully in the 
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current market-dominated global climate. It does not tell us what pushed China to 
invent CSEZAs and what accounts for its multi-dimensional feature. Neoliberalism 
only provides an ideological foundation to the policy practices applied for the 
purpose of the zone and within the zones. It does not offer the theoretical 
patronage to the concept of the CSEZA itself. Secondly, with the geographic 
displacement of zone-bound liberal economic policies from a country abiding to one 
political ideology (i.e. socialist China) to another country abiding to a different 
ideology (e.g. Mauritian liberal democracy) that too, with the involvement of a new 
range of front-running participants, there is an evident alteration in the context and 
actors to be studied. While neoliberalism does account for the participation of non-
state actors along with state actors, it is not epistemologically equipped to cater for 
an understanding of an event engaging the interactive community dimension 
inherent to the scenario of Chinese SEZs abroad. We are here referring to the 
communities which have been displaced in the host countries. This diversity in the 
genre of actors in CSEZAs symbolises diversity in motivations. Although 
neoliberalism upholds that the objective of nation-states is the economic welfare of 
the nation, it is not conceptually equipped to provide an insight into the behaviour 
of the private sector or of the respective civil communities.  This is a serious 
handicap in this case. For instance, since they are the ones who implement and run 
the zone, private developers are very likely to nurture aims of personal profitability.  
Their motivations may override those of the partner nation-states. Even then, 
academics cannot account for the zone on purely profit-driven hypotheses because 
new considerations such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) intervene. The 
element of benevolence that guides CSR is one that cannot be accounted for by any 
structural theory. Hence, although the idea of dependency is close to its basic ideas, 
neoliberalism falls of short in providing an understanding of Chinese SEZs abroad 
due to its epistemological shortcomings. It fails to trace back the cause of the 
unequal distribution of market access in the global capitalist structure. It is only 
restricted to implementing the mechanisms of dependency. 
The fact that the CSEZA is an economic formation means that, to a large 
extent, international relations theories fail to appropriately explain its fiscal 
characteristics. Borenzstein and Lee’s (1998) neoclassical growth theory, which 
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explicate the ability of FDI to create economic growth, can potentially fill this gap. 
According to them, FDI brings together labour, capital and technology to further 
economic advancement. But what is important in this equation is that there needs 
to be a balance between the absorptive capacity of the domestic labour (education, 
skills) and technology. Though the authors rightly present the pre-requirement of a 
social capital-technology equilibrium in order to extract maximum use of FDI, its 
successful realisation in the enclave structure of the CSEZA is doubtful. This is 
because the restricted local access in and out of the zone and the lack of restrictions 
on the employment of foreigners prevent the host country from extracting a 
maximum usage of the FDI.20  Looking at the CSEZA through the perspective of an 
economic theory highlights the fact that usually researchers consider FDI inflow, 
foreign exchange income, technology, and employment as the determinants of the 
success of enclave economies. However, these are all economic indicators, which 
gain value only after their implementation through policies; they cannot perform in 
isolation. In order to deliver a successful performance, these economic indicators 
require the support of ‘agency’ factors. As their abstract and multi-faceted nature 
cannot fulfil the demands of measurability sought in the studies of enclave 
economies, variables of the nature of an ‘agency’ are ignored. However, lately, WB 
analysts have recognised the contribution of a couple of these non-structural 
elements to the success of SEZs (Zeng, 2010, pp. 16-18). 
(i) Leaders’ commitment to reform and pragmatism: This is a reference to 
Xiaoping’s determination and pragmatism epitomised through his statement: 
‘it does not matter if it is a white cat or black cat as long as it can catch the 
mice, it is a good cat’. The leadership and philosophy of Xiaoping are central 
to the success of the SEZ.   
(ii) The role of diaspora: An inflow of FDI from Hong Kong that Guangdong 
experienced in the early 1980s is evidence of the importance that cultural and 
social relations hold in building successful economies. Taiwan and Macao also 
took advantage of their diasporic connections and shifted their labour-
intensive activities to Chinese SEZs. 
The works of Brautigam, Farole and Xiaoyang (2010, p. 5), further indicate towards 
an incorporation of ‘agency’ elements in the study of the CSEZA. By including ‘high 
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level of commitment and engagement from host government’ and ‘community 
relations’ among the considerations for setting up successful CSEZAs, they reinforce 
the idea that this particular form of exported economic zone calls for a 
constructivist insight. As we acknowledge the positive economic results that the 
pragmatic Chinese leadership and the support of diasporas have on SEZs, it 
becomes clear that non-structural factors have a hand in enhancing the 
performance of SEZs. Thus, if SEZ is to be studied by accounting for both sets of 
determinants, ‘structure’ and ‘agency’, it is imperative to take recourse to 
constructivism.  
 
3. Constructivism 
Where realism and neoliberalism have little to contribute to an epistemological 
understanding of the CSEZA, constructivism finds affiliation to the study due to its 
aptitude to consider both structure and agency. It sanctions an understanding of 
the interaction amongst the diversely empowered actors engaged in the creation of 
CSEZAs. Wendt defines the main premises of the theory as (1987; 1992; 1994): (i) 
structures of human association are defined primarily by shared ideas rather than 
by material forces, and (ii) that the ideas and interests of purposive actors are 
constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature. This centrality of 
inter-subjectivity and interaction in constructivism makes the theory apt to support 
Dependency Theory in explaining the dependent formation of states’ identities. 
Wendt stresses that each nation assumes multiple identities as a reflection of its 
inter-subjective interaction with every other nation. There is an exercise of role-
play. Referring to a process of creating cooperation, Wendt explains: 
[I]f we treat identities and interests as always in process during interaction, 
then we can see how an evolution of cooperation might lead to an evolution 
of community *…+ Repeated acts of cooperation will tend to have two effects 
on identities and interests. First, the symbolic interactionist concept of 
“reflected appraisals” suggests that actors form identities by learning, through 
interaction, to see themselves as others do *…] Second, through interaction 
actors are also trying to project and sustain presentations of self *…+ Thus, by 
engaging in cooperative behaviour, an actor will gradually change its own 
beliefs about who it is, helping to internalize that new identity for itself (1994, 
p. 390). 
 
 60 
This idea of the formation of a flexible identity closely relates to the premises of 
Dependency Theory which stipulate that an entity can be a metropolis while also 
being a satellite when interacting with different sets of actors.  
Nonetheless, constructivism on its own is not suitable as a prism for the study 
of the CSEZA. It focuses too much on the specificities of cases and does not provide 
a consistent framework with, at least, similar basic understandings of why China 
exports SEZs to various African countries. A grand understanding of the impact of 
CSEZA on the global structure will be difficult to achieve, since constructivism would 
struggle to draw generalisation. Secondly, Wendt’s basic premises of constructivism 
still retain states as the main actors while non-state actors and individuals are 
accommodated as intervening variables. This will not work in the study of CSEZAs 
(Wendt, 1994, p. 385) where non-state actors also assume the status of a structure.  
On a third instance, as Doty (2000) notes, constructivism can only provide an 
understanding of what is happening and how, but it does not answer the ‘why’ 
question.  It can identify the deterministic variables involved in the creation of the 
CSEZA; explain the disposition of each actor participating in the zone; and tell us 
about how these actors interact and substantiate the existence of the unit, but 
constructivism does not elucidate why these interactions occur in the first place. 
Fourthly, the normative nature of constructivism allows it to explicate stability 
better than change (Wang, Qingxin, 2000, pp. 268-69). Therefore, its adoption as 
the paradigm to study the CSEZA will not be appropriate, as it will fail to justify the 
emergence of this new exported avatar of the SEZ. 
 
Development Theories 
The Bretton Woods institutions were set up in July 1944. The IMF and International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) took upon themselves to ensure a 
strict supervision of the financial strategies of nations. They sought to ensure that 
nations keep in line with the new liberal capitalist trade regime which was identified 
as the ultimate path to economic growth and development. The Allied Nations 
agreed to it in order to overcome the disastrous effects of the Second World War 
and also to prevent a repetition of the Great Depression.21  But contrary to 
expectations, the benefits accrued by the Allied Nations under the Bretton Woods 
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arrangement did not reach their respective colonies. The 44 leading states of the 
agreement overtly prioritised their individual domestic sustenance. For example, 
suffering from a shortage of foreign exchange due to the damages suffered by its 
industries, Britain was initially reluctant to open its door to free trade.  It only joined 
the system when America assured it of an aid grant. France also had a similar 
negotiation. The loans and aid these colonial powers received were extensively 
invested at home and little of it reached their dependencies. As Gavin (1996) writes, 
the Bretton Woods system was not driven by some grand idealistic purpose 
on the part of its founders, but by considerations of national interest. The 
British especially saw in the agreements a chance to immunize their planned 
social programs from international balance-of-payments pressures and to 
acquire generous amounts of American aid without political concessions.  
 
This development bias in favour of colonial powers undermined the neoclassical 
realist hypothesis that the pursuit of maximised utility and profits by every nation 
will eventually lead to a levelling of international income (Ardnt, p. 121 in Randall 
and Theobald, 1998).  In the few years that followed this skewed model of 
economic growth, a wave of decolonisation hit the world and several Asian and 
African countries gained independence. Independence was accompanied by a 
strong feeling of self-reliance and nationalism displayed by countries such as India 
who immediately nationalised the key industries of its economy. It is under the 
same sentiment that the newly independent states formed the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) in 1961.  
After decolonisation of the South American (largely in the 19th century), Asian 
and African continents in the 1950s and 1960s, nations were left to administer their 
own politics and economies. They had to find ways to survive in a system that was 
in a daily flux, due to increased tensions among notable powerful states of the time. 
Moreover, the economic inflictions of the Great Depression and of the world wars 
still lingered, altogether limiting the options for growth and development sought by 
these newly independent countries. In such a situation, energised by the feeling of 
independence and self-reliance, some Latin American countries resorted to 
economic nationalism.22 Between 1968 and 1976, Brands (2007, p. 216) notes 22 
cases of expropriation of US companies by Latin American nations. He refers to the 
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case of the US International Petroleum Company whose expulsion was described by 
Valesco of Peru as ‘the first step toward reducing foreign influence in Peru’s 
economy and securing the definitive emancipation of our homeland’ (ibid., p. 217). 
These policies were criticised by academics and leaders of the Western states. In 
1971, President Nixon resolved to punish Latin American countries practicing 
expropriation by halting all their bilateral agreements with the US (ibid., pp. 226-
27). Scholars were confused as ‘many features of the policies, concepts, and 
methods of economic development planning in such countries either do not make 
economic sense, or else would make economic sense only in certain specific and 
rather exceptional economic circumstances the actual presence of which no one 
has felt it necessary to establish by empirical economic research’ (Johnson, 1965, 
pp. 169-70). This inability to understand this new nationalist approach initiated by 
Latin American countries through existing economic and political theories triggered 
the search for a development theory. 
Garcia (n.d, p. 2) contends that Dependency Theory arose in order to fill the 
gap between Modernisation Theory of the 1950s and the re-emergence of 
neoliberalism in the 1980s. While Garcia refers to a temporal void, it would not be 
wrong to say that Dependency Theory also filled the ideological gap between these 
two approaches. Both modernisation and neoliberal theories draw universal 
blueprints to pursue development, but differ in their respective understanding of 
the nature and source of this development. While for Rostow’s Modernisation 
Theory, growth is internally driven, neoliberalism supports externally-driven 
domestic development (where even internal adjustments are externally imposed in 
order to allow an externally-oriented growth).  Dependency Theory bridges this gap 
and considers development as being both, externally and internally, hindered. It is 
interesting to note that while Modernisation Theory and neoliberalism discuss how 
development happens, Dependency Theory focuses on how it is prevented.  
Dependency Theory itself has many variations. There is the branch of liberal 
reformers headed by Raúl Prebisch; Andre Gunder Frank pioneered a Marxist 
version of Dependency Theory; and Immanuel Wallerstein presented the World 
System Theory reading of dependency. 23 As Ferraro (2008, pp. 58-64) observes, 
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although each has different purposes and respectively hold different assumptions 
about what the key element dividing the world into strata is, dependency theories 
agree on the basic principle that external influences are deterministic of national 
development policies. However, the discussion below will only deliberate ideas of 
the liberal reformers and Marxist strands. The World System Theory is excluded 
because, as succinctly put by Smith (1978, p. 576), Wallerstein’s analysis is not 
concerned about the underdeveloped situation of the periphery. He considers the 
periphery solely in terms of the part it plays in the global division of labour. 
 
Modernisation Theory 
Disappointed by the sidelined developmental future of least economically 
developed countries (LDCs), development theorists attempted to trace back the 
roots of their lack of development in order to come up with measures to outgrow 
their pitiable conditions. In 1960, Rostow came up with the Modernisation Theory. 
He distinguished five distinct stages towards economic modernisation and 
hypothesised that every country has to go through these five stages if it is to 
achieve economic development—regardless of its cultural or historical context.24  
Since Rostow’s doctrine of economic growth is entirely reliant on internal/domestic 
efforts, Modernisation theorists conclude that developing countries lag behind 
because of lack of initiative, investment and motivation on part of their respective 
states, and due to internal problems such as traditional cultures and overpopulation 
(So, 1990, p. 96). However, some academics question the validity of Rostow’s 
suggested development exemplary. Opposition to Rostow’s model became stronger 
when the model failed under Kennedy’s 1961 Alliance for Progress.25 Rostow had 
supposed that with a small amount of aid injected in Latin American countries, the 
later would reach the ‘take-off’ stage and could thereafter be easily directed 
towards fast-paced and comprehensive development. As it failed to deliver, the 
question that emerged was: if capital and technology are indeed fundamental to 
bolstering development, why do developing countries still suffer from a 
development deficiency despite years of foreign investment and aid? Since 
independence, Latin American nations have absorbed FDI in several of their sectors. 
But even after a century, the injection of capital, technology and infrastructure has 
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not brought development to Latin America. While evaluating the success of the 
Alliance of Progress in delivering development, Ish-Shalom (2006, p. 302) and Taffet 
(2007) underline how investment, aid and democratisation—desirable components 
of Rostow’s Modernisation Theory—are unreliable foundations of economic growth 
by themselves. These require a stronger policy retinue in order to sustain their 
implementation. Nevertheless, this still does not guarantee the delivery of 
developmental goods. 
 
Import Substitution Initiative 
During his term as the Director of United Nations Economic Commission (UNEC), 
Prebisch, with the assistance of Singer, came up with the Singer-Prebisch model in 
1950. He had witnessed the immovable development situation in Latin American 
and was doubtful of Rostow’s measures. Singer and Prebisch were certain that 
there is a division in the terms of trade of LDCs and that of developed nations. In a 
study titled Relative Prices of Exports and Imports of Underdeveloped Countries 
(1949), Prebisch defined LDCs as the ‘periphery’ and the industrialised countries as 
the ‘centre’. The authors claim that, over time, prices of primary commodities tend 
to decrease and prices of manufactured goods increase due to the value-added 
involved in the latter. Consequently, producers of primary commodities (the 
periphery) have to export more to the centre for the same price, and at the same 
time, they have to pay more for manufactured imports from the centre. The 
remedy to this unbalance that Prebisch and Singer propose is an import substitution 
initiative (ISI). Under ISI, the periphery sells its raw materials to the centre but does 
not buy manufactured goods from the centre. Instead, the periphery generates its 
own manufactures, thus keeping the earned foreign exchange within its domestic 
economy. As ISI targets the domestic market, it promises more opportunities for 
development, as profits get re-invested in the country. Among the countries that 
implemented ISI in the 1960s were, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, and Peru. 
Latin American countries pursued the ISI strategy not only for economic benefits 
but also for political motives. It was expected that the industrialisation 
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accompanying ISI would roughly equalise the national bourgeoisie and the working 
class.  
Import-substitution industrialization was not born as a cohesive development 
model; it gradually emerged as a response to the socioeconomic and political 
problems of the times. The successes of the liberal export-led model between 
the 1860s and, arguably, the 1920s generated a process of urbanization 
around trade, finance, and incipient industrialization that led to the rapid 
expansion of new social groups, such as merchants, financiers, the middle 
classes, and urban labor [...] The collapse of the liberal export model brought 
social tension among these groups *…+ Thus, in its origins, import-substitution 
industrialization is better understood as a bundle of industrial and social 
policies implemented by political regimes that sought to include the interests 
of middle and lower classes.(Silva, 2007, p. 69) 
 
However, ISI had the contrary effect. It was accompanied by difficulties and 
experienced a short-lived success. It failed for many reasons. Firstly, the peripheral 
states had to import expensive machinery required for manufacturing from the 
centre. Secondly, the domestic market of the LDCs could not absorb the expensive 
goods that were being produced through ISI. And thirdly, though it was initially 
geared towards a united domestic cross-class effort for nationally contained 
development, ISI later entrenched class divisions (Gülap, 1998, p. 955).26 State-
owned enterprises coalesced with the domestic elite to exploit the working class. 
Moreover, as ISI products were expensive and not accessible to entire population, it 
deepened social and economic disparity. Disagreeing with ISI and Rostow’s 
recommendations, Frank introduced the most popular strand of dependency 
thinking. 
 
Dependency Theory 
Frank devised the Dependency Theory in 1967. He was inspired by the 1959 Cuban 
Revolution and Lenin’s theory of imperialism. During his teaching job in Latin 
American universities in the 1960s, Frank witnessed expressions of nationalism such 
as Castro’s and Che Guevara’s Committees for the Defence of the Revolution and 
the Ministry for the Recovering of Misappropriated Assets. The later worked 
towards the nationalisation of land, businesses and properties owned by the Cuban 
upper classes and foreigners. At the time, Cuba had decided to eliminate all 
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parasitic connections between the developed and underdeveloped countries. 
Guevara (1964) warned LDCs about this destructive relationship: 
[T]here is the inherent contradiction between the various developed capitalist 
countries, which struggle unceasingly among themselves to divide up the 
world and to gain a firm hold on its markets so that they may enjoy an 
extensive development based, unfortunately, on the hunger and exploitation 
of the dependent world *…+ If at this egalitarian conference, where all nations 
can express, through their votes the hopes of their peoples, a solution 
satisfactory to the majority can be reached, a unique step will have been 
taken in the history of the world. However, there are many forces at work to 
prevent this from happening. The responsibility for the decisions to be taken 
devolves upon the representatives of the underdeveloped peoples. If all the 
peoples who live under precarious economic conditions, and who depend on 
foreign powers for some vital aspects of their economy and for their 
economic and social structure, are capable of resisting the temptations, 
offered coldly although in the heat of the moment, and impose a new type of 
relationship here, mankind will have taken a step forward. 
 
Lenin’s theory of imperialism reinforced Frank’s ideas (Lenin, 1916). Lenin identified 
a relationship of exploitation between the few capitalist oligarchies made up of 
European states, corporations, peripheral elites, and the poorer states and their 
general population. He postulated that capitalists manipulate the state into acting 
as an instrument of exploitation of the periphery and ascertain the domination of 
peripheral elites, European capitalist states and corporations. The state encourages 
producers of raw materials to produce and sell their goods to the core, at a cheap 
rate. The state also hinders the development of indigenous industries in order to 
keep the periphery dependent on finance from the core. On its turn, the core 
ascertains that the peripheral elite class is sustained so as it can continue gathering 
export income from the luxury goods sold to the peripheral elites. As a result, the 
wealth of the periphery flows to enrich the core and generates imperialism. Armed 
with a concrete Latin American illustration of the divergent development 
dichotomies inherent within capitalism, Frank developed an ideological framework 
to translate his experiences into a series of causal relationships. 
Frank’s version of the Dependency Theory moves away from a unitary state 
level analysis and sees capitalism as having created a singular network of 
development consisting of two levels: the metropolis, and the satellite. The 
relationship between the two is characterised by exploitation and subordination. 
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The singular network in which these two levels repeatedly occur, allows the 
metropolis to connect to the furthest satellite in a single stretch.  In this liaison of 
dependency, its immediate metropolitan superior claims the economic surplus 
generated by the subordinate satellite.  In so doing, the surplus snowball across 
several levels to reach the ultimate world metropolis. Therefore, the interaction 
between the metropolis and satellite carries out development and 
underdevelopment simultaneously—whereby the former develops at the expense 
of the latter. Frank does not grant the status of metropolis and satellite only to 
nations. This categorisation is valid within nations as well—where similar patterns 
of domination, subordination and surplus appropriation prevail among the different 
classes and communities (1968). He attributes this internally prevalent economic 
stratification to colonisation. At independence, the indigenous population who took 
over maintained the inherited hierarchical and appropriative administrative culture 
in the peripheries. This allowed them to have constant control and access to the 
surplus created, hence reproducing peripheries and constant underdevelopment 
(ibid., p. 71). Frank illustrates his theory through the example of Brazil.  
He traces the origins of Brazilian underdevelopment to the era of 
colonisation. During that period, the profits generated through the cultivation of 
sugar were repatriated to the colonial masters in Portugal and to a large number of 
Dutch land and sugar mill owners. Frank explains that ‘*t+he concentration of wealth 
in their hands, the transfer of much of it to the metropolis, and the structure of 
production whose greatest profit lay in producing a single product for export led to 
little domestic investment and production…’(Frank, 1967, p. 153). However, in the 
1690s and early 1700s, there was a decline in the demand for Brazilian sugar due to 
an overproduction across the world. Following this, the Dutch withdrew from Brazil 
and  ‘the Northeast of Brazil began to fall into decadence. The relative weakening of 
its ties with the metropolis forced the Northeast to turn upon itself; the 
development of the system as a whole produced the involution of its Northeast 
Brazilian satellite’ (ibid., p. 153). As a result of this involution, a livestock sector 
developed alongside the sugar production. The livestock sector became the 
metropolis of the indigenous Indian peasants and a Brazilian bourgeoisie was born. 
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With the involution of the sugar economy of the Northeast, its growing 
satellite livestock sector absorbed population which went over from the 
declining export economy to this relatively more subsistence economy *…+ In 
this Northeastern region of Brazil today rules coronelismo (gamonalismo they 
call it in Peru, and caciquismo in Mexico): the kind of all-powerful local 
economic, political, social and police chieftainship that the so-called “feudal” 
land-owner represents… (ibid., p. 154–55) 
 
In this way, although Brazil became independent in 1822, due to its initial 
expropriation as a colony and continued coercive subordination at the hands of its 
domestic elites, the country remained a manufacturer of primary goods and 
dependent on imports of manufactured goods. A representation of Brazil under 
Dependency Theory is shown in Figure 2.4. 27 
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Figure 2.4: Frank’s model of Dependency 
Source: Based on Frank’s work, 1967 
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Frank remarks how, despite the end of colonisation, free trade aided the 
proliferation of relationships of domination and subordination. The political 
independence of Brazil was not enough to liberate it from underdevelopment or 
the structure that produces it. On the contrary, independence placed political 
power in the hands of those economic groups whose vested interests were to 
maintain the Brazilian status quo. Simultaneously, the metropolis now Britain 
without the mediation of Portugal, replaced the increasingly outdated mercantilist 
instruments of metropolitan monopoly control by the newer and now more 
advantageous ones of free trade. The essential metropolis-satellite structure of the 
system did not change, either domestically or internationally. Thus, political 
independence did not produce Brazil’s economic development; and free trade 
consolidated its underdevelopment and the structure which inevitably generates it 
(ibid., p. 167).As mentioned before, Frank is highly critical of Prebisch’s ISI. He 
argues that not only has LDC development failed under ISI but the strategy has 
actively underdeveloped LDCs (Frank, 1976, p. 185). He also rejects Modernisation 
Theory for supposing that development is a self-contained national process that 
takes place in isolation. The following translated phrase appropriately sums his 
contention: ‘Development and underdevelopment are the same in that they are the 
product of a single but dialectically contradictory economic structure and process of 
capitalism. Thus they cannot be viewed as the products of supposed differences in 
the stages of economic growth achieved within the same system’ (Frank, 1967, p. 
9).  To him, this duality of development and underdevelopment central to the 
capitalist system traces its roots back to colonial times when the now-developed 
nations (colonial powers at the time) initiated the process of underdevelopment of 
the satellites. Nevertheless, the colonial powers, themselves had never been 
underdeveloped. As pre-colonial circumstances, which had allowed an independent 
development of the already-developed states cannot be replicated, Frank suggests 
that satellites can halt their underdevelopment only if they distance themselves 
from the metropolis (Frank, 1968, p. 75). Satellites should try for independent 
development and secure control over nationally produced economic surplus and 
capital. Yet, Frank admits that it is impossible for satellites to overcome 
expropriation by metropolises in a capitalist system. 
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Haynes (2008), on his part, points out that historically, attempts for contained 
peripheral development—such as the New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
and regionalism—failed to produce the desired results as they were unable to 
escape their dependence on core states. Cardoso and Falleto are of the opinion that 
there are only two options to stall underdevelopment: either LDCs should find a 
niche in global capitalism or a socialist revolution by the poorer sections of the 
periphery should take place (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979, p. 212). These 
recommendations have few takers. Junker (2009, p. 4) cites the example of China 
who initially pursued a socialist path towards development but has now resorted to 
capitalism. Gülap notes that revolution by the exploited in the satellites is unlikely 
to happen because the subtleties in the different levels of exploitation internal to a 
state are well camouflaged as yet. LDCs believe that they are being expropriated as 
a nation in its entirety. Consequently, they have not developed consciousness of the 
internal bourgeois-periphery divide. Therefore, a national revolution is what would 
be most effective in overcoming dependency on the metropolises (1998, p. 954).  
 
Criticisms of Dependency Theory 
Frank’s Dependency Theory is criticised for granting primacy to external factors 
while altogether ignoring possible activism on part of internal actors of the 
satellites. Tony Smith (1979) and Caporaso (1980, p. 617-621) disagree with the lack 
of autonomy Frank automatically attributes to the state and local actors in 
influencing interaction between metropolitan actors and components of the 
periphery.28  
We conceive the relationship between external and internal forces as forming 
a complex whole whose structural links is not based on mere external forms 
of exploitation and coercion, but are rooted in coincidences of interests 
between local dominant classes and international ones, and, on the other 
side, are challenged by local dominated groups and classes. … External 
dominations in situations of national dependency (opposed to purely colonial 
situations where the oppression by external agents is more direct) implies the 
possibility of the “internationalization of external interests (Cardoso and 
Faletto, 1979, p xvi). 
 
Cardoso (1973) echoes Evan’s ‘triple alliance’ concept in his ‘associated-dependent 
development’. Associated-dependent development extrapolates upon the role of 
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private actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs) and foreign investors who 
bring about development (though limited) to the periphery through 
industrialisation. Cardoso is adamant that:  
[a]ssociated-dependent development is not without dynamism; it is not based 
on ruralization at the expense of industrialization; it does not reinforce the old 
division of labour in which some countries only exported raw materials and 
imported manufactured goods. On the contrary, the distinguishing feature of 
the new type of dependency that is evolving in countries like Brazil, Argentina, 
and Mexico is that it is based on a new international division of labour. Part of 
the industrial system of the hegemonic countries is now being transferred, 
under the control of international corporations, to countries that have already 
been able to reach a relatively advanced level of industrial development 
(Cardoso, 1973, p. 156 – 157, italics original).  
 
As he is joined by Faletto in writing about dependency in Latin America, once more, 
Cardoso highlights that, the system of domination reappears as an “internal” force, 
‘through the social practices of local groups and classes which try to enforce foreign 
interests, not precisely because they are foreign, but because they may coincide 
with values and interests that these groups pretend are their own’ (1979, xvi). 
Dependency, therefore, involves a high degree of voluntary initiative from local 
components within the periphery. However, what critics like Cardoso initially 
ignored is that associated dependent development which the state carries out 
together with external actors, could not necessarily bring in profit. Cardoso (2001, 
p. 263-64) admits reticently while still trying to hold on to the functionality of the 
state, that:  
[w]ith globalisation, the State needs to recompose its functions. Thus the 
mission of the State to provide steering capacity for development becomes 
much more important than the patently ineffectual attempt to take the place 
of private enterprise in the production of goods and services which are not of 
an eminently public nature (...) due to its new role, [the State] should 
intervene less often and more effectively, as it has increasingly restricted 
options in terms of economic policy, as a consequence of the necessary fiscal 
discipline and austerity in public spending…  
Leys (1982, p. 104) draws attention to the implications underlying Frank’s 
recommendations to overcome underdevelopment. He quizzes the chances of 
having an autonomous capitalist development that does not generate inequalities, 
unemployment and instabilities. Tony Smith (1979, p. 278-79) flags a third critical 
aspect. He argues that Frank overlooks the development happening in the 
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peripheries. Although marginal, development in the metropolises is bound to spill 
into the satellites.  It is up to the peripheral entities how they choose to interact 
with their metropolises in order to absorb the latter’s technological and economic 
advancements.  
 
Contemporary Relevance of Dependency Theory 
Many argue that in a global world defined by technological, political, economic, 
social and environmental connectedness in which instruments of power like capital 
are fluid, Dependency Theory is out-dated in its division of the world between 
metropolises and satellites. But even if Dependency Theory is unfashionable as a 
theory, the conditions upon which dependency rests still pervade the capitalist 
global economy in the form of neoliberalism. Today, neoliberalism has assumed the 
position of a function of dependency; dependency is the reality, which is being 
acted upon by neoliberalism.   
In a description of the changed implementation of dependency, Chase-Dunn 
evokes the neoliberal mechanisms present in contemporary dependency exercises. 
The maintenance of peripheral status during those times [before the modern 
capitalist world] relied exclusively on the credible threat of military force. 
Today, the reproduction of the international power hierarchy is achieved 
more subtly through market mechanisms, and force is used only when the 
market "rules" (which act to sustain the dominance of the core) are 
challenged by insurrection (1995, p. 396). 
 
Indeed, the contents of neoliberalism and its demeanour confirm Chase-Dunn’s 
words. Neoliberalism has certain prerequisites which need to be fulfilled to enable 
growth and development. These are privatisation of state enterprises, tax reforms, 
trade liberalisation, subsidies cut, and deregulation, amongst others. Though 
implemented at the domestic level, these arrangements are mere contextual 
conditioning in order to fully integrate the nation and push it to participate actively 
in global trade transactions. The belief in the universality of this approach to 
development is evident through its endorsement and enforcement by the 
regulatory Bretton Woods institutions. Nonetheless, in this process, countries and 
entities internal to those countries get further tied to the externally occurring 
political and economic activities. It would therefore not be wrong to surmise that 
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dependency is now institutionalised in the form of WTO, IMF, Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs), the debt allocation/repayment system and the entire free 
trade idea (Ahiakpor, 1985, p. 537; Strange, 1998b). Ferraro and Rosser’s  (1994) 
discussion reveal how the IMF has entrenched developing countries’ dependence 
on international organisations and developed nations. They claim that rather than 
prioritising its initial responsibility of aiding peripheral development, by adopting 
the Brady Plan, IMF assumed the position of the guarantor of debt repayment from 
the developing countries. The Brady Plan of 1989 was an attempt by the US 
Treasury towards debt reduction. It called upon the goodwill of the creditor banks 
to forgive part of the debt credited to the developing countries, in return for 
guarantees for payment of the rest of the debt. Usually, it was the IMF and the WB 
which would be providing these guarantees but ‘*t+o qualify for debt reduction, the 
plan stipulates that debtor countries should be undertaking sound economic 
policies aimed at encouraging domestic savings and foreign investment and 
promoting the return of flight capital’ (Sachs, 1989, p. 88). Strange (1998a) too 
refers to the process of taking loan from the IMF and WB to demonstrate how the 
direct dependence of the peripheral countries on the core remains. She is 
particularly concerned that loan grants invariably still depend on the direct 
contributions of core nations. 
Over years and with increased experience, the shortcomings of the neoliberal 
development model have been addressed. For example, the harsh conditionalities 
for reform imposed under SAPs were revamped and granted more local ownership 
in the form of the PRSPs. Similarly, the IMF decided to address more ground level 
poverty and inequality issues through the PRGF.  Nevertheless, as 
underdevelopment persists in LDCs, neoliberals argue that the blame rests on the 
incorrect implementation of the advised pre-conditions by the home governments. 
They project underdeveloped states as obstinate and reluctant to let go of 
protectionism. In the neoliberal revision of its development strategies in 1989, the 
African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-
Economic Recovery and Transformation by the UNEC emphasised upon the need of 
a transformation of the ‘economic, social and political structures in Africa that 
hamper development *…+ the various forms of inequalities inherent in African 
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societies and *…+ the lack of democratic political structures...’ (Owusu, 2003, p. 
1659). Therefore, by advocating for greater openness to private—often external 
forces—in order to further development, and by curbing the autonomous role of 
the state, neoliberalism reaffirms domination by external forces.  
Haynes (2008, p. 72) asserts that Dependency Theory still reigns through 
neoliberalism mainly because the peripheral elites accept the logic of neoliberalism 
and are convinced that ‘There is no alternative’. Strange is of the opinion that there 
is no withdrawal route from the capitalist liberal market system, especially for 
developing states. Developing states need the connection to the core, especially in 
terms of technology and market, in order to facilitate development (1998b, p. 23). 
As Leander puts it ‘although openness may not bring development, foregoing 
openness amounts to foregoing development’  (2001, p.  116). It appears that it is in 
a similar spirit that Chinese SEZs have been assimilated in Africa. 
 
 Summation 
When the CSEZA is studied in context of the three major transitions across the 
world’s power tectonics, it is clear that this new zone form by China challenges the 
conventional routes to development. The unusually complex set of actors involved 
in the CSEZAs and the entangled inter-linkages across and within each entity, 
undermined the attribution of this endeavour to strictly structural or constructivist 
readings. Instead, CSEZAs transcend from being mere carriers of one-dimensional 
pursuits and are instead ‘trickle-down’ projections of a series of systemic global 
appropriation activities. The subject should thus be considered from a paradigm 
which believes that political and economic activities, entities and occurrences 
represent a pre-determined hierarchical structure. Frank’s Dependency Theory 
presents us with this opportunity. His Dependency Theory brings into perspective 
the capitalist context within which variations of power coexist, complement each 
other (whether negatively or constructively) and project their relations into new 
formations. In the given light, China assumes a dual position: of peripherality to 
Western states who lead the world order, and of appropriation towards African 
states. Frank’s advocacy of socialism as a possible remedy to underdevelopment 
resonates in China’s attempt to overcome its own underdevelopment at the hands 
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of the capitalist metropolises by creating the socialist-capitalist CSEZAs. 
Consequently, CSEZAs invariably launch into an underdevelopment of the African 
periphery—an underdevelopment which is actively aided by components internal to 
the African periphery itsel 
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Chapter 3 
Export Processing Zones, Special Economic Zones 
and Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa 
 
Chapter Statement 
A review of existing CSEZA literature reveals that academics make only fleeting 
references to China’s domestic SEZs. They do so merely in order to chronologically 
locate the emergence of CSEZAs. This chapter takes a step further and engages in a 
comparative discussion of EPZs, SEZs and CSEZAs, with the aim of responding to one 
of the key research questions guiding the CSEZAs study: what is the appropriate 
methodology allowing for a comprehensive understanding of this new zone form? 
Identifying the appropriate methodology implies the need to determine the 
constant variable to be studied, taking into account the extraneous variables which 
impact the constant components; and the nature of the interactions among the 
identified variables. The aim of this exercise is to eventually designate the overall 
contribution of the studied zone form to its external environment. It would 
establish how the zone relates to the existing global system. As this chapter 
formulates the methodology to be applied to a study of CSEZAs, it is able to confirm 
the networks connecting the CSEZA to the world order. Through the presence of the 
various actors, interventions and interactions in the CSEZAs which come out in the 
methodology, this chapter preliminarily identifies the possible routes of 
development that could be explored by the CSEZAs. Since no scholar has as yet 
attempted to draw a formulaic methodology for the evaluation of CSEZAs—or of 
SEZs from which CSEZAs are inspired—our initial reference point is the existing 
methodology formulated for the study of the EPZs. For this reason, this chapter 
starts by deconstructing the components and experiences of each of the zone forms 
and reveals that EPZs, SEZs, and CSEZAs are very dissimilar from each other. 
Therefore, the methodology used for the evaluation of one cannot be transposed to 
the analysis of the other. As it puts together the correct research method for each 
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of the zone types, this chapter conducts a comparative study of the unique 
variables each zone form is made of; the macro-economic framework within which 
each specific zone-type evolves; and the different actors the zones appeal to. The 
identification of an ultimate methodology for the study of CSEZAs achieved at the 
end of this chapter allows this thesis to establish the scope of the impact of CSEZAs, 
and in so doing, confirms the theoretical affiliation of the new zone form.  
 
Establishing the Connection between Chinese Special Economic Zones in 
Africa and China’s Special Economic Zones 
Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa cannot be comprehensively understood 
unless studied alongside China’s own homegrown SEZs, from which it is derived. 
Although reports by the WB (2011) and leading academics such as Brautigam, 
Xiaoyang (Brautigam and Xiaoyang, 2010; 2012), Farole (Brautigam, Farole and 
Xiaoyang, 2010; Farole, 2011) and Akinci (Farole and Akinci, 2011) working on 
CSEZAs do acknowledge the intrinsic link between the two zone formats, their 
recognition of this correlation is based upon the simplistic insight that both the SEZ 
and CSEZA are initiated by the same patron, i.e, the People’s Republic of China. 
Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2012, p. 806) ignore China’s own SEZ experience and 
observe that ‘*t+he Chinese government had no blueprint for the zones *CSEZAs+ 
and relied on Chinese companies to design them, in coordination with host 
governments.’ Publications treating the SEZ and the CSEZA together usually contain 
these combined accounts of these two zone forms only within their introductory 
chapters. They believe that the SEZ and CSEZA only connect in terms of their origins 
and definition. Any advanced analysis of the CSEZA, thereafter ignores the umbilical 
relationship between the two units. The CSEZA gets deconstructed in its own right 
rather than in relation to its affiliation to the tried and tested SEZ model. While 
sometimes academics measure the success of the CSEZA against their subjective 
deductions with regards to what a suitable procedural unravelling of the zone 
should be, most of the time, the deconstruction of the CSEZA is simply descriptive. 
By the time researchers come to evaluate the performance of the seven CSEZAs, it 
is noticed that they have tacitly established that each of the CSEZAs have their own 
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individuality. They believe that due to different political, economic and geographical 
contexts, the CSEZAs can neither be compared to each other, nor to the experience 
of their source SEZ in China model.29 Thus, the analytical benchmarks for the CSEZA 
are the latter’s own expectations and its professed objectives. While this outright 
CSEZA-SEZ separatist position adopted by academics warrants criticism, we cannot 
blindly assume that China, in fact, intends to replicate its SEZ procedures, 
experiences and performances through the new CSEZAs—unless we are presented 
with evidence proving so. Indeed, evidence supporting this supposition does come 
forth and we are provided with reason to believe that the SEZ is a constant 
reference for the CSEZA experiment.   
The unintentional disconnection between the SEZ in China and the CSEZA 
acted upon by the English-print academia is dispelled by the efforts of Chinese 
authorities. Endeavours of the Chinese government indicate that China consciously 
intends to replicate its very own SEZ model in Africa. Three events hosted by China 
designate such intentions:  
(i) The China-Africa Experience-Sharing Programme on Special Economic Zones 
and Infrastructure Development (Beijing, 14-21 September 2010):  Organised 
by WB and China’s MOFCOM, the event was attended by 30 delegates from 
African ministries. The purpose of the congregation was for the African 
participants to learn from Chinese SEZ home experiences so that they could 
apply the same to the Chinese SEZs they host in Africa. The agenda covered 
discussions about discerning which Chinese SEZ experiences are suitable for 
Africa. Three days of the event were devoted to fieldtrips, during which the 
participants visited the Suzhou Industrial Park and Kunshan Economic 
Development Zone.30 
(ii) MOFCOM Training on SEZs for Francophone African Countries (Tianjin, 7-13 
January 2012): The training programme was organised by the China Center for 
Special Economic Zone Research of Shenzhen University. It welcomed 
delegates from six African countries. The focus was on experience sharing on 
the subject of SEZs. 
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(iii) China-Africa Seminar on Economic and Technological Development Zones and 
Sustainable Development (Beijing and Chongqing, 16-22 January 2013): 
Organised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the 
International Poverty Reduction Center in China (IPRCC), the event welcomed 
members of 11 African governments to discuss the management and 
development of China’s SEZs. The delegates visited SEZs at varied stages of 
development. Feedback from the Mauritian delegate indicates that the focus 
of the event was on transfer of knowledge. The delegate had said that ‘we 
analysed the problems and challenges facing us and explored specific 
approaches to Special Economic Zones to improve our development and 
poverty reduction models in a sustainable manner’ (United Nations 
Development Programme, China, n.d.) 
The emphasis on experience-sharing, transfer of knowledge, and the inclusion 
of fieldtrips to SEZs of different abilities unequivocally denote that China wants to 
assist Africa in developing the CSEZAs to the image of China’s own SEZs. The 
agendas of the meetings also confirm that China attempts to do so in full 
knowledge of the functional modifications that might be applicable to the different 
African contexts. This confirmation that China wants the CSEZAs to unfold along the 
lines of its own SEZs imperatively calls for a detailed insight into the SEZ model. An 
elucidation of China’s SEZ model will create awareness of the strategies, objectives 
and performances that can—and should be expected— from the CSEZAs.  
 
The History of Economic Zones 
The designation of a specific space to contain commercial and manufacturing 
activities at preferential conditions is not a new practice.  Such liberalising principles 
were originally implemented under initiatives such as custom-bonded warehouses 
and free-port areas. Nevertheless, this practice attained the shape of tangible zone-
formation only with the advent of EPZs. A general characterisation of EPZs is that 
they are fenced areas accommodating industries mostly owned by foreign 
investors. These foreign investors are involved in the production of goods for 
exportation. They benefit from tax and import-export duties exemptions. The host 
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government usually subsidises their consumption of utilities. Infrastructure is also 
provided by the host state whilst local labour is employed in the EPZs.31  The first 
EPZs were built in Puerto Rico in 1951, under Operation Bootstrap, headed by 
Teodoro Moscoso.32 
The success of EPZs in Southeast Asia, Europe and Latin America set a 
remarkable trend which other developing countries were eager to replicate. The 
success and popularity of EPZ initiatives compelled academia to delve into an 
analysis of these zone forms: what makes up an EPZ; how to frame a policy 
framework which will grant the zone a greater chance of success; what are the 
support mechanisms required to aid its development; what are its deliverables; and 
what are the extraneous elements that contribute to its success. Authors such as 
Gibbon et al. (2008) follow the journey of the EPZ and inform us of the reasons of its 
eventually diminished popularity in the 1990s.  
Meanwhile, in the 1970s, China introduced the SEZ. In 1979, Xiaoping devised 
the Joint Venture Law to encourage the inflow of FDI in China. This policy aimed to 
gather capital in order to fund the Four Modernisations programme.33 At the time, 
China did not have the extensive funds required for this mass development 
endeavour, as it had been strictly following the principle of self-reliance since its 
Soviet split.34 The Joint Venture Law offered investors the options of doing business 
independently or in partnership with Chinese nationals. These partnerships could 
take various forms of cooperation (Nishitateno, 1983).  As these were new 
experiences of the market economy for post-revolutionary China, SEZs were 
conceived as spaces to contain these experiments. SEZs started by focusing on light 
export manufacturing, industrial subcontracting and slowly expanded to 
technology-based industries, specialised products cluster manufacturing, research 
and development (R&D), real estate and, agriculture. They eventually transformed 
into comprehensive industrial cities with residential and leisure facilities. This 
transition of functionality is described in Cartier’s analysis of developments in 
China’s first SEZ, the Shenzhen SEZ: 
In Shenzhen, China’s leading Special Economic Zone, the planning and 
construction of a new city centre complex are designed to symbolise the city’s 
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transformation from a manufacturing zone to a ‘world city’... (Cartier, 2002, p. 
1513) 
 
 The early SEZs were set up in the less-developed coastal regions of China. The 
provinces of Guangdong and Fujian were the first ones to host these zones. Within 
13 years of the establishment of Shenzhen SEZ, the export income of the province 
of Guangdong shot from USD 4970 million to USD 32.9 billion (Hongyi, 2006, p. 85). 
SEZs later multiplied across the country and have been estimated to contribute to 
the unprecedented economic growth and development of China. China has since 
developed several variations of the SEZ. It now houses 127 Economic and 
Technological Development Zones (ETDZs), 56 High-Tech Industrial Development 
Zones, 13 Free Trade Zones, 14 Border Economic Zones, 60 EPZs, 31 Provincial 
Development Zones, and 29 other types of development zones which include 
National Tourist Holiday Resorts, Bonded Logistics Parks, Bonded Port Areas, Trade 
Zones and Business Investment Zones (China Association of Development Zones, 
2009). 
 
Export Processing Zones and Special Economic Zones: Similar or 
Disparate?  
The advent of a new economic zone format called SEZs in a world economic 
order, which, at that time, already extolled the virtues of the EPZ, calls for some 
explanation.  Are China’s zones also not EPZs but under a new name? Or are SEZs, in 
fact, substantially different from the traditional EPZs? This discussion lies central to 
this thesis as it would determine whether the methods and theories used in the 
study of EPZs can be replicated in the study of SEZs, and therefore in the CSEZAs.  
This confusion pertaining to the closeness of EPZs and SEZs runs throughout 
the academic community.  Some authors use SEZ as a synonym for the EPZ, while to 
others, SEZs can be any form of free economic or trade zones (Zeng, 2010; Farole, 
2011, p. 27). SEZs can be freeport areas providing only warehousing facilities to one 
school of thought, while another group might consider the SEZ as the specific 
Chinese form of economic zone introduced by Xiaoping (for e.g. Nishitateno, 1983). 
In 1985, Sit prescribed a distinctive premise for understanding the SEZ. He 
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associated the free zone concept singularly to developed states and insisted that 
when such liberal policies are implemented in developing countries, they should be 
called EPZs. He affirmed that although China’s SEZ has similar characteristics to the 
EPZ, the SEZ is essentially different because of the socialist context in which it 
unravels. Carter and Harding provide another conceptualisation of the SEZ. They 
claim that the SEZ is ‘any area or zone in Asia which operates under a special legal 
or regulatory framework and offers incentives to enterprises to locate or which are 
located within the specific area’ (2011, p. 4, my italics). Through this definition, they 
classify the SEZ as a zone-type that came into being through a specific regional or 
cultural interpretation and reproduction of spatially controlled liberal economic 
practices.   
Such diverse definitions of the SEZ only aggravate the confusion regarding the 
origins of the SEZ and its foundational ideology. Often in academia, researchers 
disagree on the characteristics associated to a particular term and consequently 
prevent the creation of its definition. In the case of the SEZ, although academics 
agree on the features that make up an SEZ, they diverge on concluding whether 
such a compilation of characteristics calls for the formation of a new concept. Or 
should it be treated only as a variation of existing concepts which have similar 
basics, i.e. EPZs? Consequently, ideas about the origins of SEZs can be divided into 
two parties:  
a. those who believe that the SEZ was introduced in China, and  
b. those who consider the SEZ as yet another stage in the evolutionary chain 
of liberal economic models. 
In the view of the first category of thinkers, although the SEZ does contain elements 
previously identified in other free trade zones, its distinct ideology and motives, the 
actors involved, its foundational elements and its implementation strategies, grant 
the SEZ enough ground to assert its own conceptual identity. They argue that the 
SEZ zone is a different spatial formation and deserves its individual identity on the 
following grounds:  
(i) The SEZ was created to capture the capacity of a particular economic 
instrument: FDI. Taking recourse to Hirschman’s Unbalanced Growth Theory, 
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Litwack and Qian (1998) explain why China resorted to attracting FDI in such a 
structured fashion.35 At the time, China lacked the capital required for the 
development of all sectors of its economy. Therefore, the Chinese 
government decided to attract foreign capital to specific domains of its 
economy, in the hope that the resultant backward linkages will bring about 
comprehensive development. This is in contrast with the measures adopted 
by the EPZ. Although like the SEZ, the EPZ also intends to re-invest the income 
produced into the development of the nation, the ‘means’ applied to their 
pursuits differ. The EPZ considers its main instrument to be trade rather than 
FDI. As Warr (1989) clarifies, the EPZ does not bank much on backward 
linkages to bring about development and is content with the limited export-
generated foreign exchange inflow and employment opportunities created.36  
(ii) The SEZ comprises of a greater variety of activities. It includes manufacturing, 
residential areas and leisure facilities, real estate businesses, tourism, 
agriculture, horticulture, research & development (R&D) and many others. 
The fact that not all the activities in the zone generate foreign exchange 
income and its self-sustaining composition, demarcate the SEZ from the EPZ.  
(iii) The SEZ embodies an amalgamation of traditionally divergent ideologies. One 
of the recurrent descriptions of the SEZ is that it is a laboratory of capitalist 
market-oriented policies in China (Wong and Chu, 1984, p. 3). It is an 
experiment by China to test Chinese adaptability to capitalist liberal market 
principles and also an attempt at establishing accessibility and adaptability for 
rich foreign parties to invest in the country. Although these liberal policies are 
the norm in the West, they are new to socialist China. This novelty of liberal 
trade practices applied in the context of an alien political ideology that the 
SEZ embodies is described by Sit (1985, p. 86) as ‘a microcosm of two 
interacting worlds: the socialist and the non-socialist, but one which is under 
control of the socialist initiator’. 
The demarcation of the SEZ as a Chinese creation is so stark that Crane goes to the 
extent of labelling the SEZs as ‘both products and producers of China's new 
economic identity’.  
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However, there is another category of researchers who perceive the SEZ as a 
new stage in the evolution of liberal economic space structures: from freeports, 
warehouses, to EPZs and now SEZs. This position is endorsed in WB publications. In 
the introduction to a collection of papers about SEZs published by WB, Farole and 
Akinci (2011, p. 6-7) conclude that ‘*i]ndeed, recent years have seen a shift away 
from the traditional EPZ model. In its place, zone development is moving toward 
the SEZ model…’ Such understandings associate a pattern to the evolution of 
economic zones: countries start with import substitution, move on to export 
production, and then in an attempt to attract FDI and enlarge their variety of goods 
and services, developing countries constructed the SEZ. This closeness with which 
researchers treat both EPZs and SEZs can be read in the light of the Derridean 
move. The Derridean move stipulates that new articulations can be added to 
existing narratives to produce a metanarrative (a progressive continuity) so as to 
further the formation of a conceptual identity (Diez, 1999).  
However, this approach makes of the SEZ subject to being studied only as 
being part of a process that has pre-determined objectives, a set logic of 
functioning, and predictive—though inconclusive—results. It hinders academics 
from recognising new dependent variables relevant to the study of the SEZ and 
blurs out certain independent and intervening modalities previously overlooked in 
the study of the EPZ model. This understanding of the SEZ as a chronological 
extension of free trade zones and of the EPZ is explained by researchers’ concern 
for the need to revamp the EPZ. Trade and markets, which were the catalysts of 
development upon which the EPZ relied in the 1970s, do not have the same 
capacity to perform and deliver independently today. With increased market 
competition and the end of preferential treatments, the supremacy of trade has 
given way to FDI. FDI is now the principal development carrier. And the SEZ model 
relies on the primacy of FDI. In his comparative study of the EPZ and the SEZ, Ota 
(2003, p. 15) attributes the peaks of growth of Shenzhen, Shantou, Xiamen, and 
Zhuhai SEZs (especially Shenzhen’s) to FDI rather than to exportation and trade. In 
his analysis, trade and export income are only subsequent products of FDI. Thus, as 
developing countries seek the most efficient instruments for the acquisition of 
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capital in order to cater for their national advancement, a restructuration and shift 
from the EPZ and the phasing-in the SEZ is the obvious development strategy. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the evolution in instruments applied. 
 
Figure 1.1: Evolution of Zone Forms and their Instruments 
Source: Author 
 
 
While one party persists on the ingrained Chinese specificities of the SEZ, its 
opponents link the SEZ to the previous motives, functioning and outcomes of the 
EPZ. Regardless of whether it is with the aim of denying or confirming their 
resemblance, the EPZ is recurrently placed as a benchmark against which to assess 
the SEZ. In light of this methodological treatment of the SEZ, a comparative 
deconstruction of the EPZ and SEZ is required. This will serve to demarcate the 
fundamental differences which would allow each respective model to retain their 
independent identities, away from the basic similarities upon which they are both 
founded. 
 
Distinctiveness of Special Economic Zones 
As this thesis agrees that SEZs are distinct from EPZs, it conducts a 
comparative exercise to make its case. This comparative study establishes the 
specific elements of difference between EPZs and SEZs and also the substantiality of 
these differences. This is essential, especially since EPZs and SEZs do, in fact, share 
some common basic features.  
During the earlier discussion which established that the origin of the SEZ was 
rooted in China and that the zone format is not merely a new form of spatial liberal 
economic practice, three premises attributable only to the Chinese fashioning were 
identified: the use of FDI as the principal instrument; the expanse of activities; and 
the ideological context. While the third feature (i.e. the ideological context) does 
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not form a technical basis for a comparative analysis with the EPZ, the use of FDI 
and expanse of activities are technical disparities separating the EPZ from the SEZ. 
However, as these differences between the EPZ and the SEZ are based either on a 
chronological prioritisation of financial instruments (the SEZ seeks trade income but 
only as an eventual outcome of the main factor, FDI, and in the EPZ the first focus is 
export income although that comes through FDI) or, on the scale over which each 
zone is deployed, they are deemed ignorable. These contrasts are treated as mere 
practical variations to the EPZ format. Consequently, the creation of a new entity on 
such bases is dismissed. Instead, it is the similarities in their structures, strategies to 
attract investment and incentive packages—all features considered as key 
determinants of the success of a zone—that push authors to conclude that both the 
EPZ and SEZ are the same. And yet, a deeper insight in the literature indicates that 
such an effacing treatment is misleading. 
 
Table 1.1: Differences between EPZ and SEZ 
Source: Author 
 
 
Table 1.1 shows how EPZs and SEZs diverge in terms of their respective 
content, developer, implied reforms, forms of investment and, key instruments.37 
 EPZ SEZ 
Content 
 
 
Light Manufacturing  Real estate, Light manufacturing, 
Electronics, Tourism, Pharmaceuticals, 
Technology, R&D, Residential, Leisure, 
Supporting services such as airports, 
financing (stock market) 
Developers Infrastructure is provided by the host 
government. 
 
Government and private investors share 
responsibilities of initial infrastructures. 
Implied reforms All major reforms required to prevailing 
national policies and practices are already 
integrated in the incentive package when 
the EPZ scheme is designed. The only 
modifications carried out after the EPZ is 
established are the small changes to 
internal EPZ practices. 
Modifications are constantly made to the 
set of provided incentives in order to make 
the SEZ more profitable. Often these are 
reforms of national magnitude. 
 
 
Forms of 
Investment 
 
Largely private foreign investors invest in 
the EPZ. 
SOEs, local and foreign investors are all 
involved. 
Key Instrument It is the income generated through the 
export of the products that is the main 
benefit. EPZs produce negligible backward 
linkages. 
SEZs rely on the capital and expertise 
brought in terms of FDI to generate 
benefits. 
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(i) Content: ‘*T+he SEZ is a more comprehensive economic zone of considerable 
size than the EPZ, not a small enclave within a city engaged in modern export-
processing of manufacturing production. *…+ The SEZs were, by all accounts, 
more ambitious than the EPZ in terms of industrial policies and activities’ (Ota, 
2003, p. 5). Indeed, while the EPZ functions exclusively as a manufacturing 
space aiming for exportation and profit-generation, the SEZ is a self-sustaining 
area which combines manufacturing and production activities with residential 
spaces, leisure facilities, healthcare, green spaces, schools and other adjacent 
services. Not all the activities in the SEZ generate exportation-based income 
and profit. Moreover, technology and R&D hold high importance in the SEZ. 
Contrary to the EPZ, where technology means new machineries and the 
acquisition of skills (which relies exclusively on backward linkages to the 
domestic economy), in SEZ, technology is a purpose. Investors are encouraged 
to produce new technologies rather than just use new technologies. In 2008, 
Shenzhen SEZ registered 2,480 new patents (Yeung, Lee and Kee, 2009, p. 
230). 
(ii)  Developers: A survey conducted by Madani (1999) across East Asian, Latin 
American, African and Bangladeshi EPZs reveals that infrastructure and 
utilities are commonly the responsibility of the state and often, the rental fee 
of the factory buildings and utilities costs are subsidised. Warr supports this 
observation (1989, p. 69). On the other hand, although it is the central 
government of China which initiates the SEZs, a large part of their 
administration and development responsibility lies with private developers. 
Government provides the off-site infrastructure for the SEZ but the 
construction of the buildings within the zone is up to the private developers. 
Referring to Shenzhen, Sit (1985, p. 75) outlines that: ‘*s+ince 1982, 
Shenzhen’s role has been further broadened. It is to be developed into a new 
type of border city with the following attributes: financing and construction 
are to be mainly by foreign capital…’ 
(iii)  Implied reforms: The EPZ does not require macrocosmic changes in the 
country’s national policy to enhance its capacity to deliver. Nor does it need 
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constant large-scale reforms to the EPZ policy framework. All major 
alterations required to enable its efficient functioning are already included in 
the zone’s incentive package when the host government launches the EPZ 
venture. On the other hand, Chinese experience reveals that the SEZ requires 
extensive extraneous reforms to enhance its performance. These frequently 
take the form of national-level reforms. Wong alludes to three examples of 
reforms which started with Shenzhen SEZ.   
a. The introduction of floating wage rates as compared to fixed wage 
rates, and the contract labour system in lieu of permanent workers. 
b. The tender allocation system for construction projects. Wong points 
out that ‘Shenzhen was the first place in China to experiment with 
the practice of inviting tenders from construction units all over the 
country and to award the job to the most cost-effective construction 
team or company, resulting in increasing efficiency and reduction in 
cost’.   
c. The introduction of the workers’ home-purchase scheme whereby 
the worker pays a third of the house’s price and the rest is subsidised 
by the employer. Wong surmises that ‘*a]s a result of the 
introduction of the home-purchase scheme for workers and the 
changing attitude towards housing subsidy, the housing policy in 
other Chinese cities is now under review’ (1987, pp. 34-35).  
While these alterations started within Shenzhen, they were later adopted by all 
SEZs in China and afterwards even diffused through the rest of the country. 
Framed by such profit-conducive national practices, the performance of SEZs 
improved. Yuan et al (2010, pp. 65-66) add to Wong’s list of large-scale 
reforms. They identify:  
d. A switch to allow commodity prices to be directed by supply and 
demand. This was implemented in Shenzhen, with the aim of 
increasing opportunities for revenue maximisation by enacting 
flexible price controls.  
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e. Openness to foreign banks and the establishment of China’s first 
foreign exchange centre in order to allow profitable transactions in 
foreign exchange.38  
The nature of the changes that Shenzhen introduced as China’s first SEZ was 
so substantial that they escalated to become national-level reforms which, 
uroborously, granted leverage to SEZs as well as drew the support mechanism 
on which they could subsequently thrive. 
Along with reforms of expansive reach, the SEZ differs from the EPZ 
because the former takes liberty to modify its zone policies on a timely basis. 
Litwack and Qian (1998) give us a glimpse of this behaviour through their 
discussion of the patterns of tax restructuration that takes place within, as 
well as across, China’s SEZs.  They explain that China oscillated between 
unbalanced and balanced investment strategies in order to make the most of 
restructuration in, and spillover effects from, SEZs. In the 1990s, Guangdong 
province, which housed three SEZs, received high investment but paid low 
taxes. This allowed the SEZ to restructure. However, this laxity towards 
Guangdong SEZs was at the expense of high taxation and stagnation of firms 
in Shanghai’s SEZs. This trend was reversed few years later. However, in 1994, 
all SEZ preferences were eliminated and a balanced investment strategy was 
established. 
(iv) Forms of investment: The EPZ mostly relies on investment from foreign 
parties. The domestic private sector is usually only involved through backward 
linkages, i.e. through contracts to supply the EPZ companies with raw or 
intermediate materials. Jauch (2002) substantiate this discriminative feature 
of the EPZ in his contemplation of the shortfalls of EPZs in Southern Africa. In 
his own words, ‘*m+ost EPZ countries do not have a strategy, targeted 
incentives or the necessary agencies to promote linkages between local firms 
and EPZ companies’ (p. 111). On its part, the SEZ allows everyone to invest 
within its boundaries: SOEs, foreign investors as well as domestic investors. 
Nishitateno (1983) recognises five ways in which investment take place in the 
SEZ: 
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a. Processing of imported materials: The machines are Chinese-owned 
and the enterprise processes raw or intermediate goods provided by 
their foreign partners.  
b. Compensatory trade: The Chinese factories receive equipment from 
foreign investors on credit. China pays back in form of the products 
produced. When the credit is reimbursed to the foreign party, the 
equipment belongs to the Chinese factory.  
c. Cooperative enterprises with shared profits: The Chinese side 
provides the land, building, labour and services, and the foreign 
investor brings in the capital, machines and materials. The profits are 
shared as per the negotiated agreement. When the cooperative 
contract expires, the Chinese party owns all the equipment. 
d. Joint ventures: The Chinese party and the foreign investor divide the 
responsibility to provide the capital and equipment between 
themselves. Both of them bear the losses and profits according to 
their respective investment. 
e. Entirely foreign-run enterprises: The foreign investor owns and runs 
an enterprise in China autonomously. 
It is evident from the above options that, unlike the EPZ, the SEZ is interested 
in actively involving the domestic Chinese sector in the zone. Instead of being 
hopeful to benefit from backward linkages such as technology, the SEZ 
contractually ensures that the local Chinese companies have access to (and 
eventual ownership of) the equipment brought in by the foreign investor. As 
remarked by Yuan and Eden (1992, p. 1042), ‘*t+he SEZs were to perform the 
dual tasks of waiyin (introducing foreign investment and technology) and 
neilian (linking with other Chinese enterprises)’. 
(v)    Key instruments:  To the EPZ, FDI is the ‘means’. The ‘end’ to which the EPZ 
aspires is the export income that it will generate. In comparison, for the SEZ, 
FDI is the ‘means’ and the ‘end’. Yuan and Eden (ibid.) support this idea and 
argue that while the EPZ’s objective is to make out the most of FDI through 
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trade income, the SEZ appears to have no defined priorities. The SEZ is treated 
as a solution to all economic problems and it functions in a flux.  
Be it in the methods and approach they respectively adopt to pursue their 
development objectives, their industry focus, size, content, or the actors involved, 
the EPZ and the SEZ diverge from each other in a number of mechanics which 
eventually add up to create two different bodies. But one area in which the 
prevalence of the EPZ over the identity and substance of the SEZ is again felt is in 
the methodology used to evaluate the performance of the SEZ.  
 
Methodology to Assess Export Processing Zones  
Regardless of the hypothesis upheld concerning the origin of the SEZ and whether 
the substantiality of the differences between the EPZ and the SEZ is accepted or 
not, all readings of the SEZ are founded on studies which focus on the domestic 
framework. Researchers who consider the SEZ as a Chinese initiative, study the SEZ 
in line with Chinese national development. Those who regard the SEZ as an 
extension of the EPZ also study the former in a domestic context. This is because 
both the initiator of the EPZ/SEZ and the reaper of its benefits is the nation-state. 
Regardless of their preferred interpretation, the fact that the SEZ and the EPZ are 
both intended for national benefits, push researchers to measure their success 
according to indicators of domestic development. The common indicators are FDI 
inflow, domestic accumulation of foreign exchange earnings through exports and 
tax revenues, employment creation, technology transfer and, backward linkages 
(Roberts, 1992).39  
This selection of indicators is inspired by the incentive package that the host 
government offers to the zone investors. Researchers consider the balance left after 
having subtracted the value of incentives granted, from the foreign exchange 
income and social capital received, as determining the success or failure of the 
zone. Warr (1989) presents a benefit-cost analysis, in which, along with the EPZ’s 
financial contribution to the host national economy, he also accounts for the EPZ’s 
contribution to national welfare. To him, the benefits from the EPZ are in the form 
of (i) foreign exchange earnings which are ‘converted into domestic currency to be 
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spent on wages and purchases for the local economy’ (ibid., p. 77), (ii) employment 
and labour training,40 (iii) technology and skills transfer and, (iv) taxes. He excludes, 
(i) profit and losses made by the EPZ firms, (ii) domestic sales of faulted products 
from the EPZ firms and, (iii) purchase of domestic raw materials and capital goods, 
from this benefit-cost calculation. This is because of the negligibility of their 
economic substance, or due to their containment within the EPZ firm itself. Figure 
1.2 draws out Warr’s formula. 
 
 
 
 
                                           
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Formula to measure EPZ Success 
Source: Based on Warr's hypothesis 
 
Two elements, which according to Warr, may be classified as costs or benefits, 
depending upon the balance they strike, are, the use of electricity41 and domestic 
borrowing.42 When evaluated according to the above economic indicators, often 
the result is that the host nation’s domestic foreign capital accumulation is much 
lesser than the profits gathered by the foreign investors involved in the venture. In 
spite of this, the domestic context singularly continues to monopolise the attention 
of researchers and perpetuates the myth that the EPZ and the SEZ are unaffected 
by the global trade environment.43 Writers (Corden in Warr 1989) who do include 
the international element in their analysis of the EPZ and the SEZ tend to treat the 
relationship between the zone and the outside world simply as transactional, 
characterised by a symmetrical exchange of goods and money. They disregard 
possible interventions of extraneous variables. This restrictive perception pushes 
authors not only to neglect the impact external actors and events have on the 
success of the EPZ/SEZ, but also ignores the effects that the locally-based EPZ/SEZ 
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have on external territories. Figure 1.3 is an illustration of Corden’s Enclave 
approach, which follows this trend. 
 
Figure 1.3: Corden's Enclave Approach 
Source: Warr 1989 
 
However, there are authors, such as Sit (1988, p. 672) and Yuan and Eden 
(1992) who recognise the importance of going beyond the domestic in order to gain 
a thorough insight into the functioning and success of the EPZ. They identify a 
methodological triad which allows them to do so. Each author gives different 
appellations to the three crucial elements that they identify as determinants of the 
fate of the EPZ. According to Sit, they are (i) macro climate (ii) meso climate, and (iii) 
micro climate. Yuan and Eden correspondingly name them as (i) international 
environment (ii) domestic conditions, and (iii) role of the state. While Sit’s ‘meso’ 
and ‘micro’ climates, and Yuan and Eden’s ‘domestic conditions’ and ‘role of the 
state’ are centred on the domestic factors, the macro climate/international 
environment emphasises the role of the global trade environment in enabling a 
successful enclave-host country equation.  
Nevertheless, even their acknowledgement of involvement of the 
international level is based upon the authors’ understanding of the relativity of the 
‘international’ to the ‘domestic’. This means that the authors see the value and 
influence of the ‘international’ depending on how it is assimilated by the domestic.  
While this limited interpretation of the international is evident in Sit’s definition of 
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the macro climate as the ‘comparative advantages of the host country’ (p. 665, my 
italics), Yuan and Eden’s words also confirm this:  
While the international economic structure at any given time sets the context 
in which a country operates according to its comparative advantage, the state 
can be instrumental in observing changes in the international arena and in 
domestic conditions, evaluating these observations against national goals and 
priorities, and formulating and carrying out policies to achieve optimal results 
within the context of these constraints and opportunities (p. 1031).  
 
As they highlight the importance of the relative advantage of the national in the 
international realm, the focus is again brought back onto the domestic context.   
The central role that the domestic dimension occupies in the study of the EPZ 
can be understood in light of the set economic nature of the relationship that the 
EPZ shares with the international arena. The connection between the EPZ and the 
international environment is such that only international occurrences of economic 
nature, such as, changes in subsidies regulations, preferential treatments and 
market competition, have any relevance to the EPZ. These are set international 
economic conditions uniformly applicable to all countries. In this scenario, the 
domestic context is central, as it is the level determining how these international 
pressures are absorbed. It is the domestic context which decides how to manoeuvre 
these international pressures to its national advantage and to that of the foreign 
investor. Furthermore, as the technical nature of economics does not allow for 
much value-judgement and that the EPZ connects to the world on such a relatively 
apolitical basis, the domestic rarely gets an opportunity to engage back with the 
international after its one-way absorption of international pressures. Figure 1.4 
shows how the EPZ engages with the international.   
Given that the SEZ inherits the methodology applied to a study of EPZs which 
focus on the domestic component at the expense of the international component 
calls for the search for a disparate formula which would be more suitable to the 
particularities of the SEZ. 
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1 (UK) 
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(Qatar) 
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Investor 
3 
(Taiwan) 
Need to reduce production 
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Increase international competitiveness 
Pressure to restructure 
Notes: 
1. All three foreign investors (UK, Qatar and Taiwan) are investing in EPZ (A) as solely foreign-owned companies. 
2. Since all three are attracted by the set incentive package A, it can be assumed that the investors have similar features and pursuits, e.g. similar capital investment capacities, labour and skills 
demands, etc. 
3. Given that the benefits offered are the same—Incentive Package A—logically, this means that all investors opting for this package are facing similar problems. Hence, the external international 
elements, which act as the push factors for these foreign investors to invest in EPZ (A), are the same.  
4. Largely, the same international occurrences are also the factors to have pushed Domestic Government A to offer EPZ (A). 
5. These pressures are grand international economic occurrences which reach all countries uniformly regardless of their level of development, political or economic situation. It is up to the domestic 
context as to how to internalise these effects. 
Figure 1.4: The Export Processing Zone in Context 
Source: Author 
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Methodology to Assess Special Economic Zones 
While understanding the EPZ in a strictly domestic framework is acceptable because 
the EPZ is a national project launched and controlled by the national government, a 
similar treatment of the SEZ is not recommended. As academics insist upon 
evaluating the SEZ model using the same expected outcomes and success indicators 
as used for the EPZ model, the SEZ fails to overcome its image as a mere extension 
of its spatial zone predecessors. Its constant association to the domestic context 
hinders academics from perceiving the SEZ as an independent self-defining entity 
that can mould itself to exude as much value when practiced at home as when 
exported as a foreign public-private venture. Contrary to the uniform and set 
approach defining the EPZ, China’s SEZ is defined by an unprecedented flexibility. Its 
lengthy experience in China reveals that the SEZ has the ability to transform itself 
according to the needs of the environment and of the local economy in which it is 
situated. Though it started as an experiment of light manufacturing activities, in 
order to finance China’s growing financial needs, the SEZ expanded to the creation 
of products and services situated on the upper value-chain. Then, in the race to 
meet the new consumer demands, it developed residential areas and eventually 
became integrated cities. Its adaptability is further confirmed by the fact that 
though it started as a domestic endeavour, the SEZ can go abroad and do the same 
job as it does at home: its adaptation by Indians and importation by Africans is 
strong evidence of this. Moreover, as earlier discussions of Litwack and Qian’s 
(1998) works revealed, the SEZ allows a modification of its tax structures according 
to the financial climate of the country at the time. The five different options of 
investment patterns that SEZs offer to its foreign investors is further evidence of the 
openness of the SEZ to accomodate a variety of partners, each of which will deliver 
particular deliverables. As Nishitateno (1983) analyses the popularity of each of 
these SEZ cooperation patterns, he notes that each type of business association 
induces particular forms of investment, from investors of specific kinds. For 
instance, the cooperative style SEZ investment is more popular amongst Hong Kong 
investors and joint ventures are less appealing to foreign investors. This openness 
to a diversified approach within the same zone causes the SEZ to be at the receiving 
end of a variety of external influences. Rather than just assimilating international 
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pressures, SEZs responds to each of them in a way that it is able to optimise 
benefits from the challenges that they offer.  Figure 1.5 designates the plural 
external influences to which the SEZ is subjected.  
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1. China provides five different investment options in one SEZ. China has numerous SEZs, each with different incentive packages set by the provincial government. Every 
particular state incentive package offers the five options. 
2. Each of the investment options attracts a specific type of investors. E.g. 1. Businessmen who have a small investment capacity prefer cooperative enterprises. These are more 
likely to be local entrepreneurs. E.g.2. Joint ventures are seen as non-profitable by foreign investors as it is usually geared towards export and not the Chinese market. 
3.   Their different chosen patterns of investment indicate that the external push factors motivating each investor’s choice are different. (The ‘reaction’ of each investor—
represented by their choice of a specific investment pattern and package—points towards a correlated ‘action’ of a particular nature.) 
4.  The variety of external influences that intervene in the setting up of businesses in an SEZ in China confirm the imperativeness to include the study of the international as part 
of the evaluation of the SEZ.  
Figure 1.5: The Special Economic Zone in Context   
Source: Based on the work of Nishitateno, 1983 
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The customised adaptability of the SEZ concept is not restricted to providing a 
varied approach to foreign investors. It is also adaptable across countries and time. 
While Litwack and Qian’s (1998) explication on the timely pragmatism of the SEZ 
concept has already been covered in the earlier discussion of Guangdong’s example 
of constant tax reforms, the concept’s transnational malleability is reflected 
through the example of India. While Chinese SEZs have special contractual labour 
regulations for its employees, Indian SEZs abide to the same labour laws established 
for the domestic trade area (Special Economic Zone Organisation of India, 2006)   
If the distinction between the EPZ and the SEZ and their different 
methodologies might have been unclear still, the demarcation is obvious today as 
China’s SEZ departs from its traditional government-established form to become 
public-private partnership (PPP) projects, exported overseas. 
 
Developing a Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa Methodology 
Wong (1987, p. 27) once remarked that ‘the Chinese zones do not belong to any of 
the categories within the family of free zones now existing in the world. Rather, the 
SEZ seems to stand on its own as a separate member’. This observation of Wong 
finds renewed substance in 2006 as China exports this essentially Chinese concept 
overseas and establishes its first seven external SEZs in Africa. None of the 
preconceived understandings of the SEZ discussed in this work up to now provides a 
methodological scope to comprehend Chinese SEZs abroad. These new ventures call 
for a new set of knowledge; a knowledge which nevertheless, departs from the 
basic premises of the SEZ model.  
Presently, whereas China’s domestic SEZ is recognised as a national 
government endeavour, academia is yet to research its recent transformation into a 
foreign policy activity. Partly due to the novelty of the subject (therefore a dearth of 
information) and partly because of the yet reigning reluctance to recognise the SEZ 
as a different entity from the EPZ (with the capability to perform unconventional 
activities such as acting as a foreign policy tool), researchers have not delved into an 
in-depth analysis of CSEZAs. Nevertheless, existing literature on domestic SEZs in 
countries like China and India, and research carried on EPZs, provide us the 
background on which to build a framework for the study of CSEZAs. In an era when 
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free port and warehousing facilities were termed as free trade zones, the EPZ 
introduced the proper ‘zone’ approach to free trade-led economic development. 
Following that, the SEZ emerged and took the aims and implementation of zone-
based free market policies to another level. Since CSEZAs are replicating similar 
conditions of practice (zone structure, reliance on FDI) and aim for similar gains 
(economic growth and development), the methods, methodologies and theories 
used in the assessment of the EPZ and the SEZ provide a valid starting point for the 
study of CSEZAs.   
The identification of the SEZ as a pragmatic entity capable of functioning 
efficiently regardless of its context and of the actors involved, stand as key to our 
understanding of the new Chinese foreign-based SEZs. The CSEZAs bring three 
dynamics into play: (i) the host and patron governments, (ii) the respective private 
sectors of the host country, patron country and foreign investors, (iii) the 
international realm. As part of a ‘win-win’ cooperation strategy, these foreign-based 
Chinese SEZs are expected to bear the influence of both, the African and Chinese 
governments. At the same time, in their capacity as the developer or investor in the 
zone, the Chinese private sector holds major influence on the functioning of the 
zone. It is very likely that the influence of the Chinese private sector in the CSEZA 
will push the private sector of the African host country to organise itself and 
influence the zone either through the national government or by establishing 
partnerships with the Chinese private investors. Foreign investors interested in 
investing in the zone join this private sector momentum. Moreover, unlike the EPZ, 
whereby there is no patron government, and as a result, the host country and 
foreign private investors connect purely by an economic linkage, CSEZAs involve 
relationships between two politically value-laden states. In such a scenario, the 
CSEZA is no more restricted to affecting or being affected by only the two 
concerned countries. The foreign-based Chinese SEZ stands open to influences and 
pressures from the international community. This new canvas calls for 
innovativeness in the methodology applicable to the study of the CSEZA. Figure 1.6 
draws a comprehensive canvas of the CSEZA, taking into account its integral and 
constant interactions with all three—international, national and local—modalities.   
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Figure 1.6: Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa 
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Summation 
As a nascent concept, the CSEZA has to undergo multiple exercises of 
demystification. What is its origin? What are the indicators which allow an 
evaluation of its performance? What is its performance benchmark? Which is the 
closest known methodological approach that most appropriately permits an 
understanding of its dynamics? Having confirmed that China seeks to replicate its 
own SEZ model through the CSEZA, it is clear that the most appropriate approach to 
a study of the CSEZA is the one applied to the assessment of the Chinese domestic 
SEZ model. However, this transposition of the evaluational framework from the SEZ 
to the CSEZA is not as easily done because the SEZ concept itself is convoluted. 
Readings of the SEZ is divided into two strands: those believing that the SEZ is a 
specific type of zone which took birth in China in the 1970s (and was eventually 
adopted by countries, such as India), and those who argue that the SEZ is just a new 
stage in the evolution of spatial economics. Even as we establish (through a 
comparison between the features of the EPZ and of the SEZ) that the SEZ alludes to 
the particular Chinese zone, we have to resort to using the methodological 
framework of the EPZ in order to be able to establish the norms for the SEZ study, 
and finally that of the CSEZA. This is because the EPZ is the zone-format which 
immediately precedes the SEZ, and it is also one of the few to have been analysed in 
a structured fashion. The trend of integrating an ‘international’ element in the study 
of the SEZ is taken even further while methodologically conceptualising the CSEZAs. 
While the SEZ model brought the different levels of active two-way interactions into 
focus, the CSEZA combines geographic stratification (i.e. local, national, and 
international) with another set of diversity—that of actors of different nature.  
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Chapter 4 
The Seven Chinese Special Economic Zones in 
Africa 
 
Chapter Statement 
This chapter aims to fill in the gap in the evaluation of the seven CSEZAs.  To this 
end, starts by outlining the well-documented establishment procedures of the 
CSEZAs, and then moves on to draw a table listing updated information about the 
seven CSEZAs. This table introduces each of the CSEZA’s stakeholders, their current 
status and the problems they face. Through a comparative analysis of the gathered 
information, this chapter identifies three preconditions for successful CSEZAs. A 
cross-sectional study of these three preconditions indicates towards the repetitive 
presence of two elements which stand as the deterministic components of the 
CSEZAs. The two recurrent elements are: the presence of Chinese SOEs in the 
CSEZAs, and the land management issue. The chapter also addresses the hindrances 
to the successful delivery of a development-conducive CSEZA. As it recognises that 
the fault lies in the mismatch of the concept to different country contexts and 
objectives, the chapter evokes the respective responsibilities of the African and 
Chinese partner states in making the CSEZAs work. This chapter concludes with a 
reflection on how the CSEZAs can still be redeemed. 
 
Why these seven specific CSEZAs? 
The 2006 FOCAC meeting was not the first time when China expressed the 
wish to export its SEZs to other countries. An amplified portrayal of this ambition 
was presented in China’s 11th Five Years Plan drawn earlier in 2006. China had 
proclaimed its objective to set up around 50 overseas trade and economic 
cooperation zones (Brautigam and Xiaoyang, 2011, p. 69). This incongruence in the 
target figures for SEZ plans can be explained by the fact that while Jintao’s 
commitment to the ‘three to five’ zonal endeavours at FOCAC 2006 referred to the 
number of zones to which the Chinese government would be making an official 
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commitment in Africa, the remaining zones (some of which are also in Africa) are 
mostly composed of private overseas trade and cooperation zones towards which 
the Chinese government has no official engagement.44 Brautigam and Xiaoyang 
(2012, p. 5) document the composition of these two sets of overseas Chinese zones. 
They list examples of private overseas zone ventures by private Chinese companies 
such as, Haier in South Carolina in 1999, Haier in partnership with Pakistan’s Ruba in 
2001, and Fujian Huaqiao Company in Cuba in 2000, among others. They argue that 
it is only in 2006 that the Chinese government, through MOFCOM, decided to 
officially assist in the proliferation of these spatial economic activities. Brautigam 
and Xiaoyang (ibid., p. 6) underline that:  
[i]nitially, a minimum of 10 zones would be established abroad, with the hope 
that 500 Chinese companies would use them to go offshore, investing a 
projected total of $2 billion *…+ The zone program was not limited to Africa, 
but the first mention of the policy in the English media came when the 
Chinese president, Hu Jintao, pledged to establish three to five economic 
trade and cooperation zones in Africa as part of eight major commitments 
made during the FOCAC. 
 
Nineteen proposals for overseas zones were initially shortlisted to benefit from 
MOFCOM’s support. By the end of 2011, four of the projects were cancelled. Seven 
of the remaining 15 ventures are located in Africa.45  These seven SEZs are spread 
across five different African countries.  
As I conducted interviews and collected data on the progress and impacts of 
the finalised seven Chinese zone projects in Ethiopia, Egypt, Mauritius, Nigeria and 
Zambia, one leitmotif lingered across the accounts of all the African stakeholders: 
largely due to the political problems on the continent over the last few years, an 
assessment of the progress and impact of the CSEZAs has not been a priority. 
Indeed, with Ethiopia embroiled in domestic political upset and its military 
involvement in Somalia; Egypt undergoing a revolutionary change of government; 
Mauritius experiencing domestic political turbulence; Nigeria battling for electoral 
consensus since 2010; Zambia facing political demagoguery from successive 
leaders; and, against a background of succeeding financial crises, it is not surprising 
that policymakers ignore the capacity of these new spaces to be potential arbiters 
of economic development. Nonetheless, seven years after their official inception, 
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there is a pressing need to evaluate the deterministic and controversial dimensions 
of the CSEZAs. 
 
Establishment Procedures of Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa  
Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2011, p. 80; 2012) conducted a thorough study on the 
CSEZA establishment process.  According to the patterns they identified, MOFCOM 
puts out a tender and invites its provincial and municipal branches to publicise the 
CSEZA venture. Both, private companies and SOEs are allowed to submit proposals. 
The criterion of selection is made up of: the zone proposal; the feasibility studies 
which elucidate the market potential of the proposal and the favourability of the 
investment environment in which the zone will function; proof of support and 
approval of the host government; proof of the developer’s ability to put up projects 
of such magnitude; and proof that the company has enough funds to sustain the 
development work of the zone throughout. As a safety net, MOFCOM seeks 
companies which have recorded an annual turnover of at least USD 2.4 billion two 
years prior to their submission of the proposal for an overseas zone 
MOFCOM furthermore prioritises applicant companies which have a history 
of presence and cooperation in the host African country (Interview with Guining, 
2011). It sees previous business engagement in the host country as a guarantee that 
the company is acquainted to the business environment and must have business 
contacts. This criterion of priority springs from the importance the Chinese grant to 
networking in business. Proposals which score high on all of the above criteria have 
to then be approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs holds the onus to vet a CSEZA plan because of the political substance 
of the endeavour. As Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2012, p. 9) put it, this is because 
‘they were to benefit other countries through official Chinese government 
subsidies’. However, the authors highlight that these are performance-based 
subsidies. They are granted to the zone developers as and when the later build up 
the CSEZA, not before (for the list of subsidies, see Brautigam and Xiaoyang, 2011). 
Certain provincial governments also provide additional financial assistance to the 
CSEZAs. Brautigam and Xiaoyang (ibid., p. 83) mention the support of Jiangsu 
province and Suzhou municipality to the Eastern Industry Zone in Ethiopia (EIZ), and 
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Tianjin province’s provision of subsidies and insurance to the Egypt Tianjin TEDA 
North West Suez SEZ (Egypt-TEDA SEZ) in Egypt. The China–Africa Development 
Fund (CADFund), an offshoot of China Development Bank (CDB) also provides loans 
and partnership opportunities to CSEZAs. Currently, CADFund supports the Lekki 
Free Trade Zone (LFTZ) in Nigeria and the Egypt-TEDA SEZ.  However, financial 
support from CADFund is not guaranteed to all CSEZAs. Functioning as a market-
oriented fund under the now-commercial CDB, CADFund only invests into CSEZAs 
which it deems as financially profitable and viable (Interview with Dongya, 2011).46 
EXIM Bank of China also lends its support.47 Zambia–China Economic and Trade 
Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ) in Zambia received a concessional loan of USD 208 million 
from EXIM Bank of China in order to finance the construction of its mining plant 
(Davies et al. 2008, p. 26). 
In order to prove its eligibility for the government subsidies, the progress of 
the CSEZA needs to be monitored (Brautigam and Xiaoyang, 2012, p. 9). This is done 
in phases. Initially, the zone developers carry out a self-monitoring and report back 
to MOFCOM and to the Ministry of Finance. The two authorities thereafter conduct 
official assessments of the zones’ progress. Evidence from the case of ZCCZ and 
Egypt-TEDA SEZ reveal that China International Engineering Consulting Corporation 
is entrusted with the responsibility to audit the financial equitability and 
advancement in the construction of the zones (Ministry of Commerce, China, 
2010c).48 Additionally, as an attempt to secure the government investment that 
goes into these ventures, MOFCOM ties up the CSEZAs to risk management and 
insurance services under the China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation 
(Sinosure) (Ministry of Commerce, China, 2010b).49  
Until date, only the procedures that take place on the Chinese side are 
known. The role that the African countries assume in the negotiation of CSEZAs has 
not been documented. This imbalanced insight is because, as there is only one 
patron to the CSEZA projects, information about the procedures undertaken by the 
Chinese developers is coherent. Contrarily, the points of intervention of the African 
host governments cannot be determined as easily, given that they consist of five 
different government administrations. Resultantly, there are diverse versions of the 
host African country’s interchange with China on the CSEZAs. For example, while 
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Mubarak is the one who requested the Chinese government to construct an SEZ in 
Egypt due to his positive impression of the Shenzen experiment, in the case of 
Mauritius, it is believed that a Chinese company already established in Mauritius 
proposed the plan to the Mauritian government. The Mauritian government then 
convinced the Chinese government to support this project (L’Express, 2006).50 A 
MOFCOM official draws a more consistent account of the role played by the African 
host countries in the CSEZA negotiation process. According to the officer, the 
Chinese government seeks the approval of the host country. The latter decides on 
the willingness to welcome a Chinese SEZ. The host government also proposes the 
location of the zone. The two parties agree over the location. Thereafter, the 
Chinese government identifies the company capable of handling the development 
of these zones (Interview with Guining, 2011).51  
 
Details of the Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa 
Table 3.1 contains the details of the seven CSEZAs. Information concerning the 
cancelled Algerian Chinese SEZ is included in parallel in order to enable a 
comparative investigation of the conditions sustaining or undermining the progress 
of these zones. 
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Table 3. 1: Details of the Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa   
Source: Author 
 
 Nigeria: Lekki Free Trade 
Zone (LFTZ) 
Nigeria: Ogun 
Guangdong Free 
Trade Zone 
(OGFTZ) 
Ethiopia: Eastern 
Industry Zone 
(EIZ) 
Egypt: Tianjin 
TEDA North West 
Suez  SEZ (Egypt-
TEDA SEZ) 
Zambia-China 
Economic & 
Trade 
Cooperation 
Zone (ZCCZ) 
Zambia: Lusaka 
Multifacility 
East Economic 
Zone (LMEEZ) 
Mauritius JinFei 
Trade and 
Economic 
Cooperation 
Zone (JFET) 
Algeria: China-
Jiangling Free 
Trade Zone 
(CJFTZ) 
Start Date 2004 2004 2006 1998 then 2009 2003 2004 2006 2006 
Shareholders 
(with/without 
SEZ experience) 
Joint venture 
 
 
China-Africa Lekki 
Investment Ltd 60%: 
1. China Railway 
Construction Corporation 
(SEZ inexperienced SOE) 
2. China Civil Engineering 
Construction Corporation 
(SEZ inexperienced SOE)  
3. Nanjing Jiangning 
Economic & Technological 
Development Corporation 
(Experienced SOE)
52 
- 
4.CADFund 
 
Lekki Worldwide 
Investment Limited:40% 
1.Lagos State Government -
20% 
2.Federal Government of 
Nigeria- 20% 
Joint venture  
 
 
Chinese 
Consortium 82%: 
1. China-Africa 
Investment Ltd. 
(Publicly owned 
unit of Guangdong 
Xinguang 
International) 
2. Guangdong 
Xinguang 
International 
Group (SEZ 
inexperienced 
SOE)  
 
Ogun State 
Government- 18% 
 
 
 
100% Chinese 
owned 
 
1.Jiangsu Qiyuan 
Group (Private) 
2.Jiangsu 
Yonggang Group 
Co. Ltd 
(Private/Partner 
with  Jiangsu 
province 
SASAC)
53
 
3.Zhangjiagang 
yangyang pipe-
making company 
(Private) 
4.Zhangjiagang 
Free Trade Zone 
Jianglian 
International 
Trading Co. Ltd 
Joint venture 
 
 
China-Africa TEDA 
Investment Co Ltd 
75%: 
1.TEDA 
54
 
(Experienced SOE) 
Investment 
Holding Co. Ltd 
60% 
2. CADFund 40%  
 
Egyptian Chinese 
J.V. Company for 
Investment: 20% 
 
Tianjin TEDA Suez 
International 
Cooperation Co. 
Ltd. 5%. 
 
 
Joint venture 
 
 
1. China Non 
Ferrous Metal 
Cooperation  
(SEZ 
inexperienced 
SOE) 95% 
 
2. Zambia 
Consolidated 
Copper Mines 
Investment 
Holdings 5% 
(Zambian SOE) 
Sub-zone of 
ZCCZ 
100% Chinese 
owned 
 
1. Shanxi Coking 
Coal (SEZ 
inexperienced 
SOE): 30.2% 
 
2.Taiyuan Iron 
and Steel Group 
Co. Ltd (SEZ 
inexperienced 
SOE) 50% 
 
3.Shanxi Tianli 
Enterprise Group 
(Private) 
 19.8% 
100% Chinese 
owned  
 
Jiangling 
Automobile 
Group 
(Private/Partner 
with SOE 
Chang’an 
Automobile)
55
 
Size & Location Initially, 16,500 hectares, 
excluding seaport & airport 
area 
Currently, 3,000 hectares
 56
 
10,000 hectares 
Igbessa region, 
near IKEJA & Appa 
airport 
500 hectares 
35km from Addis 
Ababa, Oromia 
703.2 hectares,
 
within the 2,000 
hectares
 
North 
West Suez SEZ, 
1,158 hectares 
within the 
4,100 hectares 
owned by Non-
570 hectares, 
Near Kenneth 
Kaunda 
International 
211 hectares 
Near Port Louis 
harbour 
500 hectares 
N/A 
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 Nigeria: Lekki Free Trade 
Zone (LFTZ) 
Nigeria: Ogun 
Guangdong Free 
Trade Zone 
(OGFTZ) 
Ethiopia: Eastern 
Industry Zone 
(EIZ) 
Egypt: Tianjin 
TEDA North West 
Suez  SEZ (Egypt-
TEDA SEZ) 
Zambia-China 
Economic & 
Trade 
Cooperation 
Zone (ZCCZ) 
Zambia: Lusaka 
Multifacility 
East Economic 
Zone (LMEEZ) 
Mauritius JinFei 
Trade and 
Economic 
Cooperation 
Zone (JFET) 
Algeria: China-
Jiangling Free 
Trade Zone 
(CJFTZ) 
Access to Atlantic Ocean & 
Gulf of Guinea 
 
near South 
entrance of Suez 
canal, Sokhna port 
Ferrous 
Company 
Africa,  
Copperbelt 
Province 
Airport 
 
Capital 
Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Initially USD 267 million, 
revised to USD 300 million 
 
 
 
1.Chinese Consortium: 
USD 200million
  
 
2.Lekki Worldwide 
Investment: USD 67 million 
+ Rent free land at 
construction stage + 99 
years land lease + 
compensation to displaced 
settlers  
USD 500 million 
 
 
 
 
99 years lease 
USD 101 million  
 
 
 
 
Ethiopian 
government to 
bear 30% of the 
infrastructure 
cost 
Initially, USD 280 
million, revised to 
USD 460 million 
 
 
Egyptian 
government 
provides 
infrastructure and 
utilities up to the 
border of the SEZ 
USD 410 
million 
 
 
 
99 years land 
lease granted 
to the 4,100 
hectares of 
NFCA 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
79 years land 
lease  
  
Zambian 
government will 
provide road 
network from 
Lusaka 
International 
airport to the 
zone 
USD 80 million 
 
 
 
 
99 year land 
lease 
 
Off-Site 
infrastructure + 
compensation to 
displaced 
farmers 
N/A 
Phases/Sections 
 
Initially, Phase 1: 2009-
2014 was 
1,196 hectares, revised to 
150 hectares 
 
4 sections aiming to be 
developed over 15 years: 
 1. Light/medium 
engineering, logistics & 
distribution, leisure & 
Phase 1: 250 
hectares
 
 
 
 
5 sections: 
logistics, research 
&development, 
exhibition, 
residence & group 
Phase 1: 200 
hectares 
 
 
 
 
5 sections: 
living area, 
business & trade 
area, industrial 
warehouse& 
Phase 1: 2008-
2011, 134 
hectares
 
 
 
Phase 1: 
Integrated 
Support Service 
Centre, office 
buildings & 
N/A  
 
 
 
 
5 sections: 
free trade zone, 
added value 
processing zone, 
international 
Phase 1:2009-
2012 road 
network & 
utilities, 
industrial zone, 
business centre, 
hospitality 
 
Phase 2: 2010-
2016 
N/A 
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 Nigeria: Lekki Free Trade 
Zone (LFTZ) 
Nigeria: Ogun 
Guangdong Free 
Trade Zone 
(OGFTZ) 
Ethiopia: Eastern 
Industry Zone 
(EIZ) 
Egypt: Tianjin 
TEDA North West 
Suez  SEZ (Egypt-
TEDA SEZ) 
Zambia-China 
Economic & 
Trade 
Cooperation 
Zone (ZCCZ) 
Zambia: Lusaka 
Multifacility 
East Economic 
Zone (LMEEZ) 
Mauritius JinFei 
Trade and 
Economic 
Cooperation 
Zone (JFET) 
Algeria: China-
Jiangling Free 
Trade Zone 
(CJFTZ) 
residential & tourism 
2. Petro-chemical 
industries, port facilities, if 
approved a methanol plant 
3.Medium/light/heavy 
industries, workers housing  
 4. Waterside town, 
commercial, community & 
recreational uses, 
administrative, business & 
residential centre 
management 
service at the 
centre. 
storage, public 
infrastructure 
facilities, green 
land & inland 
road area 
apartments  
 
Phase 2: 
Strengthen 
landscaping 
business zone, 
technology 
innovation zone 
and life zone 
solar power 
generation, 
ocean products 
processing, 
medication & 
medical 
instruments, 
stainless steel 
product 
processing, 
education, real 
estate
57
 
Industries/Activit
ies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oil & gas, business & 
financial services, media 
centres, real estate, 
agriculture, food & 
beverages, mining, 
pharmaceuticals, retail, 
forestry, employees 
residence, golf course, 
tourism, private villas, sport 
centres, conference 
facilities, manufacturing 
Furniture, 
ceramic, 
hardware, 
manufacturing, 
packaging, 
printing, paper, 
electronic, solar 
products, plastic, 
daily chemical, 
leather products, 
tourism, toys, 
transportation, 
autoparts, food 
processing, 
agriculture, 
beverage, 
pharmaceutical, 
entrepôt trade 
Construction 
materials, steel 
products, leather 
products, 
agricultural 
equipment, 
textile, shoes, 
food processing 
Petroleum 
equipment, 
electrical 
appliance, textile 
& automobile 
manufacturing, 
Confucius 
Institute, 
chemicals 
Non-ferrous 
metal mining, 
smelting, non-
ferrous metal 
processing, 
derived 
product of non-
ferrous metal, 
light industry, 
productive 
service 
Manufacturing, 
real estate, 
logistics, trade & 
business service, 
complementary 
service & new 
technology. 
Revised to Sino-
African 
friendship 
platform, 
Oriental 
entertainment 
centre, 
exhibitions 
centre, 
convention 
centre, 
parks, tourism, 
school, 
commercial, real 
estate, ICT, R&D 
warehousing & 
logistics, villas 
private clinics 
universities, 
multipurpose 
Automobile 
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 Nigeria: Lekki Free Trade 
Zone (LFTZ) 
Nigeria: Ogun 
Guangdong Free 
Trade Zone 
(OGFTZ) 
Ethiopia: Eastern 
Industry Zone 
(EIZ) 
Egypt: Tianjin 
TEDA North West 
Suez  SEZ (Egypt-
TEDA SEZ) 
Zambia-China 
Economic & 
Trade 
Cooperation 
Zone (ZCCZ) 
Zambia: Lusaka 
Multifacility 
East Economic 
Zone (LMEEZ) 
Mauritius JinFei 
Trade and 
Economic 
Cooperation 
Zone (JFET) 
Algeria: China-
Jiangling Free 
Trade Zone 
(CJFTZ) 
manufacturing 
unit, pre- built 
plant & 
production units 
Status 
 
 
Phase 1  under construction 
 
 
 
 
48 companies have 
committed for investment 
Phase 1 under 
construction 
 
 
 
 
11 companies 
committed  
30 expressions of 
interest 
2 operational 
9 operational 
enterprises 
Phase 1 
completed 
28 operational 
companies  
 
 
 
Negotiating phase 
two 
17 operational 
companies  
 
Zambian 
government 
working on 
road, water & 
power supply 
 
12 foreign 
expressions of 
interest & 10 
local expressions 
of interest 
Mauritian 
government has 
already set-up 
road & utilities 
Stalled 
Labour 800 Chinese & Nigerians 
employed 
More than 600 
locals employed 
 
N/A 1042 local jobs 3300 local jobs  
700 Chinese 
workers 
N/A N/A N/A 
Achievements N/A N/A N/A 2010: USD 29 
million export 
income 
2012: USD 
4.35billion 
sales 
N/A N/A N/A 
Issues 1. Displaced settlers & 
farmers
58
 
2.Greater portion of 
residential spaces 
3.Toll-road on Lekki/Epe 
Axis to reach LFTZ
59
 
4.Poor power supply  
5. Renegotiation
60
  
1. Investors 
relocating as they 
see the zone as 
unprofitable since 
Nigerian 
manufacturers 
import finished 
goods to sell 
locally.
61
 
2.Unfriendly 
1.Security 
issues
62
 
2.Displaced 
farmers 
3. Duty free 
importation of 
clinker for zone 
construction
63
 
4. Acquisition of 
additional 320 
New demands for 
Phase 2: (i) Land 
ownership rather 
than rental as 
condition for the 
development of 
phase 2 which 
consists of the 
remaining 570
 
hectares  (ii) An 
1.Salaries 
below 
minimum wage 
threshold 
2. Overlapping 
of control 
between Non 
Ferrous 
Company Africa 
(NFCA) & ZCCZ 
Delay due to 
lack of 
investment 
interest 
1.Displaced 
farmers 
2.Lack of 
investment 
interest 
3.Seeking to 
develop real 
estate 
Reforms 
requiring foreign 
investors to 
have Algerian 
partners as 
majority 
shareholders
66
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 Nigeria: Lekki Free Trade 
Zone (LFTZ) 
Nigeria: Ogun 
Guangdong Free 
Trade Zone 
(OGFTZ) 
Ethiopia: Eastern 
Industry Zone 
(EIZ) 
Egypt: Tianjin 
TEDA North West 
Suez  SEZ (Egypt-
TEDA SEZ) 
Zambia-China 
Economic & 
Trade 
Cooperation 
Zone (ZCCZ) 
Zambia: Lusaka 
Multifacility 
East Economic 
Zone (LMEEZ) 
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Preconditions for Successful Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa 
Of the seven CSEZAs, Egypt-TEDA SEZ and ZCCZ are conspicuous as the successful 
ones in terms of their advanced stage of development, financial returns, 
employment creation and the amount of investment they have attracted.67 LFTZ 
too, is at a comparatively advanced stage in the first phase of its construction. 
Notwithstanding the few years head start they have on the rest of the CSEZAs, the 
relative bankability of these three CSEZAs can be associated to three technicalities: 
 
1. Involvement of Chinese SOEs who hold a majority of the shares 
within a joint venture with the host African government. 
In 1998, when Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area (TEDA) first 
attempted to launch a Chinese SEZ with local partners in Egypt, it held only 10 per 
cent of equity in the venture. The zone did not take off. In 2000, TEDA started a 
wholly self-owned industrial park in Egypt and it was relatively more successful 
(Brautigam and Xioayang, 2011, pp. 75-6). In 2008, TEDA reverted to the joint 
venture format. It kept the majority shareholding and ascertained a small 
participatory stake by the Egyptian state through the Egypt Chinese Corporation for 
Investment. Satisfied with this equity pattern, TEDA is now seeking an extension of 
the zone territory. The same scenario is repeated in ZCCZ, whereby China Non-
Ferrous Metal Cooperation (CNMC) dominates company action though the Zambian 
government is present in its management. Similarly, LFTZ incorporates the Lagos 
state government and the federal government through partial shareholding. In 
comparison, Chinese developers who have decided to ‘go-alone’ in the form of 100 
per cent Chinese-owned SEZ ventures (i.e. Ethiopia, Mauritius and Algeria) have 
faced difficulties in launching their zones, or have even been led to cancel the 
project, in the case of Algeria. 
 
2. The SOEs involved in the CSEZAs have previous experience in zone 
management. 
Egypt-TEDA and LFTZ are the only two CSEZAs in which the companies involved are 
SOEs who have previous experience in SEZ management. While TEDA operates eight 
zones in China (Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area, Micro-
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Electronics Industry Park, Yat-Sen Scientific Industry Park, TEDA Industrial Park 
subzones, Tianjin EPZ, West Area expansion of TEDA, Micro-Electronics Industry 
Park Jinnan and Nangang Industrial Zone), Nanjing Jiangning Economic and 
Technological Development Corporation of ZCCZ is the establisher of the national-
level high-tech zone, Nanjing Jiangning Economic and Technological Development 
Zone.  
Although both Egypt-TEDA and LFTZ face hurdles, their difficulties are 
externally imposed (e.g. public discontent about the toll road in the case of LFTZ, 
political turbulence in Egypt, and so on).  The zone promoters have little control 
over them. As for the remaining five zones, the nature of their problems confirm 
that the principal deficiency is internal to their SEZ management. Investors from 
OGFTZ are relocating as the zone’s fiscal environment is not competitive to the local 
Nigerian environment; JFET has failed to attract investors; EIZ and OGFTZ are both 
showing signs of closing onto themselves and functioning as ghettos by putting in 
place intense security measures. EIZ further estranges itself from its host 
community by insisting upon the importation of clinker from China instead of 
cooperating with local cement suppliers.  
 
3. The SOEs are specialists in the service or production activity towards 
which the CSEZA is predominantly geared. 
Developers who have a familiar industry as their investment area have more 
chances of delivering a well-developed and serviceable CSEZA. ZCCZ is an example. 
In principle, ZCCZ does not conform to the CSEZA model implemented in the other 
six cases. It only focuses on one specific industry, i.e. non-ferrous metals and allied 
products. Thus, technically, ZCCZ functions as an industrial cluster. By applying its 
lengthy experience of the non-ferrous metal business and using its contacts, CNMC 
has set-up this lucrative Chinese SEZ in Zambia. However, CNMC simultaneously 
rectifies its unconventionality by building a complementary sub-zone in Lusaka 
whereby it accommodates diverse economic and commercial activities found in the 
conventional CSEZA model. As the cases of ZCCZ and LMEEZ depict, it is through the 
revenue received from the good performance of a zone where a known product is 
handled that the developer can consider venturing into unfamiliar economic 
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activities. In spite of this, due to a lack of experience in SEZ management and in 
handling such diverse investment areas, LMEEZ faces difficulties in attracting 
investors.  
These three logistical particularities identified are not mutually exclusive. A 
deficiency in one aspect compromises the ability of the CSEZA to deliver a successful 
venture. Egypt-TEDA ticks all three boxes—with TEDA’s 28 years of experience in 
SEZ development making up for the product or service specialisation required. 
While two of the three SOEs handling LFTZ are inexperienced in SEZ management, 
Nanjing Jiangning Economic and Technological Development Corporation—their 
only SEZ knowledgeable partner—specialises in information technology, 
automobiles and high technology activities. As its specialisation does not match 
what is being developed in the Nigerian SEZ, Nanjing Jiangning Economic and 
Technological Development Corporation is unable to deliver a good SEZ 
performance in this differed investment portfolio. And although CNMC’s aptitude at 
metallurgy gives it a profitable ZCCZ at Chambishi, its lack of experience in SEZ 
management exacerbates its contested treatment of its employees. ZCCZ’s 
specialisation in mining does not grant it access to other investment areas which it 
intends to develop in the Lusaka sub-zone. However, one component which 
noticeably recurs across the three prerequisites is the presence of Chinese SOEs. 
 
Deterministic Components of Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa 
Along with an identification of the premises allowing a successful CSEZA, the three 
preconditions also point towards actors and actions which compromise the ability 
of the zones to deliver the required development to Africa. This section discusses 
these controversial components.  
 
1. The Centrality of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises 
All of the three pre-requisites for successful CSEZAs ascribe a central role to Chinese 
SOEs. However, this observation is inconsistent with the stance generally adopted 
by researchers on the topic. Often, the role of SOEs in making the CSEZAs profitable 
is taken for granted, imperative or negligible. Brautigam presents such a disengaged 
view: 
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Two of the zone projects were originally led by national-level, state-owned 
enterprises: CNMC and CCECC. Others were companies owned by provincial 
or municipal governments in Jiangling, Shanxi, Jiangsu, Guangdong or 
Tianjin. Tianli Group and Qiyuan Group, the original developers of the 
Mauritius and Ethiopia zones, respectively, were private companies. The 
business models for these ventures varied (2011, p. 36). 
 
Contrary to the above assumption, Chinese SOEs are omnipresent across the 
shareholding of the seven CSEZAs. Even though the Ethiopian and Algerian units are 
led by private enterprises from China, the Chinese state is a major stakeholder in the 
leading companies of both private consortiums; either through provincial state 
administrations, or directly. In the case of Ethiopia, Jiangsu Yonggang Group Co. Ltd 
is a private company founded in partnership with the Jiangsu Province State-Owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). The Algerian promoter, 
Jiangling Automobile Group, has direct shareholding links with the national 
Chang’an automobile. This partiality to SOEs is in line with China’s usual approach. 
China prefers engaging SOEs when starting a new experiment in the investment 
sector (See Buckley et al, 2008, for a description of the pioneering role of SOEs in 
outward investment). The favourable history and experience of SOEs, coupled with 
their centralised institutional control, make them the preferred delegates to be 
trusted with the management of these bilateral zone projects of high diplomatic 
significance.68 
Xu (Interviewed in 2011) explains that initially, Chinese SOEs played a small 
role in domestic SEZs because the latter were designed to be experimental spaces 
led by capitalist market-conditions rather than by socialist preferences. Now, the 
role of SOEs in SEZs at home and abroad, is bigger for two reasons: 
(i) According to China’s Constitution, land is owned by the state. Hence, the 
priority of land development is entrusted to SOEs. They enjoy larger expanses 
of land without paying rent at market value. 
(ii) SOEs have easier access to bank loans in China. Bank loans are usually at low 
interest rates determined by the state. This allows SOEs to borrow more as 
they end up extracting greater profits. Private companies, on the other hand, 
do not benefit from such easy loans.69 This liberal access to easy loans adds to 
SOEs’ comparative weight as they venture abroad to build CSEZAs. 
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Xu comments that the success of SOEs in domestic SEZs comes from the context 
within which they function at home: within China, SOEs deal with competition from 
private companies, and, from other provincial SOEs.70  He expresses concern that if 
Chinese SOEs go abroad to set-up CSEZAs without any competitors, they will 
monopolise the zones. A complacent attitude might take over and the SOEs might 
become inefficient. The availability of cheap capital from Chinese banks will ease 
the pressure to deliver profitable CSEZAs. The current situation in Egypt-TEDA and 
ZCCZ demonstrate this reaction. Thus, merely by virtue of their function and status, 
Chinese SOEs reduce the competitiveness as well as developmental value of the 
CSEZAs. 
 
2. Land Management 
As evoked in Chapter 1, another dimension of the CSEZA which determines its 
contributive or exploitative nature, is land. As ascertained by MOFCOM (Interview 
with Guining, 2011), the decision concerning which plot to acquire is left to the 
African host government. Potential locations are discussed and then agreed upon 
by both parties. The Director of the Board of Investment (BOI), Mauritius confirms 
this site selection process (Interview with Poonoosamy, 2011). In the case of JFET, 
Chinese developers favoured the Riche-Terre site over two other options due to its 
proximity to the harbour.  
In spite of these regulated land acquisition procedures, Table 3.1 indicates 
how there were concessions over this one principal natural resource of the host 
African countries. The concerned African governments bear the following 
accompanying costs as they lease out the land for the CSEZAs:  
(i) Cost of clearing the land: Civil aviation satellite cables earthed under part of 
the JFET site had to be cleared. The LFTZ site had to undergo refilling as the 
land consistency was inadequate for construction (Mthembu-Salter, 2009, p. 
2). 
(ii) Compensation costs to displaced settlers and farmers: LFTZ involved the 
displacement of 36 pastoral and fishing communities (Social and Economic 
Rights Action, n.d). Lagos state gave out USD 4 million as compensation to the 
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settlers affected by phase one of LFTZ.  They would soon also be allocated 750 
hectares with occupancy certificates (Akinsanmi, 2010).  Some settlers are 
contesting the compensation. In Mauritius, 121 planters were evacuated. 
Most of the planters agreed to the cash compensation of USD 3,850 each, and 
those who had been actively cultivating the land were additionally allocated 
new plots for cultivation (Noël and Ramkissoon, 2010).  
(iii) Rent concessions: The lease for the LFTZ and OGFTZ land are for 99 years. It is 
moreover rent-free at the construction stage. JFET and ZCCZ too, have 99 
years leases, while LMEEZ has a 79 years lease. All leases have been granted 
on concessionary rates. Since most of these zones are still undeveloped, the 
host governments are not optimising upon the concession granted. Therefore, 
they bear the loss of an optimum rent from the land. 
(iv) Cost of forgone development: JFET’s location prevents further expansion of 
the harbour, because while JFET sits on one side of the port, the other side 
has been leased out to Indian private developers for an integrated city project 
called Neotown. In the absence of these projects, Mauritius could have had 
benefitted from a port expansion at this time when, due to proliferation of 
Somalian pirates activities, a diversion of sea route from Asia to Africa is 
endorsed. Figure 3. 1 locates JFET and Neotown in relation to the Mauritian 
harbour. 
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                   Figure 3.1: Location of JFET and Neotown in relation to the Port-Louis 
harbour  
Source: Google Map 2013 
 
(v) Security: Egypt-TEDA SEZ is seeking to own (rather than lease) the land over 
which the CSEZA has expanded. This land borders the Suez Canal (Interview 
with Commercial Secretaries, 2011). This move has obvious security 
implications. Figure 3.2 and 3.3 locate Egypt-TEDA SEZ in relation to the Suez 
Canal. Mauritius too might find itself in an unsolicited military axis between 
China (resting at JFET) and India, Mauritius hands over Agalega71 to India. It is 
currently rumoured that this Mauritian dependency would be given to India to 
use for its military purposes.72 Already, the US and France have military bases 
in the nearby Diego Garcia and Tromelin islands, respectively.73  Figure 3.4 
draws this axis. 
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       Figure 3.2: Egypt-TEDA Location in Relation to Suez Canal  
          Source: Google Map 2013 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Egypt-TEDA Location  
Source: Google Map 2013 
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Figure 3.4: Location of Mauritius in relation to Agalega and existing military bases in 
the Indian Ocean  
Source: Google Map 2013 
 
(vi) Conversion of land purpose: Nigeria’s Social and Economic Rights Action 
(SERAC) website reports grievances of the displaced communities. They state 
that they are ‘unconvinced that the land being taken purportedly for the 
project is not in excess of what it is meant for’ and that ‘land acquired are being 
resold by agents to individuals for private use’ (Suberu, 2012). SERAC’s doubts 
are echoed in the description of LFTZ plan on the China-Africa Lekki Investment 
Ltd website (2012): 
Lekki Free Trade Zone *…+ covers a total area of about 30 square kms 
[3,000 hectares] with 27 square kms [2,700 hectares] for urban 
construction purposes, which would accommodate a total resident 
population of 120,000. 
 
In Ethiopia, a company named Hujian which already functions within EIZ, has 
requested for 320 hectares near Addis Ababa. It wants to expand its existing 
production plant (Tekleberhan, 2012; Yewondwossen, 2012). Developers of 
Egypt-TEDA SEZ too, want to engage into real estate in the zone. They plan to 
dedicate 1,000 hectares to residential development (Setc-zone, n.d). Initially 
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publicised as an industrial zone, JFET is also seeking to invest into the 
construction of luxury residences. As the plot is near the coast, developers have 
expressed interest in constructing the zone in line with the Mauritian 
Integrated Resort Scheme (IRS).74 As we see in its site plan in Figure 3.5, 
sections 7 and 8, which consist of management and employees residential 
spaces, take over the larger share of the zone. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: JFET Masterplan  
Source: JFET presentation 
 
 
The Importance of Contextualisation 
The two identified deterministic components of the CSEZAs are in fact practices 
which are part and parcel of China’s own SEZ model. Purely due to a shift of context, 
the de facto features of Chinese SEZs at home turn into problems when transposed 
to Africa. This evokes the importance of contextualisation. Farole (2011, 248-56) 
initiates this debate in relation to Export Processing Zones specifically when, after an 
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analysis of the changed global economic climate, he concludes that ‘African zones are 
not likely to be competitive using the traditional zone model that many of them 
employ’. However, Farole talks about a temporal contextualization of zone models. 
For him, African countries need to modify the zone models to suit the changed 
economic climate characterized by intense competition from Asia and the effacing of 
EU and US as confirmed sources of investment. As he treats Africa as a homogeneous 
respondent to external pressures of a new global economic environment, he ignores 
the need to make economic zones adhere to the internal specificities of the African 
country hosting the zone. Throughout the process of transposition of the Chinese SEZ 
model to Africa, the importance of a customisation of the model according to the 
new context has been ignored. The adoption of a standardised SEZ model by the host 
African countries shows how, when applied to specific African contexts, norms of an 
economic hub model can transform into concessionary gestures.  
As Xu mentioned above, while the eventual participation of SOEs in SEZs in 
China proved successful, the same success cannot be ensured when these very SOEs 
shift to Africa, without any competition or pressures. The same applies to the land 
component. For instance, the allocation of a greater share of land to residential areas 
is a common SEZ practice. In China, these residential sections serve both as 
accommodation for workers on the site, and promote the urbanisation purpose of 
SEZs. Guo (2011b) upholds that ‘*d+evelopment *z+ones are not only the first stop of 
many urbanized peasants, but also the critical area on the process of urban 
modernization’. He explains that in China, residential areas within the zones are set 
up at the early stage, before the SEZ develops fully. Building new residences during 
the full-fledged SEZ development is discouraged. Nevertheless, this is becoming an 
acceptable practice as problems emerging due to a separation of the residence place 
and workplace are addressed. With those residing in the SEZ not employed within the 
zone, and those working within the zone, not living in, problems such as traffic jams, 
increased commuting costs and environmental deterioration proliferate (Guo, 
2011b). To some extent, it can be assumed that the residential quarters of the 
CSEZAs aim to prevent such problems. But the same residential areas when planned 
in JFET, LFTZ and Egypt-TEDA SEZ,75 suggest a followed negative impact. Instead of 
encouraging an inclusive national economic growth through urbanization as it did in 
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China, residential spaces within CSEZAs will generate new premises of inequitable 
division of wealth and social space. Real estate investments in the guise of CSEZAs 
will only create one-off and short-term investment returns to Africa.  
Another feature of the Chinese SEZ model which turns concessionary when 
transposed to an African context is the phase-style development procedure of the 
zones. The construction of each of the CSEZAs is planned over a minimum of two 
phases, with each phase taking at least five years. Therefore, the capital that the 
Chinese promoters commit to invest in the zones is never disbursed in totality at the 
very beginning. This has been the case in LFTZ whereby the Chinese developers only 
invested USD 50 million of the USD 200 million agreed (Mthembu-Salter, 2009, p. 2). 
Lagos state had to top-up this initial sum from its own budget in order to render the 
first phase of the zone’s development viable. It so happens that, often, at the time of 
the agreement with the African country, the Chinese developers do not have the 
amount they cite for investment. Their calculation of the total capital input is based 
on the rationale of a ‘snowball development’—a strategy that TEDA’s journey within 
China reflects. TEDA's first phase of development was financed by a government loan 
of USD 60.3 million. This loan bred one precinct of commerce and one precinct of 
residence. Together, they took up a total area of 420 hectares. In 1990, TEDA started 
‘developing a stretch of land, making a rational return on it and then using the return 
to develop new stretches of land’ (ENorth, 2004). The director of CADFund (Interview 
with Dongya, 2011) describes this ‘snowball development’ exercise as being a long-
term planning strategy whereby the initial investment areas are those which can 
generate immediate returns and attract investors. Usually, hotels, residences and 
manufacturing are the quick-return sectors. Since in China, the government, 
government-bodies and SOEs develop SEZs, the zones favour long-term development 
plans. There is no immediate profit requirement.  
The fact that China upgraded several of its long-standing SEZs from provincial to 
national-level status and approved of 74 new zone projects— all of this in an 
environment in which the emerging discourse centers on how, post China’s WTO 
integration, SEZs are losing ground in China (See, Reardon, 1996)—is evidence of the 
importance of patient investment in SEZs. Detractors use statistical proofs of the 
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performance of China’s most successful SEZs to substantiate their case. Figure 3.6 
provides a glimpse of those statistics.  
 
 
Figure 3.6: Comparison of Fiscal Revenue among major ETDZs from 2009 to 2011 
Source: TEDA (n.d) 
 
Regardless, China retains faith in the SEZs’ ability to deliver profits over long term. 
But Chinese SEZ developers in Africa do not have the same luxury of time which SOEs 
can afford when building SEZs in China. In Africa, the government administrations 
push for a quick unrolling of the zones in order to win political capital at home. 
Yongpeng (Interviewed in 2011) agrees and claims that in order to stay valid, CSEZAs 
should develop at a fast pace. This is because, given that the African states grant the 
Chinese developers incentives and access to their resources, the host African 
communities expect to see an immediate output.  
The fourth discrepancy which emerges due to an unaltered transposition of the 
Chinese SEZ model onto the African host countries pertains to the expected 
outcomes from the zone model. SEZs in China started as capitalist experiments to 
attract capital in any form: FDI inflow, export expansion or technology-transfer. The 
creation of employment was not one of its objectives. It was only a positive side 
effect of SEZs. As Guo (2011a) explains, manufacturing multinationals (MNCs) settled 
within China’s SEZs in the mid-1980s. They required unskilled workers—a demand 
which could not be fulfilled by the urban educated and skilled workforce. This 
benefitted the unskilled rural workers who thereby joined the workforce and reduced 
unemployment. However, in the case of the African hosts, they already limit the 
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areas of investment in which the Chinese developers can operate by pushing for local 
employment creation as one of the objectives of Chinese SEZs. The focus on 
employment also halts the extent to which technology can be used on the site, since 
advanced mechanisms will cut down on the number of workers. Moreover, by 
potentially curbing the number of Chinese employees allowed within the zone, 
African countries reduce possibilities for a transfer of skills and know-how to the local 
labour force—all of which are essential to serve the developmental purpose for 
which these zones have been welcomed in the first place.  
Thus, a number of features labelled as nefarious to the developmental 
potential of the CSEZA model, are revealed to be integral contributive mechanisms of 
China’s own SEZ experience. Rather than being faults of the model itself, it is the 
standardised transposition of the model from one context to another that leads to 
the poor performance of the CSEZAs. This notion has been previously documented in 
Chapter 2. The failure to foresee the need for a customisation of the SEZ model 
according to the requirements and norms of its new context is a blame that both 
Chinese and African parties share. A clear division of responsibilities that marks the 
deployment of CSEZAs advocates for an evaluation of the role of both the Chinese 
and African states.  
 
Chinese State Presence in Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa 
The account of the CSEZA establishment procedures, the percentage of shares held 
by the Chinese in each of the CSEZA ventures, and the centrality of SOEs in CSEZAs, 
reveal that China is alert and proactive in its pursuit of profits through these new 
zones. This prominence and efficiency of the Chinese government with regard to the 
CSEZAs follows from the practice established in SEZs within China. When Xiaoping 
visited Shenzhen SEZ in 1992, he remarked: 
From the very outset there were different opinions concerning the 
establishment of special economic zones, fearing whether this meant practicing 
capitalism. Shenzhen's construction achievements have answered those having 
worries of one kind or another, the special zone is "socialist", not "capitalist" in 
nature. Judged from the situation in Shenzhen, public ownership is the 
mainstay, foreign investment accounts for only one-fourth. Take that part of 
foreign capital for example, we can benefit from taxation and labor service! 
Don't be afraid the establishment of more Sino-foreign cooperative enterprises, 
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Sino-foreign joint ventures and solely foreign-owned businesses. We need not 
be afraid so long as we are clear-headed. We have advantages, large and 
medium-sized State-owned enterprises and township enterprises, more 
importantly, we have the political power in our own hands (Xiaoping as quoted 
in People’s Daily Online, 2002, my italics). 
 
Indeed, in its domestic SEZs, Chinese government marks its presence in very obvious 
ways. For instance, in the Shenzhen SEZ, even though partnership with foreign 
investors or wholly-foreign investment ventures are welcome, the central 
government—through an authority called Guangdong Province Committee for 
Administering Special Economic Zones—maintains a direct control on the actions 
within the area. The duties of the authority include land-levelling, providing utilities 
in the zone, sanctioning investment proposals for factories and economic 
undertakings within the zone, issuing registration and land use certificates to 
investors, the right to veto permission for investors to carry out foreign exchange 
transactions and to obtain insurance coverage, and the right to permit sales of 
products to the domestic market. Guangdong provincial government too, has 
established sub-offices to ascertain a hands-on monitoring of the zone. For example, 
the Guangdong Province Special Economic Zones Development Company was set up 
to promote investment opportunities in the zone. It acts as facilitator in business 
transactions for the zone investors, and even engages into joint ventures with 
investors coming into the SEZ. A similar applied presence of the Chinese state can be 
witnessed in the CSEZAs. 
While China ascertains an upfront involvement in the CSEZAs by controlling 
their financing, it also ensures an extraction of the maximum profit from the 
incentives granted by the African countries. For instance, under JFET, it uses the 
leased state land as collateral in order to obtain loan from Chinese banks. Similarly, it 
combines its security concerns with the CSEZA deployment in Egypt and seeks 
permanent presence by the Suez Canal.  
 
African State Presence in Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa 
The same premises which testify for China’s hands-on involvement in the CSEZAs 
highlight the disengagement of the African host governments in the venture. The 
accidents and labour rights violations that constantly occur on the ZCCZ site is one 
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example of the leniency of the host African government. Human Rights Watch (2011) 
notes that:  
[f]or its part, the Zambian government is failing to meet its obligations under 
the convention to provide a protective environment in which workers have the 
right “to report accidents, dangerous occurrences and hazards to the employer 
and to the competent authority...without discrimination or retaliation”. 
 
African leaders keep reinstating their confidence in the Chinese commitment to 
generate mutual growth and development through the CSEZAs. They constantly 
promise forthcoming fast-pace construction and an operational zone to the local 
population. In 2008, Governor Daniel of Ogun state claimed that ‘the pace of 
economic activities in the Ogun West Senatorial District would soon change for the 
better’ (Larewaju, 2008). This was four years after the project had been launched. 
Now, five years since this declaration, Phase 1 is still under construction. Mauritian 
politicians have pronounced similar statements of reassurance. The Mauritian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs reacted to the scepticism of the local community, saying 
that: ‘*w+e are more than convinced that given our strategic geographical positioning, 
the JinFei project has the capacity to become an investment platform for China 
towards Africa’ (Chavrimootoo, 2012). 
As they await benefits out of their investments, the host African governments 
know that they have gambled by welcoming the Chinese zones on the current terms 
and conditions. Yet, only a couple of the African partner countries have addressed 
these concerns. Following several changes and delays in the project, Nigeria 
renegotiated the LFTZ. Under the new agreement, the Nigerian government secured 
a 40 per cent employment quota for locals, and also recuperated 13,500 hectares of 
the initially leased land. Foreign partners will now develop the recuperated land 
under the guidance of Lagos state government (Mthembu-Salter, 2009). In March 
2012, the Ethiopian government announced that it would introduce a bill to regulate 
the country’s industrial zones. The main elements of the Ethiopian Bill are (i) the 
formation of an Ethiopian Industrial Zones Authority, (ii) the resolution to have 
industrial zones developed by Ethiopian government itself or in joint ventures with 
private developers. The guarded remarks of officials from the Ethiopian Ministry of 
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Industry support suspicions that these sudden initiatives by the Ethiopian 
government are linked to the poor unrolling of EIZ. 
The policy change was also triggered by the current performance of the 
industrial zones, sources within the Ministry disclosed to Fortune [the 
newspaper]. The Ministry has established an inspection committee to evaluate 
industrial zones that are operational. "Some of the lands designated as 
industrial zones are not serving their purpose, as there are even those who 
lease it for residential purposes," says an official at the Ministry (Mesfin, 2012). 
 
These disguised insinuations are, unquestionably, references to the Chinese SEZ in 
Ethiopia. The only country among the five host African nations which had a policy 
arrangement from the beginning of the CSEZA negotiation—and in this respect, is a 
good example for its counterparts—is Egypt. Although the Egyptian government 
holds only 5 per cent of action in Egypt-TEDA SEZ, the fact that Egypt-TEDA SEZ is 
situated within the larger Egyptian state-administered space called the North West 
Suez SEZ means that the Egyptian government has a grip on both the perimeters 
within which the Chinese SEZ is allowed to function, and in the internal monitoring of 
the zone. North West Suez SEZ falls under the authority of the General Authority for 
Investment (GAFI), its sub-authority, Master Development Company, and, is 
regulated by the Special Economic Zones Law 83 of 2002. As some of the African host 
countries take corrective policy measures against the CSEZAs, one wonders why the 
African governments chose to absent themselves from the Chinese SEZs in their own 
countries in the first place.  
An understanding of the larger context suggest three possible reasons for this 
withdrawal of the host African state: (i) the consciousness of the host African 
countries regarding their own lack of experience in zone management as compared 
to China’s successful SEZ history; (ii) the Chinese developers requested for a 
maximum control of the zone and the African state relented. The story of China-
Jiangling Free Trade Zone, Algeria supports the latter scenario. The Algerian zone was 
initiated under the same CSEZA concept but was cancelled after the Algerian 
government enacted reforms which required foreign investors to form partnerships 
with local firms. Algeria insisted that the Algerian partners must hold the majority of 
the shares in the partnership. While the supposition that China exercises such a 
paternalistic stance vis-à-vis the host African countries may lead to China-bashing, 
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the host African states are equally responsible for having ignored their potential to 
negotiate a favourable deal. It is a fact that the African governments ratified the 
current terms and conditions upon which the CSEZAs are founded in the conscious 
knowledge of attempting an alternative developmental experience. This irresponsible 
behaviour of the African administrators may also imply possible corrupt pursuits.76 
Nonetheless, even now, there are several elements of the CSEZA concept that allow 
for a rectification of affairs, as has been pursued by Nigeria. The phase-style 
development of CSEZAs, whereby the master plan of each phase has to be approved 
by the host country, gives the host African countries opportunities to renegotiate, 
and eventually bring the development of the zones to match their expectations and 
objectives.  
 
Redeeming Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa 
Chapter 3 referred to Litwack and Quian (1998) and argued that SEZs work best when 
tweaked to match the prevalent economic and fiscal atmosphere. By this logic, as the 
CSEZAs stand deadlocked, it would have been reasonable for the partner African 
countries to renegotiate the contract with the Chinese. Renegotiation in this context 
alludes to rectifying clauses in the agreement which (i) hand Chinese investors the 
exclusive rights to invest in the zone, (ii) limit the host government’s participation in 
the activities of the zone, (iii) do not permit the host state to carry out any kind of 
institutionalised monitoring of the development of the zone. Renegotiation can also 
imply termination of the CSEZA, if necessary.  
The parties who would benefit the most out of a renegotiation are the African 
nations themselves. After securing an expanse of land in a foreign country for at least 
79 years, securing a preferential rent, gaining investor status, gaining the permission 
to use a foreign land as collateral, and gathered knowledge of the local market and 
business opportunities, the Chinese SEZ promoters can already tick off several ‘wins’ 
from their list of cooperative ‘win-win’ objectives. This only leaves the African 
partners in the wait for their share of ‘wins’ from the ventures. Jobs, transfer of 
technology and know-how and backward linkages can occur only if the zones proceed 
beyond carcasses of buildings and bare land.  
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However, while constant reforms in SEZs are acceptable in China—since China 
is both the patron and host of the zones there—the host African communities may 
not digest the same rectifying exercise. This is because the latter believe that already, 
too many concessions have been granted to the Chinese promoters. This 
understanding that the African host governments have gone beyond their general 
practices to accommodate the Chinese SEZ developers finds support in literature 
(Auty, 2011, p. 222; Brautigam, Farole & Xiaoyang, 2010, p. 5, Brautigam, 2011, p. 
47). This belief, fuelled by media sensationalisation, diminishes the chances of 
redeeming the slowly unfolding or stagnant CSEZAs. Any subsequent contractual 
alteration—though intending to maximise the functionality of these zones in Africa—
will inescapably be seen as concessionary. The prospect of not being able to 
renegotiate the terms of the CSEZAs, even amidst the world financial crisis (which has 
also affected China’s growth and FDI inflow) is daunting.77 Therefore, it is essential to 
investigate the extent to which the host African countries have truly gone out of their 
way to woo the Chinese developers before writing off chances of revitalising the 
CSEZAs. Table 3.2 measures the general investment regulations of each of the five 
African countries alongside the special provisions extended to each of the CSEZAs.  
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Table 3.2: Comparative Table of General Zone Investment Regulations and Special Provisions for Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa  
Source: Author 
 
 General Investment Regulations Special Provisions 
Nigerian Free 
Trade Zones  
 Exemption from payment of all federal, state & local taxes, levies, rates, & customs duties 
 No import/export licence 
 Rent-free land during construction 
 Services like warehousing, pre-built factories, transportation, sanitation, canteen available 
within the zones 
 100% foreign ownership 
 Sale of up to 25% of production permitted in domestic market  
 Duty-free, tax-free import of raw materials and components for goods destined for re-
export. 
 Duty-free import of capital goods, consumer goods and equipment 
 When selling in domestic market, the amount of import duty on goods manufactured in the 
Free Zone is calculated only on the basis of the value of the raw materials or components 
used in assembly not on the finished products. 
 100% repatriation of capital, profits & dividends 
 Waiver on all expatriate quotas for companies operating in the zones 
 Prohibition of strikes and lockouts for 10 years 
 Foreigner seeking long-term employment must obtain resident permit. Short-term 
employments obtain temporary work permits. 
 Land lease term is typically 99 years 
         LFTZ 
 Finished goods produced within the zone from 100% 
local materials allowed sales in domestic market 
 No quotas on products exported EU and the USA, if local 
raw materials are used  
        OGFTZ 
 Construction on the land should start within six months 
after the land transaction. If the construction does not 
start within one year, the price of the land will be 
calculated at next year’s price & management has right 
to adjust the location unilaterally.   
 Enterprises who rent the land can enjoy free rent for the 
first six months. 
 Foreign investment and value-added investment can be 
withdrawn at any time. 
 All products produced in the zone can be sold in the 
Nigerian market. 
 Freedom for enterprises in employment decision, no 
residence permits required for foreign employees 
Ethiopia  Exemption from import/export duty 
 Tax holiday of upto a maximum of 7 years according to the percentage of export carried out 
 Expropriation/nationalisation for public interest will be effected with adequate 
compensation corresponding to the prevailing market value of property 
 Free remittances of funds 
 Land lease term in Addis Ababa vary according to activity performed by investor (science, 
technology & research: upto 90 years, Industry: upto 60 years, commerce: upto 50 years, 
others: upto 50 years) 
• Ethiopian government to bear 30% of the cost of 
infrastructure cost 
• Tax holiday of 6 years 
 
Egypt – North 
West Suez 
SEZ 
 Imports exempted from duties & taxes 
 Upon sales to local market, duties & sales tax are paid on imported components only 
• Dispute settlements 
• Licensing as well as general investors services for projects incorporated within the zones 
Egypt-TEDA SEZ receives no special policy treatment 
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 General Investment Regulations Special Provisions 
• 10% tax rate on all activities within the SEZ 
• Egyptian certificates of origin for SEZ–based exporters, allowing them to make use of Egypt's 
international trade agreements 
• Land lease term: 99 years maximum 
Zambia 
Multi Facility 
Economic 
Zones  
• 0% tax on profits made by companies in the priority sector for a period of 5 years from first 
year profits is made.  
• 50% tax on profits for years 6 to 8  
• 75% tax on profits for years 9 and 10 
• 0% tax rate on dividends for 5 years from the year of first declaration of dividends  
• 0% import duty rate on raw materials, capital goods, machinery for 5 years for priority 
sectors  
• No value-added tax on machinery/equipment including trucks  & specialised vehicles 
imported for investment in the multi-facility economic zones/priority sector 
• No withholding tax on management fees, consultancy fees, interest re-payments & foreign 
contractors 
• Exempt foreign suppliers to multi-facility economic zone from reverse value-added tax 
charge 
• Materials/equipment imported for use in the multi-facility economic zone are exempted 
from customs & excise duty 
• Land lease term for state, reserve, trust and park reserves land: 99 years 
 
 
Mauritius • 15% tax 
• Dividends & capital exempted from tax  
• 100% foreign ownership 
• Equipment exempted from customs duty 
• Free repatriation of profits, dividends & capital 
• No minimum foreign capital required 
• 50% annual allowance on declining balance for the purchase of electronic & computer 
equipment 
• Exempted from provisions of the Local Government Act relating to rates, levies & licences 
• Land lease period of state land for industrial and commercial purposes: 60 years 
• Provision of off-site infrastructure 
• Provision of one passport to investors for every USD 
500,000 of investment  
• Land lease: 99 years 
Algeria (i) 2008: Algerian tax law was modified requiring foreign investors to re-invest within 4 years 
the value of any investment tax incentives received or face a 30% penalty. 
(ii) 2009: Algerian majority (51%) stake in any investment & at least 30% Algerian stake in any 
foreign-owned import operation  
Cancelled as Chinese developers were not agreeable to the general 
investment regulations 
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(i) Nigeria: General Nigerian Free Trade Zone regulations allot 25 per cent sales 
to domestic market. In comparison, LFTZ is allowed 100 per cent domestic 
sales, if the product is fully made from local materials. While this encourages 
the Chinese SEZ investors to source raw materials from local suppliers, it also 
creates market competition for the local Nigerian manufacturers. On its turn, 
OGFTZ allows a withdrawal of investment and capital at any time. This clause 
enables investors to fully exploit the preferences granted by Nigeria—even 
using its export quota to the USA and EU, thereby penalising local exporters—
and then, leave whenever suitable. This jeopardises possibilities of 
technology-transfer. The fact that no residence permits are required for 
foreign employees not only contradicts the general developmental objectives, 
but is also in paradox with the Expatriate Quota measure of Nigeria as it 
encourages an inflow of long-term foreign workers. 78  OGFTZ enacts a 
reservation by providing only six months of rent-free construction as opposed 
to allowing the developers to occupy the land free of cost for the entire 
construction period.  
(ii) Ethiopia: Barring the 30 per cent financing of the infrastructure cost, 
Ethiopian government does not give the zone any special treatment. On the 
contrary, while Ethiopian investment regulations provide for a maximum of 
seven years of tax holiday, judging from the nature of the activities the 
Chinese investors planned to develop in the zone, EIZ was given only a six-
year tax concession period. 
(iii) Egypt: Egypt-TEDA SEZ has not been granted any preferential incentive. The 
10 per cent taxation rate is uniform to the treatment received by other zones 
falling under the Special Economic Zone Law 83 of 2002.  
(iv) Zambia: Although Zambia does not provide any active concession to both 
Chinese zones, the fact that ZCCZ is passed off as a Multi-Facility Economic 
Zone (MFEZ) despite its activities being concentrated solely on mining, makes 
Zambia miss out on profits and royalties that it could have gained by treating 
it as an integrated mining industry. Therefore, the concession that Zambia 
made in relation to the Chinese SEZ is diverted. It qualifies more as a forgone 
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cost rather than a policy preference. The five years of tax holiday given to the 
Chinese developers are in line with Zambian policy.  
(v) Mauritius: The use of state land as collateral to raise loan is in line with the 
Code Civile Mauricien, Article 1778-5. Therefore, technically, Mauritius made 
only three concessions; firstly, by providing the off-site infrastructure, 
secondly, through the provision of a passport to financially eligible investors, 
and thirdly, by extending the lease period of state land from 60 to 99 years. 
All three concessions add to national expenses. The provision of passport to 
some investors may also have adjacent repercussions such as an influx of 
Chinese migrants. But, while these are the only direct policy preferences that 
Mauritius entertains in regard to the Chinese SEZ, like Zambia, the island also 
grants indirect preferential treatments to the developers. These will be 
discussed in chapter 5. 
As the above discounting regulatory provisions to Chinese SEZs are contemplated, it 
can be concluded that the African parties have not engaged into direct extravagant 
exchanges of preferential treatment. To a large extent, African governments still 
hold a case for pushing towards a re-negotiation of several of the zones’ aspects. A 
renegotiation may re-launch these bilateral cooperative ventures on a more 
delectable note. However, the extensive amount of ‘face-saving’ exercised by the 
African parties with regard to delays to the CSEZA plans has diluted the capability of 
CSEZAs to be nurtured as hubs. Thus, as long as the host African nations, pressured 
to maintain their political goodwill at home, hesitate to renegotiate or terminate 
the CSEZAs, and while the Chinese loiter around the sites at their own pace 
maintaining their diplomatic commitment, CSEZAs will, for a long time only be a 
name.  
 
Summation 
To say that either party is confident of the capacity of the CSEZAs to be the 
envisaged ‘win-win’ initiative would be untrue. Nevertheless, China invested all 
efforts in this endeavour. It has established a support mechanism which would aid 
every aspect of the zones’ functioning in Africa. Adding to that, China has, as 
reference, its own home-grown zone model. But in spite of all these precautionary 
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measures, it is only after the CSEZAs started unfolding in the host African countries 
that the Chinese authorities identified the faults in their provisions. These faults do 
not impact so much on the aimed developmental ‘wins’ of the Chinese as much as 
they affect the mutually-beneficial nature of the venture and affect the African 
states. Nevertheless, these slips are not imperfections which come from the original 
SEZ concept itself. It is the transposition of the model to another context that 
disturbs the outcomes. This can only mean that both China and the African 
governments have failed to customise the SEZ model for each of the African 
countries. Therefore, both parties share the blame. It is from this perspective that it 
becomes important to assess the activism of each of the governments in these 
bilateral diplomatic ventures. While the Chinese government proves its decisive 
control over the CSEZAs, the absence of the host African governments is 
conspicuous. They display little willingness to partner with the Chinese actors in 
running the zones, or even to secure a return from their investments and 
concessions. Such criticism of the African attitude towards the CSEZAs maybe 
contested by arguing that the African partners need to limit interference in these 
zones if they are to maintain their attractiveness to such FDI projects—an essential 
fiscal component if African countries wish to move up the value-chain of 
production. However, these observations neither obliterate the negotiation 
leverage African countries have as they place their natural resources at the 
disposition of Chinese zone investors, nor do they cancel prospects of a re-
negotiation of the CSEZA agreements. Back in 1979, China took a risk with the SEZ 
concept. It was, nevertheless, a calculated risk as China kept the reigns in state 
hands. Similarly, the onus here lies on the host African governments in ascertaining 
that, while welcoming the promises of development from the conceptually-wise 
though contextually-novice Chinese developers, their own inaction and leniency do 
not further perpetuate the dependency relations of which the CSEZAs are a 
projection already. Of the five countries hosting the CSEZAs, Mauritius is the one 
who, instead of evading this dependency equation, has actively reinforced it. 
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Chapter 5 
The Chinese Special Economic Zone in Mauritius 
Chapter Statement 
This chapter focuses on the Mauritian case study. It starts by elucidating the 
restrictive local data environment within which the JFET has been researched. It 
then introduces the Mauritian economic context. The actors and entities important 
to a comprehensive and structurally coherent study of JFET (and of any other 
CSEZA) are identified. The section below also introduces every single actor falling 
under these five categories, and explains how each of them are connected to JFET. 
Those entities which have a cost impact on the JFET project are then selected from 
the list of JFET-related actors and a quantitative measurement of the JFET project is 
conducted. However, the cost-impact actors are further divided into two categories: 
those financed by the Mauritian government under the official budget allocated to 
JFET, and those which are not. This chapter then produces a chronological analysis 
of the JFET.  This chronological picture permits an eventual discerning of timely 
strategies employed by particular actors over the evolution of the zone. The chapter 
closes with a summary of the ideas evoked. 
 
Disclaimer 
In order to get a good understanding of the Mauritian Chinese SEZ, it is 
essential to firstly note certain basic information concerning the project. To start 
with, although its official business acronym is JFET, Mauritians know of the project 
either as ‘Tianli’ or as ‘JinFei’. Secondly, all information pertaining to the zone 
project is inaccessible to the Mauritian public. Thirdly, it is believed that the 
agreement between the Chinese and Mauritian governments regarding this zone is 
covered by two documents: a framework agreement, and a land lease agreement. 
While the Mauritian government insists that these documents are confidential, the 
land lease agreement is available to the public at one of the government record-
holding offices in Mauritius. The framework agreement is still a hidden document.  
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The Mauritian Economic Context 
Mauritius gained independence from British rule in 1968. At that point, the 
Mauritian economy relied on a single economic activity: the exportation of sugar to 
the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, and eventually to 
the EU under the 1973 Sugar Protocol. In 1970, the Mauritian government 
introduced the EPZ Act under which foreign investors were given incentives to 
establish factories on the island. The late 1970s and early 1980s was also a period 
under which Mauritius adopted SAPs—but in its own distinct way. Bunwaree (2002) 
explains makes the difference with which SAPs were implemented in Mauritius: 
[S]tructural adjustment loan was bank supported rather than bank dictated. 
The Government takes great pride in the fact that Mauritius resisted the IMF’s 
request to abolish free education and subsidies on food. This decision has 
certainly enabled many people to benefit from education. The policies of 
economic diversification adopted in the post independence period and SAPS 
with a human face have contributed to making Mauritius a middle income 
country. 
 
The Mauritian EPZ picked up only as from the early 1980s. In 1982, as the Multi-
Fibre Agreement imposed export quotas upon developing countries towards 
developed countries, manufacturers from Hong Kong moved their production plants 
to Mauritius. Taiwan followed suit shortly afterwards. After this successful 
experiment with new economic sectors, Mauritius launched itself into a full-fledged 
diversification of its economic landscape. This diversification was aided mainly by 
money coming from non-traditional donors. As will be discussed later in this thesis, 
as from 1982, China started funding certain development projects of the island. The 
information and communication technology (ICT) sector, whose activities on the 
island concentrate at Ebène, was developed through funds from the Indian 
government.  
In the two decades that followed the 1990s, tourism, ICT and financial services 
established themselves as reliable pillars of the Mauritian economy. However, since 
the past few years, the Mauritian economy has been under pressure as several of its 
trade preferences are being eroded.  The Multi-Fibre Agreement expired in 2005, 
resulting in the exodus of a number of foreign textile manufacturers from Mauritius; 
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the Third Fabric Derogation facility from which Mauritius currently benefits from 
under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) will end in 201579; the Sugar 
Protocol will terminate in 2017; the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements 
(DTAAs) that Mauritius has with several countries (especially with India) will be 
reviewed—very likely to its detriment; and the conclusion of Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) is likely to increase its regional competitors. Currently, the 
public debt per capita of Mauritius is at USD 5,582 (Indian Ocean Times, 2013), and 
the island experiences an unemployment rate of 7.5% (Central Statistics Office 
Mauritius, 2013). It is in this precarious economic context that the JFET unfurls in 
Mauritius.  
 
Why the Mauritian CSEZA? 
JFET is dotted with experiences which help in understanding the functional 
dynamics and procedures integral to the ground implementation of the CSEZA 
model. As the island has been adjudged the most equitably governed and 
constitutionally democratic of the five CSEZA host states;80 the one scoring highest 
in economic freedom for Doing Business;81 and is generally known to be the most 
politically stable, the zone in Mauritius should have been the easiest to establish. 
But this is not the case. Of the seven CSEZAs, JFET is the one which is in the most 
critical situation. It has not delivered what it had promised despite the fact that 
Mauritius has granted the highest number of concessions to China (compared to 
what the other host states granted to the Chinese developers). While Mauritian 
authorities admit to upfront concessions such as passports, extended land lease 
periods and the provision of off-site infrastructure, the aura of confidentiality 
surrounding this project does not exclude the possibility that Mauritius must have 
acquiesced to additional indirect compromises. Moreover, unlike its other four 
CSEZA counterparts, neither did Mauritius have a policy framework which could 
contain the Chinese zone project from the beginning, nor has it contemplated (like 
Ethiopia) to eventually establish a regulatory mechanism to do so. 
From the start, the Mauritian government sealed off the project from public 
and parliamentary enquiries by declaring that: 
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I wish to inform the House that I am not in a position to table the Framework 
Agreement as there is a confidentiality clause which provides that the parties 
to the Agreement should ensure strict confidentiality on the Agreement. 
(Mauritius, Parliament. 2010, 15 June) 
 
This demeanour of Mauritius may also be representative of the indirect 
compromises that the other host African countries may have undertaken to 
accommodate the CSEZAs but which may have been camouflaged. Therefore, JFET, 
as an extreme case of concession without protection, enacted by a reputational 
democratic Sub-Saharan African economy, is a benchmark for examining what went 
wrong with the CSEZA model—even when implemented in the best possible 
environment. 
Chapter 4 attributed a large part of the blame for compromising the ‘win-win’ 
essence of the zone to the limited role of the African governments. As per this logic, 
while China dominated the inception stage of the CSEZA because it owned the SEZ 
concept and also the capital and experience to go into it, technically the next stage 
at which the CSEZA is deployed on the ground, should be led by the African host 
countries. This is because at that stage, the dynamics which preside the CSEZA are 
national context and geographic location—both of which fall under the aegis of the 
host African nations. This chapter explores the latter phase of the CSEZA in 
reference to the case of Mauritius. The example of JFET allows us to single out the 
manoeuvres—internal to the zone and also external to it (pertaining to the host 
country environment)—exercised by either parties, which may condemn the CSEZAs 
during the course of their deployment.  
 
 Identifying the Units of Analysis 
Although literature connects the emergence of CSEZAs to the November 2006 
FOCAC meeting held in China, a chronology of events establishes that the planning 
and negotiation of these zones started relatively prior to their official 
announcement. While work on LFTZ started in April 2006, EIZ in May 2006 and ZCCZ 
in 2003, Egypt-TEDA SEZ traces its roots back to 1998. Similarly, the idea of JFET was 
deliberated very early in 2006 (or maybe even late 2005). By the time FOCAC 2006 
happened, some of these zones were already functional while others had reached 
  
141 
an advanced stage of negotiation.  This gap of a few months (or years) between the 
inception of the zone proposals and their officialisation under the banner of China-
Africa cooperation—which has been dismissed as inconsequential to the larger 
picture of CSEZAs—is telling of the direction in which the power equation flows 
between the Chinese and African partners in this new spatial venture. It signals a 
strategy which was deployed by China even before it was officially stated. In light of 
this prudent step-by-step unravelling of CSEZAs, it is essential to outline the 
chronology of proceedings of the controversial and confidential JFET. 
An account of the unfolding of the CSEZA cannot be given in isolation due to 
the different sets of actors and the evolving business environment connected to the 
construction of the zone. In order to comprehensively understand what propelled, 
hindered or stagnated the development of the zone, we have to take into account 
the activities of: (1) the Chinese shareholders of this zone within Mauritius but 
outside the zone; (2) the subsidiary or support companies launched by JFET; (3) the 
Government of Mauritius, which appears in indirect support of the zone; (4) 
projects in Mauritius affected by the implementation of this zone; and (5) projects 
in Mauritius which have affected the deployment of this zone. 
1. The Chinese shareholders of this zone within Mauritius but outside the zone:  
This refers to the institutionalised as well as non-institutionalised activities of 
Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Group, Taiyuan Iron and Steel Group Co. Ltd (TISCO) 
and Shanxi Coking Coal Group Co. Ltd within the Mauritian jurisdiction. The 
adjacent activities in which these three companies are involved in Mauritius 
help in demystifying their investment behaviour. It also sheds light on their 
motives and future plans. The pertinent activities to look out for are those of 
Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd, Tianli Construction Co. Ltd and CT Power 
(Mauritius) Ltd. The connection of each to JFET will be clarified later in this 
chapter. 
2. The subsidiary or support companies launched by JFET: As they declare that 
their objective is to promote mutual development through the CSEZA, it is 
unexpected that the Chinese developers would set up support companies 
functioning outside the perimeters of the zone. Even if they do set up support 
companies, these should preferably be units providing services or products 
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which are not locally produced in the host country. Therefore, a study of the 
presence and nature of subsidiary businesses established by the Chinese 
promoters in the host African country reflects the extent to which the former 
are dedicated to the idea of cooperation with the local businesses. Examples 
of such cases in Mauritius are JFET Travel and Tours Ltd and Oriental Group 
(Mauritius) Industry Co. Ltd. 
3. The Government of Mauritius, which appears to be in indirect support of the 
zone:  Officially, the Mauritian government claims that it only provides the 
Chinese developers with off-site infrastructure. However, neither is any 
publication available, nor has any statement been issued to confirm which are 
the exact off-site infrastructures that the government has contractually 
agreed to provide. While a few road, water, wastewater, telecommunications 
and power projects have clearly been demarcated as established with the aim 
to serve JFET, there are other infrastructure upgrade and construction 
projects which appear to be of indirect support to the zone. The connection of 
these undeclared off-site infrastructure projects to JFET can easily be 
established by dint of their location, scope of expenditure, timeliness of 
operation, stakeholders involved, and an assessment of their impact. Some of 
them are (a) provision of sewerage facilities to central and Riche-Terre areas 
of Baie du Tombeau, including the replacement of a section of an existing 
service located along Baie du Tombeau Coastal Road, (b) Terre-Rouge-Verdun 
link road and, (c) JinFei-Freeport area link road cutting through Pont Bruniquel 
(a bridge) and a parking space. 
4. Projects in Mauritius affected by the implementation of this zone: There are 
projects in Mauritius which have been stalled because of the implementation 
of JFET. An awareness of these ventures is important since the zone project is 
showing little sign of taking-off. In such a case, delayed or cancelled projects 
count as income and development foregone. There are a number of such 
existing projects namely, the national vegetable auction market and three 
major projects by the Irrigation Authority (IA). 
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5. Projects in Mauritius which have affected the deployment of this zone: 
There are also projects whose implementation have affected the progress of 
JFET.82 The Binani cement factory and Neotown are among these projects.  
As the above actors determine the development or underdevelopment of the 
Mauritian Chinese SEZ project, the timeline of JFET will incorporate their activities in 
order to make the impact of such indirect interventions on the zone more visible. A 
presentation of JFET in such a complete local context will also enable a detection of 
the mistakes committed by both Chinese developers and Mauritian government in 
deploying the CSEZA model.  However, the companies, projects, and entities falling 
under these five criteria will be divided into two categories: (a) those having a 
development impact on JFET, and (b) those having a cost impact on JFET. While 
certain projects have only influenced JFET by altering its developmental value, 
hence affecting both Chinese and Mauritian parties, projects which have cost 
impacts have solely affected the Mauritian side.  
Critics may condemn the exclusion of companies, entities and projects in 
China from the five factors of analysis and object to the claim that the cost impact 
projects solely affect the Mauritian side. This position assumed in this thesis in 
informed by the method of investment used by China to carry out the JFET project. 
To clarify, Mauritius JinFei Economic Trade and Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd is a 
company set up under Mauritian jurisdiction by the Chinese company, Shanxi JinFei 
Investment Co. Ltd with the purpose of establishing the zone. Shanxi JinFei 
Investment Co. Ltd, for its part, is a company set up in China by Shanxi Tianli 
Enterprise Group, TISCO, and Shanxi Coking Coal Group Co. Ltd, as a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) in order to carry out investment in the Mauritius JinFei Economic 
Trade and Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd.  Figure 4.1 is a drawing of this investment 
mechanism.  
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Figure 4.1: The Investment Method 
 Source: Author 
 
On 4 August 2009, Shanxi JinFei Investment Co. Ltd decided to invest USD 80 
million in Mauritius JinFei Economic Trade and Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd; a project 
whose total investment requirement was declared as USD 750 million by the 
Mauritian government.83 Therefore, with USD 80 million pooled together by Shanxi 
Tianli Enterprise Group, TISCO, and Shanxi Coking Coal Group Co. Ltd into the 
account of the SPV, the three partners financially isolated themselves. As a result, 
the three ultimate stakeholder companies and the Chinese SEZ developer company 
are secluded from each other. Thus, not only do the Chinese investors prevent 
Shanxi JinFei Investment Co. Ltd from being influenced by any financially 
detrimental business experience they undergo in China, but with a limited fund 
(which they intend to bring up to USD 750 million by applying the ‘rolling 
investment strategy’), they also limit themselves from disbursing additional capital 
for the purpose of the zone development. Therefore, any monetary loss to the 
Chinese side will only be in the form of indirect losses resulting from the failure of 
timely development of the zone. In comparison, the Government of Mauritius bears 
active monetary losses by constantly investing in support projects with the 
intention of aiding the progress of the Chinese SEZ.  
 
Setting the Benchmark  
In order to establish the relationships between the extraneous companies, projects 
and entities and the Chinese SEZ in Mauritius, first and foremost, we need to 
outline the details of the zone itself. The zone’s business composition and its 
Mauritius JinFei Economic Trade and 
Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd 
USD 10 million  
Shanxi JinFei Investment Co. Ltd 
USD 80 million 
TISCO Shanxi 
Coking Coal 
Group Co. 
Ltd 
Shanxi Tianli 
Enterprise 
Group 
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geographic features will act as the touchstone against which the correlation 
between JFET and the additional developmental and cost impact projects can be 
identified.  
Initially called the Mauritius Tianli Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone Co. 
Ltd, the Chinese zone company was incorporated in Mauritius on 4 May 2007. Its 
Chairman was Zhang Hongun. Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Group was the sole investor. 
The company closed down in 2009 and reopened in a new form. Now called the 
Mauritius JinFei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd., JFET (its business 
acronym) is a private, domestic company, limited by shares. It was incorporated in 
Mauritius on 13 August 2009.  The nature of the business is that of land promoter 
and property developer. Gao Zhiyi (Taiyuan, Shanxi, China) is the person who 
applied for the permit to open this company84. The names of the registered 
company heads are: Xie Li, Director (Shanxi, China); Gao Zhiyi, Chief Financial 
Manager (Shanxi, China); and Zhou Yong, Director (China, residing at Baie du 
Tombeau in Mauritius). According to its registration papers, the company intended 
to start its business activities on 1 September 2009. The shareholder of the 
company is a singular entity from Shanxi, China, called the Shanxi JinFei Investment 
Co. Ltd. The total number of shares it carries is 100,000, and the amount paid into 
this company as investment was declared as USD 9.8 million.  
Shanxi JinFei Investment Co. Ltd is the SPV through which investment is 
channelled into JFET. The registered address of the SPV is North Yaoyuanlu, Taiyuan, 
Shanxi, China. A note filed with JFET documents at the Registrar of Companies 
(Mauritius), reveals that at a board meeting of Shanxi JinFei Investment Co. Ltd held 
on 4 August 2009 at Garden International Hotel, it was decided that: 
the company shall invest a sum of USD80 million, representing 100% shares 
of number par value, in a company to be incorporated in Mauritius under 
the name of Mauritius JinFei Economic Trade and Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd. 
It was resolved that Mr Xie Li be authorised to sign all statutory documents 
relating thereto including the consent to act as shareholder on behalf of the 
company. (Registrar of Companies, 2012) 
 
At the parliamentary session of 20 October 2009, the Mauritian government 
confirmed that the shareholders of JFET are TISCO, Shanxi Coking Coal Group Co. 
Ltd, and Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Group. TISCO leads with 50 per cent of shares 
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ownership. The company is based in Shanxi and deals in steel. The second party, 
Shanxi Coking Coal Group Co. Ltd, headquartered in Taiyuan (Shanxi), holds 30.2 per 
cent of the shares of the project. Shanxi Coking Coal Group Co. Ltd is a leading 
coking coal and allied products producer in China. And lastly, the third shareholder, 
Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Group, holds 19.8 per cent of the shares. The company’s 
activities and products range from importation of coke, labour export, coal 
operation, hotel management, construction, agriculture to financial services (Shanxi 
Tianli Enterprise Group Corporation, 2010). Its website explicitly lists Shanxi JinFei 
Investment Co. Ltd as one of the Group’s equity companies. 
Information about the specificities of the JFET site location is equally 
important. This will allow us to identify connections that seemingly unrelated 
infrastructural projects have to JFET. The zone is in Riche-Terre village, which is 
located at 5 km from the harbour and the capital city, Port-Louis. The site is mostly 
composed of state-land. It borders the Baie du Tombeau coast (running alongside 
the Baie du Tombeau Road in Figure 4.2) and connects to the M2 highway which 
cuts across the major towns of the island and terminates at the airport. However, 
information about the size of the land under which the zone is to be developed has 
been inconsistent.  Article 1 of the land lease contract between the Mauritian 
government and the Mauritius JinFei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd 
specifies that: 
The Lessor hereby leases to the Lessee a portion of State Land of an extent of 
two hundred and eleven hectares (211 ha or 500 Arpents) described below, 
which is accepted by the Lessee (Lease Contract, 2009, bold original).  
 
Mauritius uses ‘arpent’ as the land-measuring unit. The conversion value of arpent 
to hectares is: one arpent = 0.4048 hectare (Four decimal units is retained in this 
conversion because the value-gap between the two units—arpent and hectares—is 
considerable). Going by this conversion value, 500 arpents is 202.4 hectares, not 
211 hectares! (The problems emanating from this confusion are later discussed in 
this chapter).  At the time when the Chinese developers selected the Riche-Terre 
site (i.e. October 2006), the land was occupied by two groups of farmers. These 
farmers occupied the land under the Terre-Rouge Land Settlement, and the Riche-
Terre Land Settlement. Figure 4.3 and 4.4 are plans of the zone site.  
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                    Figure 4.2: Location of JFET in relation to the Harbour and Neotown 
 Source: Google Map 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Overlay of Zone Plan on Riche-Terre Land 
Source: Scene-Ries Consult Ltd Report 
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Figure 4.4: Riche-Terre Plot Size 
Source: Scene-Ries Consult Ltd Report 
 
Introducing Variables of Developmental Impact 
Now that we are acquainted with the potential access points of JFET, it is easier 
distinguish which companies, projects and entities are linked to the zone project 
and how. We shall start by introducing the companies, projects and entities which 
have a developmental impact on JFET. The details of the companies below are 
sourced from their respective records kept at the Registrar of Companies 
(Mauritius). 
Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd is a private company incorporated in 
Mauritius on 6 October 2000. It specialises in spinning, weaving, finish yarn and 
allied products. It describes its activities as those of a trader, wholesaler, retailer, 
distributor, importer, and exporter. The company holds an Export Enterprise 
Certificate.85 It is located at Wooton, Belle-Rive, Eau Coulée. At the time when the 
company was registered, it had four directors, two of whom were from China:  
Zhang Yingman, Deputy General Manager; and Zhao Yimin, Vice Deputy General 
Manager. The remaining two directors were Mauritians: Ng Kwet Shing and Lindsay 
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Unt Wan. On 27 February 2003, the shares of the company were transferred to 
Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Co. Ltd (Taiyuan, Shanxi, China). Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) 
Co. Ltd is the party who initiated negotiations for the establishment of the Chinese 
zone in Mauritius. The company, via Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Group, is one of the 
shareholding partners of JFET. 
Tianli Construction Co. Ltd was registered in Mauritius on 23 July 2004 as a 
private domestic company. The applicant was Wang Xiang Long whose address is 
Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd, Wooton, Belle-Rive, Eau Coulée. The address of 
the registered company office is also the same. The directors listed were: Zhang 
Hong Yun, Chairman (Shanxi, China), Wang Zaijing (Shanxi, China), Zhang Dazhong 
(Jiangsu, China), Gao Jianhai (Shanxi, China), An Jing (Shanxi, China). The name of 
the ultimate holding company is Shanxi Tianli Construction Engineering Co. Ltd, 
which is a unit of the Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Group—shareholder of JFET. On 10 
September 2007, a notice of change of directors was registered. Of the earlier ones, 
only Wang Zaijing retained office while Shen Dong Xiong (Tianjin, China) and Sun 
Naiqun (Shanxi, China) joined the group.  
The national vegetable auction market was a project launched in 2005. Two 
hectares were earmarked at the Riche-Terre site for this purpose. The project was 
scrapped following acquisition of the land as part of the Chinese SEZ project.  
The (Mauritius) CT. Power Ltd is a private domestic company which was 
incorporated in Mauritius on 15 March 2006. The directors of the company are two 
Malaysians, Subramaniam S. Mariappan and Chay Kwong Min, who share the total 
shares of the company. There is a third director, a Mauritian by the name of Babita 
Jowaheer. Its declared activity is production of electricity at Albion, Pointe aux 
Caves. It intended to commence business in 2007. However, the company notified 
that, as from 7 November 2008, the sole shareholder of the company would be CT. 
Power Holdings Ltd, a company incorporated and situated in the Federal Territory 
of Labuan.86 The (Mauritius) CT. Power Ltd plans to produce electricity from coal 
and has assigned the operations and maintenance contract to Datang Taiyuan No.2 
Co Generation Power Plant. The latter is a unit of China Datang Corporation, which 
in turn is a partner of the Shanxi Coking Coal Group Co. Ltd—one of the JFET 
shareholders. Figure 4.5 traces this connection. The (Mauritius) CT. Power Ltd faces 
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legal opposition for its use of coal. In March 2013, the company denied all 
connections to JFET and announced that Datang Taiyuan No.2 Co. Generation 
Power Plant is no more in charge of the operations and maintenance of the plant 
(Thandarayan, 2013). Amidst strong opposition from the public and the opposition 
party, the Mauritian government is now reassessing the project proposal for CT. 
Power’s coal-powered plant (Le Weekend, 2013b).   
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                                       Figure 4.5: The Connection between The (Mauritius) CT. Power Ltd and JFET 
                                     Source: Author 
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Three projects by the Irrigation Authority were planned in the Northern part 
of the island. Not much information is available about the particularities of these 
projects. Interviewed in September 2012, a chief engineer at the IA (Mauritius) 
shared that, following the implementation of JFET, the three major projects had 
been scrapped (Interview at Irrigation Authority, 2012). 
Oriental Group (Mauritius) Industry Co. Ltd was registered in Mauritius on 14 
October 2009 as a private domestic company. Its aim was to establish a stone 
crushing plant, a tile making plant, a clinker grinding plant, a ready-mix concrete 
plant and a block making plant over 12.7 hectares of land at JFET. On the very day 
of its certified incorporation, i.e. 14 October 2009, JFET sent a letter to the Ministry 
of Environment and National Development informing that, as per government 
request, they would soon submit an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report 
in respect to the five construction materials plants to be put up by Oriental Group 
(Mauritius) Industry Co. Ltd. JFET entrusted the contract for producing the EIA to 
Scene-Ries Consult Ltd, Mauritius. There have been no updates about this project 
since. 
Binani Cement Factory (Mauritius) Ltd was incorporated in Mauritius on 25 
September 2007 in order to set up a greenfield clinker grinding unit and a packaging 
unit. The plant would expand over 6.5 hectares at the Mer Rouge Reclaimed Area, 
close to Terminal 2 of the port where cement cargoes are handled. The company is 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Binani Cement Factory LLC, Dubai. Binani Cement 
Factory Mauritius (Ltd) was supposed to start production by the end of 2012 but got 
embroiled in legal strife with Mauritian competitors, Holcim and Lafarge over its 
environmental impact. The relevance of this project to JFET is for two reasons. 
Firstly, it has an advantage over Oriental Group (Mauritius) Industry Co. Ltd as it is 
closer to the port and cuts down the transport costs. Secondly, in light of the 
liberalisation of the Mauritian cement industry since 1 July 2011, it adds to the 
competition for Oriental Group (Mauritius) Industry Co. Ltd. However, on 19 
October 2012, Binani abandoned the project in the face of continuous delays over 
its EIA clearance and due to a reduction in the space allocated for its business 
development (Barbé, 2012). 
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Neotown is an integrated city project developed by Les Salines Development 
Ltd, a subsidiary of Patel Realty India Ltd. According to records, Les Salines 
Development Ltd has been registered twice: the first time on 10 August 2005, and 
then again on 28 March 2008, as a private domestic company limited by shares. 
Events suggest that the first registration was in line with the submission of the Les 
Salines Development master plan by Stauch Voster Architects. The plan had been 
commissioned by the Mauritius Ports Authority (MPA). Later, when Patel Realty 
India Ltd took over, the project was redesigned by DSQ Architects Pvt Ltd. The 
project site, situated diametrically opposite the JFET site, on the left coast of the 
harbour, covers 23.6 hectares and involves an investment of USD 508 million. For a 
location map of Neotown, see Figure 4.2. Les Salines Development Ltd has 
requested similar terms and conditions as applied to JFET’s framework agreement 
in order to maximise the bankability and reliability of the project (Le Weekend, 
2011).87 Neotown is different from JFET in that, while the lease agreement for JFET 
is between the zone company and the Government of Mauritius, the lease 
agreement for the Neotown site is between two local parties: the MPA and the 
Ministry of Land, only to be sublet to Les Salines Development Ltd. Like JFET, 
Neotown is also a dormant zone. 
JFET Travel and Tours Ltd was initially incorporated in Mauritius on 26 
November 2007 under the name of MTET Travel and Tours Ltd. It was set up as a 
private domestic industry. The designated directors were Zhang Hongyun, Shen 
Dongxiong, Wang Zaijing, Zheng Xiaobin, and Yi Lili. Except for Yi Lili, the directors 
were also shareholders of the company, along with 18 other people from Shanxi, 
China. On 30 December 2009, the shares of the company were transferred to 
Mauritius JinFei Economic Trade and Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd and the following 
year, on 8 April 2010, the name of MTET Travel and Tours Ltd was changed to JFET 
Travel and Tours Ltd. On 10 May 2010, there was again a change of directors in the 
company. Xie li, Gao Zhiyi and Zhou Yong—the three directors of JFET—became its 
new directors. In the registration document of the Mauritius JinFei Economic Trade 
and Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd, JFET Travel and Tours figures as a subsidiary whose 
ultimate holding company is Shanxi JinFei Investment Co. Ltd 
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Tianli International Trading Co. Ltd was incorporated in Mauritius on 4 
February 2002 as a private domestic company aiming to conduct freeport activities, 
according to provisions of the Freeport Act 1992. The directors of the company 
were Zhang Yingman, Deputy General Manager (Shanxi, China, also director at Tianli 
Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd), Zhang Guozheng, Accounting Supervisor (Shanxi, 
China), Zhao Yimin, Vice General Manager (Shanxi, China), and Ng Kwet Shing, 
Managing Director (Port Louis, Mauritius, also director at Tianli Spinning (Mauritius 
Co. Ltd). However, two years afterwards, on 25 June 2004, the directors of the 
company changed. The seven new directors were all residents of Eau Coulée, Belle-
Rive, where Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd was based. On 17 February 2007, a 
notice was issued to the company stating that if necessary action is not taken, Tianli 
International Trading Co. Ltd would be struck off the Register of Companies. This 
was followed by a request from the Mauritian Ministry of Social Security, National 
Solidarity and Senior Citizen to withhold the dissolution of the company as it owed 
payments to the National Pensions Fund. There has been no update regarding this 
issue or the company since. The company could not be located on the address at 
which its office was registered.  
The displaced Riche-Terre–Terre-Rouge Planters stand at the crux of the JFET 
controversy. The majority of the land under which JFET stands was initially leased to 
two sets of planters falling under two separate agreements: 
(i) The Terre-Rouge Land Settlement of 103.76 hectares was leased to 106 
sugarcane planters. Their lease arrangement started in 1947 and was to end 
on 30 June 2007. The Government of Mauritius decided that it would not be 
renewed. The sugarcane planters were compensated in cash. Some 
additionally received land and were promised to be relocated to Côte d’Or 
so that they could continue their agricultural activities. 
(ii) The Riche-Terre Land settlement covered 74.73 hectares and was occupied 
by 121 foodcrop cultivators. Their lease started in 1985 and would have 
expired in September 2015. They were requested to vacate the land by 30 
April 2007 and to harvest their existent crops by 30 June 2007. This led to 
two hunger strikes after which they were eventually granted cash 
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compensation and relocation options at Bois Marchand and Arsenal—which 
some of them deemed insufficient. 
Figure 4.6 marks the three relocation options granted to the displaced farmers.  
 
 
               Figure 4.6: Resettlement Locations Proposed to the Displaced Planters in 
relation to JFET  
Source: Google Maps 2013 
 
 
Introducing Variables of Cost Impact 
The individual descriptions of the various companies, projects and entities which 
have a cost impact on JFET will now be attempted simultaneously with their 
assessments. Cost impact projects are divided into two categories: 
1. Those accounted for by the government within the officially designated 
budget devoted to the Chinese SEZ project: As these companies, entities and 
projects are part of the officially sanctioned selection of activities, their 
connection to JFET is straightforward. They act as the constants of JFET’s 
financial scenario, against which additional cost-elevating ventures in which 
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Mauritius has invested would be identified.  Even though the framework 
agreement is not accessible, parliamentary questions, media declarations and 
ministerial reports allow an easy compilation of a list of the government-
sponsored projects associated to JFET. As successive finance ministers have 
declared, the Government of Mauritius will only provide off-site infrastructure 
to the zone. The rest of the funding would come from the Chinese developers. 
On 10 June 2008, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of MOFEE, Sithanen 
stated: 
We succeeded in convincing Tianli [JFET] to choose Mauritius whilst 
offering a more limited package that includes provision of off-site 
infrastructure with a contribution of Rs 100 m. [USD 3.2 million] from 
Tianli *…+ of the Rs750 m. *USD 23.8 million+ of off-site infrastructure 
paid by Mauritius, only Rs85 m. [USD 2.7 million] is paid for by 
Government for road infrastructure after taking account of the Rs100 m. 
[USD 3.2 million] exceptionally contributed by Tianli for financing off-
site infrastructure. (Mauritius, Parliament. 2008, 10 June) 
 
The subsequent Minister of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED), 
Pravin Jugnauth reinstated the same on 29 March 2011:88 
I wish to inform the House that, as per the terms of the Framework 
Agreement, Government has committed to invest in off-site 
infrastructure for provision of utilities and road network to the site. 
(Mauritius, Parliament. 2011, 29 March) 
 
Hence, the Government of Mauritius will only pay for utilities and road 
networks up to the boundaries of the zone. USD 23.8 million has been 
earmarked for these projects. Of this amount, USD 2.7 million will be invested 
in roads to service JFET (in addition to the USD 3.2 million contribution by 
Tianli), and the rest, i.e. USD 21.1 million, will be invested in power, water, 
telecommunications, and wastewater provisions. 
2. Those unaccounted for by the government and falling outside the budget 
officially allocated to the Chinese SEZ project: Sithanen hinted that part of the 
disbursement to power, water, telecommunications, and wastewater 
provisions will be treated as separate expenses borne by parastatal bodies on 
an independent account. This will form part of the ‘normal expansion of work’ 
of the parastatal bodies. 
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CEB [Central Electricity Board], CWA [Central Water Authority] and 
WMA [Wastewater Management Authority] are investing the rest as 
part of their normal expansion of network to cover not only Tianli [JFET] 
but also benefit the residents and businesses in the region. Moreover, 
these utility companies will recover their investment from the very large 
bills to be expected from the companies operating in the zone. As 
regards, telephone facilities, Tianli is dealing directly with service 
providers. (Mauritius, Parliament. 2008, 10 June)  
 
While the government acknowledges the later projects, they are not 
financially sanctioned to be included within the budget granted to JFET. 
Instead, they fall under the separate financial responsibility of state-owned 
companies, which are also financially attached to the government. The 
activities of these authorities are funded from the national budget. Therefore, 
in a diverted fashion, it is the government who eventually bears the cost of 
these additional power, water, telecommunications, and wastewater projects 
established to support JFET. But one additional item of unaccounted 
expenditure that Sithanen does even not acknowledge here is the extra road 
infrastructure that is being built to aid JFET. Based on the locational attributes 
of these new roads, it can be easily derived that these are intricately linked to 
the Chinese SEZ project. Hence, they count as an additional cost borne for the 
sake of JFET. 
This separation of companies, projects and entities as those receiving official 
financial support from the government and those which do not, performs multiple 
evaluational tasks simultaneously. Firstly, it shed light on those hidden projects 
which the Mauritian government had camouflaged in order to make it appear that 
the incentive package that Mauritius grants to JFET is not preferential in any form. 
And secondly, it quantifies the excess of funds which the Mauritian government is 
investing in JFET. With this computation, we are also able to compare the 
investment that both parties, Mauritian and Chinese, have put into this cooperative 
and mutually beneficial venture. The expenditure on each item of off-site 
infrastructure will be calculated to measure the extent to which they have stayed 
true to the allocated government budget, thus determining whether JFET is a 
financially sustainable and profitable investment for Mauritius. The data cited in the 
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tables below is based on information derived from various government authorities 
and databases.  
 
Projects financially sanctioned by the government within the budget of 
USD 23.8 million.  
Table 4.1 compiles the details of the projects financially sanctioned by the 
government of Mauritius, within the budget of USD 23.8 million. 
 
    Table 4.1: Off-site Infrastructure projects accounted for by the Government of Mauritius 
Source: Author 
 
 
Discounting the costs of incomplete works by Mauritius Telecom (MT), the total 
amount disbursed by the government up to now is USD 25.7 million + cost of 
upgrade of Baie du Tombeau Road + additional cost for the installation of 
equipment by the Wastewater Management Authority (WMA). Considering that the 
total budget set aside for these projects is USD 23.8 million, already, an additional 
 ROADS Central 
Electricity Board 
(CEB) 
Central Water 
Authority 
(CWA) 
Wastewater 
Management 
Authority 
(WMA) 
Mauritius 
Telecom (MT) 
Project 1 JinFei access road 
with dual 
carriageway of 
1.1km +3 
roundabouts 
+streetlights +drains 
USD 3.2 million 
66 kv line from 
Beau Plan to 
Riche-Terre+ 
substation USD 
13.2 million 
Pipe Laying 
from Calebasse 
Reservoir to 
Riche-Terre 
USD 746,033. 
Pump station 
and pipe laying 
USD 2.8 million 
Telephone 
exchange + 6 
mobile base 
stations 
providing 3G, 
3G+ LTE service 
Project 2 Upgrade of Riche-
Terre Road USD 2.5 
million 
 Water supply 
to JinFei 7km 
pipe laying 
USD 3.26 
million 
Additional costs 
expected for 
new contract to 
complete 
installation of 
equipment 
 
Project 3 Upgrade of Baie du 
Tombeau Road 
N/A 
    
Total on 
Completion 
USD 5.7 million + 
cost of upgrade of 
Baie du Tombeau 
Road 
USD 13.2 million USD 4 million USD 2.8 million 
+ additional cost 
for project 2 
Not completed 
Budget 
Earmarked
89
 
USD 5.87 million USD 12.86 
million 
USD 3.58 
million 
USD 3 million USD 952, 395. 
Difference N/A but above 
budget 
Above budget 
by USD 340,000. 
Above budget 
by 
USD 428, 572. 
N/A N/A 
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expenditure of at least USD 1.9 million has been drawn from public funds. Figure 4.7 
marks the road infrastructures mentioned in Table 4.1  
 
 
Figure 4.7: Financially Sanctioned Road Infrastructure Projects and JFET  
Source: Google Map 2013 
 
Projects unaccounted for within the USD 23.8 million budget allocated to 
JFET’s off-site infrastructure 
The extra expenditure on JFET’s officially ratified off-site infrastructure works is only 
a prelude of the amount of money that has gone into adjacent infrastructural 
projects that Mauritius has carried out for the ease of JFET.  These unaccounted 
adjacent support projects have required an additional investment of USD 134.3 
million from Mauritian public funds. Therefore, the total additional expenditure on 
JFET’s off-site infrastructure assumed by Mauritius exceeds USD 136.2 million. Table 
4.2 presents the concerned additional off-site infrastructures and their costs. 
 
 
  
160 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Off-site infrastructure projects unaccounted for by the government of Mauritius 
Source: Author 
 
 
Despite the disclaimer from Sithanen that some off-site infrastructure works 
aiming to serve the Chinese SEZ will be in the form of normal expansions of 
networks in order to benefit the general population, links between JFET and these 
new construction plans are clearly stated in their respective project profiles 
published on the government’s Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP) website. 
It is doubtful that without JFET these ‘normal’ projects would have been considered. 
Examples of such projects are: 
 ROADS CEB CWA WMA MT Total 
Project 1 Terre-Rouge-
Verdun link road 
USD 79.36 
million
90
 
— Upgrade of 
La Nicolière 
from a 
capacity of 
66 000m
3
 to 
100 000m
3 
USD 13.65 
million 
Provision of 
sewerage 
facilities to 
central and 
Riche-Terre 
areas of Baie 
du Tombeau 
(including 
replacement 
of section of 
an existing 
service main 
located along 
Baie du 
Tombeau 
coastal road 
USD 41.3 
million 
—  
Project 2 Study for 
construction of 
link road between 
JinFei-Freeport 
area USD 85,714 
+administration 
cost in tender 
process
91
 
     
Total on 
completion 
USD 79.4 million 
+administration 
cost in tender 
process for 
project 2 
 USD 13.6 
million 
USD 41.3 
million 
 USD 134.3 
million 
+administration 
cost in tender 
process for 
road project 2 
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(i) Terre-Rouge–Verdun link road: The plan for a road connecting the North and 
South of the island was initiated in 2003 but was launched only in 2007. A PSIP 
document outlines its objective: 
It will also improve economic activities in the port and will provide easy 
access for the industrial zone of Riche Terre as well as the future 
Administrative City of Highlands. (Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development, 2009)  
 
The project was to be financed by a concessional loan from the EXIM Bank of 
China until 2009 when the Mauritian government re-launched the tender at an 
international level due to the high-priced bids submitted by the Chinese 
contractors selected by EXIM Bank of China (Mauritius, Parliament, 2009, 1 
June). Eventually, the project was financed by the Arab Bank for Economic 
Development in Africa, OPEC Fund for International Development, Agence 
Française de Dévelopement and the government of Mauritius (Public Sector 
Investment Programme, Mauritius, 2012-2016). The contract for the 
construction of the road has been awarded to a joint venture company 
comprising of Beijing Construction Engineering Group Co. Ltd  (BCEG) and the 
Mauritian company, Gamma Civic. 92  Although this road network will 
undeniably aid general traffic flow across the country, the locations chosen for 
the detours of this road specifically serve JFET. While Terre-Rouge lies within 
less than a kilometre from the JFET site, Verdun is close to Tianli Spinning 
(Mauritius) Co. Ltd’s factory at Belle-Rive.  Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd 
also intends to set up its third manufacturing plant in JFET. In this situation, a 
link road between its headquarter and the zone is a commendable facility. The 
proximity of Terre-Rouge–Verdun road to JFET is represented in Figure 4.8. 
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Figure 4.8: Approximate route for Terre-Rouge – Verdun Link Road in relation to 
JFET and Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd93  
Source: Google Map 2013 
 
(ii) Link road between JinFei-Freeport area: The proposal for a road linking the 
Mer Rouge Freeport area to JFET via Baie du Tombeau and cutting through 
Pont Bruniquel, in addition to a nearby parking lot, was considered. If the 
proposal is ratified, it will affect the fauna of the country. This is because Pont 
Bruniquel and the Rivulet Terre-Rouge Bird Sanctuary areas, which are home 
to migrant birds, would have to demolished and constructed upon. The 
feasibility study conducted by Luxconsult Ltd also suggests that once the zone 
starts functioning, a flyover should be built over the JFET roundabout. This will 
ease traffic congestion which would necessarily result from the presence of 
three roundabouts within 500m of each other, i.e. Quay D–Terre-Rouge-JFET 
roundabouts. Figure 4.9 pinpoints all locations relevant to this plan. 
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Figure 4.9: Freeport Area, JFET & potential link road routes, cutting through Pont 
Bruniquel and Rivulet Terre-Rouge Bird Sanctuary 
Source: Google Map 2013 
 
(iii) Upgrade of La Nicolière from a capacity of 66,000m3 to 100, 000m3: La 
Nicolière Treatment plant treats water sourced from 19 reservoirs of the north 
of the island and supplies potable water to the region. With the advent of 
JFET, water consumption will increase. For this reason, the government has 
decided to upgrade La Nicolière Treatment Plant from a capacity of 66,000m3 
to 100,000m3. It will be funded by loans from Agence Française de 
Dévelopement. 
(iv) Provision of sewerage facilities to central and Riche-Terre areas of Baie du 
Tombeau (including replacement of section of an existing service located 
along Baie du Tombeau coastal road): This is a large scale project aiming to 
improve the sewerage facilities in the named regions of the island and to 
replace existing equipment with new ones. It is clear that this sudden need to 
rehabilitate Riche-Terre and Baie du Tombeau’s sewerage networks is linked 
to the development of JFET.  
While these unaccounted expenditures are entirely of an infrastructural 
nature, the Government of Mauritius has made further disbursements in other 
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areas in order to secure an unencumbered foundation for the Chinese zone. Those 
items of expenditure are discussed below: 
(v) The Terre-Rouge and Riche-Terre planters: One of the largest expenditure 
that the government has made is in respect of the two groups of planters who 
were displaced from the JFET site. A total compensation amount of USD 1.7 
million was distributed among the 106 Terre-Rouge sugarcane planters. 
Eighty-six of them were additionally given 2.53 m2 of land each.94 The cases of 
20 planters who had been squatting on their plots were regularised. They will 
also be relocated to Côte d’Or (Mauritius, Parliament. 2007, 7 May). As for the 
second group, comprising of the 121 Riche-Terre Land Settlement planters, 33 
took up the cash compensation of USD 3,850 per 0.4 hectare (per arpent)95 
and relocated to Arsenal and Bois Marchand. Fifty-eight of them only took the 
USD 3,850 per 0.4 hectare. By July 2009, three of the remaining 30 had passed 
away and two were abroad. Of the remaining 25, 23 were contesting the 
compensation, of which 14 were identified as active planters and nine as 
having abandoned their plots. The remaining two cases were both identified 
as inactive planters; one was absent on the day of compensation collection 
and the other one was not eligible for compensation. These items of 
expenditure in relation to the JFET project had not been envisaged. 
Nevertheless, they have been entirely borne by the Mauritian government, 
without any contribution from the Chinese developers. Table 4.3 calculates 
the total compensation amount disbursed. 
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Table 4.3: Total Expenses over Displaced Farmers 
Source: Author 
 
 
(vi) Electricity and irrigation dues of planters: The dues of the planters to Central 
Electricity Board (CEB) and to IA were written off.  The cost was USD 63,600. 
(vii) Compulsory acquisition of adjacent sites: Another payment went towards 
compulsory acquisition of land neighbouring the JFET site. However, this item 
of unaccounted expenditure not only involves cash disbursement but also 
signals towards a probable embezzlement of additional land. While the Terre-
Rouge Land Settlement covered 103.59 hectares and Riche-Terre Land 
Settlement expanded over only 74.61 hectares, the remaining expanse of land 
required for the Chinese SEZ development had to be retrieved from individual 
proprietors. To this end, a total of 30.44 hectares was acquired in the form of 
five private plots belonging to Filature de Riche-Terre Limitée (three plots), 
Sociéte Redville (one plot) and Heirs Ahmad Salehmahomed Ramtoola (one 
plot). The amount paid to the proprietors for this compulsorily acquisition was 
decided by the Chief Government Valuer and remains confidential. (Mauritius, 
Parliament. 2008, 27 May) 
Terre-Rouge (106 sugarcane 
planters) 
Riche-Terre (121 vegetable planters) 
USD 1.7 million 
(approximately USD 16,037 each)  
 
217.58m
2 
(2.53m
2 
 to each of  86 planters) 
 
Regularisation of 20 planters having 
illegal construction of the land 
34 active planters: USD 3,850 each + 0.4 hectare each (USD 130,900 + 
13.7 hectares) 
 
58 non-active/deceased/abroad planters: USD 3,850 each (USD 
223,300)  
 
6 dead and unresolved 
 
13 certified active planters: USD 8,879
96
 + USD 3,850 +accrued interest 
of approximately USD 800 each  
(USD 115,427 + USD 50,050 + USD 10,400) 
 
9 certified non active planters: USD 3,850 + accrued interest of 
approximately USD 800 each 
(USD 34,650 + USD 7,200) 
 
1 non-active but seeks land (USD 3,850 + accrued interest of 
approximately USD 800) 
 
  
Total: USD 2.3 million + 13.7 hectares + cost of regularisation of 20 planters  
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As we add up the expanses of land acquired from the Terre-Rouge 
Settlement, Riche-Terre Settlement and from the compulsory acquisition of 
the five private plots, the total area of land comes to 208.64 hectares.  This 
neither matches the 211 hectares mentioned in the lease contract, nor does it 
match the 500 arpent (202.4 hectares) to which 211 hectares is wrongly 
equated to in the contract. Table 4.4 computes the total land acquired for JFET 
against the 211 hectares or 500 arpents (202.4 hectares) stated in the 
contract.  
 
Table 4.4: Extra Land acquired under JFET 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, if we assume that 211 hectares has been leased to JFET, then 
records accounting for the additional 2.36 hectares required to complete 211 
hectares are missing.  And if we assume that 500 arpents (i.e. 202.4 hectares) 
has been leased to JFET, then, an extra 6.58 hectares has been appropriated 
under the name of JFET.  The second hypothesis is more likely to be true since 
on 10 June 2008, Sithanen declared in parliament that, land granted to the 
Chinese SEZ developers is divided into two plots: 48.9 hectares and 153.56 
hectares. This totals to 202.4 hectares (Mauritius. Parliament. 2008, 10 June).   
(viii) Land conversion and rental fees: Although the land was agricultural before it 
was suddenly granted industrial status under JFET, the Sugar Industry 
Efficiency Act 1988 (Section 7, ix) exempts it from the payment of land 
conversion tax. This is because of a special provision which states that ‘[n]o 
land conversion tax shall be payable where an application is granted (a) for 
the purpose of the construction of industrial estates and business parks 
approved by the relevant Ministry’. Nevertheless, as per the State Lands Act 
1945, Section 6, 1, C (since the majority of the land expanse is state property), 
 Terre-Rouge 
Settlement 
Riche-Terre 
Settlement 
Compulsory 
Acquisition (5 
plots) 
Total Extra Land 
Acquired 
In arpent 256.34 184.63 75.33 516.3 16.3 
Should be in 
hectares 
(1 arpent 
= 0.4048 
hectare) 
103.59 74.61 30.44 208.64 6.58 
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rent payable on industrial lease of state land situated beyond 81.21m from 
the high water mark of Zone D of the Second Schedule (the Riche-Terre site 
falls under this area)97 should be USD 8,571 per 0.4 hectare per year.98 Figure 
4.10 designates the Zone D boundary in relation to JFET. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Zone D Boundary from Rue des Aigles to Junction of Rue Japonais to 
Pointe aux Piment Mont Choisy Coast Road  
Source: Google Map 2013 
 
But on 30 July 2009, the Government of Mauritius strategically made changes 
to the State Lands Act 1945 and reduced the rent payable by the JFET 
developers. 
Notwithstanding subsection (1C), where a large investment project is 
deemed by the Minister, subject to approval of Cabinet, to be in the 
economic interest of Mauritius, the annual rent determined in 
accordance with that subsection shall be reduced by such amount as 
may be determined by the Minister and any lease may be granted for a 
period not exceeding 99 years, with the approval of the Minister, 
subject to the approval of Cabinet. (State Lands Act 1945, Section 6, 1, F) 
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According to the lease contract signed between the Mauritian state and JFET, the 
rent is USD 4,574 per 0.4 hectare per year for the first five years. At the very outset, 
a rent of USD 3,997 per 0.4 hectare per year is foregone. 
With the above profiling of the companies, entities and projects connected to 
JFET, this work is now equipped to analyse the way in which each of these 
components have been altered by, or are altering the development of the zone. In 
short, having addressed the ‘who’ part of the query, the next step is to answer 
‘how’ they intervened in JFET and how they are responsible for the current status of 
the zone. The most coherent and transparent way in which to analyse the patterns 
of behaviour of the listed actors is through a timeline.  
 
Timeline of JFET 
 
2001: Advent of the SEZ Pioneer 
In 2001, Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd. launched a cotton yarn-spinning factory 
in Mauritius. The establishment of the company on the island was in line with the 
favourable trade climate that Sub-Saharan African countries experienced under 
AGOA 2001. Under this agreement, Sub-Saharan African countries whose textile 
products were made of (i) yarn from the region, or (ii) yarn from the US, are eligible 
to export their apparel to the US market, free of duty. Except for South Africa, 
Seychelles, Gabon, and Mauritius, the remaining Sub-Saharan African countries 
benefitted from the LDC status as from 2001 and therefore were eligible for the 
Third Country Fabric Derogation facility under AGOA. Thus, by establishing itself in 
Mauritius, Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd captured the market made up of 
Mauritian garment producers who, due to non-LDC status, had to rely on regional 
or US yarn. Along with Mauritius, South African, European and Malagasy companies 
became Tianli Spinning’s regular clients. However, in July 2004, under AGOA IV, 
Mauritius too gained LDC status. It could use yarn imported from a third country 
and still be eligible for duty-free access to US. This move affected the business of 
Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd as Mauritian producers resumed their imports of 
yarn from India where cotton yarn is much cheaper (Interview with supervising 
officer at Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd, October 2011). Subject to intense 
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lobbying from beneficiary countries, the Third Country Fabric Derogation which was 
supposed to terminate on 30 September 2012, was further extended until 2015. 
Nevertheless, in September 2004, Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd expressed its 
plans to expand its production capacity from 2,500 tonnes of yarn per year to 8,000 
tonnes per year. It is for this purpose that it leased a further 4 hectares of land from 
the Mauritian government at Quartier-Militaire. This expansion plan of Tianli 
Spinning can be read as a long-term strategy of the company to position itself as a 
profitable regional and local supplier for when AGOA preferences end in 2015. To 
date, Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd maintains that its business in Mauritius has 
not met the expectations with which it was established.  
 
2006-2007: FOCAC and Tianli SEZ Site Identification 
The (Mauritius) CT. Power Ltd was incorporated in Mauritius on 15 April 2006. On 
21 April 2006, BOI issued a letter of intent to the company, permitting it to invest in 
the proposed coal-powered electricity plant. Shortly afterwards, BOI requested the 
promoters to downsize the project. The proposal was revised to compose of the 
construction of a 2 x 55 MW plant.  
In October 2006, a newspaper reported that Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. 
Ltd had proposed the creation of an integrated industrial zone in Mauritius 
(L’Express, 19 October 2006). The project would include residential facilities for 
Chinese workers and was in line with the decision of the Chinese government to set 
up a number of such zones abroad. The location for the zone had not been decided, 
although Belle-Rive, where Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd currently stands, was 
being considered. On 27 October 2006, a ministerial committee was appointed to 
identify potential sites for this zone. Only four days after the appointment of this 
committee, on 31 October 2006, the Ministry of Housing and Lands appealed to the 
Ministry of Agro Industry and Food Security (MAIFS) to pursue the following: 
(i) a survey of the number of planters occupying land at the Riche-Terre and 
Terre-Rouge area 
(ii) possibilities of relocating the planters 
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(iii) Agricultural Research and Extension Unit (AREU), IA, BOI, in collaboration with 
the Chief Government Valuer, to calculate the quantum of compensation to 
be paid to the planters if they cannot be relocated. 
This short span of time (i.e. five days) in between the appointment of a committee 
to identify a prospective location for the Chinese SEZ and consensus upon the 
potential of the Riche-Terre and Terre-Rouge sites, signals that contrary to what 
was publicly declared, the site for the zone had been decided before the official 
committee group was set up.   
A week after the committee was set up, on 3 November 2006, Mauritian 
prime minister, Ramgoolam travelled to Beijing to attend the FOCAC conference 
which was to be held on 3-5 November.  In his opening speech at the event, Jintao 
announced the intention to set up a few CSEZAs. On the second day of the 
convention, Ramgoolam met Premier Jibao to discuss investment opportunities and 
lobbied to secure one of the CSEZAs in Mauritius. He invited Chinese investors to 
start businesses in Mauritius and presented investment protection and an attractive 
business environment as inducements. Reminding China of the past fruitful 
collaboration between the two countries in establishing the EPZ on the island, 
Ramgoolam successfully convinced China to implant a Chinese SEZ on Mauritian 
soil. The negotiations concluded with China additionally offering Mauritius a 
financial aid of USD 3.8 million for various development projects. On 6 November 
2006, it was decided that Mauritius would be hosting one of the Chinese SEZs over 
an expanse of 211 hectares. To believe that Ramgoolam lobbied and the Chinese 
government relented to a Chinese SEZ in Mauritius and even finalised the size of it 
over just two days, is delusional. Statements such as: 
As the House is aware, the Jin-Fei Zone is one of five economic zones that the 
People’s Republic of China is supporting in Africa. It is the outcome of intense 
lobbying by the Prime Minister during the Sino Africa Summit held in Beijing in 
2006 for Mauritius to be part of the Africa development strategy by the 
Chinese Government. (Mauritius, Parliament, 15 June 2010) 
 
by Mauritian ministers are only eulogies misguiding the public from the actual 
procedures which led to the formation of the Mauritius Tianli Economic and Trade 
Cooperation Zone.  
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Between 14 and 27 November 2006, AREU and the Chief Government Valuer 
submitted the result of their studies regarding the prospective displacement of the 
121 Riche-Terre farmers. The survey found that only 51 of the 121 Riche-Terre 
planters were regular cultivators. It was concluded that compensation for crop-loss 
would be unnecessary since the planters will be given time to harvest their crops 
before the displacement. Accordingly, the compensation calculated for the Riche-
Terre planters was USD 3208 per 0.4 hectare. This calculation was computed 
keeping the following in mind (Noël  and Ramkissoon, 2010): 
(i) No compensation would be given for fencing since the planters had not 
applied to Land Use Division (LUD) of the MAIFS to request for the permission 
to put it up initially. 
(ii) It is agricultural land. 
(iii) No compensation for crop-loss as planters will be allowed to harvest their 
crops before they are displaced. 
(iv) No compensation for the irrigation network because that had been provided 
by the government through the IA.  
(v) Full market rent of agricultural lands in Mauritius is estimated to USD 385 per 
0.4 hectare per annum. The rent paid by the Riche-Terre lessees is USD 3.8 
per 0.4 hectare per annum. Therefore, the profit rent is USD 381.2. The 
compensation calculation will apply an estimated 4 per cent per annum for 
capitalisation rate of profit.  
(vi) Other relocation losses were estimated to be USD 257. 
The equation resembled the following (adapted from Noël and Ramkissoon, 2010, 
p. 26): 
Full Market Rent per annum                         USD 385     
Less Passing Rent                                             USD       3.8   
Profit Rent                                                         USD  381.2  
Years Purchase 9 years at 4%                          x        7.73 
                                         USD 2947      
Other losses                                                      USD   257      
                                 USD 3204                       
Rounded to                                                       USD 3208       
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Nevertheless, two and a half weeks after these evaluations, on 15 December 2006, 
the 121 Riche-Terre planters received a notification from the government informing 
them that, as from the following year, i.e. 1 July 2007, the rental fee for the land 
they occupy at Riche-Terre would increase to USD 144. This was followed by 
another letter received on 7 February 2007, informing the planters that it had been 
decided that instead of USD 144, they would have to pay USD 64 as rental fee as 
from 1 July 2007. Eventually, on 6 March 2007, LUD issued letters to each of the 
Riche-Terre planters requesting them to vacate the land by 30 April 2007. In 
between the rent increase-decrease and eventual evacuation saga, the First 
Framework Agreement between Tianli and the Mauritian government for the 
setting up of a Chinese SEZ in Mauritius was signed (Mauritius, Parliament. 7 May 
2007). This was eight months prior to the project becoming public. 
 
2007: Displacing Riche-Terre and Terre-Rouge Planters 
Following the orders to vacate, on 9 March 2007, the president of the Riche-Terre 
Mixed Farming Cooperative Society wrote to MAIFS to confirm that the planters 
would leave the land by the date, and that they would not sow new crops. 
However, he requested for until 30 June 2007 to allow the planters to harvest their 
crops. On 19 March 2007, the Ministry conceded and communicated the following 
compensation proposal to the Riche-Terre planters: 51 of the 121 planters who had 
been identified as active cultivators would be allowed 0.4 hectare each at Bois 
Marchand or Arsenal to continue their farming, and their debts to IA and CEB would 
be written off. The total compensation amount disbursed to the 106 Terre-Rouge 
sugarcane planters was computed as USD 256, 657 (Mauritius, Parliament. 2007, 10 
April). 
By 22 April 2007, the Chinese zone developers had set an office at Baie du 
Tombeau.  It was reported that a bulldozer had already started working the land at 
the Riche-Terre site. As this was almost a week before the occupants were due to 
vacate, the Riche-Terre planters issued a notice to Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Group. 
On 1 May 2007, the day of the Riche-Terre land repossession, the 121 planters had 
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not left. Five days afterwards, on 6 May 2007, IA damaged the water pump shed at 
the Riche-Terre site and took away the pump.  
A week later, on 17 May 2007, Ramgoolam met the 121 planters and 
promised to increase the compensation computed by the Chief Government Valuer 
from USD 3,208 to USD 3,850 per 0.4 hectare. Additionally, he promised that the 
planters could sell their vegetables in the Tianli zone once it was operational. The 
next day, LUD wrote to the planters, asking them to finalise their compensation 
options.  The payment of USD 3,850 as compensation to the planters and the 
allocation of land at Bois Marchand and Arsenal became effective as from 23 May 
2007. By that time, MAIFS had applied for an eviction order to be issued to the 
Riche-Terre planters who continued to occupy the land. The government needed 
the land to be cleared as the Chinese developers were expected to start work on 
the site from 1 June 2007. However, 51 planters refused to budge until their 
requested compensation amount was paid to them. They wanted a compensation 
amount ranging from USD 78,505 to USD 127,687 each.  
30 June 2007 was the last day of the lease of the 103 Terre-Rouge sugarcane 
planters. It was also the last day for the 121 Riche-Terre vegetable planters to 
harvest their crops. On 11 July 2007, the 51 Riche-Terre planters who still occupied 
the land, reported that 14 hectares of the site had been set ablaze. They requested 
an investigation. However, on 4 October 2007, Court ordered the remaining six 
planters who still held the land to vacate the site by 30 November 2007.  The six 
concerned planters filed for a ‘stay of action’ on the judgement. On 28 December 
2007, the planters withdrew the application for ‘stay order’ on the Court’s eviction 
order and evacuated the land.  
 
2008: Changes in Masterplan and Terre-Rouge - Verdun Link Road 
The following year started with a new twist in the Chinese SEZ tale. This got brief 
media coverage, though only retrospectively: 
[T]he Prime Minister expresses reservations and seeks to be enlightened 
on certain points about the Tianli project. The reason? The magnitude of 
the project, which the government has minimised up to now. In addition 
to industrial production activities, the Mauritius Tianli Economic and 
Trade Cooperation Zone (MTET) has announced touristic activities: the 
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construction of two hotels, of which one will be situated on the coast of 
the Baie du Tombeau region, is worrying. The government had not 
envisaged having to concede a section of the coast to Tianli.  (L’Express, 
2008f, my translation) 99 
 
Already, barred from public knowledge and to the dissatisfaction of the Mauritian 
government, the zone was diverging from its initial plans.  Meanwhile, overtly, an 
official project presentation of the zone master plan took place on 21 January 2008. 
The Chinese developers stipulated that by 2013, there would be an Oriental 
Entertainment City, factories, a custom-built plant, two hotels and a commercial 
boulevard, amongst others at Riche-Terre.  Parallel to these events, the 
Government of Mauritius was working on two road projects. Those were the (i) 
feasibility study for the construction of a road linking Mer Rouge Freeport area to 
JFET via Baie du Tombeau and cutting through Pont Bruniquel and a parking lot, and 
(ii) construction of the Terre-Rouge-Verdun link road. On 11 February 2008, the 106 
sugarcane planters were paid their monetary compensation. Instead of the USD 
256, 657 computed, a total compensation amount of USD 1.7 million was disbursed.  
March 2008 was marked by further changes in the master plan of the Tianli 
zone. The Tianli zone developers had modified the project. It was no more to be the 
industrial zone as originally planned. Instead, it would be an integrated industrial 
city. The Government of Mauritius was meanwhile consulting the EXIM Bank of 
China for a concessional loan in order to finance the Terre-Rouge-Verdun link road. 
The EXIM Bank of China approved the project. In May 2008, as the Chinese SEZ got 
further delayed, it was reported that the reason for the delay was the difficulty that 
Chinese developers were having in dealing with local Mauritian architects. 
According to the then Director General of the Tianli zone, Xiao Bin, the project had 
been handed to a Chinese company, Artech Architects, because the price quoted by 
Mauritian architects were too high (L’Express, 2008a). By November 2008, four 
Chinese companies bided for the contract of the Terre-Rouge-Verdun link road. 
However, a couple of months afterwards, a tender re-evaluation had to be carried 
out for the road project as the price quoted by the Chinese bidders had doubled. 
At a parliamentary session on 10 June 2008, Sithanen explained that the 
expanse of land granted to the Chinese developers was divided into two plots: 48.9 
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hectares and 153.56 hectares. The government had given concessions only in 
relation to the 48.9 hectares. He evoked the facility extended to the Chinese 
developers, which allowed the later to pledge the land to foreign banks. He further 
stated that until that date, 14 companies had shown interest in investing in the 
zone (Mauritius, Parliament, 2008, 10 June). About a month later, during a 
parliamentary session, information about the parties to which The (Mauritius) CT. 
Power Ltd had imparted various contracts was disclosed. The contract for 
engineering procurement and construction had been given to Shanghai Electric 
Corporation, and that of operation and maintenance had been given to Datang 
Taiyuan No. 2 Co-Generation Power Plant. It was further revealed that CEB officials 
and some experts from Mauritius had visited power plants in China for the purpose 
of The (Mauritius) CT. Power Ltd project. When asked why the visit was to China 
and not to Malaysia (because the promoters of CT Power are from Malaysia), the 
minister clarified that: ‘*t+he promoter is not, as I said, the operator. They will be 
contracting a promoter to operate…’ (Mauritius, Parliament, 2008, 15 July). On 20 
November 2008, The (Mauritius) CT. Power Ltd notified the Registrar of Companies 
that from thereon, the sole shareholder of the company would be CT. Power 
Holdings Ltd, a company functioning from the Federal Territory of Labuan, Malaysia.   
 
2009: JFET and Adjoined Businesses 
It was only after Hu Jintao’s visit to Mauritius in February 2009 that the zone project 
picked up again. On 16 February 2009, the Chinese President visited the island as 
part of his ‘five Asian, African nations’ trip. On the occasion, Mauritius and China 
signed three conventions for the financing of Mauritian development projects. 
Jintao applauded the close ties between the two countries and promised to 
accelerate work on the Chinese SEZ in Mauritius. On 26 March 2009, the Mauritian 
government amended the first land lease agreement to include the remaining land 
expanse which was not available at the time when the initial lease was signed.  Still, 
the Chinese developers did not sign the amended lease (Mauritius, Parliament. 
2010, 15 June). 
On 17 April 2009, the Central Procurement Board (Mauritius) (CPB) requested 
for a renegotiation of the pricing for the construction contract of Terre-Rouge-
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Verdun link road with BCEG, the lowest bidder. BCEG had proposed USD 80 million, 
and CPB wanted to bring down the price to USD 64 million. The latter stated that it 
would otherwise prefer re-launching the tender. 
In May 2009, several major changes were announced in the Tianli Chinese SEZ 
project. The project was now to be financed by a new set of partners: CADFund, 
‘Shanxi government’ through a SPV, and the Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Group.100 The 
work was scheduled to begin as from September 2009. BOI was entrusted the 
duties of monitoring and facilitating the implementation of the project. The 
construction period would be from five to nine years and would occur in two 
phases. The rent would increase by 50 per cent after every 15 years, instead of after 
every 10 years. The zone would no more be exclusive to Chinese investors. It would 
now welcome other foreign investors too. Earlier, the land could only be pledged to 
Chinese banks but now, the developers were allowed to pledge their leasehold 
rights to banks outside Mauritius when raising money for the development and 
construction phase. In order to raise money for business operations, the companies 
investing within the zone would be able to pledge their leasehold rights, buildings 
and properties to banks both, inside and outside Mauritius, if permitted by the 
Government of Mauritius. Government had previously agreed to upgrade the Riche-
Terre Road and to build the access road. It was decided that it would now 
additionally also upgrade the Baie du Tombeau road. (Mauritius, Parliament. 2009, 
20 October) 
Meanwhile, a series of related events were unfolding. Tianli Construction Co. 
Ltd won the contract to build the extension block of Flacq hospital at the cost of 
USD 4 million. Differences between bidders and the government over the Terre-
Rouge-Verdun link road led to a re-launch of the tender. This time bidding was not 
restricted to Chinese companies only but was open to international contractors. Still 
in May 2009, Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd announced its intention to invest in 
a third manufacturing plant. The plant would be on JFET’s premises (L’Express, 
2009).   
By July 2009, the 58 non-active Riche-Terre planters had collected their 
compensation of USD 3,850 each. Six cases remained unresolved due to death and 
uninterested planters. Thirty-four of the active planters took USD 3,850 plus 0.4 
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hectare at either Arsenal or Bois Marchand each. The remaining 23 contested the 
compensation. They demanded a compensation amount which would account for 
elements overlooked during the government evaluation exercise. The overlooked 
items were: (i) moral damage and loss of livelihood, (ii) loss of investment in crops, 
and (iii) the differential treatment they had been subjected to as compared to the 
sugarcane cultivators of the Terre-Rouge Land Settlement. They explained that the 
sugarcane planters of Terre-Rouge Land Settlement had received cash in addition to 
land ownership as compensation for their foregone revenue. Comparatively, at 
Riche-Terre, vegetable planters could have derived three harvests from their 
existent crops compared to one harvest from sugarcane plantation derived by the 
Terre-Rouge planters. (Mangar, 2010). The total compensation sought by the Riche-
Terre planters was a sum of the following items: 
 
USD 3,208 per 0.4 hectare/planter x 9 years      = USD 28,872 
Moral damages per planter                                    = USD  16,041 
2.53m2 for settlement per planter          +               USD 44,913 
 
On 30 July 2009, MOFCOM officially consented to allow the Chinese developers to 
proceed with the Chinese zone development in Mauritius.  
No major developments regarding the zone took place for months until 4 
August 2009 when, at a board meeting in Taiyuan (China), it was decided that the 
zone investing company, Shanxi JinFei Investment Co. Ltd, would invest USD 80 
million (representing 100 per cent shares) in a new company to be incorporated in 
Mauritius called the Mauritius JinFei Economic Trade and Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd. 
Xie Li, an employee of TISCO, was entrusted to act as shareholder on behalf of this 
new company. Shortly afterwards, on 13 August 2009, the Registrar of Companies 
(Mauritius) gave its approval for the incorporation of Mauritius JinFei Economic and 
Trade Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd as a private domestic company. On 16 September 
2009, JFET eventually signed the amended lease agreement prepared on 26 March 
2009 for the complete land expanse of 211 hectares /500 arpents. JFET was 
officially launched with much fanfare in the presence of the vice-governor of Shanxi, 
Li Xiaopeng (Chavrimootoo, 2009).  
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JFET invited the Chinese company, Yantai Oriental Stainless Steel Industry Co. 
Ltd, to set up five construction materials plants in the zone in order to produce all 
the construction materials for the zone. Hence, on 14 October 2009, Oriental Group 
(Mauritius) Industry Co. Ltd. was registered in Mauritius. In November 2009, the 
group of 23 Riche-Terre planters who were contesting the compensation amount 
were summoned by Court to explain the reason behind their demands. The planters 
offered no explanation and withdrew their petition.101 On 10 November 2009, the 
Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development wrote to JFET to request for 
an EIA of the stone crushing plant that Oriental Group (Mauritius) Industry Co. Ltd 
was planning to set up on the site.   
 
2010: Strike and Final Compensation 
On 19 February 2010, the Riche-Terre planters started a 30-days long hunger strike, 
asking the government to reconsider their case.  Pressurised by this act, Ramgoolam 
appointed Noël and Ramkissoon to form a Comité de Mediation to investigate the 
grounds for consideration of the demands of the 23 planters. On 4 March, a social 
activist, who was also on the hunger strike with the planters, was arrested for 
organising an ‘illegal gathering’ (Hemraz, 2010). On 27 April 2010, Noël and 
Ramkissoon’s committee submitted its report. However, the government refused to 
publicly release the recommendations of the committee. The committee had made 
two strong points. Firstly, that Mauritius lacks the regulatory framework to manage 
retrieval of leased lands and calculation of appropriate compensation. And 
secondly, that although 14 of the Riche-Terre planters are genuine planters and 
nine are not eligible for relocation, in light of the problems encountered throughout 
this case, all 23 planters should receive similar compensation. The committee 
proposed that the 23 planters be granted: 
(i) Basic/Displacement compensation of USD 3,850 per 0.4 hectare, adjusted for 
accrued interest for the period 23-24 May 2007 to end of June 2010, and 
(ii) Option A 
Relocation to Arsenal and Bois Marchand with a land lease starting July 2010 
and ending in August 2018, with additional financial support of approximately 
USD 3,850 from the Food Security Fund (FSF) for land preparation, and 
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technical support from AREU.102 FSF may also consider additional support for 
activities such as waterlogging and access roads. The planters’ loans from IA 
and the CEB would be written off while their loans from the Development 
Bank of Mauritius (DBM) would be rescheduled. 
Or 
Option B 
Cash compensation in lieu of option A which has been computed for net 
revenue forgone from July 2007 to August 2015, estimated at USD 1,143 per 
0.4 hectare per annum. The resultant amount is to be adjusted to USD 8,879 
per 0.4 hectare, in line of present value. Their loans from IA and CEB would be 
written off while their loans from DBM would be rescheduled. (Noël and 
Ramkissoon, 2010) 
In the meantime, one of the 23 planters opted for land and cash 
compensation and abandoned the group. Twenty-two plaintiff planters were left. 
Eventually, on 29 June, the government decided that out of the 22, only 13 were 
genuine planters. Therefore, only they were eligible for the following compensation 
package: 
(i) USD 3,850 per 0.4 hectare, plus 
(ii) Accrued interest from May 2007 to June 2010 (approximately USD 802 per 0.4 
hectare), plus 
(iii) Relocation option, plus 
(iv) Support from the FSF for land preparation and other activities, amounting to 
approximately USD 3,850 per 0.4 hectare. 
The remaining nine planters, who were found not to be cultivating the land at the 
time of the acquisition, were eligible for the following: 
(i) USD 3,850 per 0.4 hectare, plus 
(ii) Accrued interest from May 2007 to June 2010 (approximately USD 802 per 0.4 
hectare) 
In July 2010, the Mauritian government voted a USD 5.7 million loan for CEB to 
invest in the construction of a power distribution station within the JFET zone. On 
23 July 2010, MT signed an agreement with JFET for the setting up of an exchange 
station and six mobile base stations in the zone. Three months later, on 19 October 
  
180 
2010, the state also commissioned the installation of sewerage infrastructure at 
JFET.  
On 7 November 2010, the 22 Riche-Terre planters who still contested the 
compensation, staged a second hunger strike.  On 16 November, after the planters 
refused to terminate the strike, the government decided to put in place a 
ministerial committee to solve the problem. The committee was composed of the 
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), MOFED, and MAIFS. On the 17th day of the hunger 
strike, the government announced that it would only reach a decision after three 
days, on the day of the Cabinet meeting. Eventually, on 26 November 2010, on the 
19th day of the strike, a press conference was organised to officially communicate 
the final decision of the ministerial committee regarding the case of the 22 Riche-
Terre planters. The measures put forth were that: there was a distinction to be 
made between the 13 planters who were cultivating their plots at the time of the 
survey by AREU and the nine planters who were not. Therefore, the 
recommendation made by the Noël and Ramkissoon report for an equal treatment 
of all the 22 planters would not be accepted. However, in line with the 
recommendations of the report, the 13 planters would to be offered:  
Option A: Relocation + USD 3,850 per 0.4 hectare + accrued interest.  
Option B: USD 1,143 per 0.4 hectare per year for the period of July 2007 to August 
2015, totalling up to USD 8,879 + USD 3,850 + accrued interest. 
The minister of MAIFS mentioned that as the planters had systematically refused to 
relocate, they would be granted compensation package B. Cabinet approved to 
write-off all the planters’ debts to IA, CEB, and also their loans from DBM. Technical 
support would be provided by AREU, and the FSF would help with land preparation, 
upgrading of irrigation network, providing fertilisers, seeds, fencing and other 
upgrade works. The remaining nine planters were to receive USD 3,850 per 0.4 
hectare + accrued interest. However, if they wanted to pursue agricultural activities, 
they should submit requests for land to the Ministry. These would be considered on 
a case-to-case basis. The 22 planters unwillingly relented to take the cash 
compensation. 
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2011: On-site Plans and Off-Site Infrastructure  
On 7 January 2011, JFET Travels and Tours Ltd was set up as a subsidiary of 
Mauritius JinFei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd.  In March 2011, 
parliamentary updates informed that the on-site infrastructure of the zone was 
nearing completion and that in the next few months, the construction of a business 
centre of 2.4 hectares would start on the site. By then, the only activity which 
existed on the site was a series of tents, each denoted with room numbers, which 
functioned as a restaurant called ‘China Hot Pot’.   
                                                     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11: China Hot Pot Premises in JFET  
Photograph by author, January 2012 
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In between the waves of activities within the zone, the 22 planters who had 
accepted the final compensation offered by the government were facing new 
difficulties. Contrary to what was promised to them, the DBM had not suspended 
the loans they had taken for their agricultural activities. In February and in June 
2011, the president of the Riche-Terre Mixed Farming Cooperative Society wrote to 
DBM and to the MAIFS, requesting them to look into the matter, with no avail. On 
19 July, four months after the first construction update was provided to the 
parliament, it was announced that a further development would soon start onsite. 
This would be the construction of a warehouse covering 0.6 hectare. Responding to 
queries about the sewerage works on the site, the parliament was informed that 
the government had retracted from an installation of the sewerage infrastructure 
on-site because no building existed at the JFET site yet. Nonetheless, the concerned 
minister added that the equipment had already been bought and since they could 
not be tested due to the lack of working water flow on the site, the Wastewater 
Management Authority (WMA) had taken charge of the equipment. The minister 
underlined that the warranty period of the equipment would expire in 
approximately 14 months: i.e. around September 2012 (Mauritius, Parliament. 
2011, 19 July). In November 2011, the government voted a fund of USD 320,822 to 
be allocated to the Central Water Authority (CWA) for the provision of water supply 
to JFET (Mauritius, Parliament. 2011, 22 November).  
 
2012: Chinese SEZ takes New Direction 
By January 2012, JFET developers had applied for the construction permit for 
residential plants over 1500-1700 m2. In April 2012, Ramgoolam informed the public 
that the financial crisis had caused the project to take a backseat. He reassured the 
public that Jintao was personally following the Chinese SEZ development and that 
the zone developers would have to respect the deadline to deliver the zone to 
Mauritius. The next update on the JFET project came in form of a newspaper article 
dated 2 July 2012, where investigations revealed that Chinese zone promoters were 
seeking to rent out land at the JFET site to local Mauritian and foreign firms. 
However, a special condition was attached to renting out to local Mauritian firms: 
the directors of the local Mauritian firm looking to rent land at JFET had to be of 
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foreign origin. Another requirement applicable to both local and foreign parties was 
that their planned minimum investment should be USD 2 million per hectare 
(Earally, 2012).  
In September 2012, a warehouse was under construction at the site. The 
contract for its construction had been given to Tianli Construction Co. Ltd.  It was 
being supervised by Zhen Yi Supervision Company, and repeating the defiance of 
architectural regulations in Mauritius, the design of the building had been 
conceived by the Chinese firm, Design Institute of TISCO. No local Mauritian party 
was involved in the construction process.  
Meanwhile, the displaced farmers faced further problems. In an interview in 
September 2012, the Riche-Terre farmers who had opted for relocation at Bois 
Marchand and Arsenal revealed that their harvest had been stolen. The fencing and 
facilities on their land had also been damaged. Those active farmers who had not 
opted for relocation presently find themselves without a permanent source of 
income. Most of them had undertaken odd jobs as gardener, painter and other 
manual tasks. Contrary to what had been promised to them, DBM had still not 
suspended their loans. The manager at DBM declared that the loans of the 
displaced Riche-Terre planters had not been written off because there had not been 
any formal request from the government to do so (Interview with Mooloo, 2012). 
The planters have had to repay their loans, leaving them with little or no money 
from the compensation amount they had received. Also, the Terre-Rouge Land 
Settlement farmers were yet to receive their 2.53m2 each at Côte d’ Or. In light of 
this unruly treatment, the Riche-Terre planters were contemplating to revive their 
case vis-à-vis the state, and maybe even conducting a third hunger strike. They feel 
deceived by the government and, in reference of the now-accessible Noël and 
Ramkissoon report, they explain why the compensation money they were given is 
not enough. 
They argue that although they were able to harvest their crops before 
evacuation, plants such as chilli and brinjal have a life exceeding one year during 
which they can repeatedly yield fruits. Moreover, newly sowed crops could not be 
harvested within the one-month leeway that the government had given them. In 
addition to this, the Noël and Ramkissoon report acknowledges that the sum of USD 
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3,850 is the basic displacement compensation. The same had been granted to non-
active planters whose lands were uncultivated. Therefore, USD 3,850 excludes 
compensation for the type of crop-loss mentioned above. The planters estimate the 
compensation for crop-loss to be USD 8,020. They also point out that USD 3,850 
excludes all extra expenditures that active planters have borne in relation to their 
lands, e.g. purchase of machinery for land preparation (USD 3,850), pesticides and 
fertilisers (USD 320), and labour (USD 4,812). Another element discounted in the 
government’s computed compensation is severance payment which the planters 
estimate to be USD 320. The planters see their contestation as justified, especially 
given that JFET has hardly developed since they were evacuated (Interview with 
displaced planters, September 2012).  
At the end of November 2012, the JFET site was being used as a motor rally 
location. On 19 October, Binani Cement Factory (Mauritius) Ltd cancelled its cement 
production plant project due to contestations from local cement manufacturers 
(Chavrimootoo, 2012). 
 
2013: Defiance and Cover-up 
On 30 January 2013, L’Express reported that Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd is 
investing USD 64 million in the expansion of its factory at Belle-Rive. The company 
had acquired land in Madagascar for the cultivation of cotton to supply the spinning 
plant in Mauritius. It is also considering a diversification of its activities to include 
real estate (Barbé, 2013). On 11 February 2013, again L’Express reported that one 
factory had finally opened its doors at the JFET zone. It is a Chinese company owned 
by Goldox Construction which manufactures window and door frames in aluminium 
and steel. The officer responsible of the unit informed the press that the products 
were intended for the local market. The article goes on to relate that all the 
employees working at this factory are from China and Bangladesh. A four-storey 
business center is also being constructed by Tianli Construction Co. Ltd on the site. 
In addition, there are two blocks of flats which will accommodate more than 80 
apartments, targeting investors wishing to invest in JFET. These two construction 
sites largely employ Bangladeshi workers and the construction is supposed to end 
by mid-June (Jaulim, 2013). 
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 During the parliamentary session of 26 March 2013, the government was 
questioned about the link between the (Mauritius) CT. Power Ltd and JFET. The 
minister denied knowledge of any links between the two. As at May 2013, the JFET 
zone project continues to unfold. The only functional building on the site is the 
warehouse holding the manufacturing activities of Goldox Construction (though 
strangely, the warehouse building carries the name-plate of Mauri-China 
Development Freezone Co. Ltd). The four-storey building intending to house a 
business center is still under construction, as are the blocks of apartments.  
The Mauritian press closely follows the developments on the site and the 
opposition party continues to probe to find answers to the confusion surrounding 
the project. The opposition still demands that the lease agreement and Framework 
Agreement be made public. The government remains tight-lipped on both fronts.  
 
Summation  
This detailed description of the experience of Mauritius reflects the extent to which 
the cooperative aspect of the CSEZA is executed in reality.  At first glance itself, we 
can notice the over-powering presence and activism of China in what was supposed 
to be logistical realm of domination of the Mauritian government. This was the 
phase at which Mauritius was to exercise its share of leadership in this cooperative 
venture for which it has given up its land, capital and in which it has invested its 
political goodwill. This has not happened. The role of the Mauritian government 
administrators has been reduced to that of the spokesperson of JFET. However, it is 
interesting to note that this role is willingly assumed by the Mauritian government. 
This is obvious through the new infrastructural inputs which it constantly injects in 
the zone project, the infrastructural upgrades it plans, the contracts for which it 
favours the Chinese zone’s associates, even at the expense of its own public benefit. 
The opaqueness in which the government of Mauritius conducts activities in 
relation to this project also indicates strong possibilities of corrupt practices 
involved in the domestic management of JFET.  This chapter therefore prepares us 
to analyse how, by exercising particular tactics, the Chinese reinforces Mauritian 
dependency to China from within Mauritius’s own locality. It also sheds light on the 
inactivity of the Mauritian state, which only reinforces this exploitative relationship. 
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Most importantly, this account of JFET enlightens us on why the CSEZA model is not 
able to deliver, even in the most supportive political and economic environment. 
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Chapter 6 
Evaluating JFET 
 
Chapter Statement 
This chapter evaluates the case of JFET and draws generalizations applicable to the 
remaining CSEZAs from its experiences. It starts by identifying the recurrent 
patterns of action that occur over the evolution of JFET and establishes the 
correlation of these patterns to the present undeveloped status of the zone. Seven 
such patterns are identified: the Chinese singularly deploy three, and the Mauritian 
side commands the rest. After a discussion of each of these strategies and their 
contribution to the current status of JFET, this chapter assesses the impact of JFET 
on Mauritius. The national development objectives of the country and a wise use of 
its assets are taken as indicators measuring the impact. Has JFET created jobs? Has 
it brought export revenue? As chapter 5 already conducted a quantitative analysis 
of JFET’s impact on Mauritian public funds and noted its abusive effect, this chapter 
concentrates on JFET’s impact on the only other key national asset that Mauritius 
puts at the disposal of the Chinese, i.e., land. In light of the understanding gathered 
in Chapter 2 that the CSEZA is essentially exploitative in terms of land usage, this 
chapter concludes that the combination of an integrally land exploitative CSEZA 
concept and the inability of the host country to customise its developmental 
outcomes, along with a propensity for corruption, makes JFET detrimental to the 
national assets of Mauritius. 
 
Identifying the Strategies 
As one gets familiar with the intricacies of JFET, it becomes easier to spot the 
costly undertones, inconsistencies and fault-lines that run through the zone 
venture. Some recurrent practices are revealed as patterns employed by the two 
sets of actors, the Chinese developers and Mauritian government, during the 
establishment of the Chinese SEZ. As the identified practices are repeated 
throughout JFET’s deployment, their deterministic influence on shaping the CSEZA 
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experience comes forth. In light of the current underdeveloped status of JFET, these 
recurrent practices are therefore the strategies which undermine the progress of 
the zone. Hypothetically, if the remaining four CSEZA host countries are also using 
these strategies, the same detrimental effect will be produced on their respective 
Chinese SEZ ventures. We can confidently assume so  since the seven CSEZAs share 
a common Chinese patronage and moreover, African administrations endorse, more 
or less, similar business ethics and methods. The JFET timeline acts as a progressive 
schema which allows for a visualisation of these strategies.  
This is not to say that the Shanxi-based SOEs and the Shanxi Tianli Enterprise 
Group pre-planned their interventions in Mauritian investment through calculative 
measures and under particular corporate guises. What is implied here is that, as the 
zone was implanted, the Chinese promoters acquired knowledge about how to 
conduct business in Mauritius. They recognised the opportunities outside the zone 
and decided to make the most out of them. Unfortunately, the experience of 
operating investment from outside the zone (as has been practiced by Shanxi Tianli 
Enterprise Group through Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd and Tianli Construction 
Co. Ltd) has not been as profitable. This is despite the fact that the Mauritian 
government enhanced their business environment by providing them with support 
infrastructure: for e.g. the Terre-Rouge–Verdun link road and additional state land 
provided to Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd at Belle-Rive in order to allow it to 
expand. While it can be easily be construed that it is because of the financial crisis 
that the JFET developers have failed to recruit investors for the zone, the deadlock 
may also be explained through the idea that the developers have realised that the 
incentives that the Mauritian state grants to JFET (mainly in terms of provision of 
land and infrastructure like roads) can anyway be coerced in support of investment 
projects settled outside the zone too. This is further guaranteed when the Mauritian 
government approaches the Chinese government to fund the construction of these 
support infrastructures. Therefore, there is no need for Chinese investors to restrict 
themselves to a zone’s set limitations on space and location. 
The rationality behind the strategies applied by Mauritius with regard to JFET 
is not as reasonable. The timeliness of the tactics adopted by Mauritius confirms 
that these were deliberate manoeuvres—either motivated by the acquisition of 
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personal gains by the political and economic elite, or an evidence of poor 
knowledge at the management of international investment. While evidence to 
prove the corrupt motivations which partly explain these tactics are anecdotal and 
whose investigation is beyond the scope of this thesis, what redeems the Mauritian 
government from accusations of deliberate mismanagement is that these strategies 
were implemented with the intention of assisting the Chinese developers to quickly 
deliver a successful zone to Mauritius. The behavioural patterns and strategies 
exhibited by both Mauritian and Chinese parties, which caused JFET to stagnate, are 
discussed below. 
One of the ways in which the cooperative and developmental objective of the 
CSEZA can be met is through backward linkages to the local manufacturers. This 
involves buying raw and intermediate materials from local producers, sub-
contracting parts of the manufacturing process to local parties or by transferring 
new technology and skills to local businesses. Technically, in order to encourage 
backward linkages, the investor should firstly avoid developing industries in which 
the local African businesses have already established themselves (especially if it is a 
sector in which small and medium enterprises thrive). By violating this simple ethic, 
the Chinese SEZ developers antagonise the host African business community. Not 
only does this create competition and cuts down the share of national income, but 
it also diminishes chances of passing on new knowledge and skills to the host 
country.103 In Mauritius, the Chinese developers established their own subsidiary 
travel company called JFET Travel and Tours Ltd. As a tourist destination, travel 
agency is a service that is largely available in Mauritius. It is a business which is 
dominated by small entrepreneurs. The setting up of Oriental Group (Mauritius) 
Industry Co. Ltd within the zone also trampled similar sensitive lines. The local 
cement producer, United Basalt Products Ltd contested the project (Saminaden, 
2009). UBP exists on the island since 1953 and currently shares the Mauritian 
market only with Lafarge. The arrival of Oriental Group (Mauritius) Industry Co. Ltd, 
who will also be allowed to sell its products to the local market, threatens to take 
away a share of national wealth to China (Yajing, 2011).104  
Another investment behaviour that undermines the progress of the Chinese 
SEZ is when the Chinese stakeholders of the zone get active in projects, companies 
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and entities situated outside the zone. Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Group’s involvement 
in Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd, Tianli Construction Co. Ltd and Tianli 
International Trading Co. Ltd, and now Shanxi Coking Coal Group Co. Ltd’s 
involvement in The (Mauritius) CT. Power Ltd can potentially take away the 
companies’ attention from JFET. The recent expansion of Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) 
Co. Ltd into Madagascar and its growing interest in real estate business suggest that 
this JFET partner might divert the capital it could have invested in JFET to other 
more lucrative investment opportunities outside the zone. It is highly possible that 
Shanxi Coking Coal Group Co. Ltd may also shift its focus more onto the power plant 
project. These assumptions are rooted in the fact that Shanxi Coking Coal Group Co. 
Ltd specialises in coal, the main product to be used by The (Mauritius) CT. Power 
Ltd. Moreover, compared to the more financially demanding shareholding 
position—though less rewarding—it holds in JFET, Shanxi Coking Coal Group Co. Ltd 
will be less pressured in its involvement with The (Mauritius) CT. Power Ltd since it 
is only a subordinate associate there. Shanxi Coking Coal Group Co. Ltd will risk 
lesser inputs in the power plant project but will earn greater profits through the 
recurrent sales of its services and products. 
One of the key elements to China’s way of conducting business in foreign 
locations is the ample use of SPVs. A special purpose vehicle is defined as: 
a legal entity created by a firm (known as the sponsor or originator) by  
transferring assets to the SPV, to carry out some specific purpose or 
circumscribed activity, or a series of such transactions. SPVs have no purpose 
other than the transaction(s) for which they were created, and they can make 
no substantive decisions; the rules governing them are set down in advance 
and carefully circumscribe their activities. Indeed, no one works at an SPV and 
it has no physical location (Gorton and Souleles, 2007). 
 
In the Mauritian zone, the Chinese developers make use of double SPVs. Shanxi 
JinFei Investment Co. Ltd is the first SPV. It is set up in China and is composed of 
Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Group, Shanxi Coking Coal Group Co. Ltd and TISCO. It has a 
fund of USD 80 million for investment in the zone project in Mauritius. Mauritius 
JinFei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd is the second SPV, set under 
Mauritian jurisdiction. Its shareholding company is Shanxi JinFei Investment Co. Ltd 
and it has a total fund of USD 10 million. (Figure 4.1 exemplifies this structure.) 
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Thus, instead of a direct investment, the three ultimate shareholders, i.e. Shanxi 
Tianli Enterprise Group, Shanxi Coking Coal Co. Ltd and TISCO, built two protective 
layers of financial instruments in between themselves and the Chinese SEZ in 
Mauritius.  
The reason behind the use of this strategy lies in the different functions 
respectively assumed by the two SPVs. In financial terms, there is a difference 
between the two SPVs. Shanxi JinFei Investment Co. Ltd is a non-orphan SPV, i.e. it 
is owned and controlled directly by the three sponsoring parties (Shanxi Tianli 
Enterprise Group, Shanxi Coking Coal Co. Ltd and TISCO), allowing them direct 
control of the decisions and activities of that SPV. As a non-orphan SPV, it has 
consolidated ties to the on-balance assets of the three sponsoring companies. On its 
turn, Mauritius JinFei Economic Trade and Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd is an orphan 
SPV. Orphan SPVs are ‘not legally or beneficially owned or controlled by the 
originator of the securitised assets’ (The Financial Express, 2006). In this case, the 
originator are Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Group, Shanxi Coking Coal Co. Ltd and TISCO. 
Nevertheless, the originator for whom the orphan SPV has been established should 
be able to predict and monitor how the special purpose for which the orphan SPV 
has been set is being met. An orphan SPV is usually put up in order to serve a single 
special arrangement pursued by the originator. The assets of the orphan SPV do not 
appear on the originator’s balance sheets. The Mauritius JinFei Economic Trade and 
Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd assumes this orphan status because of the presence of an 
intermediate structure lying between it and the three original sponsor companies. 
Therefore, in relation to Mauritius JinFei Economic Trade and Cooperation Zone Co. 
Ltd, Shanxi JinFei Investment Co. Ltd acts as the trust or fund usually formed in 
order to manage an orphan SPV for a specific investment purpose, i.e. the 
construction of the Chinese SEZ in Mauritius.  
The use of SPVs in the case of JFET serves various purposes: 
(i) The use of double SPVs allows for an easy monitoring of the investment 
capital going into the Chinese SEZ. It permits a slow phasing-in of capital 
(here, from the USD 80 million fund of the non-orphan SPV to an immediate 
investment of only USD 10 million in the orphan SPV). This matches the 
phase-style development model of SEZs. 
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(ii) Due to the DTAA that Mauritius has with China, the Mauritius-based SPV, 
Mauritius JinFei Economic Trade and Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd, is exempted 
from the payment of any withholding tax on capital gains acquired from the 
disposition of Chinese equity. Withholding tax on dividends paid by a 
company based in Mauritius to China is held at 5 per cent instead of the 20 
per cent. Currently, JFET developers are not able to make the most of this 
arrangement because outbound investment or repatriation of money from 
Mauritius JinFei Economic Trade and Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd and its 
subsidiary, JFET Travel and Tours, to China is negligible. However, it cannot be 
ignored that the idea to set up the zone in form of an SPV, incorporated under 
Mauritian jurisdiction instead of being implemented just as a bilateral project, 
is with the intention of benefiting from this profitable fiscal regime.  
(iii) By virtue of their structure and function, SPVs allow for the isolation of 
financial risks. Thus, Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Group, Shanxi Coking Coal Group 
Co. Ltd, and TISCO isolate their corporate activities from being affected by this 
overseas SEZ investment. 
Whereas China uses SPVs in abandon, the absence of a similar mechanism applied 
on behalf of Mauritius to manage its investments carried out in support of JFET 
partially accounts for the unbalanced losses borne by the latter. 
While the Chinese employs these three strategies, the Mauritian party too, 
has its own set of tactics which further entrench JFET into stagnation and 
dependency. Below is a discussion of the four manoeuvres.  
The case of JFET is abundant with instances where the Mauritian government 
enacted sudden legal changes in order to accommodate the needs of the Chinese 
developers. There have also been situations whereby existing legal provisions have 
been bypassed in order to further JFET’s advantage.  
(i) State Lands Act 1945: On 30 July 2009, MOFCOM eventually gave the Chinese 
developers the permission to proceed with the construction of the zone in 
Mauritius. Following this, the government of Mauritius altered the State Lands 
Act 1945 in order to revive the dormant project. An existing provision, Section 
6, sub-section (1E) stipulated that existing industrial and commercial leases 
situated in specific locations and of specific sizes may enter into a new lease 
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for the land by 30 June 2009. This provision was amended and the date was 
extended to 30 September 2009. It is obvious that the date was changed 
because the JFET site fell into one of the listed locations and by 30 June 2009, 
MOFCOM had not yet ratified the revised proposal for the Chinese SEZ in 
Mauritius.  Moreover, Section 6, sub-section (1F) now reads: 
[W]here a large investment project is deemed by the Minister, subject 
to approval by the Cabinet, to be in the economic interest of Mauritius, 
the annual rent determined in accordance with that subsection shall be 
reduced by such amount as may be determined by the Minister and any 
lease may be granted for a period not exceeding 99 years, with the 
approval of the Minister, subject to approval of Cabinet’ *italics mine+.  
 
The italicised part of the clause was only added in July 2009. Records of these 
various amendments are registered in the Government Gazette of Mauritius, 
No.69 of 30 July 2009.  
(ii) Professional Architects’ Council Act 2011: According to Part 5 Section 24 of the 
Professional Architects’ Council Act 2011, foreign architects can only partake 
in the designing of infrastructural projects in Mauritius, if (i) the project is the 
construction of a government building, (ii) the foreign architect is in a joint 
venture with a professional architect or firm, (iii) the project is that of the 
construction of a statutory corporation or government company, (iv) the 
foreign architect is appointed by the Public Service Commission. Dismissing 
these regulations, the architectural contract for JFET was granted to the 
Chinese company, Artech. Similarly, the design of the warehouse on the JFET 
site has been conceptualised by the Design Institute of TISCO, and that of the 
latest building under construction on the site has been done by China 
Metallurgical Engineering Technology Co. Ltd. Both are entirely Chinese 
companies.  
(iii) Lease agreement between the state of Mauritius and JFET: The Government of 
Mauritius has overlooked all the legal stipulations it signed up to in the lease 
contract with the Mauritius JinFei Trade and Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd, which 
provides it ground to notify, pressurise or cancel the land lease for the still-
stagnant project. The agreement contains defined exit strategies which the 
Government of Mauritius may use if it wishes to retrieve the land in case the 
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developers fail to develop the plot as per the specified construction schedule. 
According to the construction schedule, the development of the Chinese SEZ 
was to be done in two phases: phase one starts in September 2009 and would 
end in September 2012, and phase two would begin in September 2010 and 
be completed by September 2016.  
As per these clauses, with only one warehouse completed by May 2013, 
the Government of Mauritius could either have served notice to the 
developers and legally granted them an extension, or re-appropriated the 
expanse of undeveloped land. Abiding by Section 1 (a) of Article 15, a case can 
even be made for cancellation of the lease. Nevertheless, until date, the 
Mauritian government has not taken any known legal action against the 
developers, thus rendering the lease contract redundant (See Annex 3 for 
lease agreement). 
Yet another noticeable feature of the JFET establishment procedures is the 
leniency with which the company registration authorities treat the Mauritius JinFei 
Economic Trade Cooperation Zone Co. Ltd. The zone company did not have to abide 
by the requirement of having two resident directors when incorporating the 
business in Mauritius. Of the three directors of the company, only Zhou Yong is a 
resident of the country. In comparison, when Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd 
registered in 2000, it nominated two Mauritian resident directors, Mr Ng Kwet 
Shing and Mr Lindsay Unt Wan, along with two directors from China. Secondly, the 
District Council of Pamplemousses and Rivière du Rempart, the regional authority 
which has been entrusted with the responsibility to maintain the on-site and off-site 
infrastructure at JFET has only been given the first and last page of the Framework 
Agreement of the zone. It is on the sole basis of these two pages that the authority 
has to identify the spaces and tasks falling under its aegis. This is, obviously, 
contrary to the usual procedures. 
Throughout the JFET project, the Chinese developers keep a low profile and 
interact minimally with the Mauritian public and media. Most of the time, it is the 
Mauritian ministers and government authorities who relay information regarding 
the zone project. Nonetheless, the information that the Mauritian party has been 
feeding to the public is infested with inconsistencies; in terms of dates, details of 
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the development plan, amounts of investment, number of local jobs to be created 
and others. Though it can be argued that, given the propensity of the SEZ model to 
change according to the fiscal climate, such an incoherent dissemination of 
information is expected, there are also instances whereby Mauritian ministers have 
presented different versions of the same story at the same or consecutive 
parliamentary sessions. Different versions of JFET’s composition and 
implementation details have been alternatively presented after every couple of 
months. Key queries have been evaded and the recorded official dates of certain 
activities do not synchronise with the overall flow of events of the zone.   
The main examples are the misleading information regarding (i) the size of the 
JFET plot written in the lease contract and the unmatched expanse of land which 
has been acquired for the purpose of the zone, and (ii) the involvement of CADFund 
as a shareholding partner in JFET. The director of CADFund denied any participation 
in the JFET project. According to Dongya (interviewed in 2011), JFET is commercially 
a non-viable project for CADFund.  Another example is the government’s denial 
about having already identified a plot for the Chinese SEZ when it was 
simultaneously conducting studies for the displacement of planters of the Riche-
Terre and Terre-Rouge. Likewise, members of the government chose to ignore the 
various queries from the opposition party about the date at which the ‘letter of 
intent’ for the setting up of the zone was issued to Tianli (Mauritius, Parliament. 
2007, 10 and 17 April; Mauritius, Parliament. 2007, 7 May). The poorly coordinated 
actions of the government are also apparent through the sequence in which 
notifications for increase and decrease in rental fee were sent to the farmers even 
after studies for their displacement had been conducted. It is to be noted that only 
shortly afterwards, the farmers were eventually issued a vacation order. Based on 
data quoted by ministers at parliamentary sessions and in interviews, Table 5.1 
displays some examples of jarring discrepancies littering JFET’s agenda. The data in 
bold are the new activities added at that point of time. 
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Table 5.1: Inconsistencies and Modifications in Different Aspects of JFET 
Source: Author 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Due to start 1 June 2007 and will be over in 5 years 
(i.e.2012) 
This year 16
 
Sept 2009 and will be over in 8 
years (i.e. 2017) 
 Phase 1 ending 
in Sept 2012 
and 
Phase 2 ending 
in Dec 2016 
 
FDI Expected USD 500 million USD 687 million PNQ 12 May 2009: USD 700million  
 
PNQ 20 Oct 2009: USD 856.2 
million 
 
Same PNQ as above (20 Oct 2009): 
USD 750million. 
USD 
750million  
  
Components Light assembly, processing, manufacturing, 
food processing, tourism souvenirs 
manufacture, home appliances, garment, 
residential headquarters for expatriate 
workers, service facility to provide support 
services, logistics, common warehousing 
facilities, shopping facilities, exhibition 
halls, business center, staff dormitory 
 
Garments, knitting, 
pharmaceuticals, building 
materials, packaging materials, 
domestic electrical appliances 
assembly, mobile phones, 
electrical light equipment, sea 
food processing, toys 
manufacture, commercial 
complex, community services, a 
300 bed hospital, headquarter 
and administration of firms 
operating in Africa, business 
services, residential area for 
zone employees, 3 
international hotels, an 
international training centre 
including language training and 
general upgrading of skills, 
convention centre, exhibition 
Light engineering, freeport, 
logistics, warehousing facility, 
business services, training 
institutes, information zone,  
renewable energy
105
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 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
hall. 
Phase 1 : Tianli Service Tower, 
Sino Africa Fund Tower, Sino-
Africa Purchase Centre 
 
Export 
Benefits  
USD 200 million expected annually once 
completed 
 USD 300 million expected annually    
Rental  50% increase in rental after 20 
initial years – then after every 
10 years the rental will increase 
by 50% 
Rent will increase by 50% every 15 
years instead of after every 10 
years 
 
 
  
Investors Wanted to open to non-Chinese companies Only for Chinese companies 
initially (at the insistence of the 
government of Mauritius) 
Companies from China and other 
countries allowed – no Mauritians 
 
Oct 2009: Government claims that 
Chinese wanted only companies 
from China but government of 
Mauritius convinced them to open 
to other foreign countries.  
  Open to 
Mauritian 
companies whose 
directors are of 
foreign origins 
and to foreign 
firms. 
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Even though it can be argued that analysts should not be too rigid about the 
changes which are bound to happen to the Chinese SEZ plan over time, it is 
different when the project has been legally validated based on a specific 
development plan. Not only do these erratic figures and information undermine the 
validity of JFET in the eye of the public, but, in the case of Mauritius, it also provides 
ground for the opposition party to condemn this project initiated by the current 
government. The uncertainty about the foundational facts of a foreign investment 
project of this magnitude signals that the Mauritian government is investing public 
money and land in a project it knows very little about or is potentially hiding 
considerable unaccounted corrupt practices. On the side of the Chinese developers, 
while modifications during the deployment of the zone is a normal practice 
(forming part of rolling investment strategy aiming to maximise initial income in the 
zone), constant major changes prior to the start of the Chinese SEZ—that too in 
regard to policy premises such as the target investor groups— reflects a reticence 
and amateurship in managing the project.  
According to its Constitution, Mauritius is made up of four principal ethnic 
groupings: (i) Hindus (including Tamils, Telegus, Marathis) (ii) Muslims (iii) Sino-
Mauritians (iv) General Population (composed of Creoles—of African origin and 
Franco/Anglo Mauritians). Though Mauritian authorities stopped collecting data 
along ethnic lines in the 1970s, an analysis of other sources of qualitative data (such 
as investment and trade patterns) informs us about the existing economic and 
political demarcations across communities. With a present demographic structure 
consisting of 68 per cent of Indian descent (Hindus and Muslims), 27 per cent of 
African descent, 3 per cent of Chinese descent and 2 per cent of Franco-Mauritians, 
the Mauritian government favours investment from the diasporic host countries of 
Mauritians according to two factors. Either it is the demographic weightage of the 
community in Mauritius (thus determining whether it forms a potential electoral 
bank), or the economic power that the community holds in Mauritius (therefore 
posing as a potential source of funding for political parties), which, to a large extent, 
decides from which source country that investment will be favoured.  
Successive Mauritian governments have to follow these defined lines of 
political and economic functionality of the respective demographic segments if they 
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are to remain in power and be able to fund their planned national developmental 
objectives. Consequently, it is often by acting upon these functions of the different 
ethnic groups that issues of salient political impact such as state-level foreign 
investment projects are decided. While the Mauritian government does not actively 
explore opportunities of investment from the African continent—largely because 
the Creole community is neither a numerically dominating population nor a 
significant economic force (and also because the Creole community does not 
identify to the African communities)—it is partial to investment coming from India, 
which is home to 68 per cent of its population. This explains how the request by 
Patel Realty India Ltd to allow the construction of Neotown on similar conditions to 
those granted to the Chinese developers was readily approved. Likewise, the Binani 
Cement Factory (Mauritius) Ltd project was pitted against the Oriental Group 
(Mauritius) Co. Ltd. By thus inviting serious competition to the efforts of the 
Chinese investors, only for the sake of ethnic partiality in order to eventually secure 
a strong electoral voting based among the Indo-Mauritian population, the Mauritian 
government undermines the JFET project.106 
A quick glance at the strategies respectively applied by the Chinese and 
Mauritian parties reveals that the nature and impact of each set is different. On one 
hand, the three tactics employed by the Chinese not only permit the CSEZA 
developers to amass greater extraneous gains from their association to Mauritius, 
but also insures the capital they are investing in the zone venture. On the other 
hand, the manoeuvres of the Mauritian party serve the contrary purpose. They are 
detrimental to both the island government’s capital investment in the zone venture 
and to its political goodwill. These strategies of Mauritius can therefore be qualified 
as acts of creative destruction.  
 
Impact of JFET  
The utilisation of these grand strategies in the establishment of JFET, generates 
impact of correspondingly grand scale onto the Mauritian economy, politics and 
society. While impacts of specific nature (such as the displacement, loss of 
livelihood of the Riche-Terre and Terre-Rouge planters), and the additional 
expenses disbursed from public funds have already been documented in earlier 
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chapters, there is a need to shed light on the impact that JFET has on sectors and 
concerns which reside and function beyond the immediate physical territory and 
composition of JFET. By this, we refer to the effect that the Chinese zone project 
has on the national development objectives and key assets of Mauritius.    
As a Sub-Saharan African island with no natural resources and a skewed 
reliance on its human capital and geographic position, the national objectives of 
Mauritius compose of standard elements generally endorsed by economies which 
depend on its external relations. These are: employment, dissemination of skills, 
technology, know-how, R&D, backward linkages to local manufacturers, increase in 
foreign exchange income, among others.  In regard to the key assets of Mauritius 
which are affected by the zone project, the major losses faced are in terms of the 
money invested in support of the zone and the land leased to the developers.  
Given that ‘wealth’ as a national asset can only be analysed in quantitative ways (an 
exercise which has already been carried out in chapter 5), only the ‘land’ dynamic of 
the Chinese SEZ in Mauritius remains to be accounted for. This section emphasises 
on a local contextualisation of JFET’s impact for two reasons: firstly, it places the 
magnitude of the Chinese SEZ’s impact into perspective; and secondly, as the 
Chinese SEZ establishment impacts onto national components, these national 
objectives and assets can act as detectors to identify any failing or progressing 
CSEZA project.    
 
1. Impact of JFET on the National Development Objectives 
The three national development objectives that JFET affects the most are:  
(i) Backward linkages: JFET’s stated areas of investment will overlap with the 
high income generating industries of the domestic trade area of Mauritius. 
 
Table 5.2 Domestic Areas generating high GDP and overlapping JinFei Investment Areas  
Source: Compiled from Central Statistics Office Quarterly (2010c) and Parliamentary 
Questions Sessions 
 
Main Industries contributing to GDP growth in 
Mauritius 2010 
Areas of Investment in JFET 
Manufacturing 
(Garment, processed fish, beverages, watches, clocks, 
toys, optical goods, jewellery, travel goods, handbags, 
textile yarns, fabrics and made up articles, pearls, 
Garment manufacture, 
souvenir manufacturing,
107
 
food processing 
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As obvious from the two lists in Table 5.2, the products and services of the 
zone will overlap with the lucrative industries of the domestic trade area. This 
will create strenuous competition over markets. Moreover, with similar 
activities taking place in both the Chinese SEZ and the domestic trade area, 
there will be no exchanges of know-how, skills and technology. The Chinese 
will be unwilling to share their trade and technology secrets with their 
Mauritian competitors. Prospects for cooperation appear meagre.  
(ii) Employment creation: In Mauritius, the issue of interest is the number of jobs 
JFET will create for the local community. Since its inception, the number of 
prospective jobs announced has been incongruent. In 2008, Mauritian 
authorities estimated the creation of 7,500 jobs, and in 2010, the number 
rose to 35,000, only to be countered by a figure of 5,000 jobs quoted by the 
Chief Executive Officer of the project (Mauritius, Parliament. 2010, 22 June; 
Barbé, 2010). While at various times, the Chinese government and zone 
promoters have denied plans to bring Chinese labour to work in JFET, the 
inclusion of a staff dormitory in the zone plan indicates that the zone will, in 
fact, be welcoming foreign labour.108 We already have a preview of this trend 
as the employees working at the only factory presently on the site, are 
Chinese and Bangladeshis.  
semi/precious stones, wood manufactures)  
Real estate and business International conference centre, 
staff dormitories 
Hotels and restaurants Hotels 
Wholesale and retail trade: repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles and personal and household goods 
Electric home appliances, 
light engineering, 
wholesale and retail, 
shopping centres 
Financial intermediation Financial services 
Other Services  
Transport and communications Information and communication technology 
Construction  
Health and social work State-of-art medical centre 
Pharmaceuticals 
Education Boarding school 
Public Administration  
Electricity, gas and water supply  
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The importation of Chinese workers may be explained through the fact 
that often, Chinese businesses prefer dealing with labour from their own 
country because of their coinciding sensibilities, work culture and for the ease 
of communication. This need for a Chinese workforce acquainted to the ways 
of work of the Chinese investors is necessary for the developers since the 
zone will have to submit to general Mauritian labour laws (Interview with 
Rama, 2010).  While China’s employment conditions tend to be unregulated 
and minimal, Mauritius has a long and strong history of trade unions. Even the 
government supports a generous treatment of workers. Therefore, with a 
subservient workforce from China, upon which they can easily exercise their 
authority, the Chinese investors at JFET may find it easier to internally 
negotiate an adherence to the strict Mauritian labour rules and regulations.  
Nonetheless, we cannot discount possibilities of conflict that may 
emerge through the implementation of two different labour ethics. A paper 
by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions on EPZs describes a 
sample of such a clash. It relates an event where Mauritian authorities had to 
intervene to restore the rights of Chinese immigrant workers in Mauritius: 
Chinese women workers recently went on strike to protest that, having 
paid a 1,000 dollar recruitment fee, their wages were then paid in 
dollars directly to the recruitment agency, leaving them barely 200 to 
300 rupees [USD 6.5 to 9.7]. The Mauritian authorities are now insisting 
that the Chinese workers receive their full wages and that the 
recruitment agencies are officially registered by the Chinese authorities. 
(Perman et al, 2004, p. 43) 
 
If the presence of Chinese labourers can be explained through the 
preference of Chinese investors to deal with a labour force which have 
familiar understandings of work ethics, the enrolment of Bangladeshi workers 
in the manufacturing plant in JFET is quizzical. Why Bangladeshis instead of 
Mauritians? This is not the first time that foreign labour has been imported to 
take over jobs that could technically go to Mauritians. Figures from the 
Ministry of Labour, Industrial Relations and Employment reveal that between 
2002 and 2010, the number of foreign workers in the country increased from 
17,000 to 22,000. This influx of foreign labour is principally contained within 
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the manufacturing sector (Central Statistics Office, 2010a, p. 14, 23). As the 
Southern African Development Community Trade Review 2007 on Mauritius 
notes in an analysis of the impact of the phasing out of the Multi Fibre 
Agreement (MFA) on Mauritian employment (Rojit, 2007): 
the number of firms in the textile and clothing sector fell by 7% while 
the number of jobs fell by 17%. The irony is that the unemployed are 
now reluctant to work in this sector, which has led to firms relying on 
imported labour. For instance, by December 2004, the level of 
employment in the sector was recorded at 67,249 workers with slightly 
more than 20% of whom were expatriates. 
 
The employable Mauritian generation is no more interested in manufacturing. 
Other job sectors such as call centers and the service industry are more 
appealing. Given that most of the companies to settle in JFET are expected to 
be from the manufacturing sector, it is unlikely that local Mauritians would be 
willing to work there. Be it due to JFET’s preference for more subservient 
foreign workers or because of its unattractive employment opportunities, the 
Chinese SEZ will not help reduce unemployment in the country. 
(iii) Foreign exchange income: The current trade relationship shared by Mauritius 
and China is highly imbalanced. A ministerial document prepared for the 
Seventh Sino-Mauritian Joint Commission (2007) noted that between 1996 to 
2006, imports from China increased at annual average rate of 14 per cent. 
Table 5.3 below denotes this increase and also highlights the trade deficit that 
Mauritius suffers in its exchanges with China. 
 
Table 5.3: Mauritian Trade with China (USD M) 
Source: MOFEE Brief for the Seventh Sino-Mauritian Joint Commission, 2007 
 
 
 
Data from 2009 reveals that Mauritian imports from China amounted to USD 
539.9 million. Therefore, over just three years, imports from China have 
increased by 80 per cent. On the other hand, Mauritian exports to China in 
:  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Exports to China
109
 630, 000 930,000 1.3 8.4 6.3 5.2 5.6 4.9 
Imports from China
110
 96.9 124.5 124.2 
 
164.2 166 
  
212 274.9 299.6  
Trade Balance -96.3 -123.6 -122.9 -155.8 -159 -206.8 -268.4 -294.7 
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2009 were only USD 181,159. In 2008, Mauritian exports to China had been 
USD 579,710.14. Therefore, between 2006-2009, Mauritian exports to China 
had reduced by 96 per cent. Figure 5.1 and 5.2 indicate that this trend will 
persist. (Note the absence of China among the major export destinations of 
Mauritius). 
 
Figure 5.1: Mauritian Imports 2009  
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Mauritius Central 
Statistics Office, Digest of External Trade Statistics, 2009 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Mauritian Exports 2009  
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Mauritius Central 
Statistics Office, Digest of External Trade Statistics, 2009 
 
In light of the current trade imbalance that marks the exchange 
between Mauritius and China, the JFET project will further negatively impact 
the domestic accumulation of trade income of the island. This is because the 
companies operating from within the zone will compete for the same markets 
targeted by local Mauritian producers. Already, local Mauritian companies are 
India, 27% 
China, 17% 
South Africa, 
13% 
France, 
17% 
Japan, 5% 
Spain, 3% 
Malaysia, 4% 
Italy , 3% Australia , 4% 
Thailand, 4% USA, 3% 
UK, 35% 
France, 22% 
Spain, 6% 
Reunion , 5% 
South 
Africa,6% 
Italy, 7% 
Madagascar , 
8% 
USA, 
11% 
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struggling against cheaper Chinese imported products that have flooded the 
market. They will now face added pressure to match up to the predictably 
lower production costs and selling price of Chinese enterprises. Meanwhile, 
JFET investors will secure a larger share of profits and repatriate the profits to 
their headquarters in China at no cost. They are unlikely to reinvest their 
earnings in the development of, or in value-added projects in Mauritius. It is 
possible that they will even confine profits within the Chinese realm. Given 
the culture of cluster manufacturing in Chinese production methods, it is likely 
that Chinese investors from the zone will (i) cooperate among themselves to 
produce the different parts of a product, (ii) will import parts of the product 
from China, and (iii) will seek linkages with Chinese companies established 
outside the zone, in order to increase their competitiveness.111 The resultant 
low cost of production will allow them to quote competitive prices in the 
market and take away part of the export income and re-investment that local 
enterprises initially brought to the Mauritian economy.  
 
2. Impact of JFET on National Assets 
Chapter 4 concluded that one of the principal features which determines whether 
the CSEZA is contributive to development or exploitative, is the way the land under 
which the CSEZA is constructed is managed.  However, chapter 4 only limited its 
treatment of the land-aspect of the CSEZA to an analysis of the internal usage of the 
plot, i.e. the division of land usage between residential and commercial activities. It 
also skirted concerns of the additional expenses that the appropriation of land for 
the CSEZA generates. What has nevertheless escaped evaluation is the impact that 
the appropriation of a plot of land for the purpose of a CSEZA has in context of the 
existing national land distribution and usage of the host African country.  
As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, though an integrally land-exploitative 
concept, the host communities adopting the CSEZA model can overcome its 
ingrained land expropriating particularities by proper contextualisation. This is 
possible if the host country adopts the appropriate legal provisions, and also if the 
host country customises the CSEZA land usage in accordance to the already 
prevalent domestic land use scene. If the situation of land-based industry in the 
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host country is further compromised after land is appropriated for the CSEZA, and if 
the land acquisition process is not accompanied by rules and regulations 
safeguarding the interest of the national community, the CSEZA can immediately be 
classified as an exploitative venture.  However, most governments fail to harmonise 
their existing land usage equation with that required by the CSEZA.  As a result, the 
land impingement aspect of the zone project is magnified. ]  
At first glance, JFET’s impact on the Mauritian land distribution scene does not 
trigger much reaction: a dormant 211 hectares (or 202.4 hectares) of land does not 
appear of much consequence—even less, if it is compared to China’s own expansive 
ghost-towns.112 Nor should the displacement of 58 erstwhile active planters who 
have been compensated (though inadequately) be a matter of national distress. But 
it is the context within which this land appropriation happens that does make JFET a 
cause of national distress. The failure of the Government of Mauritius to match 
JFET’s land requirement to its current geographical, political and economic context 
establishes the destructive impact of the Chinese SEZ venture on the country’s 
prospects. 
The total surface area of Mauritius is 186,475 hectares, of which sugarcane, 
livestock and other crops cover 41.5 per cent. Less than one per cent of the 41.5 per 
cent is dedicated to ‘other crops’, i.e. fruits and vegetables (Mauritius Sugar 
Industry Research Institute, 2010). Riche-Terre (whose English transliteration is 
‘Fertile Soil’) is one of the regions where a large share of these vegetables and fruits 
were cultivated. Eric Mangar, head of Mouvement pour l’Autosuffisance 
Alimentaire, commented in an interview to L’Express on 4 April 2011:113 
The farmers of Riche-Terre produced and supplied at least 20 tonnes of 
vegetables to the Port-Louis market weekly. They contributed to the country’s 
food security in a very significant way before they were displaced because of 
the Tianli/JinFei project in 2006. The JinFei project, if completed, will cover 
the most fertile soil of the island with concrete in order to respond to the 
economic imperatives of the leaders of the country.114 
 
After the farmers were ousted from the site, the island lost one of its most 
productive vegetable cultivations.  
In 2002, Mauritius introduced the Integrated Resort Scheme (IRS): ‘a project 
for the development and sale of luxurious residential units to foreigners’ (BOI, 
  
207 
2009a). These projects are developed on freehold land exceeding 10 hectares and 
each unit is priced to a minimum of USD 500,000. This scheme was followed by the 
Real Estate Scheme (RES) in 2007. RES allows small landowners to develop and sell 
residences to non-citizens. It is developed on freehold land sized between 0.34 to 
10 hectares. Presently, there are 12 IRS projects, 10 of which cover a total of 860.85 
hectares, and 50 RES projects of a minimum of 0.34 hectare each (Hospitality and 
Property Development in Mauritius, 2013a & b). The IRS and RES schemes, 
accompanied by a multiplication of hotel projects, have led to the privatisation of a 
large part of the Mauritian coastline. The two schemes have also caused land prices 
to increase. As a result, a lot of these villas have not been able to secure buyers. In a 
survey by the newspaper Le Défi on 19 January 2013, Mauritian real estate and 
construction businesses agree that there is a saturation of real estate activity in 
Mauritius. This may potentially lead to a crisis of the sector soon. Referring to the 
recent liquidation of Port Chambly RES project, they warn of the emergence of 
ghost towns in Mauritius—a prospect that an island of the size of Mauritius cannot 
afford (Vilbrin, 2013).   
The implementation of an integrally land-abusive CSEZA concept, combined 
with a disregard for the need to harmonise the land-requirement of the venture 
with the existing land-use scenario, predict that Mauritius will face consequences 
similar to those faced by the Chinese and Indian communities. Nevertheless, due to 
the difference in the size of the countries, the impact that this land mismanagement 
has on Mauritius is starker. Hence, in light of its impacts on the national 
development objectives and national assets, JFET can be described as the 
culmination of land-based economic mismanagement in Mauritius. 
 
Summation 
This chapter explained how the use of strategies (which the Chinese and Mauritians 
deploy in small doses over time) percolate through the various layers separating the 
immediate physical and business components directly associated to JFET and 
compromise the indirectly positioned national developmental goals and national 
assets of the country. In the case of Mauritius—whose main asset compromised in 
the Chinese SEZ equation is land—this chapter shows how the conceptual blueprint 
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of the CSEZA, together with a failure to tailor this essentially Chinese 
conceptualisation according to the local land use scenario, condemns the CSEZA 
project. Interestingly, the strategies and impacts that JFET experiences is a 
prototype that can be transposed to the other six CSEZAs.  More or less similar 
results would be noted. (Analogously telling aspects of the other six CSEZAs have 
already been documented in chapter 4. For e.g. companies seeking to expand 
activities beyond the boundaries of the Ethiopian Chinese SEZ, and Egypt’s 
renunciation of its land strategically located at the Suez canal) However, given the 
size of the island and its compactness, these manoeuvres are more easily 
identifiable in Mauritius than in the other countries. This chapter prepares for the 
next deliberation whereby the structural magnanimity of the influence of JFET will 
be assessed in light of its ability to diffuse an aura of dependency on the various 
segments connected to it.  
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Chapter 7 
Connecting Back to JFET 
Chapter Statement 
The purpose of this chapter is to show how JFET reinforces the case for a 
dependency theory prism of the CSEZA. It draws summations out of JFET’s case and 
identifies patterns may be applicable to the remaining six CSEZA. This chapter starts 
by establishing the parallels between the CSEZA’s theoretical bearings and the real 
actors and actions which form the zone. It investigates the equation that China and 
Africa share in the context of the CSEZA. It then goes on to confirm the metropolis-
satellite nature of the interaction between China and Mauritius. As this chapters 
matches JFET’s details to the quintessential elements of Dependency Theory, it 
outlines the distinctiveness with which the newly concocted CSEZAs not only 
reproduce traditional dependency, but also nail the subordinate parties in deeper 
and more complicated dependency relations. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion that Frank’s Dependency Theory, in its known form, cannot analyse the 
CSEZA as it exists. As it identifies new instruments used in this novel interaction of 
dependency, and shows how CSEZAs have the potential to make a permanent 
satellite out of certain sections of the African host countries, this chapter 
contributes to a renovation of the Dependency Theory.  
 
China: Metropolis or Satellite? 
In order to better explain the applicability of Dependency Theory to the study of 
CSEZAs, we need to match the features of the ideology to those of the entity, i.e., 
identify the metropolises and the peripheries in CSEZAs. As demonstrated in Figure 
2.3, the CSEZA involves an interactive set of five metropolis-satellite dependencies.  
Each level is made up of various mixes of state and non-state actors. Aside of its 
internal dependency divisions, the fact that China is macrocosmically the main 
initiator and beneficiary of these SEZs in Africa suggests that China is key to the 
explanation of the emergence of this new type of zone. 
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According to Frank (1968, p. 70) world metropolises are nations (or sectors) 
which have historically never been underdeveloped and only might have been 
through phases of undevelopment. They are entities of the world system which 
experienced independent development in pre-colonial times. As per this criterion, 
China is not one of the world metropolises. Starting with the Treaty of Nanjing in 
1842, China had been successively subjugated to impositions from the British 
Empire, Japan, and from other European actors.115 There are many historical 
examples which confirm China’s non-world metropolis status: it was forced to open 
its ports to foreign settlers and trade by USA; it loss its territories such as Hong Kong 
and Taiwan; and eventually, it had to adopt the Open Door policy imposed by the 
USA. These are clear instances of the exploitation and extraction of surplus that 
China has had to undergo as a satellite to the already developed world 
metropolises. In fact, Frank (1978) himself dismissed the positioning of China as a 
world metropolis. This came in the form of his response to Lippit’s The Development 
of Underdevelopment in China (1978). Lippit argued that China underwent a process 
of underdevelopment in between 1270 and 1949. From being highly developed and 
home to several inventions, by the late 1940s, China’s ‘entire modern sector 
accounted for some 7% of Gross Domestic Product’ (Lippit, p. 254). He ascribes the 
responsibility of this underdevelopment to China itself and discards the possibility 
that the imperialist behaviour of colonial nations had influenced this situation. In his 
answer to Lippit, Frank stated:  
after 1636 *…+ and until our days *1978+, China has not been at the center of 
world economic, political, and cultural development and has occupied a 
singular intermediary role between the Western powers on the one side and 
their Asian colonies and junior partners on the other *…+. Even in the classical 
imperialist period of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries China's 
semicolonial economic position in the world was peculiar and almost unique 
among those then suffering the development of underdevelopment, in that 
unlike other such "Third World" countries (which had a consistent merchandise 
export surplus) China had a merchandise import surplus with the developed 
countries of Europe derived from her entreport trade position between the 
colonial powers and their colonies elsewhere in Asia (Frank, 1978, pp. 348-49). 
 
It is important to note here that the allusion to an intermediary role does not mean 
that China is a semi-peripheral country. Wallerstein (1976) sees semi-peripheral 
countries as a distinct set of nations, occupying a space in the capitalist world 
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structure within which core and periphery countries would not be able to function, 
given their attributes in relation to the global of division of labour.116 Semi-periphery, 
for World System Theorists, is a fixed category in which once a country fits, it 
functions only as per the duties and scope of action permitted to semi-peripheries—
unless it reaches a point where the semi-peripheral country steps up to join the core 
countries. This upward mobility can only occur under two scenarios:  
(i) The semi-peripheral state ‘garner*s+ a heavy portion of the collective advantage 
of the semi-periphery as a whole to itself in particular; that is, a semi-peripheral 
country rising to core status does so, not merely at the expense of some or all 
core powers, but also at the expense of other semi-peripheral powers’ 
(Wallerstein, 1976, p. 466), or 
(ii)  Through socialism, whereby the semi-peripheral state ‘transform*s+ the system 
as a whole rather than profit from it’ (ibid.). 
Wallerstein’s analysis of semi-peripheral countries also stresses that a change in 
production activities does not necessarily signify a shift across levels: 
Countries have not moved, nor are any now moving, from being primarily 
exporters of low-wage products to being substantial exporters of high-wage 
products as well as being their own major customer for these high-wage 
products. Rather, some move from the former pattern to that of having a 
higher-wage sector which produces part of what is consumed on the internal 
market but is still in a dependent relationship for the other part of national 
consumption. The essential difference between the semi-peripheral country 
that is Brazil or South Africa today and the semi-peripheral country that is 
North Korea or Czechoslovakia is probably less in the economic role each 
plays in the world economy than in the political role each plays in conflicts 
among core countries and the direction of their exported surplus value (ibid. 
1974, p. 8).  
 
By this logic, for Wallerstein, China remains a semi-peripheral country. But recent 
conflicting discourses about the rise or limitations of China, and whether the role of 
the Western powers will therefore be modified, suggest that the situation of China in 
the global scenario is definitely more elusive than fixedly intermediary.  
To avoid accusations of arbitrariness, we will use Snyder and Kick’s method to 
locate China’s position in the world system. In 1979, Snyder and Kick published a 
work in which they gave empirical justification to countries’ ‘structural positions in 
the world system and the dynamic relations among them’ (p. 1096). Using trade 
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flows, military interventions, diplomatic exchanges and conjoint treaty 
memberships as indicators, this blockmodel analysis establishes nine ‘statuses’, 
each different in the value of their performance on the four international 
transactionary aspects.  Bollen (1983, p. 474) summarises the study and reveals that 
in general, the core has more power and authority, both economically as well as 
militarily. It is a diversified economy and is industrialised. It occupies high positions 
in international organisations. Core nations tend to give out more foreign aid than 
they are likely to absorb. According to these criteria of measurement, China at the 
time, fell into the peripheral blocks.  
However, if the blockmodel analysis is carried out now, China will reflect 
characteristics of both core and periphery simultaneously, albeit vis-à-vis different 
nations. It takes up the tasks of either metropolis or satellite depending on whom it is 
interacting with, through which medium, and possibly for which end. Its role as a 
metropolis comes forth in the following equations: 
(i) Outsourcing manufacturing and light engineering production to countries such 
as Bangladesh, Brazil and Ethiopia, and focusing on high technology products 
and R & D sectors, allow China to shift to a higher wage bracket which aids its 
self-development. On the other hand, the devolution of the low skilled tasks to 
other countries propels the underdevelopment of those peripheral economies. 
(ii) Expropriation of surplus economic value from countries of the Latin American, 
Asian and African regions through the above devolution of activities and the 
repatriation of capital that follows.  
Altogether with the outsourcing of traditional sector activities, an outflow of 
investment to foreign destinations (especially to countries with which it has 
DTAAs)117, the provision of technical developmental assistance in the form of 
infrastructure,118 and the establishment of Chinese SEZs abroad, bestows China with 
the substance of a metropolis.  
Nevertheless, it also remains a satellite in relation to the world metropolises 
and the institutions endorsed by them, notably the Bretton Woods organisations. In 
1979, China realised that it needed to implement an Open Door policy and bring in 
FDI in order to be able to fund its Four Modernisations program. At the time, given its 
level of development, it could only be a satellite to the world metropolises. The same 
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subordination still exists today. This can be seen in relation to China’s membership to 
the WTO in 2001. Wang, S. (2000) discusses the many ways in which China is set to 
reinforce its subordination and underdevelopment by joining the WTO.119 As he 
defines the winning and losing parties of this deal, the active underdevelopment of 
China at the expense of American and European development is foreseeable: 
Whereas China gains no new access to the US market, the United States, and 
for that matter, other countries, will secure market access to whole areas of 
the Chinese economy to which they were previously denied, once China 
becomes a WTO member state.120 
and, 
Who stands to lose once China becomes a WTO member? Farmers and workers 
are most likely to suffer negative consequences from the deal in the form of 
lost jobs and downward pressure on wages. The WTO membership requires 
China to dismantle its remaining import barriers. This will entail painful 
domestic restructuring and adjustment because these barriers have been used 
primarily to protect state-owned industries and farmers (Wang, S., 2000, pp. 
394 - 45). 
 
As China still adjusts to its membership of the WTO, it constantly feels the pressure of 
the world metropolises. It has been dragged to WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
for 30 cases (the complainants of which are leaders of the world capitalist system—
USA, EU, Japan, Canada). It also faces the pressure to compromise upon its ideological 
principle of non-interference. For example, it was forced to play by the rules of the 
established world order by intervening in the Darfur crisis.121 
Advocates of a rising China may find the description of China as peripheral 
incongruent with evidences of areas in which China is even ahead of America. 
However, they cannot deny that as it integrates the neoliberal world market, China 
relies on the legitimisation of the Washington-led capitalist world structure. The 
implementation of the home-grown socialist model by China in the shape of the 
Great Leap Forward proved destructive and it was only as the country geared 
towards capitalist integration that China witnessed its first phase of development. 
Since the Open Door policy, China acknowledges that it cannot progress by 
remaining at the margins of the liberal market. Its incorporation within the global 
trade system provided China with FDI and an access to the markets of bigger 
consumer nations. Thus, China experienced unprecedented economic and social 
advancement. This growth gained momentum as the community of powerful states 
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accepted China’s accession to the WTO. As at date, China still lingers at the 
periphery of the western-led world structure as investors from the core exploit its 
resources and gather profits while sections of the Chinese population continue to 
suffer from land and food shortages (Yaguang, 2011). China, nevertheless, 
continues to work towards securing the legitimacy from its superior (in authority 
and power to dictate world regulations and code of behaviour) core so as to keep 
benefitting from the market access and FDI.  
Hence, China’s present reality rallies more with Frank’s suppositions. Given 
that it is definitely not among the world metropolises, nor is it strictly a peripheral 
country, and instead fits more into a shifting middle role, China is perfectly shaped 
to adopt the twin roles of metropolis and satellite permitted within a dependency 
framework. 
 
African Satellites 
There is a widespread belief that irrespective of their richness in natural resources, 
African countries are essentially satellites to most of the world’s structures. Starting 
from their histories of colonisation to what is projected by the more recent discourses 
of neo-colonisation, African countries are the ones which have been exploited by 
world metropolises. Their surplus economic value has always been extracted; be it by 
European powers, the US, India, or China. In an adaptation of Frank’s Dependency 
Theory and the concept of underdevelopment to the African context, Rodney (1973) 
wrote about the position of African economies: 
African economies are integrated into the very structure of the developed 
capitalist economies; and they are integrated in a manner that is unfavourable 
to Africa and ensures that Africa is dependent on the big capitalist countries 
(1973, p. 43). 
 
He is categorical that European metropolises developed by underdeveloping African 
countries through an expropriation of their surpluses. Wallerstein also equated 
African countries to the periphery. His criteria for the identification of peripheral 
states in a capitalist economy are those countries in the capitalist division of labour 
who nurture ‘low-profit, low-technology, low-wage, less diversified 
production…’(1976, p. 462).  
  
215 
 This general consensus among development theorists makes it undeniable that 
African countries are international satellites. Therefore, as a Sub-Saharan African 
country, Mauritius is also a satellite within the global capitalist system. This 
characteristic of Mauritius as a satellite is reinforced by the fact that the island is 
entirely economically dependent on externally-sourced capital and investment. 
However, we need to keep in mind that, as per Frank’s ideas, although an African 
country is a satellite, the African state still remains a domestic metropolis in 
comparison to its internal subordinate sections whose surplus value it extracts. 
 
Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa and Dependency Theory 
The awareness that the Chinese SEZ in Mauritius hardly contributes positively 
to the development of the island pushes us to question the broader repercussions 
of this malfunctioning model of development: What does the failure of JFET signify 
for Mauritius; for the remaining African countries hosting CSEZAs; and for China, 
when considered within the global framework? A theoretical assessment of this 
unbalanced investment venture can answer this question. A theoretical reading will 
elucidate the nature of the relationship between Mauritius and China when 
exercised through the Chinese SEZ. It will evaluate the impact of the CSEZA model if 
replicated elsewhere. But most importantly, it will help academics trace the effects 
that the establishment of a CSEZA has on those indirectly connected global 
dynamics which do not figure prominently when JFET is studied in the restricted 
context of the Mauritian territorial boundaries and abstract Sino-African policy 
framework. By this it is meant that, the impact of CSEZAs on existing global 
mechanisms—such as international power structures or globally endorsed 
developmental strategies and knowledge—will be assessed. In this process, this 
chapter establishes whether the CSEZA, in its current form, can be a model of 
development or not. If not, what are the elements of the model which stop it from 
becoming one. 
As China receives legitimacy from the capitalist system, it manifests this global 
integration in its own distinct fashion through SEZs in Africa. It channels its 
international acceptance by building SEZs on its own terms and for its own benefits. 
In short, while it interacts subordinately with the capitalist OECD community, China 
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projects its own subordination onto African nations through SEZs and becomes their 
metropolis. Figure 2.5 follows this process of assimilating and disseminating 
dependency in which China evolves and subsequently creates the CSEZAs.   
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Figure 2.5: Dependency Context and the Creation of Chinese SEZs in Africa  
Source: Author 
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But is China aiming to actively expropriate surplus from the African states as in a 
typical core-periphery relation? Maswana (2009), and Blázquez-Lidoy, Rodríguez 
and Santiso (2006) reject this assumption. Blázquez-Lidoy et al, note that there are 
indications that over the long term, China will extend more opportunities for trade 
to African countries. Maswana insists that the Chinese approach is a genuine 
development model based on mutual benefit. Unlike previous coercive neoliberal 
development endeavours, China recognises the cultural, political, regional and 
national affinities of its African hosts. It customises its ties to successfully produce 
synchronised action between the development needs of each African partner and 
demands of the existing global capitalist structure.  
Although China is sending profit-seeking firms that behave capitalistically in 
Africa, there is no evidence that China is trying to set up a clientelist club like 
the infamous French Francafrique network. In addition, Chinese leaders have 
repeatedly said that their aid program is not a form of charity but is based on 
“mutual benefit”’ (Maswana, 2009, p. 81, italics original). 
 
Indeed, China is neither emulating the francophone network, nor is it trying to 
establish its ideological hold on the African states. Its strategy differs from that of 
other metropolises which try to establish liberal democracy by imposing neoliberal 
practices which permit the core to have a permanent rule over the periphery. China 
comparatively displays more consideration in its creation of CSEZAs. It establishes 
its CSEZAs regardless of the nature of the regime of the host country and does not 
impose any political conditionalities in relation to the project. Nonetheless, largely 
due to a failure at contextualisation, the impact of entrenching its partner African 
states in dependency is the same. This exploitation of the periphery by China is 
therefore probably unintentional.  
China has the endorsement of the host African states throughout the 
establishment and implementation process of the CSEZAs. This is because it does 
not push the African states for comprehensive adherence or even participation in 
its socialist ideology or measures. The permanence of domination and 
subordination that is apparent under neoliberal routes of dependency is absent 
from China’s way of exercising appropriative relations. This is because China’s 
encroachment takes a temporal and spatially limited form which is visible to the 
eye. It is therefore assumed to be monitorable.  The representation of its 
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dependency relations in a temporal spatial form makes Chinese exercises more 
acceptable as the African parties have the option of non-engagement. 
Usually, the dependency of satellites is in relation to capitalist-oriented 
metropolises. But in light of these zones, the host African nations become 
dependent on a socialist exercise of capitalism. The socialist appeal of this 
exploitation diverts attention from its more harmful features of capitalist 
appropriations. Luckily for China, its exercise of domination onto the subordinate 
African host countries benefits from the larger capitalist settings (such as the 
reduced role of the state; reduced role of trade unions enforced through SAPs and 
NEPAD), already established by the Western metropolises. These make it easier for 
China to set up businesses and generate profit in Africa without being held in 
contempt for active exploitation. However, by limiting the boundaries of its 
activities to within the CSEZA territory, China aims to contain its profits while 
simultaneously exploiting African resources. What it terms as ‘mutual development’ 
is, in reality, limited development pursued through a detachable SEZ space that can 
be moved, if need arises. Nevertheless, China shuffles this aspect of CSEZAs 
backstage and rhetorically justifies the limitation of its activities within the 
boundaries of the zone as being due to its ethical commitment to non-interference. 
The CSEZA is presented as the only area of concession that it requires from the 
African host country in order to deliver ‘mutual development’. All these 
unconventional dependency features of the CSEZA reveal a nonchalance in the 
behaviour of China as it tries its hand at new economic instruments. Thus, China 
exercises dependency with a twist. This twist that China gives to dependency 
exercises mandates the application of a revised Dependency Theory, instead of 
Frank’s traditional version, in order to explain CSEZAs.  
In 2006, Mbeki warned African states: ‘be wary of neo-colonisation in the 
form of China’ (BBC, 2006). Some may argue against this understanding of China’s 
global role in that China’s demeanour in Africa does not match that of colonisers: 
China does not use force; there is no political repression of the colonised state; no 
attempt to wipe out the existing political norms and cultures; and no infiltration of 
its own people in the high administrative ranks of the state. While these give 
African countries reasons to be relieved, Randall and Theobald (1998, p. 12) remind 
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us that the process of colonisation differs according to ‘the colonising power and 
the nature of the pre-existing society’. They reminisce about to the Asian 
experience of colonisation. 
However, colonial behaviour is also a response to the host society. Here, the 
real contrast is between Asia, where existing societies were already so long 
established, densely populated, complex and resilient that colonisers had in 
some degree to accommodate and build upon them...’ (ibid.)  
 
Chinese manoeuvres are replicating these patterns. Decades after independence, 
most of the African states have found a political footing and established their 
political cultures (democratic or undemocratic) and social and cultural norms. China 
knows that the only way it can access these states is by accepting their respective 
political and normative ways and by building upon them through aid, trade, and in 
more concrete terms, through CSEZAs. Such a move would be more acceptable to 
the African countries than dictating completely new structures to them, and on new 
terms.  
Cardoso and Faletto (1979, pp. xix, 69–71) fleetingly mention the role played 
by spatial constructs in reinforcing dependency relations between metropolises and 
satellites. They argue that the ‘enclave economy’ allows FDI to take over domestic 
production activities, exploit local labour and resources while altogether enjoying 
concessions and subsidies. It only gives back a nominal profit to the periphery, in 
terms of wages and taxes. Eventually, foreign investors push local businesses out of 
the market with their low production costs. To Caporaso (1978, p. 18), this enacts a 
‘structural distortion’ process whereby ‘the local economy is structured to meet the 
needs of the foreign sector’. CSEZAs are treading the similar basic lines. 
Although Dependency Theory never came up with a definite solution to the 
perpetual problem of dependency due to their belief in the ineffaceability of 
capitalism, Cardoso and Faletto (1979) have expressed subdued support to Frank’s 
suggestion of socialism as a possible alternative. However, the failures of 
communism at development, and the unpopularity of Marxist thoughts, 
undermined the pursuit of such a remedy. Despite the general denial that socialism 
is the solution to dependency relations, to some extent, the CSEZA is doing exactly 
this for China! The CSEZA is itself the product of a combination of capitalism and 
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socialist elements. While the motivation (profit-making through competition in the 
international market) and instruments (FDI) are capitalist, the implementation 
mode is socialist in flavour (subsidised and highly government-controlled 
investments, SOEs venture out together). China, therefore, evades prospects of 
under-development in its relations with OECD countries and seeks its own 
development by remaining within the boundaries of capitalism but by these 
developmental attempts in a socialist fashion. In so doing, it is its solitary escape 
from dependency that China pursues! Those peripheral African states, who are 
hosting these capitalist-socialist enclaves, do not overcome their dependency 
through these CSEZAs because of its enclave-form and also because, by promoting 
the development of their Chinese metropolis, the African hosts maintain their own 
peripherality. 
Critics quote data on African economic growth and argue that there is no 
underdevelopment being carried out by China. Maswana identifies eight aspects of 
a bilateral relationship which determine whether the two countries relate on an 
equal platform or as a metropolis and satellite (2009, pp. 78 - 82): 
(i) Export composition: The exportation of primary commodities and 
importation of capital goods designate a relationship of domination and 
subordination.  
(ii) Investment ownership: The involvement of SOEs indicates towards non-
exploitative investment relations as compared to the appropriative activities 
of private companies.  
(iii) Power relationship (cooperation type): This refers to whether the actors 
cooperate or whether their relationship is solely one-way. 
(iv) Technology and labour: A transfer of technology from the investor country to 
the host, and an extension of job opportunities to its local population is an 
indication of equitable exchange.   
(v) Superstructure (political)/ideology: A relationship which evolves unbridled by 
conditionalities and interferences is one in which dependency is most likely to 
be absent. 
(vi) Cultural ascendancy (elite links): This refers to whether one state interferes 
in the local politics of the other and attempts to influence the local elites.  
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(vii) Financial monetary dominance: This alludes to signs of one state’s 
intervention in the other’s monetary policy or an insistence to carry out trade 
in a specific currency.  
(viii) Perception of the African market: Whether the African market is considered 
as a terrain of opportunity or a liability is a deterministic feature. 
Maswana concludes that the Chinese-African relationship does not resemble that of 
a metropolis-satellite. However, although he proves that there is no dependency, 
he does not prove that there is no underdevelopment. Underdevelopment, here, 
does not refer to the failure of making the maximum use of resources. Rather it 
implies stalling the acquisition of new resources. If the same study is replicated with 
regard to the Sino-African relationship under the CSEZAs, we reach a different 
conclusion than Maswana.  Table 2.1 evaluates the seven CSEZA projects according 
to Maswana’s dependency criteria and establishes that the Chinese zones are 
carriers of dependency.  
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Table 2.1: Dependency Features of CSEZAs 
 Source: Adapted from Maswana, 2009 
 
 
 
Dependen
cy Aspects 
Standard 
Features of 
Core-
Periphery 
Approach 
Nigeria: 
Lekki Free 
Trade 
Zone 
(LFTZ) 
Nigeria: 
Ogun 
Guangdon
g Free 
Trade 
Zone 
(OGFTZ) 
Ethiopia: 
Eastern 
Industry 
Zone (EIZ) 
Egypt: 
Tianjin 
TEDA 
North 
West Suez 
SEZ 
(Egypt-
TEDA SEZ) 
Zambia-
China 
Economic 
& Trade 
Cooperati
on Zone 
(ZCCZ) 
Zambia: 
Lusaka 
Multifacili
ty East 
Economic 
Zone 
(LMEEZ) 
Mauritius 
JinFei 
Trade and 
Economic 
Cooperati
on Zone 
(JFET) 
Export 
Compositi
on 
Primary 
commodit
y exports 
& Capital 
goods 
import 
Capital 
goods 
import 
(equipmen
t & 
constructi
on 
materials 
at rebate 
prices) 
Capital 
goods 
import 
(equipmen
t & 
constructi
on 
materials 
at rebate 
prices) 
Capital 
goods 
import 
(equipmen
t & 
constructi
on 
materials 
at rebate 
prices) 
Capital 
goods 
import 
(equipmen
t & 
constructi
on 
materials 
at rebate 
prices) 
Primary 
commodit
y export 
(copper) & 
Capital 
goods 
import 
(equipmen
t & 
constructi
on 
materials 
at rebate 
prices) 
Capital 
goods 
import 
(equipmen
t & 
constructi
on 
materials 
at rebate 
prices) 
Capital 
goods 
import 
(equipmen
t & 
constructi
on 
materials 
at rebate 
prices) 
Investmen
t 
Ownership 
Mainly 
Private 
Enterprises 
Mainly 
SOEs 
(developer
) & private 
enterprise
s 
(investor) 
Mainly 
SOEs 
(developer
) & private 
enterprise
s 
(investor) 
Mainly 
SOEs 
(developer
) & private 
enterprise
s 
(investor) 
Mainly 
SOEs 
(developer
) & private 
enterprise
s 
(investor) 
Mainly 
SOEs 
(developer
) & private 
enterprise
s 
(investor) 
Mainly 
SOEs 
(developer
) & private 
enterprise
s 
(investor) 
Mainly 
SOEs 
(developer
) & private 
enterprise
s 
(investor) 
Power 
Relations/ 
Cooperati
on Types 
Unequal 
subordinat
ion (North-
South) 
South-
South 
Cooperati
on 
between 
unequals 
South-
South 
Cooperati
on 
between 
unequals 
South-
South 
Cooperati
on 
between 
unequals 
South-
South 
Cooperati
on 
between 
unequals 
South-
South 
Cooperati
on  
between 
unequals 
South-
South 
Cooperati
on 
between 
unequals 
South-
South 
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China-Mauritius: Metropolis-Satellite Relationship 
In the context of the global capitalist hierarchy of power, China stands as a satellite to 
the world metropolises. But, at the same time, it is a metropolis to most African 
nations. In its turn, Mauritius is a satellite to China. As we establish the general lines 
along which China and Mauritius fit into Dependency Theory’s structural 
denominations, we shall contemplate the dependent nature of the relations shared 
by the two actors in light of the CSEZA. 
 China and Mauritius share a long diplomatic history which started in 1972. The 
island supported the one-China policy.  Since then, the interchange between the two 
countries has grown. Usually, China plays the role of the benefactor and Mauritius is 
the receiving state. In a briefing paper produced by MOFEE, we gather the key 
interchanges that mark the relationship of the two countries (n.d): 
(i) First Sino-Mauritian Joint Commission, 1985: China provided an interest free 
loan of USD 5.6 million over a period of five years (July 1985 – June 1990) to 
Mauritius. This was in addition to a low interest commodity credit of USD 
800,000 for the period from 1 July 1985 to 30 June 1986. This commodity credit 
allowed Mauritius to purchase Chinese commodities and other goods.123 
(ii) Second Session of the Sino-Mauritian Joint Commission, 1987: No further 
economic commitment was made by China since the previous loans were still 
unutilised. 
(iii) Third Session of the Sino-Mauritian Joint Commission, 1990: China provided a 
general commodity grant of USD 160,000,124 and an interest free loan of USD 
3.2 million to Mauritius. 
(iv) Fourth Session of the Sino-Mauritian Joint Commission, 1995: China provided a 
grant of USD 160,000 to Mauritius. 
(v) Fifth Session of the Sino-Mauritian Joint Commission, 1999: China provided a 
grant of USD 800,000 to Mauritius in the form of agricultural and medical 
equipment, along with an interest free loan of USD 3.2 million. The EXIM Bank 
of China committed to co-finance an infrastructural project at the cost of USD 
2.4 million, in the form of a loan repayable over 12 years at the interest rate of 4 
per cent per annum.  EXIM Bank of China furthermore provided a loan of USD 
16 million at 4 per cent interest per annum over 12 years to Mauritius.  
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(vi) Sixth Session of the Sino-Mauritian Joint Commission, 2002: The Sino-Mauritian 
Agreement on Economic Technological Cooperation, Sino-Mauritian Agreement 
on Educational Cooperation were signed. A Memorandum of Understanding on 
Cooperation between the Supreme People's Procuratorate of the People's 
Republic of China and the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights of the Republic 
of Mauritius was also ratified. 
A glance at the key diplomatic exchanges between Mauritius and China over the years 
is enough to define their position vis-à-vis each other. Not only does China stand as a 
major source of funding for the domestic projects of the Mauritian government, but 
sometimes, by using ‘commodity credits’ as a medium to disburse loans, China further 
entrenches Mauritian reliance on its financial support.125 Commodity credits forces 
Mauritius to use only Chinese materials in the specific project. This reduces the ability 
of the Mauritian government to explore more competitive options. This dependency 
of Mauritius upon China recurs in every sector within which the two actors are 
involved. The Chinese SEZ project is no exception. 
 
The Expected Dependency Equation 
If we apply Frank’s principles to the context of JFET, the Chinese-Mauritian equation 
would be assume the following form: 
Level 1: China assumes the role of the metropolis vis-à-vis Mauritius who is the 
satellite.126  
Level 2: The Mauritian state, together with China (represented by the Shanxi SOE 
stakeholders) combine to become the metropolis of JFET.  Through JFET, China also 
becomes the metropolis of the evacuated farmers. They will derive developmental 
value and profit out of the activities of the zone, at the expense of the national 
periphery (the Mauritian people).   
Figure 6.1 displays these expected dependency exchanges. Thus, China and the 
Mauritian state, through JFET, exploit the farmers as its metropolises. JFET, then, 
symbolically stands as a metropolis to the farmers. The evacuated farmers form the 
ultimate satellite of this equation. Frank’s Dependency Theory is accepting of 
relations of domination and subordination exercised across denominations of varied 
nature. Therefore, it makes space for the incorporation of structural actors such as 
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the Chinese and Mauritian states, JFET as a geographic entity, and individuals, in the 
form of the farmers, in a single dependency network.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Expected Structure of Relation of China-Mauritius-JFET as per 
traditional Dependency Theory. 
Source: Author 
 
As per traditional Dependency Theory, the schema of economic exploitation 
and subordination is usually simple and direct. But in this case, we have to 
acknowledge that the actors involved in the Chinese SEZ in Mauritius do not adhere 
to straightforward traditional dependency tendencies. Instead, JFET actors form two 
sets of overlapping dependency relations. The scenario is such that one structurally 
indirect actor cuts across intermediate levels to reach below and intervene directly in 
order to exploit a subordinate level which is already being exploited by its own 
immediate superior metropolis.  Eventually, there are strata which face double or 
even triple-sourced dependencies. Those two sets of overlapping dependency 
relations are: 
(i) China-JFET: China acts as the metropolis of the Mauritian state, and is also a 
direct metropolis of JFET which technically (as per geography, and political, 
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economic, and legal jurisdiction) should be a satellite of the Mauritian state 
only. 
(ii) China-Farmers: China is also the metropolis of the Mauritian farmers who have 
been displaced to make space for the Chinese SEZ project. Although it crosses 
through two levels of dependency (the Mauritian state and JFET), the direct 
connection between China and the farmers is exploitative purely because JFET is 
a 100 per cent Chinese-owned project, and also, the Chinese party has not 
compensated the farmers in any way for the displacement.  
While JFET undergoes double exploitation under both China and the Mauritian state, 
the farmers experience exploitation from three levels, i.e. from China, the Mauritian 
state and JFET. The fact that China’s status as a metropolis percolates through all 
levels, and that, along with Mauritius, China is expected to be the direct metropolis of 
the sub-national JFET and of the farmers, is justified by the following reasons:  
(i) China-JFET: China has been adamant that the CSEZAs are cooperative and 
mutually beneficial developmental ventures. By this definition, both countries 
should be able to exploit JFET and appropriate its surplus economic value in 
order to fund their respective development. Therefore, the group of displaced 
farmers is the immediate level whose underdevelopment the CSEZA is to 
expedite.  
(ii) China-Farmers: Like the Mauritian state, China too stands as a metropolis vis-à-
vis the farmers. This is because although the zone is situated on Mauritian land, 
that the Mauritian government has invested in JFET in the form of 
infrastructure, and was responsible for displacing the farmers, China remains 
the sole shareholder of JFET. Therefore, by this fiscal logic, most (if not all) of 
the profits of the zone would go to its direct patron, its metropolis, i.e. China.  It 
should be noted that the position of the farmers has allegorical value which 
evokes the public assets compromised in course of this zone project. The 
underdevelopment of the farmers represents the underdevelopment of the 
Mauritian economy as a whole.   
Keeping in mind the new formats in which exploitation and subordination are 
practiced here, and with the variety in the ‘types’ of actors involved in this 
transnational connection, the above dependency arrangement is one that theorists 
  
228 
adhering to Frank’s Dependency Theory would anticipate to see in JFET. But while this 
is the expectation we built as per set theoretical norms, the reality of the relations of 
dependency which pervade the case of the Chinese SEZ in Mauritius is different. 
Whereas a departure from the conventional Dependency Theory might be interpreted 
by critics as grounds to discredit the application of this theoretical perspective to the 
study of CSEZAs, the section that follows demonstrates how these alterations within 
the dependency framework only push the actors involved (i.e. China, the Mauritian 
state, JFET, and the farmers) to reinforce symbiotic appropriation-subordination and 
development-underdevelopment relations in this capitalist climate. This therefore 
simultaneously advocates for an updated version of Frank’s Dependency Theory. 
 
The Actual Dependency Exercise 
Enough years have passed for us to be able to identify the direction in which the 
Chinese SEZ project in Mauritius is going, and to assess the power equation amongst 
the actors.  Each actor’s role, as per dependency premises, will hereunder be defined. 
China, represented by its SOEs from Shanxi, is the patron and developer of the 
zone. The Chinese companies are 100 per cent shareholders of JFET. 127 They are 
supposed to fund all the on-site infrastructure of JFET.  The Chinese developers are 
the ones to recruit the investors for the zone, and handle the administration and 
development of the zone affairs. Conferred Mauritian status, the JFET company 
functions as a private entity and has no accountability to the host Mauritian 
government. China will occupy the plot of land for a period of 99 years and has been 
allowed to pledge its rights to Mauritian or foreign banks. As part of the DTAA that 
Mauritius has with China, the stakeholders who manage JFET are allowed to 
repatriate their capital, dividends and profit to China, free of any tax regimentation. 
Some Chinese developers have even been given Mauritian citizenship, allowing them 
to carry out their activities without being subject to monitoring by the Mauritian state 
in their capacity as foreign investors. As soon as the Chinese SEZ venture transited 
from being just a project plan on a plot of land into JFET, the company, China no more 
needed to transit through the local authority of the Mauritian government. It could 
connect to the zone by altogether bypassing the Mauritian state. 
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The Mauritian state has no equity stake in JFET. It has leased the land to the 
Chinese developers for 99 years and has also granted them the right to pledge the 
land to foreign banks. The Mauritian state holds no role in the administration of the 
zone affairs. Its responsibilities are limited to: providing the land, off-site 
infrastructure, passports to the investors, and rights of local incorporation to 
investing parties. Investors and companies who have been naturalised as Mauritian 
have the right to function unhindered. In short, the Mauritian government has 
completely removed itself from any potential direct involvement in JFET and has 
revoked its authority over the 211 hectares (or 202.4 hectares) at Riche-Terre for 99 
years.128  Its exploitation of its own internal sub-national entity, i.e. the Chinese SEZ 
area, prevailed only up until the site was being cleared and the farmers were 
displaced. Once that was completed, the role of the Mauritian state as a metropolis to 
that space—now taken over by JFET, the company—ended. It would be fair to 
describe the intervention of the Mauritian state in JFET, in the former’s capacity as a 
metropolis, as being limited only until the planning and site preparation period.  
 Before becoming JFET, the zone area was only a plot of land within the 
Mauritian territory which was occupied by local farmers. Up till the point when it was 
a mere plot of land chosen as the site to build the Chinese SEZ, the Riche-Terre plot 
was the space of the Mauritian government. The Mauritian state exercised its 
authority to terminate cultivation on the land and evacuated the occupant farmers. 
However, as soon as the land was written off to the Chinese developers in the form of 
an asset of the JFET company, the equation changed.  As it gained added-value in its 
prospective ability to generate high revenue, the plot switched from being a satellite 
of the Mauritian state to become a metropolis of the Mauritian state. This is because 
Mauritius was depending on high returns and FDI inflow from that zone in order to 
fund its domestic development, and also to garner domestic political goodwill. 
Nevertheless, for China, JFET remains a satellite. This is mostly due to its overseas 
location, through which China will be able to extract surplus value at the expense of 
the Mauritian state (through land, displaced farmers and expenditure on off-site 
infrastructure). 
Regardless of the phase through which the Chinese SEZ in Mauritius was under, 
the farmers of Riche-Terre maintained a constant position as the ultimate satellite.  
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As they were evacuated from their land in order to accommodate the Chinese SEZ 
developers, the farmers were at the mercy of the Mauritian state which assumed the 
position of their metropolis. However, the fact that the Chinese developers 
themselves chose the site and replaced the farmers also makes JFET the metropolis of 
the displaced planters’ community. However, contrary to anticipation, China is able to 
efface itself from being directly exploitative towards the latter. China’s direct 
positioning as a metropolis of the farmers is evaded by the fact that (i) China 
contractually delegated the responsibility of all the off-site infrastructure provision to 
the Mauritian state—comprising of all the arrangements for the land, and (ii) China 
chooses to exercise its role in relation to JFET only in term of its status as the JFET 
developers, and not as the bilateral government partner of the Chinese SEZ project in 
Mauritius.  
The integration of the ‘farmers’—a human composite—as a stratum of 
dependency among these spatial denominations is in line with the afore-discussed 
shifting nature of the Chinese SEZ—initially as a plot of land and eventually as a 
company. The status of the farmers too becomes subject to changing natures as JFET 
switches from a spatial status and gains corporate status. As long as the farmers  
occupied the plot and were under the process of being evacuated, they were a human 
composite, in relation to the Riche-Terre land which then stood as a geographical 
entity. However, as the Riche-Terre plot assumes a corporate guise under JFET, the 
company, (which will stay for 99 years), the 211 hectares (202.4 hectares) of land is 
divorced from its spatial status. Instead, this spatial status is transferred onto the 
farmers, i.e. individuals, who, due to their representativeness of (i) the site’s previous 
identity and function as a plot of land rather than as a company and (ii) the site’s 
underdevelopment from being a previously developmental piece of land (a 
development value that the farmers had conferred to the land by cultivating it), get 
equated to the spatial value of the exploited site. The farmers therefore equate to the 
exploitation of the developmental value of the land under JFET.  
As per the roles defined above, it would be fair to say that in light of JFET, the 
relationship of dependency between China and Mauritius went through two distinct 
phases. Phase one covered the period of preparation for the Chinese SEZ project, and 
the furnishing of all the support amenities that would aid the zone. During this phase, 
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the zone was only a plot of land. Phase two started when all off-site infrastructures 
were set for the zone and it remained for the Chinese developers to begin the on-site 
construction and development. At this point, the zone gained the status of an asset 
transferred to the name of JFET, the private company. Figure 6.2 and 6.3 show how 
the relationship amongst the relevant entities changed as the Chinese SEZ project 
unfolded over these two different phases. 
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A. Phase One Dependency 
The hierarchy of dependency which prevailed at the initial stage of the project was 
quite straightforward. At level one, China, who holds the conceptual blueprint of the 
Chinese SEZ and is the one to inject capital into the project, was the metropolis to the 
Mauritian state. It was the latter’s land and preferential business framework that 
China needed to access in order to produce the planned profitable developmental 
goods. At level two, acting as per the requirements of the Chinese developers, the 
Mauritian state assumed an appropriative stance towards its own local entity, i.e. the 
Riche-Terre plot. It disadvantageously utilised the land which supplied the local 
market with substantial stocks of food crop. At level three, the Mauritian state 
assumed the position of a metropolis, and decided to privilege national development 
through FDI at the expense of its own public’s rights. Through the Riche-Terre plot 
(here acting as the surplus value object), the Mauritian state exploited the 
developmental value of the land and the farmers by evacuating them. The latter, 
thereby became the satellites of the Mauritian state. (It is from this point onwards 
that the farmers take upon the spatial status).  
During this first phase, the relations between the levels flowed from the top to 
the bottom, with China posing as the ultimate metropolis and the farmers as the 
ultimate satellite. The intermediate Mauritian state strata alternated between the 
roles of the metropolis and satellite, depending on whom it was addressing. One 
intermediate stratum whose status remained largely unchanged was that of the 
Riche-Terre plot. We note that at level three, the metropolis to the farmers was the 
Mauritian state, rather than the Riche-Terre plot. The Riche-Terre plot cannot be 
counted as a metropolis of its immediate subordinate level (i.e. the farmers) because 
it lacked the substance to be an exploiter. Furthermore, as a stratum, it did not serve 
a subjective agenda. Instead, at that stage, the Riche-Terre plot was only a medium of 
exploitation. 
 
B.Phase Two Dependency 
Given the current deadlocked condition of the Chinese SEZ project, phase two does 
not have a complete independent identity yet. At present, it can only be referred to 
as the period which follows the already completed planning and establishment of off-
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site infrastructure. This is because the development and activities that should make 
up phase two are yet to begin. Nevertheless, as the closure of phase one (which was 
entirely the responsibility of the Mauritian state) sets the scene for its unfolding, 
phase two completely transforms the dependency equations prevailing in the case of 
the Chinese SEZ in Mauritius. As China no more functionally needs the Mauritian 
state, which has completed its contractual commitments towards the zone (arranging 
for the plot and its long term lease, providing offsite infrastructure, getting all the 
required environmental and impact assessment clearances, and so on), it bypasses 
the Mauritian state in level one. Neither does China need to further exploit the 
Mauritian state for any form of profitable extraction, nor does it need to keep the 
Mauritian state in subordinate control for the latter to act as per China’s interest. This 
marginal role assumed by the Mauritian state is further reinforced by the fact that 
Mauritius does not hold any shareholding power in JFET. As the sole stakeholder of 
JFET, China has legal rights over all profits and capital generated by JFET, even though 
the Mauritian government too has invested extensively in the zone in terms of land 
and off-site infrastructure.  
Instead of having both China and Mauritius as metropolises to JFET (as 
stipulated in Figure 6.1) and sharing the surplus value produced by the zone between 
them, the real equation clearly designates China’s moves to wipe out the role of the 
Mauritian government as a metropolis to its own internal zone once JFET is 
functional. In this scenario, JFET becomes the direct satellite of China. This is because 
it is from this particular space (which has been granted Mauritian status through the 
company’s local incorporation and from the privileges the Mauritian government has 
granted to the zone) that China will accrue a profitable commercial experience which 
is technically meant to be shared with Mauritius.  
At level two, JFET is the automatic metropolis to the satellite community of 
displaced farmers. Contrary to phase one where the Riche-Terre plot had no purpose 
or substance to exploit its subordinates, under its corporate status, JFET has an 
agenda to further; one which thrives on the underdevelopment of the farmers. But 
the metropolis status of JFET does not end with the subordination of its immediate 
inferior level. At level three, JFET exercises its superior extraction capacity onto even 
the Mauritian state. As it occupies strategically positioned state land for 99 years and 
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benefits from several other incentives—all without any legal commitment to share its 
profits with the Mauritian community—JFET holds the Mauritian government, and 
hence the national economy as a satellite. The Mauritian state can only rely on the 
goodwill and abilities of the developers to produce the promised development for the 
island. After being ignored throughout activities in phase two, the one equation under 
which the Mauritian state retains the power of a metropolis, is the one it shares with 
the displaced farmers at level four. As mentioned earlier, its positioning as the 
rhetorical spokesperson of the zone and its contractual agreement implicating its 
responsibility to vacate the plot, make the Mauritian state a de facto constant 
metropolis of the farmers. Along with it, the Mauritian state also becomes the 
metropolis of the erstwhile developmental value of the Riche-Terre plot of when it 
was an agricultural space.  
The two phases of dependency relations that the Chinese SEZ project in 
Mauritius experience are dotted with idiosyncratic features. In phase one, it is clear 
that the Riche-Terre plot is mainly employed as an agent of dependency. Positioned 
as a satellite to the Mauritian state, the plot is used as an instrument to displace the 
farmers. Nevertheless, in phase two, this same plot of land assumes the role of 
metropolis towards two strata: the farmers, and the Mauritian state. From an agent 
of dependency, the Riche-Terre space transforms into an independent structural 
denomination as it gains commercial value. On the whole, phase two reflects the 
skewed dependency equation that JFET establishes between China and Mauritius. 
Under this equation, the interaction between China and the Mauritian government is 
maintained only through a rhetorical diplomatic ephemera (which is why it cannot be 
structurally reproduced in the diagram),129 and the overall underdevelopment of 
Mauritius is further reinforced. This time Mauritian underdevelopment is not only 
exercised by external actors, but also by an entity internal to its local system, i.e. JFET. 
The subordination and underdevelopment of Mauritius in the interactions in phase 
two is perpetuated in three distinct ways. 
(i) Firstly, the Mauritian state, having acted as an efficient facilitator of the project 
throughout phase one, legally detaches itself from involvement in JFET and 
steps aside to allow China to have free access to the zone. This permits China to 
completely bypass the Mauritian state apparatus. 
  
236 
(ii) Secondly, the Mauritian state stands at the mercy of the Chinese developers to 
deliver the goods that the Mauritian government has promised to its own 
public. JFET, as a space distinctively managed by the Chinese, holds the power 
to legitimise the accountability and leadership potential of the Mauritian 
government vis-à-vis the Mauritian public. That too in a climate whereby public 
trust in the project is waning. This undermines the political capital of the 
Mauritian leaders.  
(iii) Thirdly, as the Chinese SEZ remains undeveloped, the termination of Riche-
Terre’s developmental contribution in terms its food production capacity is only 
brought back into perspective.  
The Mauritian state finds its capacity to command as a metropolis dwindle as it 
suffers from underdevelopment through the exploitation of national wealth for the 
benefit of JFET, and is subordinated even in relation to its own sub-national 
geographic space. The public legitimacy and electoral support, on the basis of which 
the democratic Mauritian government rules, is compromised. Consequently, the 
potential of the Mauritian government to continue to expropriate profits created by 
its local sections is threatened.  This indicates that in the event of further 
development of JFET, the Mauritian state will be even more marginalised: by the 
foreign investors who settle in JFET, and also by the local Mauritians who may 
concretise this marginalisation of the government by withdrawing their electoral 
support to the ruling party.  
 
Commonalities between the New Manifestation of Dependency versus Old 
Dependency Premises 
Clearly, the Chinese SEZ in Mauritius introduces new configurations of dependency 
relations. These new configurations do not have a linear flow across and within states 
but get contorted and structural denominations do not necessarily maintain similar 
roles vis-à-vis recurrent actors throughout time. What allows the Chinese SEZ project 
to do so? In order to be able to identify the new modalities which help to reinforce 
simultaneous development and underdevelopment within the Chinese SEZ scenario in 
Mauritius, an identification of the corresponding premises between Frank’s initial 
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theory and its adaptation by the new zone format is needed. Table 6.1 applies itself to 
this comparative task. 
 
Table 6.1 Traditional Dependency Premises and Converging JFET 
Dependency Premises  
Source: Author 
 
Frank’s Dependency Premise Converging JFET Dependency Premise 
Satellite-metropolis relations exist 
across all economic, political and 
social compositions, even within 
states.  
JFET induces a variety of satellite-metropolis interactions: 
 A hierarchy exercised between China and 
Mauritius whereby the disparity is founded on 
economic dynamics.  
 A hierarchy of spaces exercised between the 
Mauritian state and its own internal area (as the 
Riche-Terre plot and as JFET). This dissection is 
founded on conjoint geographic and economic 
dynamics.
130
 
  A hierarchy of communities existing between the 
Mauritian state and the farmers. This is a division 
of social compositions. 
National satellites pump back the 
economic surplus of their local 
satellites to the world metropolis. The 
world metropolises take advantage of 
this to stimulate their own 
development. 
Neither is China a world metropolis, nor does the Mauritian 
state pump back economic surplus to China. Therefore, this 
supposition does not find adherence in the JFET case. 
 
Nevertheless, the anticipated ‘ends’ of development and 
underdevelopment are achieved, though with a twist in the 
dependency procedures. The distinctiveness of this 
relationship is that the Mauritian state does not pump back 
surplus value that it has accumulated from its local 
satellites to China. Instead, the Mauritian state contains the 
surplus within itself but makes it inaccessible to the larger 
domestic domain or to itself.  
 
Consequently, we do not have a world metropolis 
stimulating its own growth after having assimilated 
surpluses from the subordinate national satellite, and 
thereby causing the underdevelopment of that national 
satellite. What we have in the case of JFET is: a direct 
stimulation of the underdevelopment of the national 
satellite by itself. The Mauritian state does not require the 
development of a superior metropolis to be the catalyst of 
its underdevelopment. It itself, is its own catalyst of 
immediate underdevelopment. Still, as the contextual 
metropolis of the Mauritian state, China profits from this 
underdevelopment to enrich itself. This twisted route to the 
same end is possible through the zone format of JFET, 
which acts as the agent furthering dependency relations.  
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Frank’s Dependency Premise Converging JFET Dependency Premise 
Underdevelopment and development 
are part of the same process.  
While this should be valid for each level of the metropolis-
satellite interactions existing within this scenario, in the 
case of JFET, underdevelopment is contained within the 
two levels which are distinctively Mauritian (Mauritian state 
and farmers), and development becomes the prerogative of 
the two Chinese spaces (China and JFET). Therefore, the 
Chinese SEZ project allows China (the metropolis) to 
directly develop a local metropolis (JFET), and thereby turn 
the national metropolis (Mauritian state) into a satellite, 
which in turn, carries on the exploitation of its own local 
satellite (farmers). Consequently, rather than the 
conventionally alternating occurrence of development and 
underdevelopment which exists in Dependency Theory, the 
sequence of developmental impacts in this particular 
dependency scenario is unique as it takes the following 
shape:  
 
Development → Development → Underdevelopment → 
Underdevelopment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The development of world 
metropolises (which do not function 
as satellites to other entities) limit the 
development of subordinate national 
metropolises by the latter’s function 
as satellites.  
This premise is not applicable to this case because China is 
not a world metropolis.  
When the metropolis overcomes its 
crises and re-establishes investment 
As China seeks new ways to make the most of the global 
platform of trade, investment and commerce to which it 
China 
 
JFET 
 
Farmers 
Mauritian 
state 
3. Underdevelopment: 
JFET- Mauritian state, 
(underdevelopment of 
Mauritian state) 
2. Development: 
JFET – Farmers 
(development of 
JFET) 
4. 
Underdevelopment: 
Mauritian state- 
Farmers 
(underdevelopment 
of farmers) 
1. Development: 
China- JFET 
(development of 
China) 
 
Figure 6.4: Distribution of Development and 
Underdevelopment in CSEZA 
Source: Author 
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Frank’s Dependency Premise Converging JFET Dependency Premise 
and commercial links which re-
incorporate the satellites in the 
system, or when the metropolis seeks 
to extend its reach to regions of the 
system which were previously left-out, 
the internal development and 
industrialisation of those isolated 
regions are halted or is led towards 
frustration rather than autonomy.  
now has unhindered access since its integration in the 
WTO, it deploys CSEZAs in an attempt to generate profit by 
aiding African development. Thus, its zones take upon the 
responsibility to develop regions previously commercially 
cut-off (i.e. Riche-Terre). The impact that China has on the 
targeted local region is one of underdevelopment and, as 
presupposed by Frank, it halts industrialisation and 
amplifies frustration. 
 
There is a decline in the export 
demand for the products and in the 
production capacity of large farming 
estates of satellite regions.  
This aptly fits onto the case of the displaced Riche-Terre 
farmers who used to contribute substantially to the 
vegetable supply of the island. The annihilation of this 
cultivation space has affected the food security situation of 
Mauritius. 
 
 
 
Dependency Updated 
Most of the particularities of the Chinese SEZ in Mauritius adhere to the parameters 
that Frank used in order to identify and define a dependency equation. Nevertheless, 
there are slight divergences in the way these dependent relationships are exercised 
which elicits an upgrading of the Dependency Theory. The section below identifies the 
premises of CSEZA action and functionality which Dependency Theory, as it is, does 
not allow us to analyse. In so doing, it also suggests the new premises which 
Dependency Theory must integrate among its concerns. These are the new variables 
that it should take into account, and the new structures of dependency relations. 
These need not be as symmetrical as anticipated by Frank in 1967. 
(i) In his key works, Frank lists a number of global dynamics throughout which 
metropolis-satellite relations exist. His list comprises of economic, political and 
social structures. He also refers to local rural–urban hierarchies which, 
nonetheless, remain economically and socially laden. One dynamic through 
which dependency relations are performed in the case of JFET—which Frank 
does not consider—is the ‘geographic’ structure which also mediates 
relationships of exploitation and subordination. The role of a geographic 
structure in acting as a relevant carrier of metropolis-satellite relationship is 
clearly demonstrated by JFET. As a property of the Mauritian state, and lying 
within its national boundaries, logically the Chinese zone should have been 
subordinated to the Mauritian state. But this is not the case. As it exists in the 
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shape of a bounded zone, JFET becomes an independent geographic entity and 
surmounts the only bond of subordination it could have shared with the 
Mauritian state. Taking leverage of this geographic separatism, JFET is able to 
compete with the Mauritian state on an economic basis. It even makes the 
latter its satellite.  
(ii) When Frank coined the notions of ‘metropolis’ and ‘satellite’ in order to 
describe interactions within the capitalist system, it was understood that, as per 
the functions of these segments, interactions across the world platform will 
take place in duality: if there is a metropolis, then a satellite must follow; if 
there is the exploiter, then the exploited must follow. But for the Chinese SEZ in 
Mauritius, the situation is somewhat different. China, the metropolis, is 
followed by JFET, the metropolis. Again, it is by dint of JFET’s geographic 
separation that, despite JFET’s umbilical link to the Mauritian state, China 
interacts directly with the zone by altogether bypassing the need to directly 
underdevelop the Mauritian state.131 China is able to do so because the 
economic and social surplus value extracted from the Mauritian satellite 
sections have already been invested in the JFET zone (under the brief phase 
one). Therefore, it is easier and diplomatically safer for China to bypass another 
act of active exploitation of the national Mauritian satellite and instead directly 
engage in the development of JFET. Similarly, the underdevelopment of the 
Mauritian state is immediately followed by underdevelopment of the farmers. 
Again, this is possible because of the geographic separatism of the intermediate 
metropolis level, i.e. JFET which should have been situated in between the 
Mauritian state and its farmers. Nevertheless, JFET’s role as an intervening 
level, which played the national Mauritian state and the local farmers against 
each other, was restricted to the point till JFET was a plot of land integral to the 
internal structure of the national satellite. As it achieves its geographic and 
economic independence in form of the a Chinese SEZ, JFET removes itself from 
being part of internal Mauritian structures. 
(iii) Traditional dependency believes that the exploitation of a satellite can only end 
if the satellite distances itself from the metropolis. However, the relationship 
shared by China and Mauritius, in this case, suggests otherwise. In phase two, 
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the distance between China and Mauritius is obvious. There is no direct 
interaction between the two. But contrary to Frank’s idea, this does not entail a 
termination of Mauritius’s underdevelopment. Frank does not account for the 
possibility that though keeping a distance from the metropolis, through 
appropriately structured FDI, the metropolis can create a local metropolis 
within the target national satellite.  
(iv) Patron China is able to skip the Mauritian state in its dealings with the zone not 
only because of JFET’s geographical separatism within Mauritian boundaries. 
This elusive transaction is further aided by the fact that JFET, set up as an SPV 
company under Mauritian jurisdiction, also has the power to remain 
economically disjointed from the authority of the Mauritian state. Thus, as it is 
bypassed during both the in-coming and out-going dealings of China with JFET, 
the status of Mauritius as a national satellite is reinforced. It witnesses its 
underdevelopment at the expense of the development of Chinese entities 
settled on its own land and using its own assets.  
(v) While the way in which a Chinese SEZ can propel underdevelopment within a 
satellite country has lengthily been discussed throughout this work, the role of 
FDI as a new instrument of dependency needs to be elaborated. Frank does not 
deliberate much about what an upgrade of financial instruments within the 
capitalist system might mean for the alternating, yet overlapping, 
metropolis/development- satellite/underdevelopment dichotomies. Touted as 
one of the major sources of capital in the modern day capitalist system, there is 
a high degree of competition among states in order to attract FDI. Not only does 
FDI imply an inflow of capital, but it is also a source of immediate development 
through backward and forward linkages, job creation, infrastructure, export 
income, and so on. Hence, in order to secure FDI, countries are forced to 
provide incentives and preferences. These preferences are usually to the 
detriment of their own economic objectives, and also at the expense of local 
producers and businesses. Consequently, by welcoming FDI, economies within 
the capitalist system willingly subscribe themselves to the status of satellites. 
They even go to the extent of underdeveloping themselves and their 
subordinate local entities in order to serve the FDI-exporting metropolis whom 
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they perceived as a messiah of development. Therefore, along with the creation 
of a separate geographic space of metropolitan nature within the satellite (in 
the form of the Chinese SEZ), the unbalanced Mauritian reliance on FDI makes 
the country a self-underdeveloping satellite par excellence.   
Geographic seperatism through the CSEZA format; economic seperatism through 
instruments such as SPVs; the underdeveloping aspects of FDI; and, an asymmetrical 
exercise of exploitation and subordination stand as this thesis’s contribution to the 
updating and upgrading of the ideas behind Frank’s traditional dependency thinking. 
However, rather than alienating the concept of CSEZAs from Dependency Theory, the 
above observations only strengthen the links between this new phenomenon and the 
theoretical perspective. Be it through convoluted routes, this capitalist expression of a 
nominally socialist state loyally carries out the development and underdevelopment 
of China and Mauritius respectively.  
 
Summation  
It is noticeable that throughout both phases of dependency, China and Mauritius, 
who are supposed to be partners in this novel cooperative development venture, are 
positioned on extreme footings. Moreover, while at one time, Mauritius is the 
satellite of China, at the other China reduces Mauritius to a non-entity within its own 
territory. The subordination of the island state reaches the extent at which it has to 
give in to the appropriative upper hand of its own sub-national space. Surely this is 
not a cooperative venture.  And if it is, then surely JFET is not a carrier of 
development. The most apt way to describe JFET, as per the above observations and 
understanding, would be as an agent of dependency. 
JFET has become a liability to the Mauritian government. It has extracted 
money out of the Mauritian government in the name of developmental investment. 
But since there has not been any development, there is no investment return. By 
occupying fertile land (which erstwhile provided food to the country in the best 
location next to the harbour) for 99 years, JFET has definitely extracted the surplus 
value of the assets and public funds of the Mauritian state.  The redundant position to 
which the Mauritian national satellite is rendered following the comprehensive 
assimilation of JFET as China’s territory, is perhaps unprecedented. The symbiotic 
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relationship of development shared by the patron (China) and its extension (JFET), 
make them relate to the Mauritian national satellite only in a defaulted fashion. They 
connect to the Mauritian state on the basis of an asset transfer, incentive packages, 
and off-site infrastructural provisions that Mauritius earlier made in regard to JFET. 
Thus, by exercising capitalism (hence, relations of exploitation and subordination) 
through ostensibly socialists actors, (i.e. state-owned enterprises) and by implanting 
its economic might in a geographically separate space within the territorial 
boundaries of an already subordinated economic entity, (i.e Mauritius), China reduces 
the possibility of Mauritius to act as the metropolis to those sections within its own 
territory whose economic surplus are being appropriated through JFET.  
Whether this dependency equation is identically reproduced in the context of 
the other six CSEZAs is a question that can only be answered after thoroughly 
researching each of them. This is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, one 
feature which undoubtedly would be replicated across each of them is the geographic 
separation induced by the zone-form of the CSEZA, which also leads to a high degree 
of economic separatism. Those CSEZAs in which the host African state is not a 
shareholder of the zone will experience more acute subordination. CSEZAs (or 
possibly any other zone form of state-directed foreign investment) hold the capacity 
to hinder the development of the host country and expedite its underdevelopment. 
Thus, the case of the Chinese SEZ in Mauritius is only an indication of the ability of 
new forms of capitalist exercises to create permanent satellites—not only by pushing 
the state to underdevelop its own local entities, as anticipated by Frank, but also by 
rendering the state-level satellites redundant and dependent on their own local 
assets which have been appropriated by foreign parties.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion 
 
Acknowledging JFET-driven Underdevelopment  
The information gathered on JFET evoked in this thesis hold considerable 
implications for Mauritius. The inconsistencies and miscalculations littering the 
evolution of the project partly explain why the Mauritian government insists on the 
confidentiality of the framework and lease agreements. The presence of adjacent 
projects, companies and entities suggests that the Mauritian government has mixed 
the Chinese SEZ project with ulterior pursuits. The additional investments that the 
Mauritian state has injected into JFET also carry important fiscal consequences for 
the country’s budget. Additionally, the confrontational position that the 
Government of Mauritius assumes vis-à-vis its own public in regard to this project 
undermines the political capital of the current ruling party. It highlights an aura of 
opaqueness around the foreign transactions of the state. Rather than developing 
the island, the way in which the zone project has been managed has prevented the 
Mauritian economy from deriving otherwise possible developmental benefits from 
the assets it bequeathed to the Chinese developers.  
This thesis is critical of the competition that the Chinese companies 
established under JFET (for e.g. JFET Travel & Tours Ltd, Oriental Construction 
(Mauritius) Co. Ltd, and more recently Goldox Construction Ltd) give to the local 
companies. This is because, as explicated in Chapter 1, ‘cooperation’ and ‘mutual 
development’ were heralded as the objectives of this zone endeavour. Although the 
advent of Chinese companies will present Mauritian consumers with more 
competitive prices and choices, because (i) they operate in the same sector 
dominated by local manufacturers, (ii) are able to repatriate their profits, capital 
and dividends to China for free, and (iii) are additionally provided land and utilities 
services to support this competition, the JFET companies take away from the 
national income.  They hardly serve the mutual cooperation purpose for which the 
CSEZAs were established. If competitive Chinese presence in the domestic market 
was what was being sought, such activity could have taken place—and already is 
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taking place—in the larger domestic trade area. Supporting competitive Chinese 
enterprises in a contained area near the harbour by putting costly public assets to 
their service (at the expense of farmers who had been helping the national food 
security sustenance), and moreover allowing these Chinese enterprises to compete 
with local manufacturers, is definitely a strategy for underdevelopment, not 
development!    
For long, Mauritius has been praised as a developmental state model and an 
example of good governance on the continent. Its has attained the status of an 
investment role model for its African counterparts—to the extent that under BOI’s 
Africa Centre of Excellence, Mauritius now offers advisory and partnership services 
to foreign investors seeking to invest on the continent (Victor, 2013). While the 
increasing visibility of Mauritius on the international as well as regional investment 
platform holds promises for the Mauritian economy and local manufacturers 
seeking to expand into Africa, the experience of the Chinese SEZ in Mauritius 
spreads scepticism over the ability of the Mauritian government to extract 
profitability out of these opportunities. Its willingness to part from huge shares of 
its already limited resources; an ignorance (feigned or real) of financial instruments; 
a lack of interest in evaluating the potential of foreign investors before enrolling 
them on such big investment projects; lack of monitoring of these projects; an 
inability to negotiate as per its local context; a keenness to modify laws for the 
profit of specific investors; a reticence to put up adequate policy frameworks to 
regulate zonal forms of investments; red-taping over issues of public interest and 
possibly even corrupt practices—all of these put to doubt the aptitude of the 
Mauritian state to manage its own investments, let alone advising its counterparts.  
As for the role played by China in this scenario, we cannot ignore the pro-
activeness of China in trying to resuscitate these unpopular CSEZAs across Africa. It 
has relented to renegotiation with Nigeria over LFTZ. Nonetheless, the choice of its 
actors to which it delegates the task of reviving the CSEZAs is poor. After an official 
commitment announced on a global platform at FOCAC 2006; the signature of 
bilateral agreements with the respective African host countries; and the 
deployment of initial investments in the CSEZAs, the Chinese party cannot go back 
on its word. Meanwhile, the zone developers are identifying ways in which to make 
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the most of this access to African assets and governmental support that they 
acquire. The journey of Mauritius JinFei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone Co. 
Ltd shows how African mismanagement, combined with Chinese creative business 
strategies, and the failure of both to customise the model to fit the local African 
affinities, transform a potential development model into a concessionary space.  
The detrimental impacts that JFET has on Mauritius are nonetheless not 
carried onto the relationship shared by Mauritius and China. Even if the zone 
project has not attracted Chinese investors, the larger Mauritian domestic trade 
area continues to thrive with the presence of Chinese enterprises. In July 2013, a 
Chinese private consortium was given the green light to implement an IRS project 
over 344 hectares on the island (L’Express, 2013). Chinese expertise has been 
sought for waste disposal and solar energy productions. Chinese construction 
companies such as SinoHydro continue to be allocated infrastructural projects. The 
Mauritian ambassador to China summarised the unaffected interchange between 
the two countries in an interview on 12 July 2013.   
The high reputation we enjoy is further enhanced by the fact that Mauritius 
has not defaulted on any reimbursement of loans it has taken, on the 
payment of interest on these loans or been in such a situation that of its 
accord, China has had to write off its debts. The assistance received in terms 
of infrastructure, buildings or in other fields has been constant. (Curpen, 
2013) 
 
Regarding recent investment exchanges, he says  
[w]hat has already been done so far has been the promotion of the offshore 
facilities with its extensive fiscal system Mauritius has put into place.  But this 
will have to wait for the going of the Chinese private sector to Africa. During 
the recent visit of the Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, together 
with the Board of Investment to China important and useful contacts have 
been made to attract Chinese shipping companies to use the port of Port 
Louis after the liberalization of the bunkering sector for the shipping industry, 
our port being one of the few viable and efficient African ports. (ibid.)  
 
This unchanged positive interaction between Mauritius and China despite the 
stagnating CSEZA clarifies that, indeed, CSEZAs are in no way the determinant 
representative of Chinese engagement with African partners. Neither do the 
shortcomings of these zones imply that all Chinese cooperative endeavours with 
African countries are problematic, nor will their positive contribution promise a 
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similar experience across other Chinese projects. What the CSEZAs nonetheless 
represent is how knowledge of the roles of each of the actors involved, and of the 
way in which a project unfolds, can provide a less extremist understanding of the 
role of China on the African continent.  The study of CSEZAs encourages Africanists 
to not only investigate the demeanours and actions of the Chinese in African 
countries but also get an insight into the responsiveness of African actors to the 
Chinese. When viewed through the prism of CSEZAs, Africa is as complicit as China 
in its own exploitation.  
 
Contribution of the Thesis 
Academia tends to treat CSEZAs as purely empirical events. Over the seven years 
since their inception, these zones have been subjected to so many controversies 
that researchers were almost compelled to focus on unravelling the substance of 
these accusations. By collating data which elucidate either the exploitative or 
developmental features of the CSEZAs, scholars have attempted to find an answer 
to the recurrent question about the nature of China’s role on the African continent. 
As most adjacent literatures reviewed in Chapter 2 indicate, the recurrent question 
in China-Africa studies in regard to CSEZAs is: will these CSEZAs confirm that China 
exploits its African partners or does it propose an alternative route to 
development? However, in a rush to find the answer to this global concern, authors 
who have penned about CSEZAs skipped the preliminary studies which would have 
granted them an accurate answer to their query. The initial need to understand the 
CSEZA concept, its theoretical and methodological bearings—all research elements 
which respond to the global relevance of the CSEZA—have been overlooked. This 
thesis provides the response to these overlooked research items. It asks the right 
questions in the right order: What is a CSEZA? How different or similar is it to other 
forms of zones? Why are some CSEZAs more successful than others? How do the 
actors and events connected to JFET explain its current status? Has JFET contributed 
to the development of Mauritius or not? What is the contribution of the Mauritian 
case study to the theoretical understanding of CSEZAs? The responses that this 
thesis provides to the above questions empower academia to establish a globally 
applicable understanding of CSEZAs. It moreover helps policymakers to identify the 
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areas where they have fallen short in their administration of these zones and 
therefore, what they need to rectify. Additionally, the importance of the local in 
enabling the successful implementation of a foreign economic model which has 
been discussed and recommended in the literature review section in Chapter 2, is 
also taken up in this thesis. The specificities of the case of JFET whereby the CSEZA’s 
components did not match the existing context and capabilities of Mauritius, is 
demonstrative of the extent to which failure at local customisation can undermine 
the developmental capacity of the CSEZA model. This therefore strongly advocates 
for a localisation of global models.   
 
1. The Methodology 
As Dependency Theory contextualises the CSEZA beyond the domestic and within 
the global realm, the exploratory journey of this new zone form needs to be 
complemented by an adequate methodology.  Studies of this new pilot zone form 
cannot rely on the restrictive scope of methods applied to the study of EPZs and 
SEZs. The later zone forms are essentially domestic endeavours. They are created, 
established and influenced by domestic factors. On the other hand, the CSEZA is a 
transnational venture and needs a methodology which comprehensively explores 
its internal dynamics as well as the external factors which influence its existence 
and actions. A focus on domestic indicators is insufficient. There is a need to 
account for the international pressures and actors at play in the CSEZA scenario. 
Thus, along with the spatial diffusion approach which confirm the transnational 
nature of CSEZAs, this thesis identifies a trio set of indicators, composed of the host 
and patron governments, the private sectors of each, and the international realm as 
the methodology to study CSEZAs. 
 
2. The CSEZA Success Formula 
Though this thesis focuses on JFET as the worst-case example of a CSEZA, it 
nevertheless also includes a study of the six other CSEZAs. Together, these seven 
CSEZAs illustrate the varied problematic of a CSEZA. From the commonalities 
identified across the seven CSEZAs, we are able to extract patterns which explain 
why some CSEZAs are more successful than their comrades.  Indeed, the presence 
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of SOEs, the shareholding composition, and the experience and specialisation of the 
zone developers come out as the three determinants of good or bad CSEZA 
experiences. Thus, this thesis establishes the pre-requirements for successful 
CSEZAs. Future CSEZA projects are guaranteed a higher rate of success if they follow 
these basic recommendations.  Along with these success-inducing ingredients of 
CSEZAs, this thesis also identifies features which undermine the deliverability of 
CSEZAs. These are the overarching presence of Chinese SOEs and the failure of host-
country customisation—both of which respectively evoke the activism or passivism 
displayed by the two partner countries of the CSEZA venture.  
 
3. Dependency Redefined 
The absence of a theoretical prism in the study of CSEZAs causes the CSEZA to be 
read as an insular entity. Its relevance to the global arena and to other actors who 
do not directly part-take in the CSEZA composition has not been assessed. This 
deficiency resulted in the inability of scholars to hypothesise about the impact that 
CSEZAs can have on global interactions. As CSEZAs are strictly studied in their 
domestic context, the innovative policy procedures and strategies that they employ 
and which provide a learning experience to other countries could learn, are ignored. 
Most importantly, by denying the CSEZA a theoretical identity, academia keeps 
away this ambitious pilot development project—which is equally endorsed by the 
China and the African host countries—from rectifying its shortcomings and 
delivering a more equitable zone-based developmental experience. Therefore, the 
association of Dependency Theory to the CSEZA is as much as a suggestion for 
reform as a critique of it.  
At first glance, the association of Dependency Theory to a phenomenon 
involving African actors may be seen as passé. It may be assumed that this 
association is based on stereotypical beliefs that the continent relies on preferences 
from ex-colonial masters and on the resource-exploitation abilities of new 
‘developing country’ partners in an unbalanced way. Surely, in a world where 
neoliberal market practices have seeped into the most distant places, the idea that 
some countries still live in subordination to others is exaggerated. Does this thesis 
mistake interdependence for dependence? The answer is no. The most obvious 
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evidence of this is the proof provided in this thesis of how China derives benefit 
from the CSEZA even though it is still stagnant. China pockets these benefits at the 
expense of the extensive input and frustrated hopes of its African partners. Most 
definitely, each aspect of the zone is pervaded by relationships of dependency 
whereby development of metropolises happen at the expense of the 
underdevelopment of its satellites.   
As it currently stands, the global capitalist structure is inherently hierarchical. 
It is characterised by numerous and different configurations of dependency. There 
are relations of domination and subordination between countries at the 
international level, between economic classes and communities within a nation and 
so on. Over years, the relation of dependency between each of these configurations 
has been channelled through distinct processes: initially through colonisation, and 
subsequently through the spread of neoliberal practices. This thesis shows that the 
advent of the CSEZA model has brought innovation to these conventional 
dependency practices. It departs from traditional understandings of dependency 
and refines Frank’s perspective to interpret what I identify as being the new 
instruments of dependency. 
The CSEZA transgresses the structural boundaries which dictate relationships 
of dependency as exercised under the neoliberal global capitalist structure. In a 
dependency situation defined solely by neoliberal structures, each segment is 
aware of who its metropolis and satellite are, and from that, it derives an 
understanding of the role it should accordingly assume. In light of this knowledge, 
each metropolis is able to calculate how much it should take away from its 
subordinate satellite in order to be able to sustain itself after its own superior level 
has expropriated its surplus value. Thus, each strata situated in subordination to the 
world metropolis prepares adequate strategies against the probability of suffering 
from acute underdevelopment. The complex configuration of the CSEZA, formed by 
state, private and community actors, challenges this organised devolution of the 
production process which characterise the current system. Dependency here is not 
exercised over alternating levels, as in Frank’s drawings. Through a spatial diffusion 
approach, China conveniently strides over certain strata and reaches out to those 
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segments internal to the host African countries which are of its interest. 
Dependency relations start to develop between actors of different nature.  
While Cardoso and Faletto propose domestically-based ‘enclave economies’ 
as one way of exercising dependency, this thesis asserts the ability of trans-national 
enclave economies to do the same—or worse! This thesis proves how dependency 
does not necessarily have to transfer the surplus it has extracted from its own local 
satellites to the world metropolis. It can fuel the development of the world 
metropolis by containing it within the CSEZAs. And eventually, a world metropolis 
can subdue a national satellite into becoming a comprehensive satellite economy to 
a specific small space internal to its own locality.  
Dependency Theory also accommodates geographic space (i.e.land) as an 
entity which can be exploited—or be an exploiter itself. The CSEZA model proposes 
that the development and underdevelopment dichotomy is not exclusively the by-
product of economic pursuits whereby the surplus value of the satellite is extracted 
by the metropolis. A relationship of dependency also thrives when a metropolis 
marks its own presence within the jurisdiction of its satellite—in this case, by 
claiming a plot of land. Similar relationships of dependency are also established 
when a skewed shareholding configuration prevails in the CSEZAs companies. 
Merely by virtue of its established majority shareholding in a project set on the 
territory of the supposedly ‘partner’ metropolis, China affirms its ultimate 
metropolis status. As the CSEZA model fuses neoliberal practices with 
unprecedented principles of geographic and economic separatism exercised by one 
country within the territory of another, the domination that China commands over 
Mauritius is absolute.  
The CSEZA dependency experience evaluated in the thesis accommodates 
new economic, foreign policy and FDI practices in the modalities of the Dependency 
Theory. In so doing, it encourages the dependency perspective to shift its mode of 
identification of dependency relations from a strict focus on traditional structural 
and procedural determinants of dependency and instead see the outcome of 
dependency, i.e.  development and underdevelopment, as indicators of the 
prevalence of relationships of dependent nature. 
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Post Scriptum 
I noted some movement during my last research visit to the JFET site in May 2013. 
Two new buildings were under construction. One was the business centre of 
Mauritius JinFei Economic Trade and Cooperation Zone. The building was over 1.27 
hectares and was scheduled for completion by 25 August 2013. The contractor of 
the project is Tianli Construction Co. Ltd, the designer is China Metallurgical 
Engineering Technology Co. Ltd, and the supervision is being carried out by Shanxi 
Zhenyi Construction Supervision Co. Ltd. The value of the contract is USD 13 million. 
The second building was situated at the far end of the zone, bordering on the Baie 
du Tombeau Road. There were no indications about the nature of the second 
building. Going by Jaulim’s report (2013), the building is possibly a block of flats 
intended for the JFET investors. 
The Riche-Terre Road, adjoined to JFET, which connects the M2 to Baie du 
Tombeau Road is still undergoing construction. The contract for the construction of 
that road has been awarded to SinoHydro, a Chinese SOE specialising in 
hydropower engineering and construction. The company was incorporated in 
Mauritius as SinoHydro Corporation (Mauritius) Ltd on 21 June 2011. According to 
recent parliamentary updates, the allocation of this contract to SinoHydro is 
contended. The opposition party describes Sinohydro as a dubious company since in 
2012, SinoHydro had failed to provide documents which could prove its financial 
credibility in order to undertake the construction tender of an additional lane along 
the M1 from Ruisseau Creole to the Place d’Armes, after which the tender was 
reallocated to a Mauritian company. There have also been incessant delays in other 
projects managed by SinoHydro. For example, in the widening of M1 motorway 
from Colville Deverell bridge to Grewals, and also in the canal works at Arnuand 
diversion. The former project has been particularly contentious. Colas Maurice Ltd 
contested the allocation of the contract to SinoHydro on the basis that the correct 
selection procedures were not followed. The opposition party refers to the 
blacklisting of SinoHydro from countries such as Botswana, Malaysia, Namibia and 
Lesotho, and qualifies SinoHydro as a ‘monument of corruption’ (Mauritius, 
Parliament. 2013, 28 May).  
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It was also in the news that in July 2012, a Chinese company called China 
Kingho Energy Group Co. Ltd had officially proposed the construction of a 2 x 55 
MW coal-fired power plant project to the Mauritian government. In this regard, the 
opposition questioned government on whether the JFET site is the location chosen 
for this venture. To this, the Deputy Prime Minister replied ‘[b]ut, it is much more 
than a coal-fired power plant. The project of Kingho and JinFei is much more than 
that, but they have gone through the BOI and have not come to my Ministry or to 
CEB yet’ (Mauritius, Parliament. 2013, 14 May). To this response, representatives of 
the opposition recalled a statement made by a minister two months earlier: 
I am informed that a Chinese company namely, China Kingho Energy Group 
Co. Ltd (CKEG) has submitted a proposal to the Board of Investment to 
develop, invest, construct and operate a coal-fired power plant in Mauritius 
and that the JinFei park has been identified as one of the possible locations’ 
(Mauritius, Parliament. 2013, 26 March). 
 
Another occurrence relevant to JFET which has been noted is an 
advertisement from Goldox Construction Ltd, the only functional company located 
at JFET to date. Although earlier during the year, officers at Goldox communicated 
that they were engaged in the manufacture of aluminium and steel window and 
door frames for the local market, only a couple of months later, Goldox 
Construction Ltd was publicising its expertise in construction works. Describing itself 
as a building and civil engineering contractor, the company announced that it 
carries out the construction of villas, bungalows, commercial and industrial 
buildings. This sudden shift of activities motivated my research into the background 
of Goldox. Goldox was incorporated in Mauritius under the name Goldox Enterprise 
Ltd in April 2009 and it practiced trade activities. The company’s registered address 
was Beau-Bassin. The sole shareholder was Ding Furen from Jiangsu, China. The 
company’s name changed to Goldox Constructions Ltd on 19 February 2010 and 
Ding Hong (Qinghe, China) is its current majority shareholder. The company was 
based in L’Escalier, in the south of Mauritius, before it moved to the JFET site on 26 
July 2012. 
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Figure 7.1: Advert from L'Express May 2013 
 
These four snapshots of recent events surrounding JFET illustrate different 
aspects of dependency. A hesitant start with the construction of a business centre 
and a block of flats four years after the zone was re-launched under new 
shareholders, are obvious efforts to salvage the project and keep the diplomatic 
commitment to the Mauritian government. Goldox’s journey across different 
locations in the country from 2009 to 2012 is strong evidence that the JFET 
developers are trying to get Chinese investors already functioning in the larger 
Mauritian domestic trade area to shift their activities within the zone since they are 
not being able to attract new foreign investors to the zone. The fact that Goldox 
Construction Ltd has been permitted to target the Mauritian market as buyers for 
its window, doorframes and construction services, entrenches JFET’s exercise of 
dependency.132 As for the role played by SinoHydro in this entire scenario, its 
growing acquisition of government construction contracts since 2011 is indicative of 
post-JFET exploitative effects.  
The involvement of the Shanxi government in JFET has opened Mauritius to 
various other Chinese SOEs. It is with the diplomatic leverage of the CSEZA in 
Mauritius that SOEs such as SinoHydro are able to bag construction works in 
Mauritius; especially the tender of those construction works which are relevant to 
the zone. The opaqueness in which SinoHydro and CT Power (Mauritius) Ltd) were 
awarded contracts despite their failure to match the requirements criteria sheds 
light onto the extent to which the Mauritian government is a corrupt and willing 
partner of this dependency-enforcing juggernaut. 
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The most interesting development in JFET remains the emergence of China 
Kingho Energy Group Co. Ltd and the way in which the Government of Mauritius is 
managing its controversial presence on the investment scene. From the exchange 
between the opposition and government which took place in parliament on 14 May 
2013, it is evident that the Government of Mauritius wants to camouflage the 
intention and plans of China Kingho and its link to JFET. The choice of words of the 
minister is operative as he says ‘…it is much more than a coal-fired power plant. The 
project of Kingho and JinFei is much more than that’ *italics mine+. A simple 
question begs to be asked: what can there be more to a coal-fired power plant 
project proposal than the intention to produce electricity? In the wake of a power 
crisis in Mauritius, the chain of events that unrolls in regard to the powerplants 
generates suspicion. The storyline is as follows: the Mauritian government objected 
to JFET’s initial suggestion to construct a solar powerplant in the zone. Instead, it 
permitted CT Power (Mauritius) Ltd to produce coal-based electricity. CT Power 
(Mauritius) Ltd then roped in Shanxi Coking Coal as a major associate. Later on,  
Shanxi Coking Coal withdraws from the project. CT Power (Mauritius) Ltd faces 
public opposition over its project in Mauritius and meanwhile China Kingho comes 
forth with a proposal for a similar coal-powered plant whose intended location is 
JFET. After this exposé, we can only agree with the minister that indeed, there is 
definitely more to the project! As these actors are new to the scene and the issue 
has undergone little progress, it is too early to investigate the intentions behind 
their activities. Nevertheless, there is one certainty: the direction that the 
powerplant project has taken, and the disorganised fashion in which the Mauritian 
government handles these various investment proposals is likely to push the island 
to incur further losses.   
The inclusion of SinoHydro and China Kingho here, in the context of JFET,  lies 
in line with the methodological path chosen in chapter 5 whereby the activities of 
projects, entities, and companies associated to the zone project through various 
tributaries are incorporated in JFET’s chronological account in order to identify the 
dynamics of and hindrances to the zone’s development. However, as these two 
companies are new to the Mauritian scene, their impact on JFET can only be 
hypothesised and not adequately measured. While this thesis has been researched 
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and written in complete awareness that all Chinese businesses conducted in a 
country are not necessarily interlinked, and that the presence of Chinese SOEs in a 
project does not automatically imply a direct engagement of the Chinese 
government in that specific venture, in the case of Mauritius, it is the exactitudes of 
the Chinese companies involved that challenges this common understanding.  
The first and main premise which legitimises this interlinking of Chinese 
companies in Mauritius, and of these Chinese companies to the Chinese 
government, is the basic fact the CSEZA is a Chinese bilateral endeavour launched, 
supported and sponsored by the Chinese government, which has delegated the 
responsibility to develop the zone to its SOEs from Shanxi, in partnership with 
private company Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Group. However, the presence of SOEs in a 
Chinese governmental project does not automatically equate to confirmation that 
the Chinese central government has an intimate involvement in the management of 
the project. Several authors have documented the relationship between Chinese 
SOEs and the central government. On one hand we have scholars such as Woetzel 
(2008) who suggest that Chinese SOEs work independently of the central 
government, on the other, we have studies by Zhaoxi (2009) who claims that: ‘*a+s a 
large number of Chinese enterprises operating internationally are SOEs or holding 
companies with the state as the biggest shareholder, the administrative influence 
on their decision-making process and management system does not create the best 
conditions to compete efficiently with private foreign MNCs’ (Zhaoxi, 2009, p. 70). 
The extent to which either of these observations is a reliable assessment of the 
relationship between the central Chinese government and its provincial SOEs rests 
beyond the scope of this thesis. In the specific case of the Shanxi-based coal 
producing SOEs, one simple event confirms that the activities of Shanxi Coking Coal 
has the direct ratification of the central government is the centralisation of the coal-
mining industry in Shanxi which happened in 2009. Thus, through their 
administrative and financial connection (which this thesis supports with evidence), 
the inherent presence and responsibility of the Chinese state in the CSEZA is 
established. However, in cases where the activities of the Chinese SOEs present in 
Mauritius are not linked to each other, the Mauritian government displays strong 
activism and propensity in forcefully forming a connection between them in order 
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to extract leverage, and especially financial support, from the Chinese government. 
This is notable in the government’s attempt to rope in the EXIM Bank of China to 
finance the construction of the Terre-Rouge-Verdun link road and the allocation of 
the contract for the Riche-Terre Road to SinoHydro. In so doing, the Mauritian 
government is instrumental in enacting its own underdevelopment at the hands of 
China. 
The stance that the host African countries, especially Mauritius, adopt in the 
face of this exploitative treatment resulting from the geographic and economic 
separatism exercised through CSEZA, can easily be described as self-deprecating. 
The examples of Nigeria, which renegotiated the terms of the LFTZ, and Ethiopia 
which revised its policy framework to guarantee a better monitoring of the impact 
of EIZ on its domestic economy, are overshadowed by the inactivity of the hosts in 
the remaining five CSEZAs. Mauritius, as representative of an extreme case, goes to 
the extent of facilitating its own underdevelopment by employing strategies which 
incessantly reproduce dependency. After an acquisition of spatial and economic 
autonomy in Mauritius in the form of JFET and through the latter’s capacity to act 
independently as a foreign private company, China bypasses the Mauritian 
government and enforces JFET in a direct expression of dependency. As a result of 
being ignored by China on the way in and out of the Mauritian jurisdiction while 
interacting with JFET and its more profitable adjacent businesses, the Mauritian 
government, local economy and the public end up as dependencies of the 211 
hectares of land now under the administration of China for the next 96 years. This 
reality cannot be hidden by rhetoric advancing notions of ‘mutual benefit’, ‘win-win 
situations’ or ‘cooperation’. 
As we compare the initial aim of the CSEZA project (which basked under the 
legitimising rhetoric of cooperation and mutual development) to the dependency-
entrenching experience that has been delivered by these zones seven years later, 
we note the CSEZA’s vain attempt to combine ‘cooperation’ and ‘dependency’. The 
CSEZA markedly epitomises China’s ambitious plan to harmonise several such 
dichotomies and create a winning formula for development; one that is more 
appealing to the developing African countries than that which is otherwise offered 
to them by proponents of purist neoliberalism. CSEZAs hereby seek to merge 
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cooperation with dependency, socialism with neoliberal capitalism, and Chinese 
socialist capitalism with African particularism. Though it is a commendable effort on 
the part of China and has attracted African interest, it is the spatial format in which 
China implements this project that somewhat foils its efforts. As it tries to diffuse 
cooperation, Chinese socialist capitalism exercised through an enclosed Chinese SEZ 
space situated within an African country—which, on its turn, is macrocosmically 
characterised by subordination, neoliberal capitalism and African particularism—
the walls of the CSEZA prove to be too impermeable.  
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1
 Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2011, in Farole, 70) affirm that the zones are part of China’s ‘going global’ 
strategy. They enumerate the ways in which these zones enable China to go global:  create the 
demand for Chinese goods; cheat the export limitations existing on Chinese products; allow upgrade 
and restructuration at home; assist small and medium enterprises in expanding overseas; and export 
China’s developmental strategy to countries needing a higher development level. Horta (2010), too, 
makes a reprise of the global capitalist pressures as one of the reasons behind the CSEZAs as she 
evokes the need for China to diversify its markets, secure resources, and restructure domestically in 
order to ascend the value chain.  
2
 For a comprehensive description of the objectives of FOCAC, see Taylor, 2011. 
3
 The term ‘economic and trade cooperation zones’ purely denotes the function that these zones are 
meant to carry out. The technical and popular name by which they are otherwise referred is Chinese 
Special Economic Zones in Africa. 
4
 While media reports numerous cases of land grab by Arab countries in Africa (see, The Economist, 
2009), there are studies which state that these projects have almost never actualised. See, Woertz.   
5
 The Suzhou Industrial Park was launched in 1994 as a cooperative zone project by the Chinese and 
Singaporean governments. It involved Chinese state-owned enterprises, along with national, 
provincial and municipal level companies. The Chinese consortium held 35 per cent of the shares of 
the zone company. The remaining 65 per cent were held by the Singaporean consortium which 
consisted of government bodies such as the Economic Development Board and the Jurong Town 
Corporation. However, in 1999, the percentage of share ownership was inverted. The Singaporean 
initiator of the zone, Lee Kuan Yew blamed Suzhou New District Industrial Park—the rival zone 
project backed by the Chinese local government and constructed near Suzhou Industrial Park—for 
the setback suffered by the latter project. The New York Times reported him as having commented 
that Suzhou municipal government was ‘using us to get investors in, and when investors came in, 
they said: 'You come to my park, it's cheaper’’ (Richardson, 1999). 
6
 Farole demarcates Chinese SEZs by calling them ‘wide area zones’. The only difference he sees 
between the encompassing category of SEZs and China’s wide area zones is their size and content. 
Yet, wide-area zones are not exclusive to China (2011, pp. 30 - 39). 
7
 Halfway through 2011, the technical designation of the Mauritian Ministry of Finance changed from 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Empowerment (MOFEE) to Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development (MOFED). MOFED is the current terminology.   
8
 The total voting power of the G7 countries as part of total IMF voting quota is 44.3 per cent. USA 
holds16.7 per cent of the 44.3 per cent. At the World Bank, America holds 15.4 per cent of the total 
percentage of voting power.  
9
 OECD countries initiated MAI in 1995. It aimed to  set up an international regulatory framework for 
investment. See, Geiger, Rainer (1998).  
10
 Gwin evokes how the subjective concerns of the US, the major contributor to the World Bank, 
took over the real purpose of the Bank during the Cold War. American allies such as Indonesia 
gained favourable treatment despite their non-compliance to various of the requirements for aid 
eligibility at the World Bank. 
11
 PFI is an initiative of OECD countries, in partnership with expertise from non-OECD countries and 
international organisations. It lists 10 requirements for governments to follow if they want to create 
an environment which is favourable to private investment.  
12
 BATNA is a term coined by Fisher and Ury in 1983. It refers to ‘the only standard which can protect 
you both from accepting terms that are too unfavourable and from rejecting terms it would be in 
your interest to accept.’ See, Fisher and Ury (2011). 
13
 It is difficult to establish the interaction between, for e.g. the host African government (a state 
entity which is traditionally perceived as pursuing public good) and the Chinese private investors (a 
set of non-state entities usually pursuing profit maximisation) as their dynamics of cooperation 
differ. The exchanges happening between them are not of the same nature: Chinese private 
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investors are giving jobs and development (social capital) to the host African state, while the host 
African state gives the Chinese private investors indirect financial capital through subsidies and 
incentives. The complexity of the situation is enhanced by the fact that by nature, subsidies and 
incentive packages are indirect benefits that are often exempted instead of paid. They have no 
accurately measurable value.  Therefore, the value of the benefit given or received is often unknown 
or inadequately comparable.   
14
 Prior to the Open Door Policy, China’s current budget deficit surged to more than 17 billion yuan 
(Galbraith and Lu, 2000).   
15
Bull defines balance of power in reference to Vattel’s words. It is ‘a state of affairs such that no 
power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay down the law to others’ (Vattel, 1977, 
cited in Bull, 2002, p. 97). 
16
 Bandwagoning refers to the act of a weaker state allying with a stronger state. 
17
 No First Rule is the commitment by subscribed nuclear-powered nations, not to use their nuclear 
power as a weapon unless as a response to nuclear attack by another entity.  
18
  To date, America has successfully monitored China’s trade behaviour: e.g. In 2004, on value-
added tax on integrated circuits; in 2006, on measures affecting imports of automobile parts; in 
2010, on importation and distribution of copyright products and several others.  
19
 Democratic Peace Theory supposes that liberal democratic states do not go to war with each 
other. 
20
 This argument is supported by World Bank’s findings that Shenzhen and other SEZs hold ‘talent 
meetings’ in order to attract foreign expertise. They offer funding opportunities to those interested 
in working for them during the course of their post-doctoral research. Such SEZ activities hinder a 
maximised derivation of FDI by the local host community. See, Zeng (2010).  
21
  The Allied Nations are those countries who grouped to counter Hitler’s Germany and its allies. The 
Allied Nations was led by the US, UK and the Soviet Union. This conglomeration went on to become 
the foundation of the United Nations in 1945. 
22
 Economic nationalism is based on an agreement between the public and private sector of a nation, 
to comprehensively shift control of the economic power, labour, and capital control from any 
domestically present foreign companies to the national government.   
23
 Wallerstein’s World System Theory’s foundational premise is that: a global division of labour 
defines the present world capitalism system. This division of labour divides the world into core, 
semi-periphery and periphery.  
24
 Rostow’s (1960) five stages:  
(i) Traditional Society: no economic growth due to an absence of science and technology.  
(ii) Preconditions to take-off: Manufacturing activities and capital mobilisation begin. Limited 
numbers of sectors are targeted.  
(iii) Take-off: Sector-based growth turns into holistic national economic growth. Investment of 
national income is required at this stage.  
(iv) Maturity: Technology creates growth. The economy diversifies and new areas of investment 
come up while older sectors stagnate. Increased investment of national income is required at 
this stage.  
(v) High Mass Consumption: Citizens seek more luxury goods.  
25
 The Alliance for Progress was an endeavour launched by the US in 1961 with the intention of 
assisting Latin American countries in their economic advancement.  
26
 For an account of how ISI entrenched the differences  between classes in Perón’s Argentina see, 
Smith, William. (1991, pp. 26 – 32). 
27
 This diagram is a pictorial representation of the description provided by Frank in Capitalism and 
Underdevelopment in Latin America. In Frank’s words: ‘As a photograph of the world taken at a point 
in time, this model consists of a world metropolis (today the United States) and its governing class, 
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and its national and international satellites and their leaders—national satellites like the Southern 
states of the United States, and international satellites like São Paulo. Since São Paulo is a national 
metropolis in its own right, the model consists further of its satellites: the provincial metropolises, 
like Recife or Belo Horizonte, and their regional and local satellites in turn. That is, taking a 
photograph of a slice of the world we get a whole chain of metropolises and satellites, which runs 
from the world metropolis down to the hacienda or rural merchant who are satellites of the local 
commercial metropolitan center but who in their turn have peasants as their satellites’ (1967, pp. 
146 – 47). 
28
 Evans developed the triple alliance theory. According to him, ‘foreign capital, now operating 
locally, shares with local capital, both private and state-controlled, an interest in the further 
development of local industry. This is not to deny that there is a differentiation of local and foreign 
capital within the industrial structure; it is only to say that conflicts of interest are now more subtle’ 
(Evans, 1979, p. 9 – 10). Evans evokes the regulatory role of the Brazilian state through a discussion 
of Petrobras, who assumed monopoly of the Brazilian market in 1974 by ousting foreign companies 
like Union Carbide and Petroquímica União who were expecting to take over the market (p. 213). He 
argues that the priority of both local and the foreign parties is an accumulation of capital—which is 
possible through a tight control over the income redistribution machinery managed by the state in 
combination with the creation of machinery generated by MNCs.  The role of the ‘local’ is mediatory 
to this process as it presents MNCs with the option of partnerships which may act as the instrument 
legitimising the tacit entente between the state and the MNCs. 
29
 Indications of this trend are: 
(i) the absence of comparative CSEZAs, Chinese SEZ studies, and  
(ii) in the World Bank’s most comprehensive study of the CSEZAs (2011, p. 83), each of the country 
case studies is evaluated against an epistemologically undefined criteria of success. The CSEZAs in 
Nigeria, Ethiopia and Mauritius are assessed individually and are prescribed recommendations 
specific to their contexts. The general lessons that the report draws at the end completely avoid 
referring to the technical or policy experiences which supported China in making its own SEZs 
successful.  
30
 It is interesting that the delegates visited the Suzhou Industrial Park since it is closer to the 
bilateral government partnership format upon which CSEZAs are established.  
31
 WTO does not provide an exact criterion to define the EPZ. The schema of preferential treatments 
to be provided under EPZs is determined by the provisions outlined in the 1995 Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). Developing countries which have a gross national 
product of over USD 1,000 per year and host EPZs, have been affected by the ASCM as they have to 
eliminate some preferences granted to EPZs by December 2015. Nevertheless, there is consensus on 
some general features of an EPZ: flexible labour laws, tax exemptions, reduced red tape, above 
average communication services and infrastructure, subsidised utilities and rental rates, and duty-
free imports of raw and intermediate materials.  
32
 Operation Bootstrap was the name given to the economic development programme implemented 
in Puerto Rico in the 1950s. It involved the diversification of the economy away from agrarian 
activities towards a more export-led industrialisation. 
33
 The Four Modernisations Programme aimed to develop the four main areas of the Chinese 
economy: agriculture, defence, industry and technology. 
34
 The Sino-Soviet split happened during the Cold War period. The conflict is said to have been 
caused by ideological disagreements over interpretations and implementations of Marxism and 
Leninism, and also due to the increasing emphasis China was putting on its economic and military 
independence. See Lüthi, Lorenz (2008). 
35
 Hirschman argues that the lack of entrepreneurship is the principal hindrance to economic growth. 
He proposes to concentrate investment in projects which promise backward linkages rather than 
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evenly distributing investment across sectors. Focused investments will create potential for other 
linked investments and opportunities will trickle down and reach smaller entrepreneurs.  
36
 Backward linkages are not the forte of EPZs because:  
(i) Foreign investor companies refrain from buying materials from local suppliers because the raw 
materials available there is of low quality. 
(ii)  Parent firms of the EPZ companies like to retain their international mobility. Therefore, 
relationships with domestic suppliers are not encouraged.  
(iii)  Sharing of technological knowledge with the domestic area is seen as producing competition. 
(Warr, 1989)  
37
 Although this work acknowledges that EPZs and SEZs are not exclusively government prerogatives 
and that instances of private EPZs and SEZs do exist, the discussion here is about EPZs and SEZs 
established by governments. While the focus on public SEZs is in light of this thesis’s treatment of 
the seven government-backed CSEZAs, the generalising stance vis-à-vis EPZs is to be understood in 
light of Madani’s (1999) observation that:  
(i) ‘The older zones were typically setup and run by the host government’ (p. 16).  
(ii) There is an obvious prevalence of public-owned EPZs and SEZs (p. 66). 
Therefore, the characteristics of the EPZ and SEZ discussed here are those of publicly-owned 
enterprises and do not take into account private EPZs and SEZs which have obvious different 
characteristics. 
38
 For further examples of policy reforms which were initially introduced in Shenzhen SEZ and were 
later comprehensively adopted in China, see Zeng (2010, p. 68). 
39
 There are different formulas for measuring zone success and each researcher have their preferred 
indicators. For example, Sklair’s (1988) list of indicators include: backward and forward linkages,  
value-added created within the host country’s jurisdiction, creation of jobs, training of local labour 
force, and, an equitable distribution of the income generated through the zone. Hers are 
unconventional indicators. Roberts (1992) presents a more universally-acceptable schema by 
referring to the five objectives that UNCTAD (1985) identified as being those that governments 
pursue through EPZs: (i) generating foreign exchange earning, (ii) creating employment, (iii) attract 
foreign capital and technology, (iv) upgrading labour and management skills, (v) domestic linkages. 
These five objectives are the indicators to be used in measuring the success of EPZs.  
40
 Labour training and employment are treated as benefits because untrained labour and the 
unemployed would have been a cost to the national government. 
41
 Electricity is a cost or benefit depending on whether the tariff paid exceeds or is lower than the 
‘long-run marginal cost (LRMC) of supplying extra power’ (Warr, 1989, p. 80). 
42
 To Warr, domestic borrowing is a cost because inevitably ‘the domestic output forgone as a result 
of additional borrowings by (foreign) EPZ firms exceeds the compensation received from them in 
interest and principal repayments’ (Warr 1989, p. 80). However, he points out that ‘domestic 
borrowing’ as an indicative feature is redundant if international capital already has open access to 
the host country’s local capital market. In such a case, there is no displacement of local investment 
because of the EPZ borrowing. 
43
 Scholars who have integrated new variables which are not accounted for in Warr’s cost-benefit 
approach, have nonetheless limited themselves to considerations, which again, are only domestic in 
nature. See, Amirahmadi and Wu (1995).  
44
 For example, Uganda’s Lake Victoria East Africa Free Trade Zone is a zone developed by a Chinese 
party. The Chinese government has professed no support to this private endeavour.   
45
 For a list of the 19 shortlisted projects and those cancelled, see Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2012, 
pp.6 - 8).  
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46
 CDB functions as a policy-bank, supporting Chinese investment projects home and abroad. Since, 
2008, there has been a change in this role and the government is pushing CDB to function as a 
commercial bank.  
47
 EXIM Bank of China’s tasks involve financial assistance to overseas Chinese export, investment and 
construction projects. 
48
 CIECC is directed by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of State 
Council (SASAC) and ‘has been established to fulfill the requirements of democratic and scientific 
decision-making for investment projects…’(CIECC, 2012). 
49
 Sinosure is a government body set up in order to assist Chinese exporters by providing them with 
export insurance services.  
50
 There are different accounts of how the Mauritian Chinese SEZ started. A lesser-known version is 
provided by Liu and Lefèvre (2012, p. 38). They evoke the role of a real estate consultant, Wang 
Zhigang, who partnered with Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Group to conceptualise an urban management 
plan in the form of JFET in Mauritius. Their proposal was submitted to MOFCOM and was approved 
for construction in Mauritius. It also got the consent of the Mauritian government.   
51
 Regardless of whether it is the Chinese party who comes up with the CSEZA proposal for a 
particular African country, or it is the African country who approaches China to host the CSEZA, the 
sequence in which the actors act in order to initiate the zone does not undermine the logic of the 
Spatial Diffusion Approach. This is because the essence of the interaction between the two sets of 
actors remains the same. 
52
 Patron of Nanjing Jiangning Economic and Technological Development Zone in China since 1992. It 
is a national-level high technology zone. 
53
  Partnering with the SASAC implies that the central Chinese government has a direct stake in the 
company or project.  See, Price et al. (2007).  
54
 Patron of Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area, China. 
55
 In 2004, Jiangling Automobile Group from Nanchang launched a joint venture enterprise called 
Jiangling Motor Holding Co. Ltd, with the national Chang’an Automobile Group,.   
56
 The agreement between Nigeria and China was renegotiated, leaving only 3,000 hectares
 
for SEZ 
development to the Chinese consortium. The rest was opened up to other foreign developers. See, 
Mthembu-Salter (2009). 
57
 The industries to be developed in Mauritius have constantly changed. 
58
 The displaced farmers of Lekki present the following grievances: (i) dispossession of their ancestral 
land and jeopardisation of their means of livelihood, (ii) unconvinced that the land being taken 
purportedly for the project is not in excess of what it is meant for, (iii) not compensated for past 
lands acquisition, (iv) land acquired are being resold by agents to individuals for private use.  
59
 The Lekki-Epe Expressway has been built in order to service the LFTZ more efficiently. However, 
the generated violent protests by daily commuters and resident who would have to pay toll-fees to 
use the route. Lagos government had declined China’s offer to build an alternate unpaid detour road 
for those not wishing to pay the toll fee, for free.  
60
 The agreement was re-negotiated to ascertain that a minimum of 40 per cent of the jobs will go to 
Nigerians and where skills already available among Nigerians were required, only locals would fill 
those posts. See, G. Mthembu-Salter (2009, p. 3).  
61
 See, Momoh (2011). 
62
 The retinue of security guards at the zone holds a double implication: it might either indicate 
towards the existence of security threats to the zone or, can have the effect of alienating the local 
community.  
63
 The importation of clinker at duty-free rates from China by cement producers on the zone has 
impacted existent cement producers in Ethiopia. Already, there has been a decline in the local 
demand for cement, and the new Chinese cement manufacturers add to the competition. The 
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competition for the cement market in Ethiopia is so intense that in 2012, the Ethiopian government 
decided to stop welcoming foreign investment in cement manufacturing.  
64
 Seven hundred hectares will be devoted to manufacturing while 1,000 hectares
 
is sought for 
residential development.  
65
  See, Haglund (2010). 
66
 Brautigam and Xiaoyang (2011, p. 80) write that ‘*l+egislative reforms in Algeria’s investment 
regime, passed in early 2009, require foreign investors to form joint ventures with Algerian partners 
as majority shareholders. This may not be acceptable to the Chinese developers’. 
67
 In 2010, Egypt-TEDA reported an export income of USD 29 million, and, by 2012, ZCCZ had 
registered a total sale of USD 4.35 billion. 
68
 Chinese private firms were prohibited from investing overseas prior to 2003.  
69
 See, The Economist (2011). 
70
 Competition from private enterprises within China, (in what is now a socialist market economy 
regulated by policies which equalise market competition such as the 2007 Anti-Monopoly Law) 
pushes Chinese SOEs to strive harder to succeed. Chinese SOEs also compete among themselves, 
across the provinces, in order to secure the central government’s fiscal support through stimulus 
packages, loan defaults etc. This cross-regional competition among SOEs is linked to the inherent 
competition amongst local governments of the different provinces. 
71
 Agalega is a two-island Mauritian dependency 
72
 Reports of Mauritius’ willingness to bequeath its Agalega islands to India first appeared in 2006. In 
2012, The Times of India published that, in an attempt to preserve the DTA it has with India, 
Mauritius has agreed to allow India to use Agalega.  
73
 The occupation of Diego Garcia by the British and of Tromelin by the French is contested by 
Mauritius. Mauritius claims ownership of the islands. 
74
 The Integrated Resort Scheme launched by the government under the aegis of the BOI, promotes 
the development of luxury villas for sale to foreigners.  
75
 The zone’s website states that ‘10 square kilometers residential area [will be devoted] to the 
participated leaders’ (Setc-zone, 2010). 
76 There are multiple rumours  surrounding  JFET which indicate that high ranking officers 
and administrators of the country have siphoned money, contracts and land using JFET as a 
cover. An investigation of these rumours is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
77
 Compared to FDI inflow collections to China in 2011, 2012 has recorded a fall of 9.6 per cent (The 
World Bank, 2013a).  
78
 The expatriate quota is the mechanism regulating the employment of foreigners in Nigeria. The 
aim behind it is to monitor the areas and are terms of expatriate employment, in a way that local 
Nigerians are prioritised if they have the required skill for the job.  
79
 A special provision called the Third Country Fabric Derogation grants Sub-Saharan African 
countries identified as LDCs the freedom to use yarn from a third country in their textile goods and 
yet qualify for duty-free access to US market. 
80
 For over the past five years, Mauritius has been ranked first on the Mo Ibrahim Index of Good 
Governance. The indicators are: safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable 
economic opportunity and human development.  
81
 The Doing Business survey by the International Finance Corporation ranked Mauritius as 23
rd
 in the 
world and first among the African countries in 2012. This leading position in Africa on this index has 
been withheld by Mauritius since 2008; a period during which it also retained a foothold among the 
top 25 countries in the world for Doing Business.  
82
 The inclusion of this dimension when assessing the advancement of the CSEZA is inspired by the 
case of the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park.  
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83
 Although TISCO, Shanxi Coking Coal and Shanxi Tianli Group invested USD 80million in Shanxi 
JinFei Investment Co. Ltd for it to use in the development of the SEZ in Mauritius, only USD 10million 
was injected in Mauritius JinFei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone Co Ltd at the time of the 
latter’s registration.  
84
 Gao Zhiyi is an employee at TISCO.  
85
 An Export Enterprise Certificate is allocated to a company under the Export Enterprise Scheme. 
With this certificate, the enterprise is allowed a 20 years tax relief period, among other incentives.  
86
 Online records of CT Power Holding Ltd show a different address and its registered activities are 
mining, power production, book printing and book-binding. 
87
 A briefing paper at the Ministry of Housing and Lands (Mauritius) stipulates: "The proposed lease 
agreement provided for the possibility of variation to the present lease agreement thus bringing in a 
degree of flexibility for necessary adjustments and amendments as and when required. Les Salines 
Development Limited has also requested that a Framework Agreement similar to the one entered 
into in respect of the Tianli Project be drawn so that Les Salines Development Project becomes easily 
bankable and financially viable…all off site infrastructural works shall be borne by government up to 
the border of the site. The company shall submit directly its request to the utility providers (CEB and 
CWA) which have already have the mechanism for the required services to be provided".  
88
A consecutive mention of two quotes on the same topic is essential because while the 2008 
declaration of Sithanen was based on the initial agreement signed between the government of 
Mauritius and the Chinese party, the reiteration of the same conditions by Jugnaugth in 2011 
confirms that the conditions remained the same in the new agreement signed in 2009.  
89
 Though the total budget sanctioned for JFET is said to be USD 23.8 million, the sum of the 
earmarked amount for each of the state ratified infrastructural project ratified by the state already 
exceed the budget by USD 2.4 million. 
90
  USD 79.36 million is a shared cost: it is partly a loan from Agence Française de Dévelopement and 
part by the Mauritian government. 
91
 The estimated cost of the project is USD 4 million. Since the project is still under feasibility testing, 
the calculation for additional cost borne by the Mauritian government will not take this amount into 
account. 
92
 Beijing Construction Engineering Group Co. Ltd was initially denied the contract in 2008 on basis of 
its inflated bid (Mauritius, Parliament. 2009, 28 April).   
93
 Approximate route according to the detours specified in RDA Annual Report 2005-2006 (p. 11). 
94
 The unit applied by Mauritius here is perch. 1 perch = 0.0025 hectare. Because the number of 
perch we are dealing with here is minimal, and therefore will not be representative in hectares, I will 
use a smaller unit for smaller expanse of land: square meters (m
2
). 1 perch= 25 m
2 
= 0.0025 hectare. 
95
 The payment to the Riche-Terre planters was provided in form of USD 3850 per arpent. The 
demarcating unit is kept as 0.4 hectare (1 arpent) throughout as opposed to 1 hectare (2.47 arpent) 
because each of the 121 planters occupied 1 arpent.  
96
 Option B: USD 1,143 per 0.4 hectare per year for the period of July 2007 to August 2015, totaling 
up to USD 8,879. 
97
 From the boundary lying south of Rue des Aigles at a distance of 74m measured south along Baie 
du Tombeau Road (B29) to junction of Japonais Road with Pointe aux Piment Mon Choisy Coast 
Road. 
98
 This calculation is on the basis that the JFET site is beyond 81.21m from the high water mark of 
Zone D. Therefore, according to Schedule 2 Part 2 1 (b), it would have benefitted from a 25 per cent 
rebate of the prescribed rent of USD 11,428 per 0.4 hectare per year.  
99
 Original Text: ‘le Premier ministre Navin Ramgoolam émet des réserves et réclame des 
éclaircissements sur certains points du projet Tianli . La raison ? L’ampleur du projet, que le 
gouvernement avait minimisée jusqu’alors. En sus des activités de production industrielle, la 
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Mauritius Tianli Economic and Trade Corporation Zone (MTET) annonce des activités touristiques: la 
construction de deux hôtels, dont un sur la côte dans la région de Baie- du- Tombeau, cause des 
inquiétudes. Le gouvernement n’avait pas prévu céder à Tianli un segment du littoral.’  
100
 CADFund denied being a stakeholder of the Chinese SEZ in Mauritius (Interview with Dongya, 
2011). 
101
 The president of the Riche Terre Mixed Farming Cooperative Society (Interview, 2011) explained 
that they refrained from any explanation to the Court as their legal aid had advised them that their 
plea stood more chances of being accepted by the government if it did not become a legal strife. 
102
 The report calculated the additional support cost coming from FSF and AREU in terms of: land 
preparation (USD 802); upgrade of irrigation network (USD 802); fertilisers and seeds (USD 320); and 
fencing (USD 1,925). 
103
 The share of national income is compromised here because while local manufacturers keep their 
profits in Mauritius itself and usually reinvest the money locally, profits earned by Chinese 
companies will be remitted to China, especially since Mauritius agreed to a zero per cent charge on 
repatriation of profits. 
104
 A similar occurrence was noted in relation to the Ethiopian SEZ shareholders, whereby the CSEZ 
developer—Jiangsu Qiyuan Group Co Ltd—with the support of CADFund, set up the Ethiopian East 
Cement Share company within the zone in 2006. This is despite the fact that Ethiopia already has 
enough cement plants to supply for the demands of the local market and that local producers have 
only recently started exporting cement. 
105
  The Mauritian government opposed the proposed of JFET developers to install a solar power 
plant in the zone.   
106
 For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of the Mauritian investment practices, see 
Cowaloosur, 2014.  
107
 Souvenir manufacturing in JinFei will create difficulties for local souvenir manufacturers who 
consist mostly of women and laid-off workers. Organisations like National Women Entrepreneur 
Council (NWEC) and Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority have specialised 
schemes encouraging unemployed and laid-off workers to opt for such low cost businesses. NWEC 
currently registers 240 handicraft manufacturers. 
108
 This is because given the size of Mauritius, all Mauritians commute to their work place daily and 
do not take up residence at the workplace. 
109
 Mauritian exportation to China is mostly composed of: frozen fish, copper waste and scrap. 
110
 Mauritian imports from China comprise of: cotton fabrics and weaves, cellular phones, parts and 
accessories of machines, yarn, bars, rods, input/output units of computers and aluminium.  
111
 Ruan and Zhang (2008, p.2-3) define Chinese-style clusters as being ‘a production system 
involving numerous enterprises in a certain location engaged in producing a wide range of stages.’ 
With reference to the Zhongguancun High-Tech cluster, Zhou elucidates the impinging aspects of 
Chinese cluster manufacturing. According to the author, clusters allow firms to benefit from services 
and goods that are not available in the local market and they furthermore increase the market 
chances of the firms within the clusters as they create a network hence more client contacts. 
112
  Ghost towns refer to China’s elaborate urban development projects which lie deserted. See, 
Banerji and Jackson (2012).  
113
  Translated as Movement for Self-sustaining Food Security 
114
  Original : ‘Les agriculteurs de Riche-Terre produisaient et fournissaient au marché en gros de 
Port-Louis au moins 20 tonnes de légumes par semaine et contribuaient d’une façon très 
significative à la sécurité alimentaire du pays avant d’être déplacés dans le cadre du projet 
Tianli/JinFei à partir de 2006. Le projet JinFei, s’il se réalise, va couvrir de béton les terres les plus 
riches de l’île afin de répondre aux perspectives et aux impératifs économiques de nos dirigeants et 
du pays.’ 
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115
 Under Qing dynasty, China had to give in to British imperial pressure after the First and Second 
Opium Wars. Instead of restricting foreign trade to the Canton port, it was forced to open up more 
of its ports to allow foreign traders to settle and execute trade.  
116
 According to Wallerstein (1974, p.2), the key features of a semi-periphery are: 1. It differs from 
core and periphery in the kinds of products it exports, its wage levels, and profit margins. While core 
and periphery countries have more to gain from a balanced trade, the semi-periphery countries are 
better-off if they reduce external trade because they can garner more profits by securing their own 
home market to consume the home products. 2. The semi-peripheral countries seek active control of 
both their internal and international market as they cannot rely on only one to bring them profit.  
117
 For example, an injection of Chinese investment into the Zambian mining sector positions China 
as a metropolis in this equation (Zambia holds a DTA with China). Through its Zambian-based 
companies, Chinese private and SOEs may acquire natural resources at reduced cost, at the expense 
of the local Zambian mining companies who could otherwise have exported the minerals to China at 
market rate. Countries with which China holds DTAs are particularly conducive to reinforcing China’s 
status as a metropolis as the fiscal arrangement allows a tax-free repatriation of profits, capital and 
dividends to China.  
118
 China secures a position of metropolis vis-à-vis Africa through infrastructural aid in the following 
way: China gives out infrastructural developmental assistance to Africa in kind rather than in cash. As 
described by Davies et al. (2008), the process is carried out through a method of Export Buyer 
Credits. This method implies that the foreign borrowing party is given a long-term credit account 
through which it can purchase Chinese construction materials. As the website of the responsible 
body, the EXIM Bank of China, outlines, ‘Export Buyer's Credit is mainly extended to finance exports 
of Chinese products, technologies and services as well as overseas construction projects that can 
facilitate Chinese exports of equipment, construction machinery, materials, technical and managerial 
expertise, and labor services’. It is clear from the words on the website that what China aims for here 
is, subjective development at the expense of peripheral underdevelopment. 
119
 Shaoguang Wang discounts one of the few obvious advantages which China benefits from its 
inclusion in the WTO: the acquisition of a permanent Most Favourite Nation (MFN) status from US. 
However, US has been renewing China’s MFN status on a yearly basis for the past 15 years and it was 
unlikely that it would have ended it regardless of whether China joined the WTO or not. 
120
 This observation follows from the words of the US Secretary of Agriculture and of Bill Clinton. 
While the US Secretary of Agriculture said that China got ‘*a+bsolutely nothing’ out of its 
membership to the WTO, Clinton observed that ‘China makes one way concessions to open its 
markets to American goods, services, and farm products … while the United States makes no new 
market access commitments’ at all (Wang, 2000, p. 393).  
121
 In May 2006, UN Security Council decided to send peacekeeping troops to Darfur in order to 
relieve the African Union troops. China, who had been opposing the deployment of troops to Darfur, 
eventually gave in to UN’s decision. This compliance by China came due to incessant pressure from 
Western actors (e.g. US-based Save Darfur Coalition) to boycott the 2008 Beijing Olympics in case 
China did not intervene in Darfur. As a result, China found itself compromising on its ideological 
stance and its established economic goodwill in Sudan. Similarly, in 2012, US and the European 
states, through the UN, endorsed the deployment of economic and trade sanctions on Sudan and 
South Sudan with the aim of restraining conflict for oil border and oil revenue issues. However, 
China, with the support of Russia, opposed this proposition of the UN since it has good trade 
relations with both Sudan and South Sudan, and is the major producer, exporter and importer of 
their oil.  But China could not hold on against US and Europe for long as it gave in because the later 
nominated the African Union to take the forefront in resolving the South Sudan-Sudan border issues.  
  
268 
                                                                                                                                                                            
122
 In October 2010, China and Mauritius agreed to a Renminbi Trade Settlement Solution enabling 
Chinese companies in Mauritius or local traders trading with China, to effectuate their transactions 
in Renminbi through the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation (HSBC). See, HSBC (2010). 
123
 At the 3
rd
 session in 1990, this low interest commodity loan of USD 800,000 was made into an 
interest free loan. 
124
 This loan involved the provision of sports equipment, sewing machines, typewriters and 
expendables by China. 
125
 Commodity credits is where the lender provides goods or services to the borrower, and the 
borrower is due to pay back to the lender, in terms of money or goods, the amount equivalent to the 
goods or services initially provided by the lender. 
126
 Note:  China is here treated as a metropolis entity in its entirety—without granting Chinese 
government the role of the metropolis and the investing companies that of satellites. This is because 
the Shanxi companies developing JFET are mainly SOEs hence technically equalling the metropolis in 
status and abilities vis-à-vis foreigners. Moreover, since the scene unrolls in Mauritius, it is the 
Mauritian context which is the focus. 
127
 Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Co. Ltd, the only private company involved, is discounted here as it is 
the minority partner in the project.  
128
 Even if Mauritius becomes legally eligible to resume possession of the land because it remains 
undeveloped, there is high possibility that the land might already be under the control of a foreign 
bank, pledged by the Chinese developers for loan purposes.  
129
 This explains the absence of an arrow connecting China and the Mauritian state level in Figure 
6.3. 
130
 The geographical hierarchy between the Mauritian state and the Riche-Terre plot is based on the 
fact that the Riche Terre plot is only a portion of the whole which is made up by the Mauritian state. 
As for the economic hierarchy, this refers to the economic disparity which posits JFET as the superior 
of the Mauritian state due to its ability to generate economic gains at the expense of the latter.  
131
 Reference is here being made to actions in phase two as it is the dynamics and structuration of 
this particular phase (rather than the temporal phase one) that will prevail for the rest of the time 
that the zone exist in Mauritius.  
132
 Mauritius has a number of able local construction companies. E.g. General Construction, Gamma 
Civic, PAD Co.Ltd, Rehm Grinaker, Allied Builders, Bhunjun Group, Ireko, Bolah Jeetun etc. 
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